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ABSTRACT
 
Collaborative innovation is growing rapidly, enabled by the internet and the possibili-
ties it offers to share ideas, content, code, and opinions fast and cheaply across the 
globe. It is relevant for business and has caught the minds of management thinkers 
because of the dynamics and promises that distant collaboration and the reuse of 
knowledge entail. Our work, introduced here, has followed three trajectories over the 
last years that can be captured in shorthand as follows: we described phenomena in 
strategy, we followed artifacts (code), and we observed collective action (social prac-
tice). This collection of essays submitted as a habilitation in management science maps 
theses three trajectories of work that capture three essential characteristics of collabo-
rative innovation: its strategic relevance, the technological agenda, and the communal 
work as the social practice. Each of these characteristics can be seen as a perspective 
that opens up fascinating research questions and an agenda for management science to 
be covered in future research. 
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1. INTRODUCTION AND DEFINITION 
Collaborative innovation is defined here as a development process of new and useful products and 
services across and outside firm boundaries. This definition helps to characterize a research agenda for 
organization and management science that takes seriously three central approaches to theory building 
and testing that deserve attention: strategy, technology, and social practice. They deserve particular 
theoretical attention due to the speed of technology development (mostly in information and commu-
nication technologies ICT) and recent developments in our field which point to a shift in theorizing 
towards assessing real life problems and action in the context of their inseparable social and material 
characteristics (Orlikowski and Scott, 2008). First, a brief explanation of the definition, then the three 
approaches, then the justification in terms of theory and relevance.  
Defining collaborative innovation as a development process of new and useful products includes the 
study of user innovation because user innovations are also defined as new and useful independent of 
commercialization and market success (von Hippel, 1988). The definition focuses on an activity over 
time rather than on states and transactions. Collaborative innovation, here, refers to a creation and 
development process involving multiple actors and stakeholders inside and outside of firms who col-
laborate around a specific purpose of generating ideas, concepts, technologies, and solutions for busi-
ness or for their own use. Out of focus moves the market for technology (Arora, Fosfuri and Gam-
bardella, 2001) as well as the similar concept of open innovation (Chesbrough, 2003) because while 
trading licenses and patents enables innovation inside and outside of firms, the process of generating 
and developing ideas is frequently excluded or assumed in that literature.  
Firm boundaries play a critical role in collaborative innovation as defined here. Development proc-
esses span across organizations and include individual actor outside of firms and in networks that in-
clude universities, communities, and partner firms (Allen, 1983; Mowery, 1983; von Hippel, 1988; 
Powell, Koput and Smith-Dorr, 1996; Prandelli and Sawhney, 2000; von Hippel and von Krogh, 
2003). Collaborative innovation has been documented historically as collaborations between inde-
pendent research organizations and manufacturers (Mowery, 1983) and the free exchange of knowl-
edge (techniques, designs, know-how) among firms (Allen, 1983, von Hippel, 1987). Learning is known 
to occur in networks of firms (Powell et al., 1996) and individuals and firms engage in joint develop-
ment activities in private-collective innovation (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003). Firms contribute to 
technology development outside their boundaries over long periods of time by giving away technology 
and participating in development activities (Henkel, 2006; Stuermer, Spaeth and von Krogh, 2009).  
This collection of works highlights three approaches to collaborative innovation that extend into an 
agenda for future research. They are strategy, technology, and social practice. Each approach had 
been tackled with a slightly different set of methodologies and outlook at theory and theory develop-
ment. First, strategy is about enabling collaborative innovation from the perspective of management. It 
is about efficient and feasible ways of collaborating and learning from external users, peers, and con-
sumers and how to organize in order to collaborate. 
Second, technology enables collaboration independent of the actors who are in charge, deploying cer-
tain communication and information infrastructures in their communities or firms. Technology is an 
artifact with the ability to influence and profoundly change the way work is organized (Leonardi, 
2007). Studying collaborative innovation by following the technology means identifying the knowledge 
that enables action, which is code, documentation, designs, text, and much more.  
Third, collaborative innovation as a process refers to a social practice. The social practice turn in the 
field of organization and management science has sharpened our perception of everyday work in con-
text (Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina and Savigny, 2001). Studying the social practices that constitute collabo-
rative innovation means studying the working environment of individuals in communities and firms 
   3 
who engage in discussions and exchanges with other individuals often located at a distance both physi-
cally and organizationally. Understanding why individuals engage and how they build productive, 
creative, sustaining working environments (institutions, routines, relationships) requires novel assump-
tions about motivation and incentives in organizations.  
The first theoretical reason why we should study collaborative innovation is straightforward. ICT has 
changed the life and work environments of almost everyone in the developed and developing world. 
The existent theories that explain how members of organizations collaborate with individuals outside 
the organization usually, up to say 10 years ago, cannot cover the implications of wide-spread social 
software applications or even access to the Internet. This claim needs refinement which I will only 
touch upon lightly in this introduction and refer to the individual papers in this collection to carve out 
the space of their theoretical contribution. However, three warrants stand out: access, speed, and net-
work characteristics of ICT.  
The Internet counts over 2bn users as of March 20111. Individuals with needs and preferences from all 
walks of life can access distributed sources of information and contribute their ideas, designs, pro-
grams, or support. Consider the project Open Source Ecology (OSE)2. Marcin Jakubowski founded 
the rapidly growing network of farmers, engineers and supporters in 2003 with the goal of prototyping 
the fifty basic industrial machines needed for a sustainable civilization with modern comforts in an 
easy, do-it-yourself fashion. Access to the Internet from remote corners of Earth enable farmers every-
where to build their own machines using the OSE blueprints and documentation material, such as 
video tutorials. Twenty years ago, the growth of Open Source software demonstrated that distributed 
software developers organized in online communities in order to download and build on each others’ 
code (Stallman, 1999; Moody, 2001). Thus, explaining how a farmer in Missouri may work together 
with a farmer in Cambodia needs to take into account that both may have access to the same online 
resources.  
Speed of ICT needs to be considered: consumer feedback may come back seconds after product re-
lease just as competing and collaborating groups of crackers race to publish the first illegal copy of a 
newly released game or piece of software (Rehn, 2001). A theory of collaborative innovation needs to 
build on the assumption that content can be shared across the globe instantaneously just as funds can 
be transferred within seconds. In addition to access and speed, ICT offer network characteristics that 
allow individuals to connect to each other in selective and dynamic ways giving rise to what has been 
described as fluidity (Faraj, Jarvenpaa and Majchrzak, 2011). Faraj and colleagues (2011) start and call 
for theory on the organization of dynamic resource flows in knowledge collaboration and characterize 
tensions and generative responses in the organization of collaborative work in online communities. 
The network characteristics of ICT enable individuals and firms to enter and exit networks by con-
tributing and withdrawing resources such as time and passion. Organization and management theory 
stands at the outset of understanding what ICT affords in terms of collaborative innovation.  
The second theoretical warrant for studying collaborative innovation has been supplied by a fruitful 
and rapidly evolving perspective in organization and management theory, broadly known as the prac-
tice turn. Studying innovation means studying processes of generation and experimental and ambigu-
ous action towards a goal that is only partly understood and uncertain from the start. We cannot know 
what we do not know yet. This truism leads to endorsing a perspective in theorizing that can deal with 
complexity, evolving structures and rules, dynamic interactions, and individuals who enact organiza-
tional reality facing ever changing contexts and external forces (Ciborra, 1996; Feldman and Or-
likowski, 2011).  
                                                
1 According to Internet World Stats: http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm 
2 For more information turn to: http://opensourceecology.org/about.php 
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Collaborative innovation generates artifacts and is in turn influenced by the artifacts produced along 
the way. On a fundamental, theoretical level, we follow Leonardi (2011) when suggesting that new 
technologies and new routines are brought about by both human and material agencies. Thus collabo-
rative innovation can be described in terms of the social interactions as well as in terms of the material 
progress and contingencies that co-determine the path innovation takes. In reality, these descriptions 
are inseparable and refer to an entangled whole (Barad, 2003; Orlikowski, 2010) which requires care-
ful theorizing in terms of attention to context, timing, and the materiality of collaborative innovation.  
Lastly, collaborative innovation is practically relevant. Customers of mass customized products are 
willing to pay more when able to design the product themselves (Franke, Schreier and Kaiser, 2010). 
Open source software developed collaboratively over the Internet is used to run 75% of websites glob-
ally and the world’s largest stock exchanges run Linux systems when attempting to reach new records 
in trading speed (King 2010; Vaughn-Nichols 2009). Pharmaceutical companies form research clubs 
with competitors and research institutions that will release their discoveries into the public domain 
while the companies get to influence the research agenda by nominating proteins of potential value to 
their products (Alexy, Criscuolo and Salter, 2009). 
Table 1: Overview of thesis chapters with published articles 
This habilitation thesis is structured according to the logic laid out in Table 1. Each row represents a 
section: strategy, technology, and social practice. By submitting as the thesis a collection of nine articles 
(eight of which published) each section briefly discusses the articles and the research issues emerging 
from each work. The concluding section ties back to this introduction by formulating research ques-
tions that point beyond the articles and working papers to inspire a broader research agenda on col-
laborative innovation.  
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2. STRATEGY 
“Well, we actually, in the first step so we made fun of Sony Vista and so, no not Sony, Microsoft Vista and it’s 
and we realized, oh shoot we’re kind of, we’re harsh about it and it’s one of their clients. So we said, “Oh! Okay 
sorry, sorry guys.”  
Interview with Frank Dellario of The Ill Clan, Brooklyn NY, March 27, 2007
Strategy in collaborative innovation is a fragile affair. The quote above hints at three points about 
collaborative innovation and strategy: the creative potential of users, their disruptive potential to hurt-
ing business, and the fragility of interaction between users and firms when crafting strategy collabora-
tively. This first section on strategy explains crucial aspects of collaborative innovation through the 
difficulties of mutually aligning the interests of creative users with business and vice versa, the strategies 
to build a community of customers and draw on a community of peers, the conditions and fragility of 
initiating mutual sharing of knowledge, and the particular challenges when using social software as a 
means to connect to users and peers outside the firm.  
The first section on strategy contains three essays contextualized here. First, the study of Machinima 
builds on 7 in-depth case studies that revealed a pattern of market entry by user entrepreneurs after 
and while collaborating with peers and learning how to create films using video games. Second, the 
case of the Machinima companies and the study of open source software development revealed the 
critical strategic issue of licenses and incentives that build a fundament for collaborative innovation. 
The experimental study of initiating private-collective innovation demonstrates the fragility of knowl-
edge sharing and paves the way for the third, broader essay in this section. Mutual sharing of knowl-
edge, collaboration that spans organizational boundaries, implies agreement about the benefits of en-
gaging in collaboration. However, underlying successful cases of collaborative innovation between 
firms and communities or individual users are ICT tools that enable value creation and appropriation, 
their acceptance and use in firms, as well as leadership issues. The third essay elaborates on a research 
agenda for strategy and social software and builds a framework to help managers understand strategic 
issues when deploying social software in companies. 
Frank Dellario is one of the fathers of Machinima. Co-founding the Ill Clan in 1997 with Paul Marino, 
Matt Dominianni, and Manu Smith in Brooklyn NY, the clan produced a series of videos that helped 
defined what the genre would become: shooting film inside video games meant taking a video game 
and manipulating its visual appearance and subtracting the interactive nature of the game that it was 
designed for. Frank and Paul re-skinned entire sequences of the game Quake in order to turn a first 
person shooter game, released by ID Software, into a cooking show. Re-skinning refers to the re-design 
of the artwork in the game for characters and scenery to no longer look like soldiers and space stations 
but, in this case, cooks and kitchens. Frank and Paul then went on stage. They used the game to per-
form a talk show in front of live audiences by “playing the game” while speaking over it. The game 
Quake, however, no longer looked like the monster hunting playground set on an alien planet but 
rather like a kitchen. The comical effect was overwhelming. They decided to record sessions and pub-
lish them online. The Ill Clan’s legendary show “Common Sense Cooking with Carl the Cook” was 
born and with it inspiration for numerous other Machinimators who used video games to shoot film 
using various techniques and strategies for reaching an audience and turning their ventures into busi-
nesses.  
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Dellario’s statement quoted above also shows that users may display problematic behavior for compa-
nies. The history of Machinima is fraught with potential and actual cases of copyright infringements 
that are characteristic of the struggle between users and copyright owners when using new technolo-
gies that allow re-using content and the practice of “rip-mix-burn” (Lee, 2008; Depoorter, 2009). In 
addition, defamatory statements are frequent and part of political and humorous expressions online. 
The legal uncertainty and the ease of reusing content may lead to a culture of suspicion between con-
tent owners (frequently firms, video game publishers in the case of Machinima) and creative users. 
Collaborative innovation, however, requires building on each others’ works and respecting each oth-
ers’ positions as ideally business enabling. The company Rooster Teeth Productions, introduced in the 
next section, successfully established a relationship with Bungie, a former subsidiary of Microsoft, to 
use their video game sequels Halo to produce their Machinima series Red vs. Blue. Their collabora-
tion has been ongoing for over nine years due in part to Bungie’s conviction that the publication of the 
film series Red vs. Blue was actually positive for the sale of the video game Halo.  
The achievement of agreement between users and firms for collaborative innovation should not be 
underestimated. Our cases studies in Machinima document widespread anxiety among both users and 
game publishers about the potential harm that could come from using video games in ways unin-
tended by the designers. Machinimators, in turn, fear lawyers blocking the publication of films after 
production. An example of the first case was Electronic Arts (EA), a large game publisher, taking legal 
action to block the publication of a user-created modification of the game Battlefield to take place in 
Iraq. An example of the second case is a Machinimator creating an entire film with the ambition to 
submit it to a film festival and being denied taking part in the competition due to missing legal docu-
ments that could certify that the film did not contain copyrighted material not in the possession of the 
Machinimator. In this case, the video game publisher denied the Machinimator the right to use their 
video game for producing a film after the film had been produced. This unfortunate case illustrates 
painfully how collaborative innovation should not take place: without collaboration.  
Agreement on the terms of reusing content is instrumental for collaborative innovation. Whether con-
tent is freely revealed by one party (Harhoff, Henkel and von Hippel, 2003) or contractually shared 
between two parties (Zhang and Baden-Fuller, 2010; Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004), both strategies 
enable the process of collaborative innovation. The mostly successful cases of collaborative innovation 
in the first essay should not blind our perception of the difficulties of reaching agreement on a funda-
mental level. Knowledge sharing is most beneficial when mutual and this is where the second essay 
takes hold.  
The notion of private-collective innovation (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003) has profoundly influ-
enced how organization theory can make sense of collaborative innovation. The study of private in-
vestments in innovations in firms (Arrow, 1984; Demsetz, 1967) stood apart from the study of invest-
ments in innovations outside of firms, in academia and collective action using public funds (Stephan, 
1996; Olson, 1965). In the former, private investors receive the gains from selling the innovation; in 
the latter the rights to commercialize the innovation are relinquished in the interest of creating a pub-
lic good. The hybrid between the two models describes the situation of private investors relinquishing 
control over their innovations and turning them into public goods. Von Hippel and von Krogh (2003) 
argued that the hybrid model, that they called the model of private-collective innovation, would work 
when private investors perceive greater benefit of revealing their innovations than from keeping it se-
cret. Private-collective innovation could be observed in open source software development and in 
many cases of user innovation. The important empirical question was: when and why would the net 
benefit of revealing outweigh the potential benefits of exclusive appropriation of rents from the innova-
tion? 
One answer to this question involves the process of collaborative innovation. From studies of open 
source software developers it became clear that developers valued the involvement in collaborative 
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innovation in addition to the benefits that the actual, final product offered (Lakhani and Wolf, 2005; 
Spaeth, Haefliger, von Krogh and Renzl, 2008). These benefits include learning from peers, the ability 
to influence the technological agenda of the group of developers, enjoyment, feedback on own work, 
and so on. However, while these findings might explain why developers keep contributing to an ongo-
ing development process it is harder to understand how private-collective innovation could begin. It is 
well known that the reasons for joining a collective action differ from the reasons for continuing be-
cause learning how collaboration works and identifying with the collective endeavor change motiva-
tions and the perception of costs and benefits (Elster, 1986; Shah, 2006). 
Given the difficulty of observing the choice not to join collaborative innovation we faced a methodo-
logical challenge. In open source software development silent observers and users are called lurkers 
(Nonneke and Preece, 2000). Lurkers remain by definition invisible and if they were to respond to any 
form of request they would no longer be lurkers. A recent study of peripheral contributors to collabo-
rative innovation by Setia, Rajagopalan, Sambamurthy and Calantone (2011) found that peripheral 
contributors enhanced and popularized a product, open source software in their case, by contributing 
bug reports and word-of-mouth promotion. Given the impossibility of studying the decision not to 
share knowledge in the field we modeled the incentive structure of this private decision in order to 
observe the behavioral consequences of the individual, private decision. The laboratory study revealed 
sharing in cases where no sharing would have been expected and fragility in terms of opportunity 
costs.  
The third essay on strategy formulates a framework that both cautions against simplistic visions of 
collaborative innovation and calls for more research on the tools employed to enable collaborative 
innovation. Both issues are of critical strategic relevance. Under the topic ‘Social Software and Strat-
egy’ the essay explores a specific growing family of ICT tools: social software is receiving considerable 
attention from managers and investors due to, for example, the considerable successes of initial public 
offerings of companies based on services offered within their own or others’ social software networks, 
such as LinkedIn. Zynga, a publisher of online games that use Facebook as the equivalent to a gaming 
console, has raised enormous expectations only to see their growth rate slow down again and estab-
lished game producers such as EA catching up3. 
First, the risk of simplistic metaphors among strategists may cloud their perception of the real chal-
lenges when introducing social software tools within and across their firm boundaries. In online com-
munities, users frequently rely on social software to organize their work and “develop a life of their 
own” (Wiertz and de Ruyter, 2007: 390) deciding which relationships to build and when to judge 
company interventions as obtrusive. Partners in collaborative innovation may emerge among consum-
ers, users, suppliers or even competitors. When consumers become co-developers in product design 
(Fuchs and Schreier, 2011) their power over strategic decisions may increase for good or worse. The 
metaphors of “harnessing” the creativity of the crowd and so on may blind out the potentially disrup-
tive impact empowered users may exert on the firm.  
The potential disruption of organizational routines and structures stems from the fact that the perspec-
tive from inside the firm may not necessarily converge with a perspective from outside the firm. While 
differing perspectives are a business reality, collaborative innovation may float them unexpectedly. 
The reason for this is that ICT has the capacity to change the way users seek and access and distribute 
information (Kling and Scacchi, 1982; Markus, 1983; Leonardi, 2007; 2008). In addition, when build-
ing a community designed for collaborative innovation membership is unpredictable and the members 
may be unknown to the sponsor or gatekeeper of the community (West and O’Mahony, 2005).  
                                                
3 According to the Wall Street Journal, Sept 21, 2011: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903703604576585570928213398.html 
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Second, a strategy for collaborative innovation calls for detailed insights on how to use tools such as 
social software. A new study by Jarvenpaa and Lang (2011) calls for attention to boundary manage-
ment when a firm sponsors a community or builds a platform for collaborative innovation. Openness 
and control represent a trade-off closely linked to the boundaries that online communities share with 
the firm. Issues such as power, identity, and competence should be taken into consideration at the 
same time when making boundary decisions. The authors highlight the notion of “generative capac-
ity” which enables knowledge collaboration in online communities and responses to tensions inherent 
in organizations characterized by unpredictable membership fluctuation and dynamic rather than 
contractually secured resource commitments (see also Faraj et al., 2011). 
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We inductively develop a model of the commercialization process for new products or services 
user entrepreneurs undertake when entering an industry while drawing on proprietary tech-
nology developed in another industry. Extending the growing field of user entrepreneurship, 
we identify a two-phase approach to industry entry by user entrepreneurs who start “under the 
radar” of incumbent firms, gain experience, attract a first potential customer base, and then, in 
a second phase, engage in commercialization. During this process, a community of fellow users 
is of major importance for the entrepreneur, serving as a knowledge pool for skills development 
and experimentation with different commercialization paths. We study a nascent group of 
firms founded by users of video games who became entrepreneurs on entering the animation 
industry by producing Machinima, a new film genre characterized by shooting film in video 
games. We explain how user entrepreneurs gain access to complementary assets (video games) 
for their new use (shooting film), how they deal with intellectual property issues when using 
other firms’ assets, and how user entrepreneurs combine domain knowledge about film pro-
duction with their experience in video games and the art of Machinima. Our propositions hold 
implications for management and policy. 
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INTRODUCTION
Entrepreneurship, conventionally understood, is 
a process where opportunity recognition precedes 
prototype development (Venkataraman, 1997; 
Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). In the case of 
user entrepreneurship, however, this process is 
reversed: users first develop prototypes and, while 
using and gaining experience with the new de-
sign, recognize a potential for commercialization 
of their product4 or service (Shah and Tripsas, 
2007). Thus, user entrepreneurship can be seen 
as taking a position within a standing debate in 
entrepreneurship theory about the discovery or 
creation of opportunities (Alvarez and Barney, 
2005, 2007; Sarasvathy, 2001, 2004) by describ-
ing entrepreneurial opportunities as created in 
use. Generally showing traits of user innovators 
(von Hippel, 1988), user entrepreneurs derive 
their designs from existing products or technolo-
gies. If commercial value is created in a different 
industry from that in which the original product 
was located, we should expect new challenges 
connected to technology diffusion and knowledge 
recombination (Geroski, 2000). The aim of this 
paper is to fill a gap in the fast growing literature 
on user entrepreneurship, by theorizing about the 
process of user entrepreneurship as users move 
from one industry to another in order to com-
mercialize. User entrepreneurs face low opportu-
nity costs and exhibit a high willingness to ex-
periment and high potential to explore commer-
cial opportunities by entering existing markets or 
creating new ones, especially when the target 
markets are turbulent and demand is uncertain 
(Shah and Tripsas, 2007). Usually embedded in a 
community of users with similar needs, user en-
trepreneurs operate under favorable conditions: 
the community plays a vital role in diffusing new 
designs while user entrepreneurs are granted 
early access to feedback and information relevant 
to commercialization prior to firm foundation 
(Shah and Tripsas, 2007).  
Examples of user entrepreneurship have been 
studied in the fields of sporting equipment 
(Baldwin et al., 2006; Luthje et al., 2005; Franke 
and Shah, 2003) and juvenile products (Shah and 
Tripsas, 2007). Both fields present cases where 
                                                
4  To reduce complexity throughout the paper, we use the 
term “product” to refer to products, technologies, or 
processes. 
commercialization occurred in the industry in 
which the original user activity took place. In the 
case of juvenile products, dissatisfied parents in-
novated more sophisticated designs, like a stroller 
that can be used while jogging, which they even-
tually commercialized after other parents became 
aware of its superior performance. In the case of 
rodeo kayaking, users redesigned kayaks to better 
perform under extremely challenging conditions. 
In either case, user entrepreneurs developed new 
concepts on the back of existing products. They 
demonstrated and promoted their designs in 
competitions. In scanning for products that satis-
fied their needs prior to developing their own, 
user entrepreneurs gained familiarity with the 
general market structure and the competitive 
environment of their industry.  
Products and services are fungible in their appli-
cation. They can be modified, developed, or re-
interpreted to be used as a tool or basis for new 
products in another context (Faulkner and 
Runde, 2009; von Hippel, 1988). User entrepre-
neurs may shift the use activity from one industry 
to another or, to put it differently, diffuse tech-
nology across industries through different use (cf. 
Rogers, 1962). Research has so far neglected this 
important aspect: user entrepreneurs who de-
velop products based on assets from one industry, 
which they apply as complementary assets in the 
industry where they commercialize. Based on a 
study of the Machinima phenomenon, a new 
animation genre, and a sample of firms started by 
users, we develop a new process model of user 
entrepreneurship across industries. The firms in 
our sample apply video games as production 
technology for animation and commercialize 
their films via online distribution or DVD sales in 
the animation production industry, a subdivision 
of the motion picture industry. In the 1990s, user 
innovators started to record their game play and 
introduced recording technology to video games, 
transforming their use (Faulkner and Runde, 
2009). With the publication of the first Ma-
chinima films, shot in video games, the technol-
ogy became amenable to story telling that ex-
tended beyond the story elements contained in 
the game. User entrepreneurs publish animated 
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shorts5 using video games as production technol-
ogy and create opportunities to commercialize 
from their experience with Machinima. Figure 1 
shows the process of user entrepreneurship in two 
phases as we observe and develop it in this paper, 
where an initial user innovation in industry A 
enables user entrepreneurs to enter industry B, in 
a first phase, under the radar of incumbents and, 
in a second phase, to commercialize animated 
shorts based on the new use of a technology from 
industry A. For example Rooster Teeth Produc-
tions, a Machinima firm in our sample, made use 
of the game Halo, produced by Micro-
soft/Bungie, to create a Machinima franchise6 
called Red vs. Blue under which they publish 
episodes online. Based on their experience and 
audience gained, they subsequently sold DVDs, 
sponsorship access, and merchandising.  
Products, goods, or services are usually sold or 
licensed under conditions that restrict their use or 
application, such as enduser license agreements 
(EULAs). User entrepreneurs drawing on existing 
products experience use restrictions as obstacles 
to commercialization. Relying on third party 
assets complicates commercialization; intellectual 
property rights attached to either modified prod-
ucts or assets remain with the original producer 
and create legal uncertainty for the user entre-
                                                
5  Animated shorts are the predominant products while 
(feature) films appeared rarely, especially early on. 
Throughout this paper, we use the terms film, animation, 
and shorts interchangeably. 
6  Walt Disney pioneered this marketing concept evoking 
various sources of revenue based on their characters 
(Wasko et al., 1993; Yoon and Malecki, 2009). 
preneur (Depoorter, 2009). Companies holding 
the IP of products affected by such user activity 
may show tolerance toward the application of 
their assets (Harhoff et al., 2003); otherwise, per-
mission may be granted through a variety of 
means, such as research exemption in the field of 
science (O’Rourke, 2000; Strandburg, 2008), fair 
use under US copyright law, or the growing prac-
tice of (informal) unauthorized use of copyright 
material (Lee, 2008).  
While firms in the industry where the original 
user activity was located (industry A) may apply 
and enforce patents or copyright to secure profits 
in their home market, they might adopt a more 
lenient position toward others’ exploitation of 
these assets in industries where they do not com-
pete (industry B), especially given the high cost 
and effort of monitoring and enforcing intellec-
tual property rights (Lie-
beskind, 1996). Hence, 
firms may be willing to 
share selectively and 
tolerate the application 
of specific assets that are 
core to their “home” 
market but complemen-
tary in other markets, 
and so provide user en-
trepreneurs with a 
foundation to 
commercialize.   
The knowledge needed 
to commercialize in an-
other industry’s markets 
may extend beyond the 
knowledge acquired in 
use and, possibly, be-
yond the experience available through the com-
munity of users (Baldwin et al., 2006). Domain 
knowledge important to commercialization in-
cludes market-relevant education and experience, 
production techniques, work flows and processes, 
insights about genres and market demand, and 
industry-specific marketing knowledge. We study 
commercialization by user entrepreneurs outside 
the industry where the products they use origi-
nated. This offers new insights into tolerance 
toward application of IP, opportunity creation by 
user entrepreneurs in new industries with frag-
mented markets, and community support across 
industries. The particular mix of competition, 
versatility of commercialization-relevant assets 
across industries, intellectual property rights, and 
the role of knowledge acquisition raises an impor-
Figure 1: Process of user entrepreneurship in two phases 
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tant question that we address in this paper: Un-
der what conditions do users, who apply (selec-
tively shared proprietary) assets from one indus-
try, commercialize in markets of another industry 
(thus becoming user entrepreneurs)?  
We examine this question in the motion picture 
industry, which represents an ideal context to 
study user entrepreneurship, considering Shah 
and Tripsas’ (2007) proposition that markets with 
high turbulence and demand uncertainty favor 
user entrepreneurship: besides a huge main-
stream market for theatrical film production, 
several niche markets within the industry are in a 
state of revolt due to technological advances. 
Today, major studios show little interest in pro-
viding content for the Internet even though there 
is excess demand for it and customers are willing 
to pay. Industry analysts have commented that 
the low profitability of the Internet market, com-
pared to their mainstream business, has meant 
that major studios have missed the opportunity to 
develop sustainable business models to serve on-
line customers (Papies and Clemet, 2008). This 
neglect may prove critical as the Internet is gain-
ing in importance as an outlet for media content 
(Scott, 2004; Yoon and Malecki, 2009). Further-
more, it is still unknown whether theatrical and 
non-theatrical outlets substitute or complement 
each other (Eliashberg et al., 2006). “The devel-
opment of new delivery systems will in principle 
open up the market to more effective contestation 
by smaller independent film production and dis-
tribution companies (cf. Leyshon, 2001). Thus, 
the eventual attainment of film distribution by 
means of the Internet will no doubt give rise to a 
great increase in the amount of cinematic mate-
rial available to consumers, thereby widening the 
market and almost certainly making inroads on 
blockbuster audiences” (Scott, 2004: 58).  
The motion picture industry can expect to see 
new entrants from the video game industry since 
both industries show similar characteristics and 
boundaries are blurring (Calantone et al., 2010; 
Eliashberg et al., 2006; Yoon and Malecki, 2009). 
The animation industry is probably the closest 
link to the video game industry, in that both 
share substantial talents (Aoyama and Izushi, 
2003; Izushi and Aoyama, 2006). With the in-
creasing digitalization of the value chain, entry 
barriers to the animation industry are lowering, 
enabling everyone with a personal computer to 
participate (Eliashberg et al., 2006). Internet and 
animation production technologies overlap (Brit-
ton et al., 2009). Producing animated shorts is 
considered a point of entry for small studios that 
might later attract a growing audience. Being 
able to shift among markets means that these 
animation studios can eventually move into fea-
ture films, as AKOM demonstrated with The 
Simpsons (Yoon and Malecki, 2009).  
Our study extends work on user entrepreneurship 
by defining core constructs and explaining the 
commercialization patterns of users who create or 
enter new markets in different industries. Effec-
tual strategies that assume that opportunities 
emerge when created by an entrepreneur have 
been positively associated with venture perform-
ance (Read et al., 2009). We pay special attention 
to the strategies users follow to remedy legal un-
certainty when applying borrowed assets, the new 
knowledge they need to acquire, and the support 
they receive from their community of peers. 
Based on case studies, we inductively generate a 
model describing key elements of the strategies 
user entrepreneurs follow when commercializing 
products or services in new and economically 
relevant markets.  
After introducing our research design, we de-
scribe the relevant cases and present the results of 
our study in the form of descriptive propositions. 
We conclude with a discussion of our findings, 
the implications for research, management, and 
policy, and outline a future research agenda for 
user entrepreneurship and strategy.
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SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
Machinima offered an ideal context to explore 
the research question of this paper because (1) 
user entrepreneurs could be observed entering 
the animation industry7 over the past ten years  
while the genre was in the process of emerging; 
(2) the animation industry was traditionally char-
acterized by high entry barriers, leading to “crea-
tive” entry strategies; (3) Machinima production 
involves proprietary software as well as artwork, 
allowing a nuanced observation of how users 
manage IP conflicts; (4) users frequently possess 
advanced gaming skills but need to acquire film 
production knowledge to sustain a business in the 
target industry; and (5) users display high vari-
ance in their entrepreneurial approaches over 
time, ranging from product sales to diversification 
into consulting, software development, and online 
services.8 
Our research comprised three phases: case sam-
pling, data gathering, and data analysis. We con-
ducted a multiple, non-embedded case study 
(Yin, 2003), and gathered data from seven firms 
within the Machinima community representing 
the entire population of Machinima-based busi-
nesses at the time of this study. We follow an 
inductive logic to theorize about industry entry 
and market fragmentation by user entrepreneurs 
and generate propositions derived from the cases 
(Cohen, 1980; Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007; Glaser and Strauss, 1967; 
Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Theory development 
on a small sample size has been discussed by 
March et al. (1991), Eisenhardt (1989), and Sig-
gelkow (2007), while exemplary works with the 
methodology include Vaughn (1990), Lawrence 
et al. (2002), and Pervez et al. (2008). Eisenhardt 
(1989: 545) proposes “a number between four 
and ten cases to usually work well” and allows for 
                                                
7 According to the International Standard Industrial 
Classification of All Economic Activities, Rev.4 (ISIC), 
software game development (6201) belongs to another 
industry than motion picture production and distribution 
(5911, 5912, 5913, and 6020, respectively). The first two 
digits are sometimes used to denote a specific industry. 
(See Farjoun, 1994, for a discussion of the relatedness of 
industries in terms of knowledge, an aspect we use to 
define complementary assets and show the market entry.) 
8 A number of publications (Marino, 2004; Morris et al., 
2005; Hancock & Ingram, 2007) cover the topic of 
Machinima for the general reader. 
sufficient complexity without creating too much 
data. Such a sample size allows researchers to 
describe and analyze the cases in a systematic 
and methodical manner, leading to thorough 
contextual interpretation.  
2.1. Sample  
The production of animated films used to be 
restricted to media professionals who could afford 
the expensive software packages needed. These 
restrictions led users in the animation industry to 
produce films with games, inspired by innovative 
gamers who developed methods to record their 
game play. Such games are relatively cheap com-
pared to traditional production tools. In addition, 
most of the in-game assets, like characters and 
landscapes that resemble actors and scenes, are 
already available, thus reducing overall produc-
tion cost and time.9 
Defined as “shooting film in a real-time 3D envi-
ronment” (AMAS, see footnote 6), Machinima is 
(1) a production technology, and  
(2) the name for the genre. It is deeply rooted in 
the gaming culture where gamers, early on, expe-
rienced the need to record, edit, and distribute 
proof of their gaming skills on film to demon-
strate their proficiency as gamers. Adding story 
elements to their films (FK—see Appendix for full 
names and affiliation of interview partners), Ma-
chinima users in the animation industry later 
introduced a new genre that can be clearly dis-
tinguished from traditional animation (Mezias 
and Mezias, 2000; Peretti and Negro, 2007) 
when they produced low-cost films for themselves 
or close friends (Morris et al., 2005). The unique 
characteristics of the Machinima production 
process enabled users to become entrepreneurs, 
applying gaming technology in the animation 
industry as well as related industries, like film 
distribution and production support. The cases in 
our sample cover all aspects of the product devel-
opment and commercialization process.  
                                                
9 Estimates of costs alone show that Machinima production 
amounts to a fraction of animation production. See also 
an article by the BBC 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/7045018.stm 
(October 26, 2007). 
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Every important step in the history of Machinima 
was initiated and conducted by users who played 
games and experimented with the Machinima 
production technology. Some of these users went 
on to form firms, including Rooster Teeth Pro-
ductions, the ILL Clan, Strange Company, Ma-
chinima.com, Bong + Dern, and Fountainhead 
Entertainment. Table 1 provides an overview of 
the samples in this study.  
Interviewees brought these seven firms, which we 
later identified as the population, to our attention 
as predominant examples of Machinima-based 
commercialization. Thus, we defined “successful” 
Machinima firms according to informants (Brown 
and Eisenhardt, 1997). All seven firms had pro-
duced Machinima films and won at least one 
award at an AMAS Film Festival.10 Three started 
by producing animation and continued to do so; 
another three altered their sources of revenue 
after having produced Machinima; and one firm, 
Machinima.com, started producing animation 
                                                
10 A film festival held by the Academy of Machinima Arts 
and Sciences (AMAS) 
later on to supplement their portfolio. Thus, all 
firms once entered the animation industry. Of the 
three firms that altered their sources or revenue, 
one chose to turn away from Machinima. We 
conducted literal and theoretical replication (Yin, 
2003) by considering firms with operations in the 
animation industry as well as firms that devel-
oped alternative sources of revenue different 
than, but still based on, the Machinima produc-
tion experience. The fact that user entrepreneurs 
show a tendency to display their capabilities at 
championships (Baldwin et al., 2006), like the 
annual AMAS Film Festival, provides further 
confidence that our sample covers the entire 
population at the time of data gathering.  
Within the community, the visibility of Strange 
Company, the ILL Clan, and Machinima.com 
was extraordinarily high due to their involvement 
in the formation of Machinima. Rooster Teeth 
Productions was the prime example of a firm that 
generates revenues solely from the production of 
films and related products common to this indus-
try. Fountainhead Entertainment used to be a 
Machinima pioneer in producing animation as 
Table 2: Sample of firms for the cases 
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well as supplying a production tool.11 It originally 
focused on a Machinima-centered business and 
then refocused its activities on mobile phone 
games. Short Fuze first released the film Desert 
Combat: James Bond—No License in 2004; 
later, Matt Kelland and Dave Lloyd wrote the 
first book describing Machinima for the general 
reader (Morris et al., 2005). As a result of techni-
cal problems experienced during the production 
of their film and their observation of the commu-
nity’s needs, Short Fuze began to develop Movi-
estorm, an easy-to-use Machinima production 
tool, for which they received £450,000 in seed 
funding in 2005, followed by a first round of 
funding of £950,000 in 2007. This Spartan Life, 
produced by Bong + Dern productions, is an 
award-winning virtual talk show that received 
substantial publicity because of its high-profile 
guests from game companies.  
Although the Electric Sheep Company (ESC) 
hired the workforce of the ILL Clan in 2007, we 
regard the ILL Clan as a separate entity in our 
sample for three reasons: (1) the ILL Clan had 
been producing Machinima since 1997, that is, 
for most of our observation period;  
(2) the founders retained their brand and contin-
ued to make their existing and new animation 
products available under this label; and (3) the 
group continued to produce Machinima for ESC, 
which operated in virtual worlds such as Second 
Life.  
The resulting sample combines all incorporated 
Machinima businesses that were at least a year 
old. Their common denominator is the entry of 
its founders into the animation industry as Ma-
chinima users at one point in time, ultimately 
leading to commercialization. The firms differ in 
terms of their commercialization activities, fi-
nancing, size, age, ambitions, and goals. We also 
included one firm that discontinued its Ma-
chinima-related revenue source.  
2.2. Data gathering  
Data gathering took place in five phases, includ-
ing both real-time observations and retrospective 
data (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1997). Desk re-
search delivered insights on how the user com-
munity defined itself, who participated, the mo-
tives of the different users, and (most importantly) 
                                                
11 Machinimation is a real-time 3D filmmaking software 
add-on representing a dedicated solely to Machinima. 
modification (mod) of id Software’s Quake III Arena. 
active firms as well as those that had ceased op-
eration. Understanding the phenomenon helped 
us establish more effective relations with key in-
formants. Hosting Machinima films, we retrieved 
plenty of information from community websites12 
including the names of the producer, the director, 
and the year of publication. Moreover, some of 
the films and credit files provided information 
about the production process, individuals, and 
firms involved. Altogether, we read 32 articles, 
studied a 340-page report on the video game 
industry, watched more than 100 short films, and 
browsed roughly 50 web pages to gain a thor-
ough understanding of the phenomenon (for the 
use of rich information sources, see Vaughan, 
1990).  
Second, one of the authors participated in a four-
day Machinima workshop to conduct field obser-
vations and build relations with the Machinima 
community. The workshop covered the entire 
Machinima production process and the author 
created a film to gain first-hand experience of the 
process.  
Third, in November 2006, we identified inter-
viewees from a variety of backgrounds and began 
semi-structured interviews. This approach al-
lowed us to react to replies and adapt the ques-
tions to a candidate’s profile. We usually started 
the interview with questions about an individual’s 
background and education to decide later on 
whether the interviewee was an objective ob-
server or a key informant on a topic. The initial 
set of questions, based mainly on desk research, 
was tested during the workshop. The question-
naire was subsequently refined and tailored to the 
specific background of each interviewee, based 
on information taken from online résumés or 
previous interviews.  
Fourth, before entering the second round of in-
terviews we analyzed our preliminary results. 
Having a general understanding of Machinima 
and the community that supported it, we focused 
on user entrepreneurs, some of their legal advi-
sors, user innovators who played an important 
role during the development of Machinima—
people who provided valuable background in-
formation, and finally games companies to com-
plement the picture. From February to March 
2007 we completed seven interviews, one face-to-
face, and another six conducted by telephone (see 
                                                
12 Such as www.Machinima.com, www.mprem.com 
(Machinima Premiere) or www.gamevideos.com. 
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Table A2 in the Appendix for a full list and de-
scription of interview partners).  
Fifth, another author travelled to New York and 
Texas and conducted a total of ten interviews 
and participant observation during a week on site 
with Rooster Teeth Productions, the ILL Clan, 
Fountainhead, and an ESC representative. Daily 
records of working routines, the Machinima pro-
duction process, and other office tasks were kept; 
notes were taken while attending meetings, lunch, 
and evening events (Brown and Eisenhardt, 
1997). Five formal interviews were conducted, 
three of which were recorded on video for later 
analysis and classroom use. In addition, more 
than 100 photographs of Machinima working 
environments were taken during the field trip.  
In total we conducted 25 interviews, 21 in Eng-
lish and four in German, each lasting 55 min on 
average. We transcribed 19 interviews (20–30 
pages each) verbatim. In addition, we cross-
checked relevant information with other inter-
view data or facts from desk research incorporat-
ing external links and comments in the text.  
2.3. Data analysis  
We compiled individual case studies, based on 
the data gathered from the five phases. First, 
bearing in mind the process of traditional user 
entrepreneurship from existing literature, the 
data were prescreened to derive a common cod-
ing scheme (see Appendix). Our interviewees’ 
frequent and unexpected references to IP issues 
and legal uncertainty indicated that the entire 
process of commercialization was greatly influ-
enced by the legal aspects of game engine use. 
Hence, we considered relevant literature in this 
field to support the coding scheme.  
A rough sketch of what industry entry involved 
supported us in describing the phenomenon to 
interviewees. We then coded the transcribed in-
terviews using MAXQDA, a software tool for 
text analysis. While analyzing the interviews, we 
coded statements in the text, which allowed us to 
sort and evaluate information. Two researchers 
working in parallel conducted the coding. After 
the initial coding, results were merged and the 
second coder recoded selected interviews, con-
Table 3: Overview of propositions and grounding in cases 
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tributing to inter-coder reliability.  
Applying an iterative process with an overlap of 
data analysis and data collection (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Glaser and Strauss, 1967), we used the 
distilled interview data, including the codes and 
the higher code categories (e.g.: 2 Domain 
knowledge, 2.1 Education, 2.2 Work experience, 
2.3 Prior film production), as well as secondary 
information, to refine our case studies by gather-
ing additional data whenever gaps were identified 
during coding. We evaluated the interview data 
and compared coding of key informants (e.g., 
director) with objective observers’ (e.g., lawyer) 
views where applicable. We triangulated the find-
ings from the interviews with our observation 
records (Pettigrew, 1988), independent informa-
tion gathered from the Internet, image, and video 
material, and third-party newspaper articles. We 
produced detailed case write-ups for each firm to 
cope with the magnitude of data. While structur-
ing and analyzing the within-case data, we 
checked whether information depicting every 
construct was obtained for each case. This led us 
to drop one early construct but to formulate an-
other, enabling further consolidation of the cod-
ing scheme. The final case study write-ups facili-
tated the comparison of all ventures’ positions in 
terms of user entrepreneurship. Searching for 
cross-case patterns enabled us to extract the gen-
eral sequence of actions users followed to com-
mercialize their products or services as well as to 
identify the different stakeholders or stakeholder 
groups involved in the different phases of the 
commercialization process (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Based on the flow of actions, we derived five 
propositions and drew up a table summarizing 
the findings for each (see Table 2). To enhance 
construct validity, all propositions were compared 
and discussed in the light of the existing litera-
ture. The maintenance of individual case studies 
during the analysis supported replication across 
firms. A final working paper was sent to all in-
formants for comments and feedback, which 
were integrated with the text.  
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TOWARD A PROCESS MODEL OF INDUSTRY ENTRY BY USER ENTREPRENEURS 
In this section we present findings on how, in the 
case of Machinima, users become entrepreneurs 
who commercialize their products or services 
based on assets from another industry in a two-
phase process. We inductively develop a model 
from the cases and formulate five propositions 
(Table 2) to explain user entrepreneurs’ behavior 
and the consequences of their activities (Fig. 2, 
explained throughout the text). We emphasize 
the interactions between user entrepreneurs and 
firms that selectively share complementary assets, 
between user entrepreneurs and their community 
of peers who exchange knowledge about the ap-
plication of complementary assets, and between 
user entrepreneurs and talent from the motion 
picture industry to acquire domain knowledge. 
First, we describe the context of industry entry, 
which occurred in two phases.  
3.1. Under the radar of incumbent firms: a 
two-phase process of industry entry  
The first phase of industry entry consists of a 
lateral move from one industry to another under 
the radar of incumbents: When first applying 
video games as tools to produce animated shorts, 
users emerged from the domain of the video 
game industry to enter and become producers in 
the animation industry where they used games as 
alien production tools—most of them continuing 
to be avid gamers. Neither companies in the 
video game nor in the animation industry paid 
attention to or followed the activities of these 
“hobbyists” who operated on a very small scale of 
product development (cp. Depoorter, 2009), 
which we consider under the radar. At the same 
time, video game companies were harsh with 
users who altered or modified video games re-
gardless of the scope of modifications or their 
commercial intention (AC, CB). The same holds 
true for film production companies that saw their 
media assets re-used and or distributed over the 
Internet.  
The following quote from Geoff Ramsey (GR) 
illustrates how the founders of Rooster Teeth 
started out to reach an audience from a spare-
time activity and moved on to a full-time activity, 
following the success they achieved in terms of 
audience and attention received.  
“Initially we worked in Burnie’s spare room in Burnie’s 
house. And it was a small room [...] and it wasn’t so 
bad when we were just Burnie and I. But you know, two 
people turning into five people in a room that’s maybe 
[...] 250 square feet became pretty cramped, and at some 
point Red vs. Blue [...] became successful enough, where 
I quit the day job and devoted full time to Red vs. Blue. 
Burnie eventually did it as well.” (GR)  
While one might argue that users are not located 
in a specific industry without commercialization, 
they nonetheless produce and distribute anima-
tion. This compares to cases of open source soft-
ware, where no commercial intentions may exist 
but where market share of incumbent software 
companies is affected. Geoff Ramsey’s anecdote 
provides a typical illustration of the transition 
from phase one to phase two.  
“Machinima was a very cheap way to produce animation 
or, you know, any kind of narrative, but as it becomes 
more popular the cost increases. And, unfortunately, the 
more popular you are the more money you generate ...[and 
the more] bandwidth you’re paying for people to be able 
to watch your series. ...So we were always looking for 
ways to help offset costs. So, I reckon June of 2003, this 
is around episode 12 of Red vs. Blue, I put a thread in 
the forums: I said, if I made a Red vs. Blue T-shirt, just 
a white T-shirt with a logo on it, would you be interested 
in buying it? And the response was overwhelming. And so 
I made a T-shirt and people bought it.” (GR)  
In phase two, user entrepreneurs experimented 
with various ways to commercialize their ideas. 
Rooster Teeth introduced merchandising to help 
offset costs, besides DVD sales, an increasingly 
popular revenue window in the motion picture 
industry in times when box office sales do not 
suffice to break even provided the production 
costs (Eliashberg et al., 2006; Wasko et al., 1993; 
Yoon and Malecki, 2009). Table 1 summarizes 
the activities undertaken by the firms in our sam-
ple during under-the-radar entry to the anima-
tion industry (phase one) and first opportunity 
recognition and commercialization strategies 
(phase two).  
It is important to note that the user entrepreneurs 
were the producers as well as the distributors, 
exhibitors, and the licensees of their own mer-
chandise—roles usually separated along the value 
chain or at least split into various subdivisions of 
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corporate groups in the motion picture industry. 
Thus, user entrepreneurs in our case entered 
several related industries subsequently based on 
potential business opportunities they recognized 
during display of their core product, the Ma-
chinima films.  
Wendy Selzer (WS), of Brooklyn Law School, 
explained the critical legal situation in which user 
entrepreneurs found themselves when entering 
phase two. Here, their foremost concern is the 
uncertainty regarding a potential legal dispute 
with the game companies:  
“They typically ask that question when they’re trying to 
do ... when they move from the non-commercial into the 
commercial space because another of the factors in the fair 
use inquiry is whether your use is commercial or non-
commercial as well as that somebody is far less likely to 
sue you if you’re just doing non-commercial. Or at once 
you start making money that they see it as something that 
they might be getting a cut of. So at that point, you see 
more of them [user entrepreneurs] asking the question.” 
(WS)  
Operating within uncertain legal boundaries, 
resulting from the copyright restrictions that 
came with the video games, made access to dis-
tribution channels anything but easy. TV net-
works exerted pressure on user entrepreneurs by 
passing on the legal clarification regarding copy-
right infringement (WS). User entrepreneurs in 
our sample (AK, MK, CB, PM) reported having 
experienced conservative reactions to Machinima 
from industry incumbents such as TV networks 
and film studios. This negative attitude meant 
they had either to seek alternative sources of 
revenue or obtain explicit 
permission from IP holders.  
3.2. Asset holders’ prefer-
ence for selective sharing 
of proprietary assets (in-
dustry A)  
Dependency on video 
games as complementary 
assets for animation produc-
tion (see Teece, 1986) com-
plicated industry entry by 
user entrepreneurs for a 
number of reasons. Game 
engines (movements in 3D 
space, sound, artificial intel-
ligence, look-and-feel, etc.) 
and artwork (settings, scen-
ery, characters, skins, textures) represent signifi-
cant investments by companies in the game in-
dustry. Copyright law and EULAs protect these 
assets, prohibiting any (commercial) application 
of the acquired video game or the artwork that 
comes with it. These copyright agreements made 
it difficult if not impossible for user entrepreneurs 
to sell their Machinima films directly (see also 
Marino, 2004; Hancock and Ingram, 2007). Fred 
von Lohmann (FvL), IP lawyer at the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation, clarified the difference in 
copyright for the two main components of a 
game, the engine and the assets. While copyright 
on the assets is closely defined and attributed to 
the creator, the output generated by the game 
engine is far from easy to classify and thus vul-
nerable to lawsuits, giving user entrepreneurs 
little leeway to negotiate with distributors:  
“I’m sure a game company would say, ‘We own copy-
rights in all of the graphics that comprise the game, so the 
character designs, the textures, the landscape arrange-
ments,’ you know, all of the graphical elements. I’m sure 
they would claim that there’s a copyright there, and they 
may also argue that they have a copyright in the engine 
and the output of the engine is, you know, therefore a 
derivative work. I think that is a more far-fetched argu-
ment, that argument would quickly lead to the conclusion 
that Microsoft owns everything that is produced with 
Microsoft Word, and I think that argument is far fetched 
but, again, it’s not inconceivable. So those are the two 
elements that are most likely to arise in a copyright dis-
pute: the graphical objects themselves and then the actual 
...the algorithm—the engine that puts it all together.” 
(FvL)  
Figure 2: Process model of commercialization by user entrepreneurs across 
industries 
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Using games for animation production thus re-
quires user entrepreneurs to gain legal access to 
the pertaining assets. Chris Burke of Bong + 
Dern explained his approach to third-party IP as 
reaching an agreement with the game company 
to avoid any risk, despite incurring high transac-
tion costs originating from the negotiations:  
“Generally the intellectual property rights are always a 
big restriction, you know, even if the game company is 
willing to work with you, it’s still going to take you six 
months, sometimes a year to work out something which 
will allow you to do, what you want to do.” (CB)  
Users solved the dilemma of uncertainty in two 
ways: they either negotiated a contract with the 
game company who granted use and thus selec-
tively shared game assets for clearly defined pur-
poses, or they remodeled large parts of the game. 
While the ILL Clan and Strange Company ap-
plied specialized tools to “re-skin” avatars and 
avoid using existing artwork, Rooster Teeth 
struck a deal, which allowed them to use the art-
work from Halo for their Red vs. Blue franchise. 
We discuss the advantages and disadvantages of 
either strategy later. Burnie Burns of Rooster 
Teeth described their relationship with Microsoft 
as being grounded in excitement about the possi-
bilities user entrepreneurs discovered, while at 
the same time showing generosity and interest in 
a long-term engagement:  
“[Microsoft] what we found was we found a group of 
people who really like innovative cool stuff and they saw 
something that I think they thought was unique and they 
worked with us and it was really great, it was surprising. 
I was really amazed and I continue to be amazed at how 
great they are to us and how much freedom they give us 
and how long we are able to work with such a big com-
pany.” (BB)  
Selective sharing by game companies takes differ-
ent forms: they license assets under creative 
commons or open source (OS) licenses (such as 
parts of the Unreal Tournament engine released 
by Epic Games in 199913 or the tool set for 
Neverwinter Nights by Bioware); or they close 
contracts with Machinima producers that allow 
user entrepreneurs to use the games (engines 
and/or artworks) for commercial purposes. The 
game companies’ incentives to grant these excep-
tions to the standard licensing terms include the 
promotion or advertisement of games through 
                                                
13 Ports to Linux are available from the Open UT project: 
http://openut.sourceforge.net/info.php. 
Machinima (AC, BB, FvL, PD). Phil DeBevoise 
(PD) of Machinima.com reported:  
“The game publishers recognize this is being a terrific 
free promotional and marketing vehicle for their games 
and they are very much, you know, we have spoken to 
pretty much all of them ...are very excited, and very much 
want to engage the gaming community and have them be, 
you know, very much invested in their games. Like when 
they are making Machinima, that’s a true act of love and 
passion. They are working many hours not only playing 
their game, but they’re also making this.” (PD)  
Without the game companies’ consent, users face 
the dilemma of producing films without permis-
sion to distribute and run legal risks of infringing 
the copyright or the EULA. To date, no case 
involving Machinima had been tried in court nor 
have EULAs with special Machinima clauses 
spread widely. One game publisher that recently 
engaged in encouraging its users to produce Ma-
chinima under terms of fair use is Blizzard Enter-
tainment, the producer of World of Warcraft.14 
In general, the right to produce Machinima un-
der fair use of video games (U.S. copyright law), 
as users hope, remains uncertain and a sense of 
frustration about this dilemma is widespread in 
the Machinima community (voiced by all inter-
view partners).  
Another approach was to create large amounts of 
artwork from scratch. The ILL Clan pioneered 
this work with their film Hardly Workin’ for 
which “we changed the entire look of the game” 
(PM), accomplished by two members during two 
years of part-time work. Shooting the film, which 
involved five people, and integrating the improvi-
sors’ dialogues, took a further six months. Creat-
ing own assets by modifying the game gave con-
fidence of not infringing any IP rights, as Paul 
Marino (PM) and Frank Dellario (FD) described:  
“Quake allowed you to re-skin your characters, that was 
one of the things that id Software did ...that was a very 
innovative approach to customizing the game and [...] we 
used this feature to do that for our film.” (PM)  
“Using Quake 2 we then made Hardly Workin’ which 
Paul Marino directed and that we created all on our own 
assets. The only thing we used was the engine. The map, 
everything we used, we created from scratch, cause we 
said ‘Let’s get away from other people’s IP.”’ (FD)  
Four firms in the sample (The ILL Clan, Strange, 
Fountainhead, Short Fuze) opted for the costly 
                                                
14 http://www.wow-
europe.com/de/community/Machinima/letter.html. 
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approach of creating artwork themselves. Bong + 
Dern and Rooster Teeth were the exception, in 
that they primarily used game assets after negoti-
ating with the game company. Since the contract 
details between game companies and Machinima 
producers remain undisclosed, this study cannot 
conclude whether this involved great cost or 
whether the companies placed their assets at the 
disposal of selected user entrepreneurs. However, 
the evidence shows that support tends to flow 
from game companies to users, in terms of per-
mission to publish, submit to film festivals, con-
tract work (commissioned Machinima, TV adver-
tisements and game commercials), and feature 
support. The Sims 2 features integrated video 
capturing and Blizzard recently added tutorials 
for Machinima in World of Warcraft. The latest 
sequel of Halo offers a save film feature, which 
allows players to view and record their game play 
in retrospect from camera angles they did not use 
during actual game play. This also demonstrates 
that the Machinima community, after gaining 
enough leverage, had a reverse impact on the 
game companies (compare von Hippel, 1988, on 
producers who incorporate user innovation).  
Thus, we propose (1): If firms (in other industries) 
show a preference toward selective sharing of proprietary 
assets, this positively impacts the user entrepreneurs’ access 
to complementary assets for commercialization.  
User entrepreneurs often first use complementary 
assets regardless of potential IP infringements 
(phase one) and later recognize an opportunity to 
commercialize (phase two)—a central finding in 
the user entrepreneurship process. The failure of 
asset holders to approve the commercial applica-
tion of complementary assets may represent a 
road-block for user entrepreneurs, since access to 
complementary assets is critical for commerciali-
zation, even if access is granted ex post (the initial 
use).  
3.3. User entrepreneurs’ access to comple-
mentary assets for commercialization (indus-
try B)  
User entrepreneurs need access to a range of 
complementary assets, including those of game 
companies, as we discussed in the previous sec-
tion. We now relate these assets to commerciali-
zation. The process of finding and locating rele-
vant assets in the video game industry to match 
with a story and produce a film is illustrated by 
Burnie Burns (BB) of Rooster Teeth:  
“I think, probably since Red vs. Blue started, we’ve never 
had an idea and then found a game to make the idea 
work. That’s how Red vs. Blue started, we had the idea 
for Red vs. Blue and we found Halo as the way to do it. 
Everything else has been where we’ve had a game with 
great tools and great Machinima capabilities and then we 
have found a story to match the theme of the game. We 
try not to make it about the game but thematically it 
makes sense, if you are going to have elements in the game 
already, we want to include them in the story. You can’t 
take a game like F.E.A.R. and turn it into a romantic 
comedy, well you could but you know...It’s more of a 
suspension of disbelief in that case. It’s more about just 
position this. We try to do stories that are believable, 
within the context.” (BB)  
All firms in the sample used and relied on com-
plementary assets such as game engines, tool sets, 
and artwork stemming from video games, which 
were incorporated in the production process. In 
some cases, the artwork even stimulated the in-
novation process (BB).  
Following a different approach, Short Fuze relied 
on complementary assets they produced them-
selves: a software product called Moviestorm. 
The firm’s business does not rely directly on the 
application of game assets but on the user experi-
ence associated with them. After seizing the op-
portunity while active in the animation industry, 
Short Fuze created a game-like environment for 
users to shoot films, thus actually supplying com-
plementary assets to users. Matt Kelland (MK) of 
Short Fuze depicts legal uncertainty as the incen-
tive to create Moviestorm, which substitutes the 
formerly used video games:  
“One of the biggest issues with Machinima is that there 
is a big debate about copyright issues, because when peo-
ple are making videos, using games made by professional 
game companies, they say, well, you know, you’re using 
our sounds, you’re using our assets, you’re using our an-
imations, our levels and so on. And everybody in the Ma-
chinima community is waiting for the first big lawsuit to 
happen and one of the things we decided was just to move 
around this by saying, well, we intend to own the engine, 
the assets, maps and everything so when somebody makes 
a movie with Moviestorm, they own it. In just the same 
way that they would own anything they created with 
Word or Photoshop.” (MK)  
Fountainhead quickly ceased to commercialize 
animation despite its access to complementary 
assets that allowed it to create groundbreaking 
Machinima early on. Machinima.com stands 
alone, due to its special role as a web platform 
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supporting the community15 in various ways, 
ranging from hosting to education. The remain-
ing four firms, however, lend support to our sec-
ond proposition by relying on complementary 
assets for their commercialization strategy.  
Thus, we propose (2): User entrepreneurs’ access to 
complementary assets positively impacts commercialization.  
Proposition two also reflects the two-phase proc-
ess, since access to complementary assets is pro-
vided by user innovators, whom we regard as 
separate from user entrepreneurs, as well as the 
game companies’ willingness to share these assets.  
For completeness, it should be noted that while 
complementary assets play a crucial role in creat-
ing Machinima, they do not  
replace the creation of original artwork like voice-
over and audio effects by user entrepreneurs. The 
integration of assets, artwork, and potential post-
production with the actual shooting requires con-
siderable skill and experience in making Ma-
chinima all in areas of domain knowledge, which 
we turn to next.  
3.4. Acquisition of new domain knowledge  
Critical new domain knowledge for commerciali-
zation represents the qualification necessary not 
only to produce but also to distribute animation 
shot in video games that appeals to a greater 
audience. It includes education and experience in 
cinematography, the creation of a narrative, 
screenwriting, post-production and editing skills, 
as well as knowledge of the film business such as 
marketing, reaching an audience, creating se-
quels, and sustaining the interest of an audience 
in film characters and stories—in other words, 
the creative skills that are crucial to producing 
any kind of film, including Machinima. The ap-
plication of complementary assets refers to the 
users’ technical skills at applying and exploiting 
given features in a video game, such as special-
ized tools to reshape the appearance of charac-
ters, puppeteering, or the capturing of raw video 
material, basically all functions related to execu-
tion.  
Friedrich Kirschner (FK), member of the AMAS, 
explained early approaches to production knowl-
edge exchange as being part of the maturing 
                                                
15 Because www.Machinima.com did not start 
commissioning films until the end of August 2007, after 
we interviewed their CEO Philip DeBevoise, we have not 
considered Machinima.com for some of our propositions. 
Machinima community. He describes the inter-
weaving of technology and knowledge about the 
motion picture industry:  
“Presenting [Machinima] to the community is less im-
portant. [...] early on it was about [technology]. That 
has changed a little today because the community moved 
to a field that is less concerned with the technology. A few 
years ago, technology was more central ... to consider 
things from a technical perspective. There were different 
games one could have possibly worked with. Then pros 
and cons were discussed, that was definitively important, 
because back then in the Machinima.com community one 
didn’t come from the game but from the wish to produce a 
movie. And because of that, one could be talked into using 
another game or at least checking out another game, be-
cause it was used as a tool. [...] In this regard, Ma-
chinima matured a little or at least the community thinks 
it matured a bit. And this has more to do with how they 
deal with the newcomers. [...] Machinima producers 
simply don’t know anything about the 180-degree rule 
and cutting and directing in the broadest sense. There, 
they try to very much catch up and tutorials are written 
and hints are exchanged and that kind of stuff.” (FK, 
translated from German by the authors)  
Knowing each other’s work well, users exchanged 
experiences and opinions during film festivals 
(AMAS, Sundance, Tribeca, Bit-film, and oth-
ers), game conferences, and via online discussion 
forums (Machinima.com and others). Some even 
wrote Machinima beginners’ books about their 
specific production knowledge (Hancock and 
Ingram, 2007; Marino, 2004) or kept regularly 
updated blogs (FK, PM, FD). Key contributions 
by community members in the form of tools 
(Uwe Girlich’s Little Movie Processing Center or 
Friedrich Kirschner’s Movie Sandbox16) altered 
the way users worked and frequently facilitated 
the art of Machinima for new talent. Certain 
Machinima pieces reverberated inside the com-
munity and inspired new work because of their 
demonstrable feasibility. The way tools were 
applied was critical for the development process 
since it would shape the final product and, ulti-
mately, the extent of commercialization. A global 
community of users sustained discussions about 
the most effective ways to use tools, both legally 
and artistically. Chris Burke (CB) of Bong + Dern 
exemplifies this stimulation of the community 
with extraordinary contributions:  
“Something that really fascinates me is non-narrative 
Machinima, which is, I guess, what grew out of what 
                                                
16 http://www.moviesandbox.com/ 
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used to be speed run and all that stuff [recording of game 
play]. Things like Warthog Jump. [...] I think that’s 
fascinating. To me that’s something you would never have 
in any other medium. And some users they watch it and 
they think, oh it’s just some guy messing around, which it 
is. But there’s, I think there’s a really ... there’s like real 
theory going on behind that.” (CB)  
These observations demonstrate that another 
indispensable aspect of the user entrepreneurship 
process in this case involved the community of 
users (Machinimators), which impacted positively 
not only on domain knowledge from the motion 
picture industry, but also on the combination of 
domain knowledge with complementary assets. 
While the community of Machinimators helped 
to promote the art of producing high-quality 
animation and provided the resources to develop 
and deepen domain knowledge, it also promoted 
the integration and application of complementary 
assets.  
Burnie Burns (BB) and Geoff Ramsey (GR) of 
Rooster Teeth produced the first series of Red vs. 
Blue in their homes while voice actors called in 
over the phone to contribute their part of the 
scripts. Later, they recruited friends, some of 
whom had worked in Hollywood studios, to join 
the team. Domain knowledge proved crucial 
when it came to commercialization. Not only did 
Matt Hullum bring valuable film experience to 
the team, but the development of the series’ 
characters and epic story elements over 100 epi-
sodes, commitment to the web as the preferred 
channel of distribution, as well as contracts that 
secured the rights to sell DVDs and merchandise, 
all represent thorough knowledge about the mo-
tion picture industry that few video game users 
possess.  
The case of Fountainhead Entertainment demon-
strates the contrary situation. Its founder, Anna 
Kang (AK), one of the co-founders of AMAS, 
created groundbreaking Machinima work. De-
spite critical acclaim, their efforts did not trans-
late to sustained commercial activity in the ani-
mation industry, possibly because there was lim-
ited industry experience within Fountainhead—
their critically acclaimed music video In the 
Waiting Line had been produced with an outside 
director who was interested in trying new tech-
nologies. The other Machinima producing firms 
in the sample had at least one core member or 
founder with an education in film or extensive 
industry experience in film or animation or both.  
Despite the importance of domain knowledge, 
commercializing Machinima seemed to rely on 
the user entrepreneurs’ ability to combine do-
main knowledge and experience with comple-
mentary assets. Users of video games approached 
animation production in new ways (Lowood, 
2007; Marino, 2004) regarding their use of tech-
nical tools and cinematography, as Matt Kelland 
(MK) of Short Fuze commented. The crew at 
Short Fuze knew that there were important 
trade-offs when making animation with games or 
with user experience of gamers. Moviestorm, a 
game-like animation production environment, 
caters to users who want to produce Machinima 
but have little or no film-related education or 
experience:  
“As a game player, my preconception is ‘I don’t have to 
do anything, the computer just works it all out for me.’ 
And it may not be exactly what I want, but it’s good 
enough and it was easy. Whereas an animator would 
say, well you have to be able to decide where they walk 
and how they walk and get it all absolutely right, which 
we say, it actually doesn’t matter.” (MK)  
Our cases demonstrate that a community of users 
positively impacts on the accumulation of rele-
vant domain knowledge from different industries. 
We can observe an important distinction between 
user innovators and user entrepreneurs. User 
innovators, within a community or by them-
selves, combine complementary assets (video 
games) with cinematography skill (e.g. Randall 
Glass with his film Warthog Jump, published in 
2002, achieving effects once thought impossible). 
User entrepreneurs, however, take their anima-
tion products one step further and commercialize 
them in the animation industry. Depending on 
the user entrepreneurs’ origin, the respective 
other domain knowledge has to be acquired.  
To commercialize Machinima, user entrepre-
neurs need to combine domain knowledge with 
their skills at applying complementary assets. 
Consider again the example of Rooster Teeth: 
the tale of their successful series starts with the 
discovery of a bug in Microsoft’s Halo game that 
allowed them to make their avatars look straight 
ahead while pointing their guns down. This non-
feature enabled the dialogue scenes in Red vs. 
Blue. The deep experience with a video game, 
the cinematographic skill to exploit this bug artis-
tically to create entertaining products, and the 
business knowledge of how to market the product 
need to come together for commercialization. All 
of our cases show that access to both kinds of 
COLLABORATIVE INNOVATION STEFAN HAEFLIGER • 2012 
 24 
knowledge—domain knowledge as well as expe-
rience and skills—is necessary for commercializa-
tion.  
We propose (3a): The community of users positively 
impacts on user entrepreneurs’ skills at applying comple-
mentary assets.  
The ability of all firms to generate revenue could 
be traced to talent from the motion picture indus-
try, whether by temporary arrangements, hiring, 
or via the founders. We thus propose (3b): Access 
to the talent pool of the target industry positively impacts on 
user entrepreneurs’ acquisition of domain knowledge.  
Note that this finding is compelling in the sense 
that all but one user entrepreneur followed this 
course and phase one (under the radar) appeared 
as a prerequisite for phase two. Understanding 
how to produce Machinima film and the experi-
ence as users of Machinima tools, the insights 
gained from a community of peers, and the 
knowledge to be gained in the domain of the 
animation industry, all contribute to the possibil-
ity of entering phase two, commercialization.  
In summary, commercialization was impossible, 
in our sample, without the combined knowledge 
of the domain of filmmaking and of the applica-
tion of games as complementary assets to film 
production. We propose (4): User entrepreneurs com-
bine domain knowledge with the skills to apply complemen-
tary assets to commercialize their products.  
Table 2 gives a summary of the propositions and 
how they relate to the respective firms, with a 
short description of how each proposition is sup-
ported throughout the cases. 
  
DISCUSSION 
Our findings relate to the emerging literature on 
user entrepreneurship which shares with an effec-
tuation view on entrepreneurship theory the per-
spective that opportunities are created given a set 
of means (Read et al., 2009), here, the user expe-
rience. In this section we discuss where and how 
our propositions resonate with existing theory or 
depart from it.  
Our finding that industry entry occurs in two 
phases extends existing work on user entrepre-
neurship (Baldwin et al., 2006; Shah and Tripsas, 
2007) in that it separates the user innovator from 
the user entrepreneur while describing a coherent 
process of user entrepreneurship. A user innova-
tor may enable phase one by extending the use of 
a product or technology (von Hippel, 2005; 
Faulkner and Runde, 2009), in our case enabling 
a video game to be used as a tool for animation 
production. Phase two may evolve without major 
user innovations if user entrepreneurs draw on an 
existing innovation for their own use and for later 
commercialization. Nevertheless, a deep familiar-
ity with the use of the innovation was a prerequi-
site for commercialization for all entrepreneurs in 
our sample.  
4.1. Propositions in the light of existing theory  
Proposition 1. Some authors have argued that 
firms frequently solicit the use of their knowledge 
assets for a licensing fee (Chesbrough, 2003; 
Arora et al., 2001). Uncompensated tolerance of 
asset exploitation has been documented for cases 
of informal know-how trading (von Hippel, 
1987), and in areas where participating firms do 
not compete directly and find it beneficial to sup-
port each other (Henkel, 2006; Dahlander, 2007). 
User entrepreneurs who deploy proprietary assets 
depend on the owner’s tolerance of the applica-
tion of these assets for commercialization. Our 
cases extend previous research on selective shar-
ing and tolerance toward application by demon-
strating the potential relevance of assets for user 
entrepreneurs’ entry into commercial market-
places. They also document a nascent group of 
firms that contribute to developing a new genre 
in the industry they enter, which underscores the 
novelty of their products and the associated risks 
of IP infringement.  
Proposition 2. The innovation literature has so 
far generated only limited insights into the com-
mercial use of selectively shared assets. We show 
that selective sharing may apply to different types 
of asset (game engine, artwork, toolkits, etc.), 
which in turn represent different trade-offs for the 
user entrepreneur in terms of gaining access to, 
or substituting for, the asset. We observe that 
while user innovators frequently make unauthor-
ized use of copyright work (as described by Lee, 
2008), user entrepreneurs display great sensitivity 
when working with others’ copyright protected 
work. They either secure owners’ explicit permis-
sion to create and distribute Machinima using 
video game artwork, or they completely re-create 
artwork to avoid conflict over intellectual prop-
erty rights. Commercializing with others’ assets in 
a new industry is a facet of the user entrepreneur-
ship process not yet described by the literature.  
Proposition 3. An important finding in the user 
innovation literature is that users tend to organize 
their innovation projects in communities (von 
Hippel and von Krogh, 2003; Shah, 2006; von 
Hippel, 2007). Members of these communities 
bring their individual domain knowledge to bear 
on technical problems, share solutions, promote 
their work, and develop and improve on technol-
ogy (Franke and Shah, 2003; von Krogh et al., 
2003; Jeppesen and Molin, 2003). As users who 
become entrepreneurs and enter a new industry, 
the firms in our sample provide a unique oppor-
tunity to observe where knowledge is sourced and 
to distinguish between knowledge of production 
methods, application or development of comple-
mentary assets, and domain knowledge. Little is 
known about this distinction in the user innova-
tion literature, which is vague about when knowl-
edge emerges from a user community and when 
it needs to be acquired through hiring, or as part 
of the founding team.  
Within user communities, members share and 
exchange experience with peers from other 
knowledge domains (Lee and Cole, 2003; Spaeth 
et al., 2008). Kogut and Zander (1992) suggested 
studying how firms combine knowledge from 
internal as well as external sources for innovation 
(see also Schumpeter, 1934). Successful innova-
tors need the ability to identify external knowl-
edge as an important input to innovation and 
commercialization, and must have the capability 
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of combining new and existing knowledge (Alva-
rez and Barney, 2005; Brockman and Morgan, 
2003; Chirico and Salvato, 2008). Users are con-
sidered a source of domain knowledge from idea-
tion to complete product development (von Hip-
pel, 1988, 2007; Baldwin et al., 2006; Ogawa and 
Piller, 2006; Füller et al., 2007); however, produc-
tion methods are frequently considered proprie-
tary (Henkel, 2006: 962). We identify the types 
and sources of knowledge combined by user en-
trepreneurs and propose ways in which a user 
community provides insights into the production 
technology for Machinima. By developing and 
evolving the use of video games for animation 
production, the community participates in entry 
into a new industry.  
The firms in our sample exchange insights about 
video games in user communities (Cohendet and 
Simon, 2007) and hire market insiders to acquire 
domain knowledge. At the same time, they de-
velop proprietary production knowledge, such as 
experience in narrative development and plot-
ting, or post-production techniques. Revealing of 
knowledge by user entrepreneurs depends on the 
industry context, in that production tools—the 
application of game engines for Machinima pro-
duction—are more liberally shared within the 
user community than production skills, such as 
cinematography and story development, key 
elements for revenue generation in the animation 
industry.  
Proposition 4. When building new ventures in 
an industry, entrepreneurs need domain knowl-
edge relevant to commercialization (Michael et 
al., 2002). When entering new industries, domain 
knowledge about target markets plays a key role 
in commercializing innovations. The case of Ma-
chinima shows that users’ experience can trans-
late into an ability to apply tools that serve as 
complementary assets in a new industry, and that 
a combination with domain knowledge enables 
them to commercialize their products. This find-
ing departs from the literature on user innovation 
and user entrepreneurship, which assumes users’ 
stronghold to be their domain of experience, their 
access to knowledge generated by their practice 
as users, as well as their network (Luthje et al., 
2005; von Hippel, 2007). Our sample suggests 
that users’ realm of entrepreneurial activity ex-
tends beyond the market where initial user inno-
vation could be observed (the video game indus-
try) to include other industries and the creation of 
new market fragments.  
4.2. A summary of stakeholders and activities  
In exploring the case of Machinima, we studied a 
new genre and a growing community of film and 
gaming enthusiasts. Table 3 provides an overview 
and summary of the stakeholders involved and 
their activities before and during the phases of 
commercialization described by our model. User 
innovation began before the users became entre-
preneurs and the stories of their businesses un-
folded. Our data cover the beginnings of user 
innovation in this field and the birth of the genre, 
since many of the individuals who went on to 
become entrepreneurs are today considered Ma-
chinima pioneers (Paul Marino, Hugh Hancock, 
Burnie Burns, Anna Kang, and others). They 
reported their first encounters with the technolo-
gies of recording and sharing game play, the 
creativity these spurred, and the first teams they 
formed to manage early productions.  
In our account of the propositions, some 
stakeholders’ positions were omitted for the sake 
of brevity. However, more detail about the roles 
played by the video game companies and the 
audience may facilitate the testing of our model 
in other contexts. We convey a comprehensive 
account of the Machinima case, reaching back as 
far as possible in its history, to open the possibility 
for others to discover and identify nascent mar-
kets and industries by recognizing user activity 
and behavior in terms of knowledge acquisition 
and re-interpretation of assets.  
The columns in Table 3 show critical activities 
within the two relevant industries, video games 
and motion picture. The rows follow the 
stakeholders over time, going from top to bottom, 
from an enabling phase to user innovation and 
then to the two commercialization phases cov-
ered by our propositions. The relevant 
stakeholders, apart from user entrepreneurs, in-
clude gamers who are forming a community of 
Machinimators (the lead user community), in-
cumbent firms in the video games industry, and 
consumers of videos. Shaded cells contain user 
entrepreneurs’ key as described above, and may 
serve as reference points to compare with other 
stakeholders’ activities. 
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Table 4: Stakeholder analysis considering the sequence of activities and industries 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH AND MANAGEMENT 
Our findings contribute to the literatures on user 
entrepreneurship and (remotely) strategy, in that 
we motivate future research on entrants keeping 
a low profile to overcome entry barriers. Four 
contributions stand out.  
First, a central finding of our study relates to user 
entrepreneurship. Industry entry by user entre-
preneurs could be observed to occur in two 
phases (see Fig. 1 and Table 1). This demon-
strated that entrants could outmaneuver entry 
barriers by operating under the radar of incum-
bent firms before commercializing. Although 
they were already distributing film, users did not 
appear as commercial players. Once they had 
gained a foothold through their audience, users 
began to commercialize. Their two-phase entry 
into the animation industry avoided apparent 
conflict over IP rights by first relying on informal 
copyright practices (see Lee, 2008), and also 
avoided large investments in established distribu-
tion channels by using the Internet.  
Second, our findings contribute to research in 
entrepreneurship and effectuation more specifi-
cally. Rooster Teeth produced Machinima in 
Halo 1–3, Sims 2, F.E.A.R., and Shadowrun. 
The team’ skill in attracting a community of over 
half a million subscribing viewers and fans re-
sulted in several sources of revenue through their 
franchises: DVD sales, sponsorship, merchandis-
ing with various items, as well as the production 
of a comic series that features the Rooster Teeth 
crew as main characters. The comic was avail-
able for free through their website and sold in 
print. The ventures grew around Machinima but 
developed Rooster Teeth into a web-based enter-
tainment group with artistic products, such as the 
comic and the communication contents. Rooster 
Teeth’s team learned by experimentally setting 
up a shop around its brand and around specific 
characters from its Machinima series. Rooster 
Teeth’s strategy was driven by its creative use of 
complementary assets. Using another video game 
led to an all-new series. According to our inter-
viewees, using the team’s gaming experience to 
relate to other gamers in the audience creates 
customer loyalty and sparks creativity, in terms of 
customer-generated content on the community 
site as well as within the Rooster Teeth team (BB, 
GR). A traditional sitcom around video gaming 
could fit with the Rooster Teeth’s strategy just as 
well as more Machinima. The point here is not 
that user entrepreneurs’ creativity is unlimited 
but that their accumulated experience in the 
production of Machinima, and the gaming cul-
ture that the team shares with its audience, are 
sources of new ideas that can give rise to new 
opportunities and ultimately to commercializa-
tion. User entrepreneurs search for new applica-
tions for assets and skills (their givens) rather than 
focusing on a predefined target by discarding 
alternatives, a process that Sarasvathy (2001) 
terms “effectuation.” This process could also be 
observed in other firms in our sample.  
This finding confirms the notion that user inno-
vation rests on the advantage provided by sticky 
knowledge (von Hippel, 1994) and users’ “local” 
perception of their own and their community’s 
needs. However, it also shows that user entrepre-
neurs effectively leverage community knowledge 
for entry into new industries. Studying the user 
entrepreneur’s role in the context of fellow users 
and consumers echoes the recent call by Rindova 
et al. (2009) to study entrepreneurial activity 
more deeply to “understand the relationships 
between change intent and the nature of relation-
ships with other social actors” (2009: 480). We 
contribute to the body of research on effectuation 
by delineating the characteristics of a process 
where entrepreneurs enter a new industry in two 
phases. Future research may help to predict tar-
get industries and entrepreneurial activity based 
on user innovation and the principal of givens in 
effectual thought (compare Read et al., 2009).  
Third, our theory contributes to a differentiated 
understanding of the user’s role in technology 
diffusion. Users, the Machinimators in our case, 
have radically changed the use of video games by 
using them as stage and input for animation pro-
duction rather than game play. Faulkner and 
Runde (2009) describe the diffusion of these user-
triggered changes in products. Video games con-
tain both technology (the physics engine that 
creates a basis for the virtual world) and art (the 
artwork that makes the virtual world visible and 
allows for the experience of sensations inside the 
virtual world). The two can be separated, as we 
demonstrated, and their diffusion follows slightly 
different paths, given their creators’ choices to 
protect them from exploitation in different con-
texts. The new context is animation; since the 
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advent of Machinima in the late 1990s, video 
games have been used for animation production 
in various ways. Hence, users diffuse technologies 
across industry boundaries depending on their 
assessment of the components of the technology, 
on their own costs of re-creating it, and on the 
outcome of the negotiations with the owners of 
the IP rights to the technology, which may in 
turn be a question of timing.  
Fourth, our study raises a few important ques-
tions about atomistic versus collective user entre-
preneurship and the logic of selective revealing 
(Henkel, 2006). While the user community of 
Machinimators was instrumental in diffusing 
knowledge about the application of video games 
to animation production, process and business 
knowledge (sequel and storyline development, 
distribution channels) were revealed to a far lesser 
extent. Gamer communities that became Ma-
chinima communities preceded commercial ef-
forts, a finding that corresponds to other areas of 
user entrepreneurship (Baldwin et al., 2006, Shah 
and Tripsas, 2007). What is new, in our case, is 
that the choice of industry lies in the nature of the 
users’ activity. We were not observing a few 
renegade firms that decided to venture into an 
unknown industry; ours were entrepreneurial 
users who took innovation one step further and 
commercialized in the industry most akin to the 
work they had done: animation. The Machinima 
community does not discuss game play or exten-
sions of games for gaming’s sake but develops 
ever more sophisticated knowledge that combines 
the use of games and cinematography, as the 
quote by Friedrich Kirschner (above) illustrates.  
Some limitations apply to this study. First, while 
the Machinima phenomenon is growing rapidly, 
generalization of the propositions to areas other 
than games must be tested in future research. 
Second, two effects were almost impossible to 
disentangle and could jeopardize the future ap-
plicability of the theory to contexts other than 
virtual environments: the diffusion of broadband 
access and advances in distribution technology 
for media content over the Internet. The popu-
larity of Machinima, and thus the commercial 
viability of the firms studied, might be connected 
to the general trend of viewing film over the In-
ternet. Finally, Machinima represents a very re-
cent phenomenon that provides scarce data on 
the survival of our sample firms (none of which 
can demonstrate a track record of more than ten 
years). Game companies could eventually cease 
selective sharing of engines and tools and venture 
into the motion picture industry themselves, or 
the audience could turn away from Machinima. 
However, given the Machinima firms’ diverse 
sources of revenue, their dependence on game 
companies is limited. Future research needs to 
follow up on the phenomenon.  
5.1. To be continued...  
Our analysis covered a number of topics beyond 
and in addition to the process model, which we 
cut in favor of length and accessibility (see also 
Table 3). We thus propose an agenda for future 
research. Successful industry entry implies a gain 
in market share by the new entrant at the ex-
pense of incumbent firms. To date, Machinima is 
insignificant compared to the revenues generated 
by big players in the motion picture industry. 
Measuring the market share to justify successful 
entry thus proves impractical. Machinima repre-
sents an emerging genre in film today and user 
entrepreneurs, entering under the radar, created 
a new niche in the animation industry, fragment-
ing existing markets. The new niche is character-
ized by low barriers to entry, which in turn en-
able further talent to enter the Machinima mar-
ket. With the continuously advancing graphical 
capabilities of video games, the full potential of 
this market might yet to be unleashed. How this 
industry will evolve over time, and whether it will 
capture market share or disentangle from the 
conventional media markets, remains to be seen. 
Machinima represents a fertile ground for study-
ing the strategic impact of industry entry and 
market fragmentation on incumbents as well as 
new entrants.  
The cases demonstrate that learning can occur in 
phase one, prior to full entry. Hence, important 
industry entry barriers do not deter user entry 
and may need reconsideration in terms of their 
effectiveness for this type of activity (Porter, 1980; 
Lieberman, 1987). If de novo entrants can inno-
vate without entering an industry commercially 
(users learn by experimenting with products and 
processes and from peers), learning curve effects 
could in fact moderate other entry barriers. Op-
portunity costs of users are rather low, so could 
offset entry costs, while they rise with commer-
cialization when the user entrepreneur engages in 
firm foundation. This eventually leads to the 
question of which entry barriers remain intact 
during phase one, industry entry, and which dur-
ing phase two, entry to the commercial market-
place—a question we defer to future research.  
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Interaction with their customers helped user en-
trepreneurs to improve their products and correct 
flaws. Posting Machinima on sites with social 
software features (such as commenting and rat-
ing) allowed user entrepreneurs to read viewers’ 
comments within minutes.17 Rooster Teeth en-
couraged short feedback cycles by establishing a 
dual release structure granting sponsors early 
access to new episodes. Sponsors’ feedback thus 
enabled the production team to correct flaws 
prior to the public rollout. Consumer motivation 
to engage in such activities, as well as the impact 
of social software features to support these proc-
esses, need close examination in order to imple-
ment value-adding IT solutions. The nature of 
this interaction contributes to the continuous 
blurring of boundaries between the traditionally 
separated media of film, Internet, and video gam-
ing.  
Firms in one industry increasingly witness how 
freely or restrictively shared tools and assets can 
be used in another industry. This can be both 
beneficial and detrimental to the core business 
and thus needs close monitoring. In general, our 
sample suggests that positive effects dominate for 
game industry incumbents. Ill-considered han-
dling of IP, whether in the form of a too lenient 
or too strict position on exploitation of comple-
mentary assets in users’ target industries, can 
negatively affect the core business. Game compa-
nies might want to take a clear stance and en-
courage or discourage users from certain prac-
tices from the point of product launch. While 
game companies did this rigorously for their 
home industry, they largely ignored setting up 
directives for user entrepreneurs’ target indus-
tries. These policies can define both the kind of 
exploitation and possible target industries.  
Laws differ about the fair use of IP across coun-
tries and create uncertainties for users, as our 
study confirmed. Users can be frustrated with 
EULAs and select games based on their availabil-
ity and flexibility of use. EULAs do not necessar-
ily need to be rewritten, nor will individual con-
tracts and agreements resolve the problem in the 
long run. Amendments can give certain rights 
back to users, as happened on Blizzard’s World of 
Warcraft site where the company made a 180-
degree policy change in 2007 and started to share 
assets for certain uses selectively. Microsoft issued 
                                                
17 Season five of Red vs. Blue averaged 1,163 comments per 
episode, the first 50 posts usually arriving within 30 min of 
the episode’s release. 
a similar license in the same year.18 A recent 
analysis by Lee (2008) documents the rise of in-
formal copyright practices for user-generated 
content. This “warming to unauthorized use” 
(Lee, 2008) includes commercial applications and 
may, given appropriate and balanced policy (Ro-
quilly, 2010), influence the behavior of both users 
and entrepreneurs. However, this is an emerging 
legal practice and the firms in our sample 
avoided building their ventures on the unauthor-
ized use of copyright work.  
Innovation policy needs to take into account the 
way protected assets can be used across indus-
tries. Crucially, the transaction costs to create 
legal agreements should be lowered so that rights 
holders have incentives to enter negotiations with 
prospective entrepreneurs. Today, these incen-
tives frequently point the other way and lead to 
wholesale decline. Recent Internet technology, 
such as video compression and distribution, al-
lows new talent to create entertainment products 
on a broad scale (Eliashberg et al., 2006). En-
couraging innovation in this domain calls for 
more flexible and informal copyright agreements, 
since the current uncertainty may deter user in-
novators and user entrepreneurs. 
                                                
18 
www.worldofwarcraft.com/community/Machinima/lette
r.html. An article in Wired discussed the license change by 
Microsoft: www.wired.com/culture/art/ 
news/2007/09/Machinimalicenses. 
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Incentives to innovate are a central element of innovation theory. In the private-investment 
model, innovators privately fund innovation and then use intellectual property protection 
mechanisms to appropriate returns from these investments. In the collective-action model, 
public subsidy funds public goods innovations, characterized by non-rivalry and non-
exclusivity in using these innovations. Recently, these models have been compounded in the 
private-collective innovation model where innovators privately fund public goods innovations. 
Private-collective innovation is illustrated in the case of open source software development. 
This paper contributes to the work on this model by investigating incentives that motivate in-
novators to share their knowledge in an initial situation, before there is a community to support 
the innovation process. We use game theory to predict knowledge-sharing behavior in private-
collective innovation, and test these predictions in a laboratory setting. The results show that 
knowledge sharing is a coordination game with multiple equilibria, reflecting the fragility of 
knowledge sharing between innovators with conflicting interests. The experimental results 
demonstrate important asymmetries in the fragility of knowledge sharing and, in some situa-
tions, more knowledge sharing than theoretically predicted. A behavioral analysis suggests that 
knowledge sharing in private-collective innovation is not only affected by material incentives, 
but also by social preferences such as fairness. The results offer general insights into the rela-
tionship between incentives and knowledge sharing and contribute to a better understanding of 
the initiation of private-collective innovation. 
 
  
INTRODUCTION 
Explaining why and under what conditions inno-
vation happens is a major task for innovation 
scholars. Software like Linux, Apache, or Firefox, 
brought the open source software (OSS) move-
ment from obscurity into the public domain and 
in the process generated much debate among 
academics and practitioners. OSS is to a large 
part created by software developers who volun-
tarily and freely share their knowledge, in what 
von Hippel and von Krogh (2003) have termed 
the “private-collective innovation model.”19  This 
model does not require innovations to be pub-
lished or released under an open source license, 
but the innovator forfeits any means of appropri-
ating exclusive returns from selling the innova-
tion. Innovators following the private-collective 
model of innovation only retain partial ownership 
of the intellectual property they create, giving up 
their right to sell and control the use of the inno-
vation after publication or release (see Boldrin 
and Levine, 2001, and Bessen and Maskin, 2009, 
for a critical discussion of intellectual property 
and patents). This model prompted a number of 
empirical studies on the motivation of OSS de-
velopers (e.g. Lakhani and Wolf, 2005; Hertel et 
al. 2003). On the one hand, research found that 
participation in a community of software devel-
opers could explain contributions to OSS. The 
community rewards developers who innovate and 
behave consistently with the community’s social 
norms, by providing new software, discussion 
platforms to exchange ideas, assistance in im-
proving software, employment opportunities, or 
public recognition of their effort. These rewards 
offset the developers’ contribution costs (Hertel et 
al. 2003; Roberts et al. 2006). On the other hand, 
these studies also revealed a puzzle: what moti-
vates the initiation of private-collective innova-
tion before a community has been established 
and such social norms have emerged? None of 
the previous studies could shed light on this ques-
tion because they focused on contributions to 
                                                
19 Not all OSS is available as a public good. However, if the 
software is not available as a public good and is, say, 
created and used by a single developer, that devel- oper 
follows the private, rather than the private-collective 
model of innovation. By definition, private-collective 
innovation entails the publication or release of inno- 
vation (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2006). For a definition 
of open source turn to: 
http://www.opensource.org/licenses. 
running software development projects.  Yet, the 
answer to this question is crucial. This paper aims 
to contribute to a better understanding why the 
first innovator shares knowledge. If we can spec-
ify conditions under which the innovation proc-
esses emerge, we then may assess the general 
utility of private-collective innovation beyond 
established OSS communities.  
The essence of private-collective innovation can 
be illustrated in a simple dyadic relationship: one 
innovator (firm, entrepreneur, leader, OSS de-
veloper) shares knowledge with (at least) one 
other innovator. In general, this knowledge can 
be tacit or explicit (Nonaka, 1994), but explicit 
knowledge (e.g. articles, comments, ideas, engi-
neering plans, design drawings, formulas, algo-
rithms, procedures, software, etc.) can more eas-
ily be shared and become non-exclusive and non-
rival (Arrow, 1984). During the initiation of pri-
vate-collective innovation, with no access to pub-
lic funding, employment contracts or social 
norms, any innovator can choose to share his or 
her explicit knowledge as a public good (using, 
for example, an open source license), or keep it 
private and use secrecy or intellectual property 
rights to appropriate private (exclusive) returns 
from the innovation for example by licensing it to 
a third party. Under many circumstances, the 
innovator's incentive to conceal rather than to 
share knowledge is strong. For example, if an 
innovator has an idea for a new product that 
shows great market potential if licensed as a 
commercial product (rather than using an open 
source license), the incentive to defect from pri-
vate-collective innovation can be strong. Several 
scholars have argued that knowledge sharing is 
often hampered by such massive conflicts of in-
terest (e.g. Huber, 1982; Michailova and Husted, 
2003; Cabrera and Cabrera, 2002; Osterloh and 
Frey, 2000), and will be fragile at the initiation of 
private-collective innovation. Authors have sug-
gested that a cost-benefit analysis could shed 
more light on how different interests and incen-
tives influence innovators’ propensity to share 
knowledge (Foss and Mahnke, 2003: 78–79). In 
short, two questions stand out in the initiation of 
private-collective innovation: first, how fragile is 
knowledge sharing?; and second, what cost and 
benefit incentives are sufficient to induce sharing 
rather than concealing knowledge in the initia-
tion of private-collective innovation?  
Conducting research on the motivation for initi-
ating private-collective innovation is challenging. 
Once innovators have shared knowledge and set 
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innovation in motion, they can be identified by 
the field researcher. However, since the decision 
to share knowledge is private, it is difficult if not 
impossible to study knowledge sharing in the 
field, and especially difficult to identify innovators 
who decided not to share their knowledge and 
their reasons for doing so (see Nonnecke and 
Preece, 2000). To circumvent these difficulties, 
we model the incentive structure behind knowl-
edge sharing and make use of an experimental 
method to understand the behavioral conse-
quences of these incentives. The paper contrib-
utes to the literature on private-collective innova-
tion by questioning what incentives motivate 
innovators to share their knowledge in an initial 
situation, before a community and social norms 
are available to sustain private-collective innova-
tion.  
In section two of this paper, we review existing 
research, and discuss the role of incentives in 
private-collective innovation. We develop a game 
theoretic model of knowledge sharing at the ini-
tiation of private-collective innovation. We show 
that knowledge sharing is a coordination game 
with multiple equilibria. Since there are many 
outcomes of knowledge sharing, we develop an 
experimental research design to identify behav-
ioral strategies, given different incentives. The 
third section explains our research design and 
methods, and the fourth section presents the re-
sults. We find there are important asymmetries in 
knowledge sharing and, in some situations, much 
more knowledge sharing than theoretically pre-
dicted. A behavioral analysis suggests that knowl-
edge sharing is affected not only by material in-
centives, but also by social preferences, such as 
fairness. In Section 5 we discuss our findings and 
conclude.  
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INCENTIVES FOR KNOWLEDGE SHARING IN 
PRIVATE-COLLECTIVE INNOVATION 
Three models have specified incentives that give 
rise to innovation in society and economy: the 
private-investment model (Demsetz, 1967; Ar-
row, 1984), where the innovation remains a pri-
vate good for the innovator who retains the rights 
to consume it, sell it, or provide access to it for 
third parties for a fee; the collective-action model, 
which relies on collective or public subsidy for 
public goods innovations (e.g. Olson, 1965; 
Stephan, 1996; Dasgupta and David, 1994) and 
where innovators relinquish control of knowledge 
or other assets they have developed and make 
them a public good (Hargrave and Van de Ven, 
2006; Garud et al., 2002); and the private-
collective innovation model (Von Hippel and von 
Krogh, 2003), where innovators fund public good 
innovations voluntarily and privately. OSS is 
often discussed as an exemplar of the latter 
model. In thousands of OSS projects in existence 
today, ranging from the operating system GNU 
Linux to the Firefox browser, individuals, re-
search teams, universities, firms, and govern-
ments give their money, limited time, and talent 
to create software free for all to inspect, down-
load, use, modify, and freely redistribute to others 
in a modified or unmodified form. The term 
“open source software” refers to copyright li-
censes, such as the GNU General Public License 
(GPL), that simultaneously guarantee access to 
the source code to users of the software and keep 
the innovation available as a public good once it 
has been shared with users (see discussion of this 
point in Lerner and Tirole, 2002; O’Mahony, 
2003; Osterloh and Rota, 2007). Although open 
source licenses vary in restrictiveness20 and in 
their tolerance for integration with proprietary 
software, the GNU General Public License is the 
most commonly used. To date it has been used 
                                                
20 Differences in restrictiveness apply to the use of OSS in 
conjunction with pro- prietary software. The GNU 
General Public License mandates a so-called “copyleft” 
provision stating that all other software derived from or 
used together with software licensed under the GPL 
adheres to the same license terms. Other OSS licenses, 
such as the BSD License, are less restrictive or, in other 
words, allow copies and deriva- tives to be used in 
proprietary software as long as the authors are 
acknowledged (see, e.g., 
http://www.openbsd.org/policy.html). 
by 124,000 out of 170,000 projects listed on 
sourceforge.com, and it forms the backdrop of 
this paper. 
The private-collective model proposes that the 
efforts and participation of innovators in a com-
munity create incentives to innovate. A number 
of empirical studies have provided evidence for 
this proposition. Research has uncovered com-
munity-related incentives. These include: the 
application and testing of the software by many 
users and developers (Raymond, 1998; Lakhani 
and Wolf, 2005; Shah, 2006); the adaptation of 
OSS to solve specific technical problems on sev-
eral developers’ computers (Franke and von Hip-
pel, 2003); the learning that takes place when 
users share knowledge and jointly write OSS 
(Kuk, 2006); the individual software developers’ 
creation of software modules that can be com-
bined into a whole software product by the work 
of many (Baldwin and Clark, 2006); the reputa-
tion that individuals achieve among peer devel-
opers in the community (Roberts et al., 2006); the 
developers’ obligation to help fellow software 
users solve problems installing programs on their 
computers (Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003); and 
the developers’ identification with a specific 
community (Hertel et al., 2003). In their review 
of research on OSS, Bergquist and Ljungberg 
(2001) suggested that a cornerstone of OSS de-
veloper communities is the way they evolve 
strong social norms of reciprocity that enable 
them to operate as “gift economies.” When soft-
ware developers receive “gifts,” in terms of ad-
vice, acknowledgment, or software from others 
they feel an “obligation” to reciprocate by giving 
new or improved software, advice, and tips.21  
The private-collective model of incentives to in-
novate presupposes an active community of in-
novators, and until now has not explicitly covered 
the initiation of innovation (von Hippel and von 
Krogh, 2003; 2006). It has always been under-
stood as “routine collective action” (Useem, 
1998), where innovators build on already existing 
technology to create new and useful products. 
However, incentives during initiation differ sub-
stantially from incentives once the community is 
established and working routinely. According to 
Elster (1986), the initiation of collective contribu-
                                                
21 Lately, studies have also found private-collective 
innovation incentives in other fields than software, 
including product development and cultural goods (e.g., 
de Vries et al., 2006; Jeppesen and Frederiksen, 2006). 
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tions to a public good requires a higher incentive 
level than that required to sustain them.  
Consider four examples of research on OSS de-
velopment that highlight the evolving nature of 
incentives as communities grow and prevail. 
First, an initial gift (Bergquist and Ljungberg, 
2001) must be exchanged before a social norm of 
reciprocity can be established in the community. 
OSS developers may only feel gratitude and an 
obligation to return a gift if they have first re-
ceived useful software, appreciation, or advice. 
Second, when a developer releases a first working 
version of OSS to the public, other developers 
who find the software product useful will join the 
development effort and build a community 
(Raymond, 1998; Lerner and Tirole, 2002). The 
role of working software (a public good) in gener-
ating development activity has been confirmed by 
statistics on new developers joining the Freenet 
open source peer-to-peer project  (von Krogh et 
al. 2003). Third, Baldwin and Clark (2006) 
showed that the modularity of software architec-
ture is positively related to the options available 
to OSS developers in terms of exchanging valu-
able work. The value of these options, and hence 
the incentive to contribute, hinges on a modular 
structure of existing software architecture already 
created by many developers. Fourth, Shah (2006) 
found that long-term OSS developers take on 
mundane tasks in a community, such as giving 
advice to newcomers or maintaining mailing lists. 
This work reaches beyond the developers’ imme-
diate, individual goals of satisfying their technical 
needs. Thus the motivation for contributing to 
the community changes over time in an OSS 
project.  
The evidence that incentives change as commu-
nities emerge and grow suggests that we cannot 
infer characteristics of initial knowledge-sharing 
situations from our observations of established 
private-collective innovation; nor can we make 
assumptions about levels of incentive in such 
situations. Therefore, in order to capture the 
initiation of private-collective innovation before 
the establishment of a community and the emer-
gence of social norms, we introduce two rather 
weak assumptions from von Hippel and von 
Krogh (2003; 2006). These allow us to model the 
basic structure of knowledge sharing (sequential-
ity and asymmetry in conflicts of interest) and can 
be illustrated by a sequential two-person game 
that models an initial knowledge-sharing situa-
tion:  
1. Knowledge sharing enhances value for 
the party that receives the knowledge.  
2. Mutual knowledge sharing makes knowl-
edge public and precludes the exclusivity 
of received knowledge for one’s own pri-
vate financial benefit. By implication, a 
necessary (but not sufficient) condition for 
exclusive appropriation is unilateral 
knowledge sharing. 
Assumption 1 states that knowledge sharing is 
value enhancing (net of adoption costs of the new 
knowledge) for the innovator receiving the 
knowledge. This is an innocuous assumption, 
because in case it does not hold, knowledge shar-
ing is not really of economic interest. Value en-
hancement occurs if one party shares his or her 
knowledge, and is further enhanced if there is 
mutual knowledge sharing (von Hippel and von 
Krogh, 2003). Assumption 1 does not state 
whether or not the act of sharing knowledge is 
costly for the innovator. We will discuss this later. 
Note also that knowledge is distinct from other 
resources, such as land or money. Sharing it does 
not necessarily diminish the rewards it will bring 
for the innovator who first held it. For example, 
in OSS, the software developer who shares his 
source code with another developer will still have 
a copy that can be used to solve technical prob-
lems on his own machine. By “innovators” we 
mean both individuals and firms. Recent research 
provides evidence that firms often reveal knowl-
edge freely and extensively, including software 
code released under an open source license and 
developed in-house (e.g. Henkel, 2006; Stuermer 
et al., 2009). 
Assumption 2 says that mutual knowledge shar-
ing rules out the exclusive appropriation of re-
ceived knowledge for one’s own private financial 
benefit (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003). This 
is because mutual knowledge sharing makes 
knowledge a public good and, by definition, the 
returns on a public good cannot be exclusive 
(Arrow, 1984).22 Appropriation refers to the ca-
pacity of the knowledge holder to receive a return 
equal to the value created by the knowledge, for 
example, by keeping it secret or by protecting it 
                                                
22 An example would be publishing a software (and source 
code) on the Internet, with everybody being allowed to use 
the software for free. In this case a private market is not 
viable any longer and hence exclusivity is ruled out. 
Assumption 2 does not preclude products, services, and 
business models that build on the public knowledge by 
combining it with complementary assets and skills, thus 
partial, or non-exclusive, appropriation. 
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through intellectual property rights (Arrow, 1984; 
Teece, 1986; Grant, 1996). An individual who 
combines her own concealed knowledge with 
knowledge received from others may receive a 
higher return than the returns from knowledge 
sharing. Sharing knowledge entails opportunity 
costs of giving up exclusivity that must be added 
to the possible out-of-pocket costs of sharing.  
Assumption 2 is important because it allows us to 
model conflicts of interest as a possible conse-
quence of unilateral knowledge sharing. This 
asymmetry captures the real-life differences be-
tween innovators’ prior knowledge and their op-
portunities. For example, a programmer may 
face a technical problem. She combines her soft-
ware with a technical solution provided by others, 
and in doing so learns to solve the problem more 
efficiently. If, thanks to this combined knowledge, 
the programmer can create software that allows 
her to sell a software product on the market, she 
might choose to release a binary version of the 
software only and license the software to third 
parties in return for a fee. However, if the soft-
ware is protected by an OSS license, the pro-
grammer's ability to sell the software is limited by 
others' rights to do the same or give the software 
away for free, in other words, exclusive appro-
priation becomes impossible.23 As we mentioned 
earlier, most open source licenses guarantee the 
rights of current and future users to freely down-
load, inspect, modify, and release modified and 
unmodified versions of the source code (not the 
binary version) to third parties. Open source 
licenses thus lower the opportunity costs of shar-
ing, suggesting a model structure that allows us to 
observe the sensitivity of mutual sharing to vary-
ing levels of conflicts of interest.  
Knowledge is accumulative; it enables learning 
and can provide complementary benefits to ei-
ther of the innovators involved. In the absence of 
the sort of hierarchy, incentive structure, em-
ployment contracts and other contextual factors 
found in firms, innovators act according to social 
preferences, such as fairness, efficiency-seeking, 
and reciprocity. To uncover what motivates the 
initiation of private-collective innovation, we now 
                                                
23 Other business models derived from the use of publicly 
available software, e.g., in combination with proprietary 
software, can still create conflicts of interest for the 
receiver. Henkel (2006) showed that mutual revelation can 
be compatible with private benefits in the example of 
embedded Linux. Further private benefits can include 
intrinsic motivation (Osterloh and Frey, 2000; Ryan and 
Deci, 2000). 
turn to some basic incentives for knowledge shar-
ing.  
 
2.1. The knowledge-sharing game 
The generic properties of the conflicts of interest 
in knowledge sharing that follow from our two 
assumptions can be illustrated in a sequential 
dyadic relationship. An example of sequential 
knowledge sharing is an individual’s decision to 
contribute software to an existing open source 
project and add his or her own solution to what 
has already been published. 
Figure 1 illustrates our “knowledge sharing 
games.” For simplicity, we call the two innovators 
leader (L) and follower (F). Both innovators have 
the choice of sharing (s) or concealing (c) knowl-
edge. In the knowledge-sharing game in Figure 1, 
L moves first and decides whether to share or 
conceal his knowledge. F is informed of L’s 
choice and decides whether to share or conceal 
his or her knowledge. Note that the model allows 
F to decide whether or not to share knowledge, 
even if L has decided to conceal.24 After F’s 
choice, the game ends and payoffs are realized: bi 
(i = L,F) denotes a base payoff where vi is the 
value enhancement through sharing knowledge, 
ai is the exclusivity payoff, and k denotes the ex-
penses for sharing explicit knowledge. These 
payoffs are derived from the assumptions and 
explained in detail below.  
 
Figure 3: The knowledge-sharing game 
 
                                                
24 In our example, this would correspond to adding a 
solution to an existing project even if the project leader 
has not (yet) contributed code. The famous example is 
Linus Torvalds’ discussion of a new operating system 
before publishing code (Moon and Sproull, 2000; Moody, 
2001). Fora or mailing lists may provide a social context 
independent of the initial sharing of code. 
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Before analyzing the incentive structure and in-
herent conflicts of interest in the knowledge-
sharing game, payoffs must be specified. Each 
actor receives some basic net benefit bi ≥ 0, i = 
L, F, even if he or she only retains knowledge. An 
example would be programmers who produce 
software that is useful to them without receiving 
any knowledge from another programmer. Ac-
cording to Assumption 1, net value is enhanced 
for the knowledge recipient. In Figure 1, this is 
reflected in payoffs vi > 0, i = L, F, to player i if 
player j ≠ i shares his or her knowledge. For in-
stance, if L shares his or her knowledge, then, 
irrespective of F’s choice, F receives payoff vF in 
addition to his or her basic payoff bF. If F shares 
his or her knowledge, then L’s base payoff bL is 
augmented by payoff vL. If player j conceals, 
then vi=0, i = L, F.  
Assumption 2 says that knowledge (a public good 
created by mutual sharing) cannot be turned into 
an exclusive benefit. Therefore, a necessary (but 
not sufficient) condition of turning received 
knowledge (in combination with one’s own 
knowledge) into an exclusive benefit is that 
knowledge sharing is unilateral. Only the innova-
tor who can combine his or her own knowledge 
with knowledge obtained, and does not share his 
or her own knowledge, can possibly enjoy the 
benefits from exclusive appropriation, denoted by 
ai ≥ 0, i = L, F. Therefore, if L shares and F con-
ceals, F can exclusively appropriate aF. Likewise, 
L only appropriates aL, if he conceals and F 
shares his or her knowledge. Notice that the pay-
off connected to exclusivity can be zero (which is 
why asymmetric sharing is only a necessary, not a 
sufficient, condition). This is the case, for in-
stance, if exclusive appropriation of shared soft-
ware is prevented by an Open Source license (see 
O’Mahony, 2003, for a discussion of various pro-
tective measures for OSS). Exclusivity is the cru-
cial variable in the subsequent experiment, as will 
become clear in the game-theoretic analysis. In-
tuitively, exclusivity constitutes the opportunity 
costs of sharing knowledge, because benefits from 
exclusive appropriation are foregone if knowl-
edge is shared.  
One might argue that, in real life, sharing explicit 
knowledge in innovation is costly (for example 
shipping documents or traveling to meet people). 
The cost of knowledge sharing is modeled with 
the variable k.25 These costs are “out-of-pocket 
                                                
25 We assume that (i) k is the same for both players because 
market prices for shipping costs or access to the internet 
expenses,” distinct from the opportunity costs 
that are created by exclusivity (private returns 
from the exclusive appropriation of knowledge). 
If knowledge sharing is costless, k = 0. OSS de-
velopment is characterized by this condition. Von 
Hippel and von Krogh (2003) and Kogut and 
Metiu (2001) argue that the internet makes the 
sharing of knowledge between programmers a 
near costless activity. This is in contrast to the 
high out-of-pocket expenses needed to share or 
replicate many other technologies across sites, 
such as manufacturing processes, physical prod-
uct prototypes, or chemical compounds (Kogut 
and Zander, 1992, and Teece, 1977, discuss 
many costs involved, such as local adaptation of 
the technology to the manufacturing site simply 
to make it run).  
 
2.2. Theoretical predictions 
We are now ready for a game-theoretic analysis 
of the conflicts of interest inherent in this knowl-
edge-sharing game. First, we assume that players 
are rational and purely self-interested. Second, 
we predict the outcomes considering fairness as a 
social preference, building on the model by Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999). Fairness considerations play 
an important role in bilateral exchanges and ap-
ply to a broad range of economic situations (Fehr 
and Gächter, 2000).  
Observe the implications of positive out-of-pocket 
costs k > 0. In case vi > k > 0, the sequential 
knowledge-sharing game is a sequential prisoner’s 
dilemma game, where the only equilibrium is 
mutual concealment. This holds irrespective of 
the exclusivity ai.26 Therefore, in the present 
model, knowledge sharing by self-interested in-
novators is not possible if k > 0 (of course, mutual 
concealment is inefficient). Since both players 
want to conceal in the sequential prisoner’s di-
lemma, there is no genuine conflict of interest 
either. Therefore we confine our attention to the 
consequences of opportunity costs in sequential 
knowledge sharing if k = 0 for both players.27 
                                                
are the same for everyone, and (ii) k < vi , i = L, F (the 
costs of knowledge sharing are smaller than the value 
created). 
26 If the leader and the follower decide simultaneously and k 
> 0, the knowledge- sharing game becomes a prisoner’s 
dilemma. 
27 If sharing knowledge is actually beneficial for the sharer, 
i.e., if the sharer would be paid for the act of sharing, k < 
0. The implications are that, if abs(k) > aF , F will always 
share whether L conceals or shares. In this case the result 
is that mutual sharing is an equilibrium if abs(k) > aL . 
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The following proposition summarizes the 
knowledge-sharing game:  
 
Proposition 1: Knowledge sharing based on ra-
tionality and self-interest:  
(i) Mutual concealment is always an equilib-
rium outcome. 
(ii) A necessary condition for mutual sharing 
as an equilibrium outcome is that aF = 0. 
A necessary and sufficient condition for 
sharing in all subgames is that exclusivity 
payoffs are zero for both players (aL = aF 
= 0).  
(iii) In all constellations of exclusivity payoffs 
(aL ≥ 0)x(aF ≥ 0), there always exist 
equilibria with unilateral knowledge shar-
ing (in addition to mutual concealment).  
 
The first basic message of the proposition is that 
the knowledge-sharing game has multiple 
equilibria. Appendix A contains the complete list 
of these. Proposition 1(i) makes it clear that in 
addition to possible unilateral and mutual knowl-
edge-sharing equilibrium outcomes, mutual con-
cealment is always an equilibrium. The intuition 
for this result is that, under k = 0, F will, in both 
subgames where she has to make a decision, ei-
ther be indifferent to sharing and concealment (in 
the subgame after L chooses c, or in the subgame 
after L chooses s and aF = 0) or be better off by 
concealing (in the subgame after s and if aF > 0). 
Thus, concealment is always a best response for 
F. It then follows that it is best for L to choose c 
as well, since he is indifferent to sharing and con-
cealment in this case. 
Proposition 1(ii) says that mutual sharing will only 
occur as an equilibrium outcome if F cannot gain 
exclusivity payoffs. Since F is indifferent to both 
sharing and concealment in this case, F may re-
solve her indifference by sharing. Given that F 
shares, L may also share, provided aL = 0. In this 
case L is equally indifferent to sharing and con-
cealment (L’s payoff is bL+vL anyway). As soon 
as aF > 0, F will conceal, if L shares and mutual 
sharing can no longer be an equilibrium. Thus, 
aF = 0 is a necessary condition for mutual shar-
ing; aL = aF = 0 is necessary and sufficient.  
The rationale for proposition 1(iii) is that in cases 
of indifference to both sharing and concealment, 
both choices are a best response. That is, when 
matched with the other innovator’s best response 
of sharing, concealment can be a best response, 
and vice versa.  
Proposition 1 shows that genuine conflicts of 
interest, where one innovator wants to conceal 
and the other share, can only arise if there are 
positive opportunity costs to sharing knowledge 
for one innovator alone. There is no conflict of 
interest in the mutual knowledge-sharing (-
concealment) equilibria, because it is in both 
innovators’ interest to share (conceal) their 
knowledge.  
A particularly interesting situation is the one 
where neither innovator has opportunity costs of 
sharing (i.e., aF = aL = 0). As von Hippel and 
von Krogh (2003) argue, this situation is charac-
teristic of many open source licensed projects. 
The analysis shows that the resulting open source 
knowledge-sharing game is no prisoner’s di-
lemma, but a game with multiple equilibria with 
different efficiency consequences. Mutual knowl-
edge sharing can occur simply because innova-
tors are indifferent to both sharing and conceal-
ment and are prepared to resolve their indiffer-
ence by sharing. It is exactly this indifference that 
allows for mutual sharing among self-interested 
innovators.28 However, by the same token, mu-
tual concealment is also an equilibrium, albeit an 
inefficient one.  
Proposition 1 is crucial for understanding the 
fragility of knowledge sharing in the initiation of 
private-collective innovation, because it high-
lights the structure of the conflicts of interest in-
herent in knowledge sharing. The dual findings 
that (i) mutual concealment is always an equilib-
rium outcome, and (ii) that only equilibria with 
unilateral knowledge sharing or mutual conceal-
ment exist as soon as aF > 0, gives a theoretical 
meaning to the “fragility of knowledge sharing.” 
In sections 3 and 4 of this paper, we complement 
this theoretical result with evidence of the behav-
ior that causes fragile knowledge sharing. Since 
knowledge sharing is a game with multiple 
equilibria, it is an open question which equilib-
rium innovators will play. This is an inherently 
                                                
28 An example would be a programmer who develops 
software for himself. Sharing it does not diminish the 
utility of the software for him, but may be beneficial for 
another programmer. So given that he is not worse off by 
sharing, and somebody is potentially better off, he might 
easily be prepared to share his software with others. 
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empirical question that we attend to in the re-
mainder of the paper.29  
Proposition 1 summarizes a benchmark game-
theoretic analysis under the simplifying assump-
tion that innovators are rational and selfish (i.e., 
they only maximize their own payoffs). However, 
the research on open source communities we 
discussed earlier (e.g., Bergquist and Ljungberg, 
2001), and research in psychology and experi-
mental economics, has repeatedly revealed that 
rather than being selfish, many people are 
equipped with “social preferences.” In addition to 
pecuniary payoffs, people also care about equity, 
efficiency, and reciprocity (Camerer, 2003, chap-
ter 2). Since knowledge sharing has various pay-
off and efficiency consequences, social prefer-
ences might also matter in the context of private-
collective innovation.  
One simple model of social preferences is the 
inequity aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999). According to this model, players’ utilities 
increase in their own material payoff but decrease 
if there is inequality in bilateral payoff compari-
sons.  For instance, an inequality-averse F will 
always conceal if L has concealed because shar-
ing only increases L’s payoff but not F’s and 
therefore would put F at a payoff disadvantage 
(Fig 1). Players in the Fehr-Schmidt model might 
also dislike advantageous inequality, that is, situa-
tions in which they earn more than their co-
player. For instance, after L has shared, F might 
consider sharing if he is sufficiently averse to ad-
vantageous inequality, that is, if his dislike of the 
payoff advantage vis-á-vis L (v + aF) outweighs 
the material gain compared to concealment (the 
material payoff gain from concealment compared 
to sharing is aF).  
To see this more formally, consider the Fehr-
Schmidt utility function of F: UF  πF   αF max[πL   
πF , 0]   βF max[πF   πL , 0] where πi , i  F , L indi-
cates the material payoffs as they were relevant in 
the experiment; αF ≥ 0 measures F’s aversion to 
disadvantageous inequity (πL   πF  0) and βF 
measures aversion against advantageous inequity 
(πF   πL  0) (αF ≥ βF ≥ 0; βF < 1). Plugging the 
relevant payoffs in the utility function shows im-
mediately that an inequity-averse follower will 
never share if L has concealed.  
                                                
29 See, e.g., Camerer et al. (1997), Weber et al. (2001) and 
Camerer (2003), (Chapter 7) for discussions of the 
difficulties of coordination. 
F might share, however, if L has shared. F’s util-
ity from sharing, given that L has shared, is UF (s 
|s )   b   v. The utility from concealing is UF (c|s) 
 b   v   aF   βF (b   v   aF   b), that is, F enjoys the 
material benefit of b   v   aF and suffers a disutility 
of βF (v   aF ) from earning (v   aF ) more than L. F 
will share if and only if UF (s|s)   UF (c|s) which is 
the case if βF   aF /(v   aF ). In our experiment v = 
20 (see next section). Therefore, our different 
levels of the exclusivity payoff require the follow-
ing minimal β* (a ) to induce F to share: β* (0)  0;β* 
(10)  1/3;β* (20)  1/2 and β * (30)   3/5. Thus, the 
higher the benefits from exclusivity the higher has 
F’s aversion against advantageous inequality to 
be to induce him to share despite giving up exclu-
sivity.  
What can we say about L’s behavior? If L expects 
F to share, it will be best for L to share, as L’s 
payoff for sharing will be b + v rather than b if he 
conceals. If L expects F to conceal, it will be best 
for L to conceal as well. We summarize the role 
of inequity aversion in knowledge sharing in our 
second proposition:  
 
Proposition 2: knowledge sharing under inequity 
aversion  
(i) If followers are even slightly inequity 
averse they will always conceal if the 
leader has concealed. If the leader shares 
the follower will also share, if he or she is 
sufficiently inequity averse. The degree of 
inequity aversion needed to induce a fol-
lower to share increases in the follower’s 
exclusivity payoff aF.  
(ii) The leader will always share if he expects 
the follower to share and conceal if the 
follower conceals.  
 
Which parameters for βF are plausible? Based on 
results from student participants Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999: 844) assume that 30 percent of 
people have β = 0; another 30 percent have β = 
0.25 and 40 percent have β = 0.6.30 If we assume 
that our student participants have similar β-
values as those reported by Fehr and Schmidt, 
and know about the distribution of these values, 
then we can make the following prediction about 
                                                
30 These values should only be seen as a rough 
approximation, rather than as exact point estimates. See 
Bellemare et al. (2008) for econometric estimates based on 
a representative sample. 
   41 
mutual sharing (remember that L will always 
share if he expects F to share): If L shares, 70 
percent of Fs (with a β > 0) will share if aF = 0 
(the remaining 30 percent are indifferent toward 
the outcome), and 40 percent will share if aF > 0.  
Apart from inequality aversion, other kinds of 
social preferences might impact the fragility of 
knowledge sharing, namely efficiency-seeking and 
reciprocity. If followers (perhaps in addition to 
inequality aversion) think concealment is unkind 
and that leaders who conceal are greedy (“They 
conceal because they want to appropriate my 
shared knowledge”), reciprocity predicts that, in 
this subgame, followers who want to “punish” 
greedy leaders will conceal.31 
Efficiency concerns (e.g., Charness and Rabin, 
2002; Engelmann and Strobel, 2004) make dif-
ferent predictions if L has concealed knowledge. 
If F is concerned with efficiency, he might share 
knowledge because his own payoff is not affected; 
but L’s payoff is increased and efficiency is en-
hanced. 
 
                                                
31 Choosing c in case L chooses c, is a “punishment” for L, if 
L expected F to choose s instead, since L’s payoff is 
smaller under c than under s. Reciprocity theories (Rabin, 
1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Falk and 
Fischbacher, 2006) make similar predictions to inequality 
aversion in this game and so we do not consider them 
separately here. 
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RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
The generic incentive structures in the initiation 
of private-collective innovation follow from the 
two basic assumptions we discussed in section 1. 
As we saw in section 2, it is difficult, if not impos-
sible, to examine possible defection by innovators 
in field studies of private-collective innovation. 
Therefore, we will test the behavioral conse-
quences of the model in a laboratory decision 
scenario that has the same incentive structure as 
the theoretical model we described earlier. Pay-
ing the experimental subjects according to the 
payoffs of the model ensures that the subjects face 
the monetary equivalent of the incentives that are 
assumed in the model (see Smith, 1982, for a 
comprehensive methodological discussion of this 
“induced value” technique). In this way, one can 
observe real economic decisions by human deci-
sion makers who face real stakes in a situation 
that has the same form as the model of knowl-
edge sharing discussed above.  
Since (i) the only crucial variables are the exclu-
sivity payoffs, and (ii) none of the theoretical re-
sults requires bL ≠ bF and/or vL ≠ vF, we sim-
plify the analysis to focus on variations in a by 
assuming bL = bF = b, and vL = vF = v. We also 
assume that k = 0, i.e., out-of-pocket costs are 
absent. In the experiments, we implemented the 
extensive form game of Figure 1. We chose the 
following parameters: b = 10 and v = 20. We did 
not change these parameters during the experi-
ment since, theoretically, they are of minor inter-
est. The exclusivity payoffs vary between four 
levels: ai ∈ {0, 10, 20, 30}, i = L, F. The ration-
ale for four levels of ai is as follows. Note that for 
ai = 0 or 10, the social optimum (i.e., the sum of 
payoffs) is always achieved in mutual sharing. If 
ai = 20, both mutual and asymmetric knowledge 
sharing are socially optimal. If ai = 30, the social 
optimum is that only one player shares knowl-
edge and the other conceals. We included this 
payoff in the design as well, since there is evi-
dence from experiments that efficiency-seeking is 
often an important behavioral motive. It is par-
ticularly interesting to examine how combina-
tions of aL and aF influence the likelihood of 
knowledge sharing, and therefore we vary these 
payoffs systematically, by playing all 16 possible 
payoff combinations aFxaL ({0, 10, 20, 30}x{0, 
10, 20, 30}).  
Each participant in the experiments played 16 
games—each resulting from aFxaL—once. Sub-
jects were randomly allocated to their roles as 
leaders or followers. After they had read the in-
structions (see Appendix B), they made their deci-
sions in each of the 16 games without feedback. 
We programmed and conducted the experiments 
in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). For simplicity, 
subjects saw only the sum of payoffs (b + v) or b 
alone on their screens. Moreover, we told sub-
jects that the only payoffs that would change in 
each of the 16 games were payoffs for the fol-
lower (called y on the screens) that resulted from 
the share-conceal combination (L chooses s, F 
chooses c) and the payoff for the leader (called x 
on the screens) in the conceal-share combination 
(L chooses c, F chooses s). We did not inform 
subjects beforehand about the values of x and y. 
They were told that only these two payoffs would 
change from period to period. However, subjects 
did know that there would be 16 periods. The 
order of x-y combinations was randomly deter-
mined but the same for all subjects.32  
We avoided possibly value-laden content labels 
for the choices, following common practice in 
experimental economics. The players were not 
referred to as “leaders” or “followers,” but as 
“decision maker 1 and 2.” Choices were framed 
neutrally and did not refer to knowledge sharing. 
Choices were termed left or right (in the game in 
Figure 1, left corresponds to share and right to 
conceal).33 Leaders simply decided whether to 
choose the left or right option. For followers, we 
applied the strategy method (Selten, 1967). That 
                                                
32 One might object that, despite the lack of feedback, some 
“virtual learning” (Weber, 2003) might affect all players 
similarly because they all played the games in the same 
order. To test whether this procedure had an impact on 
our results, we ran further experiments (with 51 subjects) 
where we randomized the sequence of games for each 
individual (i.e., each individual played the 16 games in a 
differ- ent sequence). For each of the 16 games we apply 
tests of proportion to test the null hypothesis that the 
frequency of leaders’ sharing decisions in the experiments, 
where everyone played the 16 games in a same order, is 
the same as in the control experiment, where people play 
the games in different orders. We applied the same test to 
the followers’ sharing decisions after the leader had shared 
and concealed. In all, we performed 48 tests. We could 
not reject the null hypothesis (at p < 0.05) of equal 
proportions of sharing decisions in 45 out of 48 tests. We 
concluded that our results (reported below) are robust to 
the sequence of play. 
33 The research methodology behind this design choice is to 
look at the basic incen- tive structure behind knowledge 
sharing. Future research should address the role of context 
for the fragility of knowledge sharing. 
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is, followers had to make a left-right decision 
whether the leader chose left or right. Neither 
leaders nor followers received any feedback. The 
rationale for the strategy method is twofold: first, 
it allows the observation of F’s behavioral reac-
tions to both possible leader choices. This would 
not be possible if F were restricted to making a 
decision after he or she has seen a specific leader 
choice.34 Second, asking for contingent choices 
has the added advantage that feedback does not 
have to be given in each round. This makes deci-
sions between individuals independent, which is 
advantageous in the statistical analysis of the 
data. In particular, since with the strategy 
method without feedback decisions are inde-
pendent between subjects, we can use the ob-
served sharing frequencies to calculate the ex-
pected probability that a randomly matched 
leader-follower pair (not just the actual matched 
pair) plays a certain strategy combination, and—
of particular interest—the probability of mutual 
sharing. This would not be feasible without the 
strategy method and independence of decisions.  
To determine payoffs, leaders and followers were 
matched randomly in each period. However, we 
did not provide feedback on the 16 games until 
the end, when subjects received the earnings 
from each of the 16 games in cash. In each of the 
games, payoffs were determined according to the 
decisions of a randomly matched leader-follower 
pair. During the experiment, payoffs were de-
noted by points. Finally, we exchanged the ac-
cumulated sum of points into Swiss Francs at an 
exchange rate of one point = 0.04 Swiss Francs.  
We conducted the experiments at the Universities 
of St. Gallen and Zurich in Switzerland, with 228 
undergraduates from various fields as experimen-
tal subjects. They provided a total of 3616 share-
conceal decisions. The experiments lasted 30 
minutes and subjects earned on average 15 Swiss 
Francs (approximately US$ 12.3). Across all 
games, leaders and followers earned very similar 
amounts.  
                                                
34 There is evidence that in simple coordination games like 
ours the strategy method does not lead to systematically 
different responses than ordinary game playing. See 
Brandts and Charness (2000) for a systematic analysis. 
They study coor- dination games with and without the 
strategy method. In the experiments without the strategy 
method, subjects are simply confronted with the choice of 
a first mover and then make their decision. Under the 
strategy method, subjects make decisions for all possible 
moves of another player. The behavioral results do not 
differ between the methods. 
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EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Our analysis of the results from the experiments 
on knowledge sharing in the initiation of private-
collective innovation is largely descriptive. Ap-
pendix D contains an econometric analysis that 
corroborates our results statistically.  
 
4.1 Sharing decisions 
Since the only parameters in the experiments are 
combinations of aFxaL, we will present most 
results as a function of these parameters.35  
 
Result 1:  
(i) Contingent on the leader sharing, followers 
share in about 73 percent if aF = 0. If aF 
> 0 the probability that the follower 
shares drops dramatically (to less than 30 
percent) and decreases further in aF. This 
holds for all levels of the leader’s exclusiv-
ity payoff aL.  
(ii) When the leader conceals, we find that the 
probability of followers sharing is on av-
erage 45.3 percent across all aFxaL-
combinations.  
                                                
35 Appendix C documents the frequency of L’s sharing 
choices for all 16 games, as well as F’s choices after L 
shared and concealed. Since we have information from 
the full strategy set of our knowledge sharing game, we 
also document the expected frequencies at which the 
various strategies are played. 
Figures 4a and 4b provide the main support for 
Result 1. For each of the 16 aFxaL-games, the 
figures show the frequencies at which F shared in 
the sub-game after L shared (Figure 4a) and con-
cealed (Figure 4b). A comparison of these figures 
shows that L’s decision strongly affects F’s sharing 
behavior. 
Figure 4a illustrates the contingent probability at 
which Fs are prepared to share knowledge, in 
case L shares. Recall that under our assumptions 
of rationality and selfishness, there should not be 
any knowledge sharing in the event of a positive 
exclusivity payoff aF. If aF = 0, rational and self-
interested followers are indifferent to both shar-
ing and concealment. This implies that behavior 
is undetermined in this case. To the extent that 
Fs are inequality averse or care for efficiency, F 
might be willing to share (Proposition 2). For all 
levels of aL this was the case for between 67 to 74 
percent of followers.  
The followers’ willingness to share dropped dra-
matically for aF > 0. This holds for all levels of 
aL. If aF = 10, the likelihood that F will share 
was between 20 and 29 percent. If aF = 30 it 
dropped even further to between 10 to 14 per-
cent.  
Figure 4b illustrates the contingent probability at 
which Fs are prepared to share knowledge in case 
L conceals. The results show that Fs chose to 
share in between 
37.5 and 53.6 
percent of cases. 
The average over 
all aFxaL-
combinations was 
45.3 percent 
(which is not 
significantly dif-
ferent from 50 
percent, the ex-
pected outcome 
of indifference 
between sharing and 
concealing; t-test with 
individual average 
sharing rates as 
observations).  vations).  
Recall that Proposition 1 predicts that F does not 
share in case aF > 0, and is indifferent in case aF 
= 0, whereas Proposition 2 (in combination with 
plausible parameters) predicts 70 percent sharing 
if aF = 0 and 40 percent sharing if aF > 0. Thus, 
the evidence of F sharing after L has shared ap-
pears to be consistent with Proposition 2. How-
Figure 4: Percentage of followers who share if (a) the leader shares and (b) if the leader 
conceals 
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ever, the fact Fs share in almost 50 percent of the 
cases in which L conceals is inconsistent with 
inequality aversion but consistent with efficiency 
considerations.  
The next result concerns the probability that the 
leaders share knowledge in the initiation of pri-
vate-collective innovation.  
 
Result 2: 
The probability that leaders share is affected 
negatively by both their own and their followers’ 
exclusivity payoffs.  
 
Figure 5: Percentage of leaders who share 
Figure 5 is the main support for Result 2, which 
shows the percentage of cases in which L shared 
in each of the 16 aFxaL-games.  
As Figure 5 shows, the likelihood that L shares 
knowledge decreases in both aF and aL. In case 
both exclusivity payoffs are zero, Ls share in 84.2 
percent of the cases. The probability that Ls 
share is lowest if aF = aL = 30 (it equals 17.5 
percent). Thus, in the inception of private-
collective innovation, Ls take into account not 
only their own exclusivity payoff aL, but also 
their followers’ (aF).  
 
4.2 The fragility of knowledge sharing  
As we have seen, innovators’ opportunity costs of 
knowledge sharing strongly affect the likelihood 
that mutual knowledge sharing will occur in the 
initiation of private-collective innovation. We 
close our empirical analysis by examining the 
fragility of mutual knowledge sharing, using the 
possibilities inherent in collecting data with the 
help of the strategy method with no feedback 
between rounds. The design of the strategy 
method (i) provides many independent observa-
tions and (ii) allows the observation of strategies, 
not just realizations of decisions in the game. The 
likelihood of a certain outcome can be estimated 
(see Appendix C).  
Fragility is operationalized as the change in the 
expected probability of mutual knowledge shar-
ing, when the opportunity costs of sharing 
change. Note that the fragility of mutual knowl-
edge sharing is a composite of L’s and F’s sharing 
behavior. It is therefore an empirical question 
whether L’s or F’s behavior is more important for 
the fragility of mutual knowledge sharing. The 
result is as follows: 
 
Result 3:  
Knowledge sharing is substantially more fragile 
in aF than in aL.  
 
Formally, we define πss(aL,aF) as the probability 
of mutual sharing of two randomly matched in-
novators, dependent on the exclusivity payoffs aL 
and aF. Figure 6 depicts the empirical observa-
tion of πss(aL,aF), which is the expected fre-
quency of mutual knowledge sharing as a func-
tion of all 16 (aFxaL)-games. For a given game, 
the expected frequency results from the probabil-
ity that L shares multiplied by the probability that 
F shares.  
 
Figure 6: The fragility of knowledge sharing - percentage 
of mutual sharing 
We define the marginal change of the probability 
πss in the exclusivity payoffs (i.e., 
Δπss(aL,aF)/Δai, i=L,F), as the fragility of mutual 
knowledge sharing induced by i’s exclusivity pay-
off ai, i = L,F. Figure 6 shows that πss(aL,aF) is 
convex in ai, i = L,F, and more fragile in aF than 
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in aL. Of particular interest is Δπss(0,0)/Δai, 
i=L,F, i.e., the marginal change in the probability 
of mutual sharing once an exclusivity payoff be-
comes positive. The expected probability of mu-
tual sharing drops dramatically, once aF > 0. 
Compare in particular aF = 0 and aF = 10, when 
aL = 0, which reveals a marginal drop in mutual 
sharing of 45.9 percentage points. The drop is 
much smaller in aL than in aF, namely 19.99 
percentage points (compare aL = 0 and aL = 10 
when aF = 0). Importantly, in the initiation of 
private-collective innovation, mutual knowledge 
sharing is substantially more fragile in F’s than 
L’s benefits from exclusivity. In other words, F's 
opportunity costs of sharing represented by exclu-
sive returns threaten mutual knowledge sharing 
more than L's. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
We investigated the relationship between incen-
tives and knowledge sharing when initiating pri-
vate-collective innovation. The first part of the 
study showed that incentives in knowledge shar-
ing give rise to a knowledge-sharing game, a co-
ordination game with multiple equilibria (rather 
than a public goods game, although mutual 
knowledge sharing makes knowledge a public 
good between innovators). Some of these 
equilibria entail mutual sharing. However, the 
analysis also revealed that knowledge sharing is 
fragile: as soon as innovators face opportunity 
costs of sharing, mutual sharing ceases to be an 
equilibrium of the knowledge-sharing game. In 
contrast, mutual concealment is always an equi-
librium in the knowledge-sharing game, albeit an 
inefficient one. The theoretical analysis also re-
vealed that many equilibria entail unilateral 
knowledge sharing, where one innovator shares 
his or her knowledge while the other conceals. 
These equilibria describe genuine conflicts of 
interest in knowledge sharing, and situations that 
would prevent private-collective innovation. In 
the second part of the study, we implemented the 
model in a controlled laboratory experiment with 
monetary incentives that took the same form as 
the incentive structure for knowledge sharing in 
the initiation of private-collective innovation. The 
experimental results demonstrated important 
asymmetries in the fragility of knowledge sharing 
and, in some situations, much more knowledge 
sharing than predicted by purely selfish behavior. 
Taking into account that some people care about 
fairness, mutual sharing outcomes can corre-
spond to equilibrium strategies even when there 
is a conflict of interests between innovators. 
A few limitations apply to this study. Initial deci-
sions might be affected by repeated interactions 
with the same individuals. However, the goal of 
our study was to understand the basic incentive 
structure of the constituent game that underlies 
any repeated interaction. For this reason we stud-
ied a one-shot game that is not confounded with 
repeated interactions. Future works should study 
repeated knowledge sharing games as well as 
non-repeated games with the possibility of multi-
ple followers. Our model did not include funda-
mental psychological dispositions explicitly. Con-
text-specific attitudes or processes might influence 
knowledge-sharing behavior, such as open source 
ideology, altruism, or OSS development routines. 
The initiation of private-collective innovation 
could be facilitated or restrained by cultural fac-
tors specific to the context of software develop-
ment, academia, biotechnology, and so on. How-
ever, from a game theoretical point of view one 
might argue that these factors would be incorpo-
rated into the payoffs of the knowledge sharing 
game (from a game-theoretical view payoffs in 
games are utilities anyway). To the extent that 
these added psychological factors do not change 
the structure of payoffs, our analysis would not 
change. Moreover, our conventional experimen-
tal economics approach of inducing material 
incentives (Smith 1982) allowed us to observe to 
what extent social preferences matter on top of 
material incentives.  
This work presents four implications for theory 
and research. First, to our knowledge, our study 
is the first to investigate the role of incentives to 
share knowledge in the laboratory. We provide 
evidence that economic incentives matter greatly 
in initial knowledge-sharing decisions. From an 
economic viewpoint, sharing or concealing 
knowledge affects costs and benefits for innova-
tors. These results confirm the argument of many 
authors that it is important to conduct cost-
benefit analyses of knowledge-sharing situations 
(Foss and Mahnke, 2003; see also Takeishi, 2002; 
Szulanski, 2000). Our study also demonstrates 
the benefits of an experimental setup for studying 
knowledge sharing in various situations, in par-
ticular where decisions are difficult or impossible 
to observe in field studies. Building on the results 
from this study and the findings of other game 
theoretical work on knowledge sharing (Harhoff 
et al., 2003; von Hippel, 1987), future research 
needs to identify the empirical parameters, such 
as a variety of cost-benefit types, that enable pri-
vate-collective innovation in various fields. They 
may include benefits from unilateral sharing such 
as reputation or signaling. 
Second, since many people not only care for their 
own costs and benefits but also entertain social 
preferences, knowledge sharing is likely to be 
affected by inequality aversion, reciprocity, and 
efficiency considerations. We found that when 
the leader initiated sharing, the extent of knowl-
edge sharing amongst the participants in the 
laboratory experiment exceeded the predictions 
from Proposition 1, and provided empirical evi-
dence for a conjecture in the literature that social 
preferences impact on knowledge sharing (di 
Norcia, 2002; Wasko and Faraj, 2000; Faraj and 
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Sproull, 2000; Orlikwoski, 1992; Kim and 
Mauborgne, 1998; Kogut and Zander, 1996; 
Bergquist and Ljungberg 2001). Interestingly, 
there is also more sharing in situations where 
inequality aversion and reciprocity predict little 
sharing, namely when the leader decides to con-
ceal. A concern for efficiency can explain follow-
ers’ sharing in these situations. 
Future studies should distinguish between the 
various forms of social preferences that impact on 
knowledge-sharing decisions in the laboratory. 
This work should also attempt to investigate the 
transition from a “pure” sharing decision by the 
leader and the immediate follower, to those situa-
tions where interactions between leaders and 
followers recur, and/or other innovators enter 
the game. The results from this work will shed 
more light on the transition from the initiation to 
the maintenance of private-collective innovation.  
Third, our study is important for understanding if 
and how private-collective innovation can diffuse 
in OSS and beyond. Recall that the incentive 
structure in the initiation of private-collective 
innovation makes knowledge sharing highly frag-
ile. Fragility is likely in any field where an innova-
tor contemplates sharing knowledge as a public 
good. By showing that the probability of knowl-
edge sharing drops as a consequence of the op-
portunity costs of sharing, we operationalized and 
demonstrated the fragility of knowledge sharing. 
We found that mutual knowledge sharing is sus-
ceptible to relatively low incentives for not shar-
ing. This result is important for the initiation of 
private-collective innovation: if opportunity costs 
to knowledge sharing are low, innovators are 
more likely to make their work freely available. In 
the case of OSS, the findings suggest that oppor-
tunities to sell innovations in the software market 
should influence the decision to publish software 
under an open source license. However, OSS 
licenses provide an elegant solution to the prob-
lem of the fragility of knowledge sharing in the 
initiation of private-collective innovation. Such 
licenses restrict the opportunities to release binary 
versions of the published code and (unlawfully) 
license it for a fee to a third party, thus limiting 
followers’ opportunity costs. If innovators share 
through an OSS license, they know that followers 
cannot enjoy exclusive financial benefit from 
selling the software. In fact, innovators may hope 
that followers use the software and feed back 
improvements (Raymond, 1998; Lakhani and 
von Hippel, 2003). Future work should investi-
gate the initiation of private-collective innovation 
with different license forms. Although across OSS 
projects in general the most common license is 
the GNU GPL, as we point out in footnote 2, 
there are various forms of licenses providing in-
novators with different weak or strong limitations 
to appropriate exclusive returns from innovation 
(for an overview of licenses, see Lerner and Ti-
role, 2005). Research should investigate the ex-
tent to which these licenses create effective incen-
tives for initiating private-collective innovation, 
too.  
One should expect private-collective innovation 
to flourish only in settings where some forms of 
license limit followers’ opportunity costs (aF = 0), 
and not in others. In the absence of such licenses, 
one should expect private or collective action 
models of innovation to dominate. An important 
emerging area for private-collective innovation 
incentives is research tools for life sciences and 
biotechnology—for example, tools for human 
genome research or genetic engineering of plants. 
In recent years there has been a dramatic expan-
sion in the patenting of these types of tool by 
biotechnology firms, and authors warn that un-
less open source-style licenses are applied to such 
tools, progress could be halted (Hope, 2008: Jef-
ferson, 2006; Broothaerts et al. 2005). In order to 
advance their research, universities are often 
forced to license expensive tools from firms. 
However the funding for these licenses are in 
many cases limited or entirely absent. Although 
universities often contributed to the development 
of these tools in the first place, researchers are 
often not allowed to transfer the innovation to 
public sector institutions or use them to develop 
products, for example agricultural products for 
developing countries. Thus, firms are repeatedly 
accused of blocking innovation rather than using 
patents to share knowledge on which others can 
build. Feldmann (2004) discusses how open 
source-style licenses in biotechnology have the 
potential to bring innovations in this area into the 
public domain, and create downstream, non-
economic rewards by tapping unused innovation 
resources (e.g. smaller research labs or individual 
researchers) that traditional patenting cannot 
reach. Work exploring open source-style licenses 
in biotechnology should investigate innovators’ 
incentives to conceal or share knowledge on re-
search tools. An issue here is the extent to which 
licenses applied to research tools can prevent 
follower-innovators from capturing and commer-
cially exploiting them. To what extent do open 
source-style licenses apply to this area, where 
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innovation is costly, takes longer, patenting is 
already widespread, and where the opportunity 
costs (incentives to defect) may be immense from 
the outset? A thorough investigation of these 
issues will help researchers understand to what 
extent the widespread initiation of private-
collective innovation can be expected in this area. 
The initiation of private-collective innovation 
may also be of interest to policy scholars. Re-
cently, many countries have adopted a policy of 
using OSS in governmental agencies and publicly 
funded institutions. Researchers have investigated 
the consequences of these policies for public ex-
penditure, firm, and industry competitiveness, 
etc. (Ghosh, 2005; Casadesus-Masanell and 
Ghemawat, 2006). Policy research on OSS can 
be complemented with future work on the initia-
tion of private-collective innovation. An interest-
ing situation would occur if at least one follower-
innovator for a software product were a govern-
ment agency committed to OSS policy. This 
could potentially lower the opportunity costs of 
knowledge sharing, implying that innovators 
would be more likely to make their work freely 
available in the public domain. Thus, a policy 
could impact not only on the diffusion but also on 
the initiation of OSS projects. Our study cannot 
reach a conclusion about the effects of an OSS 
policy, but this is an important area for future 
research.   
Fourth, since knowledge sharing plays a crucial 
role in innovation, the relationship between in-
centives and knowledge sharing offers fertile 
ground for the study of the role of incentives be-
yond the firm-market dichotomy. The firm is 
usually defined in terms of asset ownership, con-
tracting and incentives (Holmstrom and Mil-
grom, 1994; Foss, 1996). But there is a contin-
uum of external sourcing methods and hybrids 
between firms and markets (Leonard-Barton, 
1995), which vary in terms of ownership and 
contracting (OSS communities are one of them). 
As Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) comment, 
little is known about the interdependencies 
among the defining characteristics of firms. The 
role of private-collective innovation in software 
reinforces the need to study non-traditional forms 
of economic organization (e.g. Hargrave and Van 
de Ven, 2006). Knowledge sharing and incentives 
could function as signposts for innovation schol-
ars into organizations that blend the characteris-
tics of firms and markets. 
We close with a methodological comment about 
the use of laboratory experimental methods to 
study issues in management and organization 
theory. We argue that studying the causal conse-
quences of incentives in knowledge sharing re-
quires the full observation of all costs and bene-
fits, as well as actual decisions to share or conceal. 
Since these requirements are impossible to fulfill 
in the field, our paper was based on a laboratory 
study where the theoretical model of knowledge 
sharing was implemented. Experimental results, 
such as those from our study, complement field 
investigations. In particular, the tight results from 
the laboratory can help guide field research, 
which has the advantage of being more realistic 
but also the drawback that causal inferences are 
often unfeasible. Our paper joins recent studies36 
that use laboratory methods to study specific 
phenomena relevant to management and organi-
zation theory that are hard to investigate in the 
field.  
 
                                                
36 Recent examples comprise the formation of corporate 
cultures (Weber and Camerer, 2003), bargaining (Zwick 
and Chen, 1999), deception in organizational decision 
making (Brandts and Charness, 2003), leadership (Weber 
et al., 2001), incentives in mergers (Montmarquette et al., 
2004) and policies to foster innovation (Meloso et al., 
2008). 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A: Equilibria of the sequential knowledge-
sharing game. 
 
The extensive form game of Figure 1 has the 
following unique normal form representation, 
where the leader (L) is the row player and the 
follower (F) the column player. F has to make 
decisions at two information sets, and has four 
strategies at her disposal, which we denote as ss, 
sc, cs, and cc. The Nash equilibria of the exten-
sive form game can be found in its strategic form 
representation. We assume that players are ra-
tional and purely self-interested.  
Result A1 (Nash equilibria of the sequential 
knowledge sharing game if sharing is costly):  
If vi > k > 0, then the only Nash equilibrium is 
the strategy profile (c, cc), i.e., L conceals, and F 
conceals in both subgames. This holds irrespec-
tive of ai, i=L,F. 
Result A2 (Nash equilibria of the sequential 
knowledge sharing game if sharing is costless):  
If k = 0, the equilibrium strategies depend on ai, 
i=L,F. We get the following pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium profiles (bold strategy profiles are 
subgame perfect):  
 
Both results follow from the payoffs specified in 
the strategic form representation.  
There is also a host of mixed strategy equilibria. 
They have the following form. In all mixed strat-
egy equilibria, L plays a pure strategy of either 
concealing or sharing with probability 1. In other 
words, in all mixed strategy equilibria it is only F 
who mix. Their mixing probabilities are as fol-
lows:  
• If aL=0 and aF>0, then F mixes s and c 
in both subgames with probability 0.5. L con-
ceals. 
• If aL=10 and aF>0, there are two 
equilibria, in both of which L conceals: (i) in the 
subgame after L has chosen c, F plays c with 
probability 0.6 and s with probability 0.4. In the 
subgame after s F plays c with probability 0.4 and 
s with probability 0.6. (ii) In the subgame after L 
has chosen c, F plays c with probability 0.33 and 
s with probability 0.67. In the subgame after s F 
plays c with probability 0 and s with probability 
1. 
• If aL=20 and aF>0, there are two 
equilibria, in both of which L conceals: (i) in the 
subgame after L has chosen c, F plays c with 
probability 0.67 and s with probability 0.33. In 
the subgame after s F plays c with probability 
0.33 and s with probability 0.67. (ii) In the sub-
game after L has chosen c, F plays c with prob-
ability 0.5 and s with probability 0.5. In the sub-
game after s, F plays c with probability 0 and s 
with probability 1. 
• If aL=30 and aF>0, there are two 
equilibria, in both of which L conceals: (i) in the 
subgame after L has chosen c, F plays c with 
probability 0.7143 and s with probability 0.2857. 
In the subgame after s, F plays c with probability 
0.2857 and s with probability 0.7143. (ii) In the 
subgame after L has chosen c, F plays c with 
probability 0.6 and s with probability 0.4. In the 
subgame after s, F plays c with probability 0 and 
s with probability 1. 
• If aL=0 and aF=0, there are two 
equilibria, in both of which F mixes between s 
and c with probability 0.5. In one equilibrium L 
shares and in the other L conceals with probabil-
ity 1.  
• If aL>0 and aF=0, there are four 
equilibria, which have the same structure as the 
equilibria described above for aF>0. In two 
equilibria, L shares with probability 0 and in two 
equilibria L shares with probability 1. The mix-
ing probability of F corresponds to those for 
aL=10, aL=20 and aL=30.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Strategic form representation of the knowledge sharing game 
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Appendix B: Experimental Instructions 
 
This experiment is about economic decision 
processes. Please read the following instructions 
carefully. You are not allowed to talk during the 
experiment. If you have any questions, please 
refer directly to the instructor. 
The points incurred as income during the ex-
periment are converted to Swiss francs and paid 
out cash. In the experiment, your income is cal-
culated in points.  
One point = 4 Rappen. 
 
Description of the decision situation 
• The decision situation in this experiment 
involves two decision makers. 
• The first decision maker decides first: 
he/she can choose either “left” or “right.” 
• The second decision maker also faces the 
choice between left and right. He/she has to 
choose before he/she knows how the first deci-
sion maker has decided. This means that the 
second decision maker has to choose between left 
and right, both where the first decision maker 
chose left and where he/she chose right.  
• The relevant decision situation is dis-
played schematically  here, as you will see it later 
on the screen:  
 
 
How decisions are made 
The incomes for both decision makers derive 
from the combination of both decisions. If, for 
example, the first decision maker chooses left and 
the second also chooses left, both receive an in-
come of 30 points. If both choose right, they re-
ceive an income of 10 points each. 
 
The income for the first decision maker is shown 
in the first row. The second row indicates the 
income for the second decision maker.  
 
Altogether, you have to decide for 16 situations. 
The incomes generated by the decision combina-
tions vary across the situations: 
(1) if the first decision maker chooses left and the 
second chooses right; 
(2) if the first decision maker chooses right and 
the second subsequently chooses left. 
In the display above, the incomes from these 
situations are marked with x and y. Only the 
incomes x and y vary from period to period 
across the situations. During each period, the 
current values of x and y will be labeled in red on 
the screen. All other incomes remain unchanged 
across the 16 periods.  
 
How do you make decisions? 
• You will be assigned the role of first or 
second decision maker at random. Your role 
assignment will be communicated on the screen.  
• Through all 16 periods you will be either 
the first or the second decision maker.  
• During every one of the 16 periods of the 
experiments you will be rematched to another 
randomly chosen counterpart.  
• If you are the first decision maker you 
have to decide in every period whether you 
choose left or right. 
• If 
you are the 
second deci-
sion maker 
you have to 
decide in 
every period 
whether you 
choose left 
or right for 
both possi-
ble decisions (left or right) taken by the first deci-
sion maker. 
• The income from all decision situations 
will be aggregated and converted to Swiss francs. 
• During the 16 periods you will not know 
how your counterparts decided. You will be in-
formed about your income at the end of the ex-
periment. 
• Your income derives in every period 
from the combination of decisions, given your 
decision and your counterpart’s decision.  
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• Before the start of the experiment, you 
will have to answer two control questions on the 
screen. 
  
Appendix C: Frequency of sharing decisions  
 
In this appendix we document the frequency of 
individual decisions for each of the 16 games. We 
also analyze the strategies and equilibria that 
subjects actually played.  
 
Table 6: Frequency of chosen actions 
In section 2 we explained that a theoretical prop-
erty of the sequential knowledge-sharing game is 
the multiplicity of equilibria in the absence of 
out-of-pocket costs of knowledge sharing. The 
next step is to investigate which of the equilibria 
are behaviorally relevant. We describe them in 
Table 7, which summarizes the distribution of 
choices over the strategy space as a function of 
the opportunity costs of sharing.  
The leader (L) has two strategies, share (s) and 
conceal (c). The follower (F), however, has four 
strategies (see Figure 1): he/she can (i) share if L 
shares or conceals (denoted ss), (ii) conceal if L 
shares and share if L conceals (denoted cs), (iii) 
share if L shares and conceal if L conceals (de-
noted sc), and (iv) conceal irrespective of L’s 
choice (denoted cc). Therefore, the strategy space 
of the whole game is (s, c)x(ss, sc, cs, cc). Since we 
have applied the strategy method in our design, 
we can observe the behavior in the complete 
strategy space of the 16 games.  
Table 7 shows the strategies and—given the sub-
jects’ actual choices—lists the expected distribu-
tion of strategy combinations for the relevant 
cases of (aFxaL)-combinations (each row sums to 
100 percent). Under the assumption that L and F 
are randomly and independently matched, the 
expected distribution is determined by multiply-
ing the observed frequency of s- or c-choices by L 
and the frequency of F’s respective strategy. For 
instance, in the game with (aL=0, aF=0), L de-
cided for s in 84.21 percent of the cases, and F 
chose the strategy ss in 38.39 percent. This makes 
an expected frequency of observing the (s, ss)-
strategy combination of 38.39x84.21=32.33 per-
cent. Equilibrium strategies are shaded, and bold 
letters indicate subgame perfect strategy combi-
nations.  
Strategy profiles (c, sc) and (c, cc) induce a mutual 
concealment outcome ((c, sc) is a non-equilibrium 
profile, however). When no player has opportu-
nity costs of sharing knowledge, then the ex-
pected frequency of mutual concealment is 8.6 
percent. When both players have positive exclu-
sivity payoffs, the expected frequency of mutual 
concealment jumps up to 40.86 percent.  
The four strategy profiles—(s, cs), (s, cc), (c, ss), (c, 
cs)—induce unilateral knowledge sharing, which 
allows at least one party to benefit if exclusivity is 
possible. For instance, if (aL>0, aF>0), then we 
expect unilateral knowledge sharing in 54.63 
percent of cases. Particularly interesting is the 
strategy combination (c, cs), which induces uni-
lateral sharing that results in an unequal payoff 
benefiting L. In our data, the expected frequency 
at which F is prepared to resolve indifference in 
favor of L, if L conceals, is 27.04 percent.  
Finally, the strategy profiles (s, ss) and (s, sc) in-
duce a mutual sharing outcome (compare Figure 
1). In case no player has a positive exclusivity 
payoff, that is if aL=0 and aF=0, we observe that 
the expected frequency of strategy combinations 
leading to mutual sharing (as an equilibrium) is 
61.65 percent. This percentage drops dramati-
cally once at least one player has positive oppor-
tunity costs of sharing knowledge. If L alone has 
positive opportunity costs (aL>0, aF=0), the ex-
pected frequency of strategies that induce mutual 
sharing outcomes is 36.61 percent (16.24 percent 
are consistent with equilibrium play). If only F 
has positive opportunity costs (aL=0, aF>0), mu-
tual sharing does not occur in equilibrium. How-
ever, we observe mutual sharing in 9.51 percent 
of all strategy combinations. In case both have 
positive exclusivity benefits (aL>0, aF>0), the 
likelihood of strategies supporting mutual sharing 
drops to 4.5 percent.  
In summary, mutual sharing occurs particularly 
when it is an equilibrium of the knowledge-
sharing game. Yet, for the reasons discussed in 
section 2.4, we observe mutual knowledge shar-
ing even if it is not an equilibrium. 
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Appendix D: An econometric analysis of sharing 
decisions 
 
An econometric analysis provides further support 
for Results 1 and 2. Table 8 provides economet-
ric evidence for the impact of the exclusivity 
benefits aF and aL on (a) F’s knowledge sharing 
decision after L decided to share; (b) F’s knowl-
edge-sharing decision after L concealed, and (c) 
L’s knowledge-sharing decision. As the share-
conceal 
decision is 
binary, we 
ran a logit 
regression 
with the 
binary 
variable 
(1=share, 
0=conceal) 
as the de-
pendent 
variable. 
The independent variables are dummies for the 
respective levels of aF and aL; the omitted 
benchmarks are aF = 0 and aL. = 0. To account 
for the fact that a subject’s decisions might be 
correlated across games, we calculate robust stan-
dard errors with clustering of decisions at subject 
level (between subjects decisions are independent 
by design).37 Since coefficients of logit estimations 
are hard to interpret, we report the marginal 
effects in Table 8, which shows how an increase 
in ai, i = L,F, influences the probability of shar-
ing.38  
Column (a) reports the results of how F change 
their knowledge-sharing decision, relative to the 
benchmark game where aL = aF = 0. Holding 
L’s exclusivity payoffs constant, we find that the 
                                                
37 A random effects panel model yields very similar results. 
38 Specifically, we calculate the marginal effects when all 
dummies are zero. The marginal effect measures dy/dx 
for a discrete change of a dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
drop in F’s knowledge-sharing rates is quite dra-
matic and highly significant. Relative to the 
benchmark, the likelihood F will share drops by 
more than 45 percent, if his/her exclusivity pay-
off changes from 0 to 10. The likelihood of shar-
ing drops by more than 60 percent, once aF = 
30. L’s exclusivity payoff does not matter: a χ2-
test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
three dummies are jointly not different from zero 
(p=0.194). In other words, in their knowledge-
sharing decision F do not take L’s exclusivity 
payoff into account when deciding whether to 
share knowledge or not.  
Column (b) shows F’s knowledge-sharing deci-
sion, after L has concealed. The estimated 
changes in probability of sharing are small (al-
though in two cases significant) and we do not 
find a systematic pattern. 
Column (c) documents L’s sharing rate, relative 
to the benchmark. L is significantly less likely to 
share if his/her own exclusivity payoff aL is high, 
but also if F’s exclusivity payoff aF is high.  
 
 
 
 
Table 8: Marginal effects of logit estimation of the sharing decision 
Table 7: Expected frequency of strategy combinations given subjects' choices 
  
SOCIAL SOFTWARE AND STRATEGY 
 
 
 
Stefan Haefliger a) 
Eric Monteiro b) 
Dominique Foray c) 
Georg von Krogh a) 
 
a) Chair of Strategic Management and Innovation 
Department of Management, Technology, and Economics (MTEC) 
ETH Zürich, Switzerland 
 
b) Department of Computer and Information Sciences, Norwegian University of Science and 
Technology NTNU, 7491 Trondheim, Norway 
 
c) EPFL, CDM e CEMI, Odyssea 1.16, Station 5, CH - 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland 
 
Published in Long Range Planning vol. 44 2011 page 297-316 
Social software challenges strategic thinking in important ways: empowering creative, inde-
pendent individuals implies indeterminate and uncertain reactions and creations in support of, 
or in opposition to, management’s original thinking. We build a framework that organizes re-
search on social software, taking perspectives from both inside and outside companies. We use 
this framework to introduce the contributions to this special issue in terms of strategy, technol-
ogy, and community and to ask a series of questions for strategy research that pays particular 
attention to value creation and appropriation, the role of technology both as tool and mediator 
between managers and users, and the role that management can play in communities, both as 
leaders and in shaping boundaries. 
  
INTRODUCTION 
Aligning interests, motivating contributions to 
knowledge work, and giving direction to multiple 
business units and market initiatives represent 
daily challenges for the strategist in most compa-
nies. The diversity of contexts within an organi-
zation has led critical management thinkers to 
suggest that in the presence of multiple initiatives 
and discourses, the introduction of a new tech-
nology has multiple unintended consequences for 
organization. New technology is regularly subject 
to power struggles, conflicting goals, and discrep-
ant events (Markus, 1983; Barley, 1986; Or-
likowski, 1992; Ciborra, 1996; Leonardi, 2008) 
which impact on how strategies are shaped 
within organizations.  
Information technology, such as social software, 
may affect the interaction patterns between orga-
nizational members, create new opportunities for 
knowledge and information sharing (von Krogh, 
2002), or unfold the disruptive and possibly 
change-inducing potential of so called “informa-
tional capabilities” (Leonardi, 2007). Informa-
tional capabilities refer to an information tech-
nology’s potential to alter the storage, transmis-
sion, and creation of information in an organiza-
tion. In this respect information and communica-
tion technology (ICT) differs from other tech-
nologies adopted by organizations. Despite the 
broad application of ICT and its potential impli-
cations for company performance (Powell and 
DentMicallef, 1997; Tippins and Sohi, 2003; Ho 
et al., 2011), strategy scholars seldom include the 
properties of ICT in their theorizing on strategic 
thinking, firm growth and its boundaries, or the 
strategies for creating ICT infrastructure (Leidner 
et al., 2010; Yoo et al., 2010).  
The term “social software” grew out of the notion 
of groupware and computer-supported collabora-
tive work (CSCW) and had been attributed to 
Clay Shirky, who denoted software that supports 
group interaction (Allen, 2004; Shirky, 2005). 
Designed to facilitate individual creativity com-
bined with community building, groupware and 
social software have led, in their 1.0 incarnation, 
to novel and significant insights in academic fields 
ranging from technological innovation, organiza-
tional behavior, and management and organiza-
tion theory, to strategy (Sproull and Kiesler, 
1986; Sawhney and Prandelli, 2000; Lee and 
Cole, 2003; von Krogh and von Hippel, 2006). 
Today, social software, frequently annotated with 
Web or Enterprise 2.0, also receives a lot of inter-
est from managers due to its commercial use, 
increased network functionality, massive mobili-
zation of users in some cases, and growing infra-
structure capabilities, such as multi-media 
streaming online.39 The more than enthusiastic 
reception of LinkedIn by investors during their 
initial public offering in May 2011 suggests that 
the commercial promise of a business model in-
volving large numbers of users connected 
through social software inspires investors: secon-
dary market valuations of companies such as 
Facebook, Groupon, or Twitter are interpreted 
along similar lines or else discounted as signs of 
market participants’ exuberance. 
Social software affects the interaction between 
employees within and individuals outside the 
firm, such as members of user communities or 
customers. In many industries, users of technol-
ogy, frequently organized in communities, are 
known to innovate independently of manufactur-
ers (von Hippel, 1988; 2007), and consumers 
have successfully contributed to innovation and 
product development organized by firms (Füller 
et al., 2010; Franke et al., 2010). A perspective 
that privileges firm-internal matters, which the 
strategy field has often tended to adopt 
(Minzberg, 1978), risks overlooking the increas-
ingly powerful and important position that indi-
viduals outside the firm hold, particularly when 
organized in communities (Fredberg, 2009; Dah-
lander and Wallin, 2006). Here, users and cus-
tomers set up the governance structures for their 
communities independently of firms (Markus, 
2007; O’Mahony and Ferraro, 2007), often voice 
criticism toward firms and their products (Kaplan 
and Haenlein, 2010; Kozinets and Handelman, 
2004; Muniz and O’Guinn, 2001), or develop 
rival products in existing markets (Casadesus-
Masanell and Ghemawhat, 2006; Young and 
Rohm, 1999). Hence, in terms of strategic analy-
sis, users and consumers can be “suppliers,” 
“competitors,” or “providers of substitutes,” as 
shown in the examples of widely used Open 
                                                
39 For the original definition of Web 2.0 see O’Reilly, 2005. 
Wirtz et al. (2010: 276) characterize Web 2.0 with four 
factors: social networking, interaction orientation, 
personalization/customization, and user-added value. 
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Source software (OSS) programs like Apache 
servers or the GNU Linux operating system.  
Social software enables the activities of people 
inside and outside companies actively to shape 
strategies. The papers in this special issue offer 
novel, strategic insights on this subject. Social 
software thus holds an intriguing potential. As 
consistently demonstrated over the last couple of 
decades, the actual realization of this potential is 
anything but straightforward. This special issue 
unites authors who have gained deep insights into 
the workings of user communities, their tech-
nologies, and the strategic potential that collabo-
rations between firms and communities harbor, 
in terms of value creation and appropriation. 
This introductory article contributes to an overall 
positioning of the papers, drawing on the litera-
tures from fields such as strategy, ICT, technol-
ogy studies, and innovation. In so doing, we also 
develop a research agenda on social software that 
we hope will inspire strategy scholars to continue 
work in this important area.  
Social software creates platforms for self-
expression (Schau and Gilly, 2003) and direct 
interaction between individuals and so facilitates 
rapid and often spontaneous community building 
(Culnan et al., 2010). Social software also enables 
interaction between online consumers and users, 
their product development efforts (Füller et al., 
2010), their mutual rating of ideas and comments 
(Haefliger et al., 2009), and provides online 
community members with a basic infrastructure 
for their work (Lee and Cole, 2003; Ren, Kraut, 
and Kiesler, 2007; Kohler et al., 2011). Thus, 
social software becomes an exciting topic for 
strategy practitioners and scholars. If social soft-
ware supports management in harnessing the 
creative output of individuals inside and outside 
the firm, the deployment and diffusion of such 
technology may hold considerable business po-
tential. The video game industry, for example, 
experiences rapid growth thanks to social soft-
ware platforms (such as Facebook, which has 
more than 500 million registered users) that serve 
as alternatives to consoles and enable online gam-
ing involving competition among friends con-
nected through such platforms.40  
                                                
40 For example, Zynga, the producer of games such as 
FarmVille, is valued at US$10 billion and is thus 
significantly higher than, e.g., the game industry 
incumbent Electronic Arts (US$7.5 billion) according to 
the Wall Street Journal (February 19, 2011). And while 
90% of all users play for free, 10% of the 250 million users 
At the same time, the “harnessing” metaphor 
often employed by companies interacting with 
communities may be problematic. It might very 
well suggest too much firm influence. The conno-
tations of control embedded in the metaphor 
need to be supplemented or even substituted by 
stronger aspects of cultivation and facilitation. 
Evidence for successful interaction between firms 
and user communities is scarce (e.g. Stam, 2009; 
Stuermer et al., 2009), despite frequently high 
investments by firms in such collaboration (Dah-
lander and Wallin, 2006). IBM, for example, 
invested significant resources into the public de-
velopment of their Eclipse software development 
platform for a duration of five years, before de-
velopment by outside software users outweighed 
IBM’s own development efforts (Spaeth et al., 
2010). There are three major implications result-
ing from the use of social software that favors a 
broader view of collaboration, extending beyond 
the company. First, users can assume several 
strategically important roles for the company 
beyond their obvious role as consumers of prod-
ucts and services. Most notably, they may supply 
ideas for product development (see Fuchs and 
Schreier, 2011), and may offer competing prod-
ucts, as is the case for OSS (see von Hippel, 
2007). Second, social software shares with all 
information technology the capacity to change 
organizations in unpredictable ways, because it 
directly alters the way and the location where 
information is stored, shared, and created (Kling 
and Scacchi, 1982; Markus, 1983; Leonardi, 
2007; 2008). The fact that most “outside mem-
bers” of social software platforms are unknown to 
the firm makes it even harder to foresee how ICT 
will change the organization. Third, users rely on 
social software to organize within online commu-
nities that may or may not be supported by com-
panies, and “develop a life of their own” (Wiertz 
and de Ruyter, 2007: 390). Understanding which 
interventions by the company will be perceived as 
beneficial or obtrusive is key to building lasting 
relationships with members of such platforms 
(Jeppesen and Fredriksen, 2006). In the software 
industry, IBM received credit for their efforts to 
support the OSS community, whereas Sun Mi-
crosystems (now Oracle) was widely criticized for 
their hesitation to release the source code for 
Java, the cross-platform programming language 
                                                
reliably pay small amounts for in-game assets and 
enhancements. 
   57 
(West and Gallagher, 2006; Vaughn-Nichols, 
2009).  
These three implications build a framework, 
which we present in the next section, which or-
ganizes research on social software, taking per-
spectives from both inside and outside compa-
nies. We use this framework to locate the contri-
butions to this special issue in terms of strategy, 
technology, and community. Later, we use the 
framework to highlight open issues for strategy 
research building on the contributions by authors 
in this issue.  
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TOWARD A FRAMEWORK  
Social software has been in use in firms for a 
number of years but standard or best practice 
ways of applying social software are not yet visi-
ble. Managers and researchers alike still struggle 
with questions, such as why and how to interpret 
social software, what are shared perceptions, how 
to appropriate potential business value, when to 
enact work practices involving social software, 
and where to align it with other business proc-
esses. For example, the usefulness of social soft-
ware as an internal communication device is up 
for debate (see Denyer et al., in this issue). 
Moreover, the perception of Facebook as a plat-
form to do business is changing the gaming in-
dustry. Finally, aligning internal software devel-
opment efforts with external community devel-
opment creates new challenges for design science 
(von Krogh and Haefliger, 2010).  
The role of information and communication 
technology in organizations has been the focus 
over decades of research (Markus and Robey, 
1988; Leonardi and Barley, 2010). Early organi-
zational theorists considered technology to have a 
unidirectional impact on organizations, forcing 
management to change some aspect of the orga-
nization according to the contingencies inherent 
in the material features of the technology (Per-
row, 1967). This perspective was later challenged 
by social constructivists who focused instead on 
the members of the organization who responded 
to the technology’s constraints and to each oth-
ers’ use of the technology (for a review, see Leon-
ardi and Barley, 2010), as well as on the material 
features of the technology and its role as an actor 
in organizations (Orlikowski and Scott, 2008; 
Wagner et al., 2009). This highlights the inher-
ently unintended consequences of technology, 
which undermine its overly instrumental “de-
ployment” (Rolland and Monteiro 2007). It is this 
active role of ICT as a mediator between indi-
viduals in organizations and between intended 
and completed actions that complicate strategic 
deployment and adoption of ICT in firms, even 
more so when individuals outside and frequently 
unknown to the company play an important role. 
The study of social software in terms of its strate-
gic implications needs to accelerate, since many 
companies are far advanced with experiments 
connecting individuals inside and outside the 
company. At the same time, strategy research 
should broaden the narrow perspective of 
authoritative decisions about technology adop-
tion that might miss the influential role technol-
ogy plays outside the direct control of manage-
ment. With this special issue and this framework 
we attempt to follow both suggestions. More spe-
cifically, we suggest issues for future research to 
build on a balanced perspective that takes into 
account what management can and should influ-
ence, combined with an appreciation of consum-
ers’ and users’ work outside the firm. Two obser-
vations about social software may help strategy 
scholars understand the connection between the 
perspectives from inside and outside the firm. 
First, social software shapes the behavior of indi-
viduals during evaluation, adoption, early use, 
and adaptation. Second, and closely connected to 
the first point, it enables individuals inside and 
outside the firm to appropriate features of the 
technology in ways unintended by management 
or the technology’s designers (Markus and Silver, 
2008; DeSanctis and Poole, 1994). The case of 
LEGO (Hienerth et al., in this issue) shows how 
the adoption of social software enabled a business 
model where customers co-create new products 
and commercialize them on the LEGO platform. 
In the process LEGO had to overcome significant 
organizational and psychological barriers includ-
ing the fear of losing control. Stuermer et al.’s 
(2009) study of Nokia’s development of the Open 
Source Maemo platform reached a similar con-
clusion.  
There are a number of recent contributions in 
strategy and organization theory that have ad-
dressed issues involving social software in the 
domains of strategy, technology, and community. 
Table 1 presents the proposed framework and the 
research published in this special issue. The table 
distinguishes work that takes a view from inside 
the company, and studies that focus on similar 
issues outside the firm. Rather than aiming at an 
extensive review of this literature, we focus below 
on distinctive characteristics of the two views that 
are relevant for understanding the strategic dy-
namics social software can help generate. First, 
research that bridges the two perspectives has 
emerged in the management of innovation (La-
mastra, 2009; Fuchs and Schreier, 2010; Capra 
et al., 2011), but less so in strategy, management, 
and organization theory (O’Mahony and Bechky, 
2008). The articles brought together in this issue 
bridge the insights that emerge from studying 
managerial intentions as well as user and con-
sumer behavior inside and outside the firm. Stud-
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ies limited to a view from outside the firm may 
bear little business relevance and studies limited 
to a view from inside the firm may ignore activi-
ties by (sometimes unknown) outsiders with sig-
nificant potential impact on strategy and new 
business models.  
Strategy 
Thirteen years ago, Jeffrey Sampler (1998: 349) 
was already proposing that the availability of 
critical information for the same market defines 
industry boundaries, rather than what strategy 
scholars’ considered an industry; firms delivering 
comparable or similar outputs. Thanks to the free 
exchange of information over the Internet and 
the access to social software applications, infor-
mation that assumes a strategic importance for a 
market may be available to individuals inside or 
outside companies. This information may include 
insights into customer preferences as they are 
shared in social networks, ideas for new products 
and services, or information about available sub-
stitutes. On the one hand, research on consumer 
and user communities in the areas of marketing 
and user innovation focused on a view outside the 
firm, and showed that consumers and users build 
communities and organize to achieve specific 
goals (Muniz and O’Guinn, 2001; Moon and 
Sproull, 2001; O’Mahony, 2003; Wiertz and 
Ruyter, 2007). On the other hand, strategy re-
search looked inside the firm to approach the 
question of how firms can make use of consumer 
and user communities in the creation and appro-
priation of value. The results from implementing 
social software here, however, either tend to be 
focused on specific positive cases or provide in-
conclusive results (da Cunha and Orlikowski, 
2008, see also Denyer et al., this issue). Moreover, 
the growing literature on open innovation tends 
to confine the exchange with external parties, 
such as suppliers or users, to identifiable and 
manageable knowledge (Chesbrough, 2003), such 
as research papers, information about patents or 
instruments, or to one-directional search in a 
space of technological opportunities (Laursen and 
Salter, 2006; Jeppesen and Lakhani, 2010). An 
exception can be found in new product develop-
Table 9: Special issue contributions within a framework for using social software from a perspective within and outside 
the firm. 
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ment, where firms have started successfully to 
empower customers to interact among themselves 
(Fuchs and Schreier, 2010). Using social software 
in its simpler (1.0) versions, firms have success-
fully appropriated value from implementing 
strategies targeted at collaborating with OSS 
development communities (Henkel, 2006; Dah-
lander, 2007) as well as modding communities in 
the video game industry (Arakji and Lang, 2007). 
However, so far only Stam (2009) has conclu-
sively linked collaboration with Open Source 
communities with innovation performance. Fre-
quently, the argument in the literature is that 
devoting resources to collaboration strategies with 
user communities would only be beneficial if their 
contribution paid off for the firm (von Hippel and 
von Krogh, 2003; Dahlander and Wallin, 2006). 
A view from outside the company suggests that 
social software generates value for individuals 
because it facilitates interaction with and learning 
from other consumers and users, helps to build 
shared identity, and enables joint creation and 
shaping of technology for own use (Lakhani and 
von Hippel, 2003; Kuk, 2006, Hertel et al., 
2003). Initially, so-called “commons-based peer 
production” relied on users who connected and 
exchanged information through a set of rather 
simple social software tools such as email lists, 
Internet relay chat, and message forums (Benkler, 
2002; Lee and Cole, 2003). While the technology 
became more sophisticated (2.0), the communi-
ties spread and grew: individuals perceived value 
in collaboration and continued to exchange in-
formation in online communities (Ren et al., 
2007). Meanwhile, much of the value generated 
is free and publicly available (including posts in 
online forums and OSS) and consumers and us-
ers take measures to protect this value 
(O’Mahony, 2003), such as non-profit incorpora-
tion, social norms of collaboration, and legal 
refinement (e.g. licenses under which OSS is 
made available). Licenses are designed to keep 
access to information and technology as open as 
desirable or possible, and they include creative 
commons and various Free and Open Source 
software licenses (Lerner and Tirole, 2005, Lang 
et al., 2009). Furthermore, users turn entrepre-
neurs by learning from industry experts and re-
cruiting through a network enabled by social 
software (Haefliger et al., 2010).  
The first contribution to this special issue by Bur-
ger-Helmchen and Cohendet provides guidelines 
and examples of how companies in the video 
game industry foster special relationships with 
community members outside firm boundaries, in 
order to gain insights and creative output from 
collaborating with closely bound and loyal cus-
tomers. The authors classify communities and 
their members in order to understand better ap-
propriate firm action to improve the relationships 
with communities; co-creation of value is a fragile 
process that depends on motivation and mutual 
trust. The second contribution by Hienerth, 
Keinz and Lettl explores the characteristics of 
user-centered business models, building on well-
known cases such as LEGO and IBM. A core 
contribution lies in identifying successful strate-
gies for integrating users into essential business 
processes and overcoming internal resistance. 
The authors elaborate how these processes en-
able the appropriation of value as part of a new 
user-centered business model. The paper by Jar-
venpaa and Lang compares two distinct platform 
ownership strategies for supporting content co-
creation, using real cases from the music industry. 
They find that both firm-based and community-
based platform ownership designs present viable 
strategies. The authors suggest that firm-based 
platform ownership strategies are associated with 
a moderate level of openness (in terms of content 
and community membership) and are most effec-
tive when importance is granted to the coherence 
of the co-created content output and opportuni-
ties (for community members) to express identity. 
Community-based platform ownership strategies, 
on the other hand, are most suitable when novel 
content and opportunities (for community mem-
bers) to develop competence are critical.  
Technology 
ICT is a management tool but, at the same time, 
it harbors a deeply disruptive potential for orga-
nizational change that should not be underesti-
mated. Users inside and outside companies at-
tribute meaning to the functionality offered by a 
technology that can alter the identity of a techno-
logical artifact, such as a search platform or a 
discussion forum (Faulkner and Runde, 2009), 
change work practices such as information seek-
ing (Leonardi, 2007), or, as Shirky (2005) puts it, 
result in a “runtime effect” of ICT. Analogous to 
software, certain characteristics of the program 
become apparent as a runtime effect: only after 
an ICT system is installed and used, can we dis-
cern its real impact on the organization. Bridging 
economics and management, Brynjolfsson and 
co-authors (2009) discuss evidence of the key 
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ways in which firms have transformed the firm, 
supplier relations, and the customer relationships 
by combining IT with changes in work practices, 
strategy and products and services. Case studies 
and econometric work point to organizational 
complements—such as novel business processes, 
skills, and organizational structures—as major 
drivers of the contribution of information tech-
nology. The management literature often uses 
suggestive wording about “harnessing” and “util-
izing” users’ creative thinking. Management 
scholars have frequently adopted a perspective on 
ICT as a tool for gaining access to users’ creative 
output (e.g. Fuller et al., 2010). Less often, 
authors have focused on the biases and novel 
forces social software introduces when mediating 
and organizing work. For example, Dellarocas 
and Wood (2008) demonstrated the impact of 
online trading platforms on the interaction be-
tween users in a way that resulted in massively 
overstated user satisfaction. In a study on market 
research, social software is shown to have the 
potential to generate insights, due to the links it 
enables between consumers, whose commenting 
and rating behavior introduces quality judgments 
and points to trends (Cooke and Bukley, 2008). In 
these examples, social software mediates between 
individuals’ activities and collective outcome in 
ways that are limiting or enabling. 
Users perceive social software as a tool for crea-
tive expression and identity building online 
(Schau and Gilly, 2003; Muniz and O’Guinn, 
2001). Visibility and peer recognition motivate 
consumers and users to share their personal expe-
riences with products and companies, and even 
lead to the development of sub-cultures with spe-
cific vocabularies, creative expressions, and be-
havior (Kozinets, 2002). Conversely, users are 
shaped by social software, the architecture of 
digital artifacts, and the specific practices of col-
laboration that surround and build these artifacts. 
According to Baldwin and Clark (2006) the archi-
tecture of a software can be understood in terms 
of “option value” where collaboration and con-
tributions to its development are guided by the 
user’s perceived rewards in terms of progress and 
recognition. For example, users are known to self-
select into tasks for a collaborative project in OSS 
development (Yamauchi et al., 2000) and the 
specialization of labor in projects follows the logic 
of an evolving and growing technology imple-
mentation (von Krogh et al., 2003). Hence, there 
are strong links between the architecture of an 
ICT system and user behavior, including where 
and to what part of the technology users choose 
to contribute, how they collaborate and commu-
nicate, or even when and where they choose to 
free-ride on what other users provide.  
Contributors to this special issue approach the 
technology of social software from a strategic 
perspective, paying particular attention to the 
motivations and reservations of individuals inside 
and outside the firm. The article by Denyer, 
Parry, and Flowers documents the effort to de-
ploy social software within a large telecommuni-
cations company. Their story is one of disap-
pointment relative to the high-flying promises of 
openness and participation. The authors find that 
the solution implemented did not achieve positive 
outcomes relative to more traditional methods of 
communication. The authors offer valuable in-
sights into political processes, such as monitoring 
and self-promotion, which may have contributed 
to the dismal reception of the new technology. 
They show that the problems uncovered do not 
lie with the technology but with the behavior of 
users, who need to find a delicate balance of 
power between the organization’s leaders and 
employees. The contribution by Frey, Lüthje, 
and Haag studies a search platform for innova-
tive ideas. Social software takes the form of a 
mediator between individual contributors and 
firms performing broadcast search on the plat-
form. The authors suggest that deploying such a 
platform leads to more substantial contributions, 
when it succeeds in attracting intrinsically moti-
vated individuals with diverse knowledge back-
grounds. Both these contributions engage with 
technology and lead the authors to caution 
strategists in being too ambitious towards social 
software and urging them to take users’ perspec-
tives and motivations seriously. 
Community 
Social software is an integral part of the forma-
tion of online communities; it enables individuals, 
who may not be previously linked, to interact and 
socialize. Part of the strategist’s fascination with 
social software stems from the possibility of ac-
cessing a pool of voluntary contributors to strat-
egy, products, services, and business models, who 
are qualified, motivated, and productive. Realiz-
ing this potential requires influence, which is not 
easy to gain. Dan Frye, Vice President of OSS at 
IBM, commented on IBM’s work with the 
Eclipse community (quoted in Kerner, 2010): 
“There is nothing that we can do to control indi-
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viduals or communities, and if you try, you make 
things worse. What you need is influence. It goes 
back to the most important lesson, which is to 
give back to the community and develop exper-
tise. You’ll find that if your developers are work-
ing with a community, that over time they’ll de-
velop influence and that influence will allow you 
to get things done.” 
The question is, what strategic actions toward 
facilitating community interaction are possible, 
for whom, and at what stage (Thompson 2005)? 
Leadership in an online community is fragile 
because gaining influence takes years of com-
mitment and investment (Spaeth et al., 2010) and 
the involvement of companies may change com-
munity members’ motivation (Shah, 2006; Stew-
art et al., 2006). For example, companies must 
decide whether to found a community or to spon-
sor an existing community (West and O’Mahony, 
2005). Both options involve trade-offs with regard 
to control, influence, and costs. Users may look 
beyond the deployment of social software to con-
sider joining existing social networks that span 
across and beyond companies. Thus, it becomes 
important to understand the governance struc-
tures of online communities in order to appreci-
ate the differences and potential risks when ap-
plying leadership practices established in a corpo-
rate context (Markus, 2007; O’Mahony and Fer-
raro, 2007). Leadership in user communities is 
thought to emerge from a meritocracy where 
technical achievement and boundary spanning is 
rewarded with power (Fleming and Waguespack, 
2007). O’Mahony and Ferraro (2007) drew a 
refined picture by showing that technical skill 
alone does not lead to powerful positions: social 
skills of mediation and negotiation among com-
munity members predict future leaders more 
reliably (see also Fleming and Waguespack, 2007; 
Collier et al., 2010). 
Community boundaries form around individuals, 
frequently volunteers, who “interact over time 
around a shared purpose, interest, or need” (Ren 
et al., 2007: 378). Beyond a general understand-
ing of the risks in social software, such as “knowl-
edge leakage” (e.g. Hustad and Teigland, 2008), 
the current strategy literature offers little guid-
ance for firms on how to manage community 
boundaries. Central questions involve the selec-
tion, joining, and adherence to norms in existing 
communities and how this relates to staffing, task 
allocation, or business process involvement. Pro-
fessional communities play an important role in 
the early stages of alliance formation (Rosenkopf 
et al., 2001) but comparable research on online 
communities is largely lacking. A potential re-
course for strategy scholars may be the literature 
on virtual teams, which emphasizes the role of 
facilitators and cautions about the risk inherent in 
spanning different cultural contexts (e.g. Pauleen 
and Yoong, 2001; Martins et al., 2004). This risk 
may grow when linking corporate and non-
corporate contexts. 
The practice of setting up mechanisms to protect 
intellectual property reveals that users, like com-
panies, are concerned about losing control over 
their work (O’Mahony, 2003). However, users 
often operate in a context of private-collective 
innovation outside a corporate hierarchy and 
without labor contracts that regulate their contri-
butions to the community or company (von Hip-
pel and von Krogh, 2003). Because of this, re-
searchers have devoted comparatively more at-
tention to the motivation of users with respect to 
community boundaries than to leadership issues 
involving the firm. The motivation to contribute 
to the community seems to be affected by 
whether or not companies are involved and spon-
sor the community (Shah, 2006; Stewart et al., 
2006), and the extent to which the firm explicitly 
credits and recognizes users’ contributions 
(Jeppesen and Fredriksen, 2006).   
Two contributions in this special issue deal ex-
plicitly with the interactions between firm and 
community. Sutanto, Tan, Battistini, and Phang 
test a model of emergent leadership in a setting 
where users interact and develop network ties. 
The model predicts perceived leadership from 
the interaction patterns of users and may provide 
strategists with specific insights and potential 
levers about companies interacting with user 
communities. The work by Jarvenpaa and Lang 
focuses on boundary management in platform-
based online communities by taking a holistic 
perspective on platform owners and users who 
form communities. Based on findings from a case 
study that compares a firm-sponsored fan com-
munity and an autonomous community of prac-
tice in the domain of digital music remix, they 
discuss the interactions and interdependencies 
among organizational boundaries and tradeoffs 
between openness and control. They argue for 
integrated management of power, identity, com-
petence, and efficiency boundaries as a necessary 
condition for achieving community goals and 
managing what the authors call the “generative 
capacity” of online communities—that is, their 
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ability to create and innovate content around the 
members’ shared purpose. 
This special issue on social software assembles 
works that span perspectives inside and outside 
the firm by studying topics of relevance to strat-
egy and placing the emphasis on the role of con-
sumers and users. Next, we build on these contri-
butions by formulating an agenda for future re-
search. 
 
Table 10: Open research issues for strategy research and social software 
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OPEN ISSUES FOR STRATEGY RESEARCH 
There are several open issues regarding social 
software that deserve the attention of strategy 
scholars. Many of them start with a practical 
appreciation of the business implications of this 
technology: practical technologies for recruiters 
may help human resource management refine 
their frameworks for talent management and 
succession planning; new ways of storing, access-
ing, and locating patient data may bring about 
not only personalized medicine but also changes 
in health management systems; best practices of 
compensating resourceful users boost new prod-
uct development initiatives.  
Generally, strategic management is concerned 
with issues like firm survival, the allocation of 
resources across business units, or the creation of 
novel business models. In what areas other than 
those treated in this special issue does social soft-
ware impact on these questions, and how? To 
begin exploring this question, it is worth consid-
ering the larger ramifications of social software. 
While refined definitions of social software may 
moderate or limit disruptive effects to specific 
business processes, the logic builds on what 
Leonardi (2007) termed informational capabilities 
of information technology. Organizations need to 
grapple with fundamentally indeterminate effects 
when introducing social software at many levels. 
The idea of a “runtime effect” of social software 
(Shirky, 2005) is analagous to the role the system 
environment plays in the execution of a software 
program. Adoption, use, and adaptation of a new 
technology, such as social software, provide con-
texts in which organizational actors define what a 
technology means and what it can do for them 
before and during action (see Leonardi and Bar-
ley, 2010 for a review). Hence, the “manage-
ment” of social software becomes an ongoing task 
that incorporates the user’s role and adapts strat-
egy according to negotiation and structuring of 
work. Against this background, we develop a 
series of questions for strategy research that pays 
particular attention to value creation and appro-
priation, the role of technology both as tool and 
mediator between managers and users, and the 
role that management can play in communities, 
both as leaders and in shaping boundaries. Table 
2 contains the questions evoked by the frame-
work. 
Co-creation and appropriation of value 
The creation of economic value involving con-
sumers and users connected through social soft-
ware may depend on organizational structures 
that support their work. These individuals may or 
may not be members of the same organization. 
Yet, the new links between individuals, the ex-
change of information, and the potential to ad-
here to the norms of such a network may gener-
ate opportunities for knowledge sharing and joint 
work inside an organization that could be very 
valuable, or even disruptive to existing ways of 
creating value. The first question regarding orga-
nizational structure touches upon fundamental 
issues in strategy: which parts of the hierarchy 
remain intact and which may change? How 
might social software impact on formal and in-
formal organizations and their interaction? How 
are decision rights allocated among members in 
business processes with open networks and free 
flows of information? Who has the authority to 
interact with external users? What are the “hid-
den costs” of changes in organization structure? 
The issue of value creation has an important time 
component, in that co-creation between firms 
and outside consumers and users involves build-
ing trust, providing mutual support, and bearing 
joint questioning. If social software is to grant 
access to members from outside the company, the 
meaning of a “common purpose” may change. 
Some consumers show extraordinary loyalty to 
brands and products over a long period of time. 
Creating a shared purpose relating to a brand or 
a product could be a productive way of activating 
value co-creation. This may be costly and time-
consuming—and the question of what supports 
mutual buy-in remains open to research. In their 
seminal study, Jeppesen and Fredriksen (2006) 
showed that explicit recognition of outside con-
tributions had a positive impact on value crea-
tion. 
Value appropriation requires relatively exclusive 
access to an asset or complementary assets from 
which products or services can be derived. The 
growth of business models that contain some 
“free” elements, and the use of advertising to 
collect revenue (McGrath, 2010), indicate that 
appropriating value from user-generated content 
may become easier. However, the creative com-
mons family of licenses may lead to the growth of 
the number of domains where appropriation of 
others’ work becomes less straightforward, and 
companies can no longer count on unsuspecting 
users who, sometimes ignorantly, pass on the 
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rights to their intellectual property (von Hippel, 
1988). With the growing awareness of intellectual 
property infringements, we also expect more 
public awareness of ownership. The creative 
commons movement actively educates users 
about their rights and advocates their making a 
conscious choice about how to license creative 
work.41 Based on their study of music remix 
communities that have adopted creative com-
mons content licenses, Jarvenpaa and Lang (in 
this issue) argue that sustainable community-
based participation in deeper forms of co-
creation practices—that is, creating multi-
generational product derivatives—requires new, 
nonlinear kinds of authorship certification. In 
particular, they point to the incorporation of 
software-automated attribution trees into the 
creative commons license design as a possible 
solution to recognizing complex authorship struc-
tures and providing an incentive for community 
members to continue to contribute content to co-
creation communities (in the example of cultural 
goods). In software, OSS licenses limit the possi-
bility of users and firms appropriating the rights 
to software components for re-sale. Important 
works by Henkel (2006) and Dahlander and 
Magnusson (2007; 2008) have classified a series of 
strategic approaches to this difficulty encountered 
by software companies. 
Future research may uncover generic patterns in 
business models that take advantage of assets co-
created with consumers and users. The work by 
Hienerth and colleagues in this issue takes a ma-
jor step in that direction. Following McGrath 
(2010), who suggested that successful business 
model innovations are discovery driven, Hienerth 
and colleagues suggest that the issue of “runtime 
effects” of ICT may even prove to be an advan-
tage for firms that experiment with technology 
like social software. Once deployed and subject to 
adaptation, social software platforms may evolve 
in unpredictable directions. McGrath (2010: 254) 
points out that business model experimentation 
takes place across and within companies. In this 
way, the use of platforms such as Facebook may 
alter information flows across and within firms, 
leading to new opportunities for products and 
services. Consider Zynga, which produces online 
games: friends already connected via a social 
software platform (Facebook) may compete free 
of charge against each other in online games or 
                                                
41 For further information about creative commons see 
http://creativecommons.org/about/. 
acquire certain in-game assets for improved per-
formance, and so on. Cross-promotion activities 
among games published by Zynga may retain 
customers or introduce further products and serv-
ices as the user base grows. The notion of busi-
ness model portfolios (Sabatier et al., 2010) could 
be a promising starting point for scholars who 
want to theorize about complementary strategies 
for value appropriation using social software. 
Contextualizing social software 
From the perspective of changing opportunity 
structures and informational capabilities, social 
software is both a tool and mediator in organiza-
tional processes. Maintaining balance and achiev-
ing specific goals from a managerial point of view 
entails paying attention to four factors: context, 
power, ethics, and trust. All these factors deserve 
more explicit attention in future research to sup-
port strategists. First, social software is applied to 
a specific organizational context or business 
process. There is a choice of maintaining and 
supporting an existing context or accommodating 
work involving social software. Are certain busi-
ness processes more amenable than others to 
work practices involving social software? What 
part do contingencies such as hierarchical infor-
mation barriers, openness to new organization 
members, privacy issues, or prior communication 
patterns play? Does adaptation of the social soft-
ware change the way it’s received in the organi-
zation? Does one specific type of work fit better 
with social software than others? Can strategy 
processes be opened to outside participants 
through social software? Strategists should re-
member that ICT can be heavily customized or 
designed in-house. Hypothesizing about contin-
gencies and adaptation after adopting technology 
may pave the way toward creating a favorable 
context for using social software in a way that can 
be perceived as successful by both users and 
management. Case studies of more or less suc-
cessful implementations of social software along 
the lines of the contributions in this special issue 
may help to identify additional context factors. 
Second, power struggles are an important ele-
ment in a number of areas of technology man-
agement, from the viewpoint of institutional the-
ory (Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2006) as well as 
from an organizational perspective (Leonardi and 
Barley, 2010). Proponents of specific technologies 
form networks (Garud, 2002) or change institu-
tions (Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2006) by lever-
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aging and applying legitimacy and framing 
strategies to supersede their opponents. On a 
micro scale, actors within one organization or 
community may dominate others in defining 
modes of use and work practices involving social 
software. Leonardi and Barley (2010) suggest that 
because the construction of meaning and organi-
zational change occurs at multiple levels and 
phases of ICT implementation, and because its 
outcome is indeterminate, both human activity 
and the material features of the technology are 
significant for the outcome of organizational 
change. Power struggles may well determine the 
result of strategic initiatives and challenge strate-
gic management in terms of organizational justice 
and fairness. A pertinent question in this regard is 
who is allowed to access information on social 
software platforms, and for what purpose (for a 
review see Colquitt et al., 2001).  
Third, social software can be perceived as a me-
diator between groups of users and their respec-
tive positions. As a platform for exchange, a filter 
of information and knowledge, and as facilitator 
of organizational change, technology inevitably 
bears values and sides with certain perspectives 
that may reflect the organization only partially or 
privilege certain (powerful) individuals. Consum-
ers can become fiercely critical of companies, 
management, or other employees (Kozinets and 
Handelman, 2004) and voice criticism even while 
generally advocating the brand they criticize 
(Muniz and O’Guinn, 2001). Social software may 
suddenly create opposing factions that were pre-
viously hardly aware of each other. ICT may act 
as platform for the voices of consumers, users, or 
developers who loudly and explicitly vent what 
they could not say before or what went unheard 
by management. Apart from information flows 
and employee motivation, such confrontation 
may require ethical deliberation from the strate-
gist before and during the implementation of 
social software. Where does learning end in user 
communities and where does disruption for the 
company begin? What is the correct and appro-
priate level of respect toward emerging criticism, 
internal and external? How and when can social 
software be integrated into the work practice and 
become a balanced platform, guarantee equal 
access, or prevent uneven coverage of organiza-
tional events? The process by which social soft-
ware co-evolves with organizations is strategically 
important, and the opportunities and limitations 
in managing and mediating co-evolution deserve 
more attention in future research. 
Fourth, the development of social software as a 
new step in building virtual relations has given a 
new edge to the issue of trust. It goes without 
saying that fraudulent behavior, forgery and pre-
tence have not suddenly been spawned by the 
virtual world and social software. Questions 
about what is the original and what the copy, not 
to mention the evaluation of informational goods 
that are the object of commercial transactions, 
have given rise to trust issues and highlighted 
how crucial trust-building mechanisms are to the 
functioning of markets and communities since the 
beginning of time. But the development of virtual 
relations and social software has increased the 
need for new trust-building mechanisms. What is 
at stake here is the entire range of mechanisms 
that facilitate interpersonal and interorganiza-
tional transactions, given the new conditions for 
knowledge transactions and exchanges: increas-
ing specialization, increasingly asymmetrical dis-
tribution of information and assessment capabili-
ties, ever greater anonymity among interlocutors 
and ever more opportunities for identity theft. 
Clearly, new methods need to be devised to “cer-
tify” the knowledge circulating through virtual 
relations within a context where inputs are no 
longer subject to control. 
Contextualizing social software means studying it 
as both the tool and mediator of organizational 
change that is triggered, facilitated, and aided by 
management. “Contextualizing” implies a proc-
ess of construction, where users form networks, 
communicate across boundaries and exchange 
information that may alter their identities and 
work or question power relationships. That is 
why contextualizing social software may make 
power relationships transparent and bring forth 
ethical issues that researchers can analyze in the 
nascent structures of organizations. Actionable 
strategy research gives managers insights into 
other organizations’ experiences of the demands 
put on them by very sophisticated or recalcitrant 
users, internal or external to the organization. On 
the one hand, internal users may undercut hier-
archies by way of informal communications via 
social networks; on the other, managers scan 
Facebook entries before hiring. Issues pertaining 
to power relations and ethics run in several direc-
tions and call for research that makes these issues 
transparent and relates them to technology. Such 
research should also balance the perspectives 
between management and users, or internal and 
external company stakeholders.  
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Co-existing with communities 
Social software plays an instrumental role in fa-
cilitating group work and bringing individuals 
together to form communities. Individuals gather 
around a shared purpose or attach to other 
members (Ren et al., 2007) resulting in communi-
ties that produce new technology (Sawhney and 
Prandelli, 2000) or celebrate certain forms of 
consumption (Muniz and O’Guinn, 2001). On-
line communities are organizations in their own 
right that incorporate and govern their work 
(O’Mahony and Ferraro, 2007), enable joining 
and specialization of labor (von Krogh et al., 
2003), and allow firms to sponsor or regulate 
work (Shah, 2006; Bonaccorsi et al., 2006; West 
and O’Mahony, 2005; Capra et al., 2010). The 
value of social software-enabled communities for 
business seems obvious in terms of the knowledge 
they develop and conserve (Brown and Duguid, 
2001). There are many types of online commu-
nity working with various purposes and breeding 
all sorts of interests and passions. Can companies 
emulate the best of the governance structures of 
online communities? And if so, what type of 
community should serve as a template for learn-
ing? Or, more radically, will leadership need to 
be fundamentally recast in terms of open-ended 
notions of governance (Hess and Ostrom 2007)? 
The relationship between firms and online com-
munities is not well understood in organization 
theory, where outlines became visible for such a 
relationship to communities located within the 
perimeters of the firm and operating face-to-face, 
yet independent and “bottom-up” (Thompson, 
2005). The attempt to gain influence in a com-
munity may be a struggle; and exerting influence 
may bring uncertain outcomes for user motiva-
tion and user identification with the community’s 
purpose. The study of leadership that bridges and 
connects firms and communities is an open field 
for management research. 
Similarly, the discussion of community bounda-
ries raises questions about the purpose of a com-
munity, its membership base, and its dynamics. 
First, purpose may play a central role within the 
work practice and life context of the individuals 
who become members of the community (Muniz 
and O’Guinn, 2001). Communities bear and 
develop crucial knowledge in organizations 
(Brown and Duguid, 2001) and there is no reason 
to believe that communities whose users span 
organizational boundaries fall short on their abil-
ity to develop, protect, and share knowledge (e.g. 
Lerner and Tirole, 2002; Sawhney and Prandelli, 
2000). Purpose and membership seem tightly 
linked, not only for the ex post definition of what 
the community is about, but because individuals 
working on similar issues perceive the need to 
exchange and learn from their peers and mentors 
(Lave and Wenger, 1991). While this observation 
is general and pervades studies of collective ac-
tion (Oliver, 1993; Ostrom, 1998), it translates 
into a series of questions regarding the use of 
social software whose technical implementation is 
more or less cost-free via the Internet. If firms 
provide opportunities to interact, individuals 
sharing similar interests are likely to pick up and 
exchange information. Importantly, the possible 
effects of a community on work practices within 
an organization are a direct consequence of the 
relatedness and bond that move an individual to 
join a community in the first place.  
Consider the fictitious example of a social soft-
ware platform (such as LinkedIn or Xing) for the 
recruitment of management talent within a spe-
cific industry. Naturally, prospective talent will 
rush to become visible on the platform, and so 
will recruiters. Given an open political and cul-
tural context it becomes easy to see how labor 
market participants within that industry may join 
such an emerging community to discuss the firms’ 
strategies, voice their ideas, and challenge each 
others’ ideas. The platform may represent both a 
labor market opportunity as well as a branding 
and reputation challenge for participating and 
sponsoring firms. What policies should accom-
pany the implementation of social software for 
such a platform? The issues include the eligibility 
of community membership and the authority to 
set boundaries, both internal and external. Co-
existence with user communities means that 
authority for such policies is either shared with, 
or delegated to, members outside the organiza-
tion, particularly if the company is only a mar-
ginal member.  
Last, the research issues become even more pro-
nounced when we consider the dynamic proper-
ties of community boundaries. There is particular 
value in search that bridges knowledge domains 
(Poetz and Prügl, 2010; Laursen and Salter, 
2006) and, thus, in community membership that 
expands in unpredicted ways. On the downside, 
reputation risks increase because of the nature of 
social software applications, as we discussed 
above (Barwise and Meehan, 2010). Research on 
the dynamic properties of community boundaries 
is needed, particularly regarding communities 
that extend beyond the boundaries of one com-
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pany. Jarvenpaa and Lang (in this issue) suggest 
that creating both enabling and constraining 
boundaries is essential for the sustainability of the 
communities observed and that these (interde-
pendent) boundaries need to be managed holisti-
cally and renegotiated with the community on an 
ongoing basis. This raises the important question 
of the link between firm sponsorship and com-
munity boundaries, which has not been fully 
explored. The presence of a company in a user 
community may not only affect members’ moti-
vation and work practices (Shah, 2006), but also 
the membership dynamics and growth of the 
community.  
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CONCLUSION 
Social software challenges strategic thinking in 
important ways: the articles in this special issue 
show strategy practitioners meaningful ways to 
deploy social software successfully, and strategy 
researchers which critical challenges deserve 
more attention. In our introduction we have 
summarized the open research issues along three 
dimensions that we believe are critically affected 
by the massive changes to everyday work in or-
ganizations, due to growing use and acceptance 
of social software within and across companies. 
First, value creation and value appropriation can 
gain momentum through interaction with con-
sumers and users inside and outside the firm. 
Referring to collaboration with users, Jarvenpaa 
and Majchrzak (2010) talk of vigilant interaction 
that involves simultaneous knowledge protection 
and sharing. The balance between sharing 
knowledge with consumers and users and protect-
ing knowledge assets to appropriate value is sub-
ject to experimentation in practice and ongoing 
research in strategic management and organiza-
tion theory. Users who had been careless about 
the rights to their content and innovations (von 
Hippel, 1988) are becoming more aware of avail-
able licenses for their intellectual property (ease of 
use of creative commons and Open Source li-
censes) and less sensitive about their privacy (us-
ing Twitter and location-based services such as 
foursquare or LocalUncle). A logic of co-creating 
strategy may extend the notion of emergent strat-
egy to very active and loyal customers and users 
outside the company, and create opportunities 
for strategists who understand and internalize the 
two perspectives of inside and outside the com-
pany. 
Second, as a technology, social software chal-
lenges not only competitive dynamics in indus-
tries but also the structure of organizations. With 
the increasing digitization of products and serv-
ices, interaction among consumers and users 
becomes easier and cheaper. Our behavior as 
purchasers of e-books depends on the device we 
use for reading them (mobile or at home, etc.) 
and recommendations from friends and strang-
ers. The competitive landscape is shaped by what 
Yoo, Henfridsson and Lyytinen (2010) call the 
layered modular architecture, because the choice 
of a platform—staying with the e-book example, 
is a choice of both hardware (e-book reader) and 
social network (recommendations). Thus, social 
software may appear to be a tool of strategic 
choice and at the same time a mediator of rela-
tionships between the firm and users inside and 
outside the firm. Frey, Lüthje, and Haag (in this 
issue) make the point that empowering and re-
stricting the user goes hand-in-hand with receiv-
ing substantive user contributions. This balance is 
also a question of power relations; the design and 
implementation of social software needs to take 
into account that these relations can substantially 
alter or disrupt organizational processes (Leon-
ardi, 2007). 
Third, communities grow and build on social 
software applications that enable users and con-
sumers to interact. Two choices impact strategic 
thinking: leadership and boundaries. To what 
extent should management lead a community 
and to what extent should strategists influence the 
extent of growth and influence of the commu-
nity? Again, both decisions are constrained and 
enacted as part of a balancing act that makes the 
community possible in the first place. A logic of 
co-existence can guide strategic thinking when 
deciding about sponsoring a community by set-
ting up social software infrastructures and sharing 
knowledge. The contribution of Denyer and col-
leagues in this issue alerts management to the 
pitfalls this can entail. The same logic may guide 
leadership that can be shared or distributed 
across community members who stand out inde-
pendently of, and possibly outside, the firm. 
A strategic approach to social software should 
start with the insight that empowering creative, 
independent individuals implies indeterminate 
and uncertain reactions and creations in support 
of, or in opposition to, management’s original 
thinking. New business opportunities abound and 
an experimental approach to strategy (McGrath, 
2010) may be guided by the signposts erected by 
successful companies, who maintain long-term 
relationships with their users. A number of these 
are described and analyzed in this special issue. 
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3. TECHNOLOGY 
“The primary driver of that [reuse] decision is making the project the best it could be. The fact is that we're mor-
tal and we don't have an infinite amount of time to rewrite everything. So even if the other project's code isn't per-
fect but good enough, you're simply going to use it because if you've got a thousand bugs to fix you don't want to 
spend the next year rewriting all the software you could just use from someone else.”  
Interview with Mark Gilbert of Abiword, by phone, March 24, 2004 
Technology is fundamental to collaborative innovation. Historical examples may recount cases of col-
laborative innovation without reliance on ICT (Allen, 1983) but it is the advent of the Internet, IRC, 
email, and, particularly, groupware and computer supported collaborative work (Allen, 2004; Shirky, 
2005) that is of interest for organization and management science today in order to understand how 
collaborative innovation unfolds and is organized by those involved in its unprecedented speed. The 
second role that technology plays is the focus of innovation. For reasons of economic relevance and the 
accessibility of data and intermediary knowledge artifacts, as explained below, this thesis favors techno-
logical innovation without completely ignoring other innovations, however. This section contains three 
essays that focus on two levels of collaborative innovation from the perspective of technology: first on 
the collaborative groundwork by asking what supports knowledge reuse in the form of code reuse in 
open source software development, and, second, on the design and integration of strategic information 
systems. 
The logic that guided the study of technology in collaborative innovation started with a series of close 
analyses of how developers work when collaborating over a distance and over the Internet, using open 
source software development as the empirical context. We asked: how does collaborative innovation 
differ from innovation within one organization as described in the textbook examples (for software, see 
for example Cusumano, 1991)? And how do the structural features of an evolving technology influence 
the allocation of work effort in collaborative innovation (von Krogh, Stuermer, Geipel, Spaeth, Hae-
fliger, Baldwin, 2011)? The first essay in this section documents our findings related to knowledge re-
use in open source software development.  
Moving from the development of specific technologies to the design of systems, the second essay in this 
section takes a look at the interaction between designers of information systems inside firms and devel-
opers of systems and system components outside the firm in order to understand the design process, as 
a special case of innovation, when it becomes collaborative. 
The third essay is empirical again and looks at the connections between projects that each build com-
ponents of a larger system that is being integrated without anybody assuming the role of systems inte-
grator. A close analysis of collaborations across projects reveals that the code is part of the social fabric 
that developers use to connect with each other and to connect their own work with others’ work in the 
system. Developers build interfaces to bridge components following a negotiation process with users 
who specify the technical requirements of the interface (and the system) by reusing existing code and 
forking code to enable experimental, organizational as well as technical, branches.  
There are important, current examples of collaborative innovation that focus on low-tech innovations 
such as Wikipedia (Garud et al., 2007) or cumulative problem solving and idea generation (Füller, 
Matzler and Hoppe, 2008; Jeppesen and Lakhani, 2011). This thesis privileges the study of technologi-
cal innovation for a few reasons, none of them being an exclusive justification for studying technology, 
rather in combination the study of technological innovation holds specific promises for understanding 
the organization of collaborative innovation in close touch with the details and intricacies that collabo-
ration processes entail. First, technology as a source of innovation drives market success in many indus-
tries including software (Brynjolfsson and Hitt, 2000; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991) and entertainment 
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(Fisher, 2004; The Economist, 2011). The development of new technology is economically and socially 
relevant. 
Second, collaborative innovation is frequently cumulative when focusing on technology development, 
an extreme case being the GNU Linux operating system that has been in continuous development 
since 1991. Technological artifacts, such as software code, carry explicit knowledge and can function 
independently as modules, components, or preliminary systems. Depending on the openness of the 
system, see below, the cumulative nature of software means that certain sections of the software 
“stack” can be reused and run in or as part of another system for a user who may or may not have 
contributed to its development. A similar argument can be made for text (Wikipedia), design blueprints 
(fashion, sports, or the example of Open Source Ecology used as illustration above to design heavy 
machinery) or entertainment (production procedures in Machinima, for example). Observing the cu-
mulative and reusable characteristics of technological artifacts allows for a certain granularity in the 
study of collaborative innovation because the organization of the innovation process becomes more 
visible and traceable through he technology that is being assembled or created. Adding, reusing, fixing, 
or changing a specific software code file leaves a mark on the overall system, permits others to evaluate 
and react on the changes made and triggers further tests and use cycles. It is not surprising that tech-
nology development occurs in cycles of evaluation and implementation but that the cumulative nature 
of the activity, when carried out in a collective, allows an observation of the organization of the activ-
ity. 
Third, technology, such as software code, can be made publicly accessible and traceable through its 
development stages thanks to licensing it as open source. The same may be true for artwork and text 
under creative commons. However, the history of Free and Open Source licenses has paved the way 
for artwork and text to be published with the freedom to use and share and redistribute the work, for 
example via the Creative Commons licenses42. The important point, here, is the access and permission 
to use. As legal scholars have pointed out, collaboration on a broader, societal scale will bring welfare 
to society through innovation if, and only if, prior work is accessible as freely as possible and if the ac-
tivity of reuse is not sanctioned or discouraged (Lessig, 2004; Lee, 2008). With access and the permis-
sion to use publicly available technology new users can join and become collaborators (von Krogh et 
al., 2003). The details about the organization of the innovation process can be studied when the source 
and destination of the technological artifact can be observed: a situation ideally available in the case of 
open source software development. 
Fourth, the development of technology is traditionally the domain of research and development de-
partments in companies or applied science educational institutions. The advent of Free and Open 
Source software development by volunteers created a puzzle for organization scholars (Lerner and 
Tirole, 2002) who struggled to explain why and how volunteers collaborated on a long term basis to 
create complex technology without being co-located or knowing each other from face-to-face interac-
tion. Thus, while other forms of collaborative innovation matter, it is technological innovation that 
posed the salient questions to organization scholars regarding motivation, coordination, and competi-
tive dynamics (von Krogh and von Hippel, 2003). 
This thesis makes only a small contribution to an agenda that focuses on technology when studying 
collaborative innovation. The difficulties and challenges that developers face when collaborating over 
a distance and when facing complex tasks are considerable and, for researchers, spawn a long agenda 
for organization and management science. The growing practice of individuals to reuse works that are 
free as well as protected by intellectual property rights (Lee, 2008) shows the need for better under-
standing how collaboration occurs with and through technology. The next section on social practice 
will pick up the interplay of technological and social process in more detail. However, starting from a 
perspective of technology development, there is an urgent need to better understand what enables 
individuals to select their point of departure in collaborative innovation and how this decision interacts 
with the architecture of the technology under development (Baldwin and Clark, 2006). From the per-
spective of the firm, how can non-contractible resources, such as voluntary contributions, extra effort, 
loyalty, creativity, identification, advocacy, or sacrifice be attracted and retained?  
                                                
42 For more information: http://creativecommons.org/ 
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A structured approach to thinking about the difficulties involved in initiating and coordinating collabo-
rative innovation may start with a simple yet frequently applied typology of “open systems”43. They 
are markets for technologies, open standards, and open source. First, markets for technologies enable 
transactions involving clearly defined knowledge goods such as patents and licenses (Arora et al., 
2001). The notion of open innovation extended this idea by making the use of technology markets a 
strategic priority for companies when developing innovations (Chesbrough, 2003). Open innovation 
does not explicitly exclude openness for ideas under development but makes it very clear that company 
boundaries can be crossed only if sufficient information is available for contracting (Chesbrough, 
2003). Contracts may go either way, the company can outlicense knowledge and receive royalties from 
users of the knowledge or the company may inlicense knowledge in return for a fee or compensation to 
the creator or broker. Hence, what crosses company boundaries in the funnel leading from idea to 
marketable product is contractible knowledge. However, this may only be a perceived limitation as 
recent efforts by companies in the field of mass customization set up contracting schemes that define 
the ownership of ideas to be created at the outset (Ogawa and Piller, 2006; Füller et al., 2007). The 
term open innovation tends to be used more broadly to cover also initiatives by companies to set up 
platforms to interact with consumers and users (Franke and Piller, 2004; Fuchs and Schreier, 2011), a 
case categorized under open standards discussed next. 
Second, the term open standards can be used as shorthand for systems designed to enable interaction 
on an interface that accepts and gives back knowledge, from product ideas to software applications to 
entertainment. Admittedly a large category of systems, they cover a host of activities aimed at generat-
ing visibility in user communities, diffusing the reach of proprietary technologies, or sourcing talent 
and ideas through innovation contests. The systems have in common that they rely on a standard or 
interface that accepts knowledge of a certain format without pre-defining its content. Before going 
further, this claim needs some clarification. 
Open standards, and standards in general, can create platforms that function as ecologies for multiple 
businesses (Gawer and Cusumano, 2008). The term “open standard” can refer to the requirement of a 
reference implementation in open source software development or to the transparency of the standard 
setting process, as used for example by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C). Business ecosystems 
built around a central standard or platform include the Apple App Store, Facebook, Microsoft, the 
Open Handset Alliance, and many others in industries ranging from telecommunications, to automo-
biles and electronic payment systems (Gawer and Cusumano, 2008). Social networks, such as Face-
book, today substitute for consoles in the video gaming industry, which goes to show that sufficiently 
large platforms can fundamentally change the way industries work. Android, the operating system for 
mobile devices produced by the Open Handset Alliance (Google, HTC, Qualcomm and others) rivals 
Apple as a standard with more openness in terms of access to software source code. This example 
points to the open question of whether more open standards (Android) may prevail over less open 
standards (Apple) and we are witnessing a struggle between standards on a global scale. 
Network effects play an important role in the competition between platforms (Economides and 
Katsamakas, 2006, Eisenmann, Parker and van Alstyne, 2011) but for innovation learning and access 
to knowledge are needed as well, that is, access to fluid, partly non-contractible resources fundamental 
to innovation. For the case of online communities, Faraj, Jarvenpaa, and Majchrzak (2011) argue that 
these resources are passion, time, identity, disembodiment of ideas, socially ambiguous identities, and 
temporary convergence. Open standards enable collectives of firms and individuals to set up rules for 
collaborating and structures (such as a technological architecture) to locate points of relative interest: 
the architecture of the platform can inform contributors about the value of their contributions before 
actually implementing them (Baldwin and Clark, 2006). It is important to remember that the setting of 
standards is fraught with challenges due to resistance, fragmentation and legitimacy issues in collective 
action (Garud, Jain, and Kumaraswamy, 2002). The evolution towards modular systems can alleviate 
certain difficulties and facilitate contributions on various levels: setting standards as well as material 
contributions to collaborative innovation (Baldwin and Clark, 2006; Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006). The 
way the standards are set, that is the making of the design rules, tells a story of how a system evolved 
                                                
43 I’m grateful to Carliss Baldwin for suggesting this typology in her recent talk at the Strategic Management Society annual 
meeting in Miami on Nov 6, 2011. 
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(Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006) but also how it can be extended: and it is to the degree that it is modular 
that new additions can be fitted, holes filled, and features added44. The additions are uncertain and the 
knowledge added cannot be known in advance. This uncertainty characterizes open standards over 
markets for technology. 
Whereas on markets for technology transactions involve clearly defined knowledge, open standards 
create a platform for knowledge in creation and lend themselves to collaborative innovation in early 
stages of knowledge creation. This can mean that companies successfully integrate users into their core 
business processes when developing innovations by building interfaces so that innovative users can 
centrally influence product development in a process of co-creation (Hienerth, Keinz, and Lettl, 2011). 
The companies these authors studied (Lego, IBM, and Coloplast) all asked for a transfer of intellectual 
property rights in order to exploit the ideas commercially. They used non-monetary incentives to re-
ward contributors and they allowed users to become entrepreneurs building products issuing from 
collaborative innovation (Hienerth et al., 2011).   
Open source as the third type of open system refers to the full disclosure of the underlying technology 
(the source code in software) and the permission to use, modify, and redistribute the technology45. The 
idea to keep software freely accessible in its source code takes its origin with software development 
practices in the 1970ies and Richard Stallman who founded the Free Software Foundation in 1985 
(Levy, 1984; Moody, 2001)46. A more detailed account of the history of Free software can be found in 
section 3 under “Carrots and Rainbows”.  
The main difference between open standards and open source is that in open source the entire tech-
nology required to run the system represents a public good: it is freely available online and non-
rivalrous as a knowledge good. The openness of open standards may be limited to interface documen-
tations and specific layers (parts) of the technology needed to run a system whereas other critical parts 
are proprietary and belong to firms participating in promoting and developing a technology platform. 
However, the two types of systems outlined here overlap: Joel West (2003) has shown that hybrid plat-
form strategies can involve both open source and proprietary components (see also Stuermer, Spaeth, 
and von Krogh, 2009). 
The openness of the technology base had been an important argument for studying collaborative in-
novation in the example of open source software development (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003). By 
following the artifact, that is the code, we could observe individual developers’ work and contribution 
to the code base as well as ask for their rationale when reusing code from another project. Given the 
extensive history in the literature on software development on reuse studies in firms, the first study in 
this section on collaborative innovation across organizations in open source could compare and report 
on findings that appeared as surprising: frequent and substantial reuse despite a lack of formal pro-
grams for reuse and incentives by management. The surprise held only when the reader was familiar 
with the experiences from software development in firms as reference for open source software devel-
opment. If that was not the case and the two contexts of software development were considered too 
different to allow for comparison, then research designs would have to be adapted.  
The rationale from developers and the insights gained in studying code reuse contributed to a better 
understanding of collaborative innovation that involved long-term interactions among developers who 
coordinated their (mostly voluntary) work. The openness of systems, particularly the full openness of 
open source software, helped in attracting and retaining essentially non-contractible development re-
sources because developers could search and identify useful components that advanced their projects 
and allowed them to work on what they preferred to do. Thus, the same openness that allows develop-
ers to identify each other around a shared goal or interest enables research on collaboration to proceed 
by following the artifacts that developers exchange.  
                                                
44 I owe the clarity of this idea to Carliss Baldwin (in her talk at the Strategic Management Society annual meeting in Miami 
on Nov 6, 2011). 
45 For more detail on the definition of open source turn to the website of the Open Source Initiative: 
http://www.opensource.org/ 
46 For further information about Free software and the history of the GNU project turn to: http://www.fsf.org/about and 
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/philosophy.html  
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Open source software development lends itself to study ever more detailed and specialized questions in 
innovation and our further and future projects document a part of such an agenda, see the last section 
of this thesis. The authors’ experiences with the phenomenon of open source software development as 
a phenomenon in organization and management science led to a broader reflection on open source 
and a methodological contribution on studying phenomena (von Krogh, Rossi Lamastra, and Hae-
fliger, 2011). The question whether readers follow a transfer of concepts from established literature 
(software development) to a novel context (open source) in order to test relationships thought to hold in 
well-understood contexts leads to a discussion of dimensions broadly thought of as similar or dissimilar. 
This question is highly relevant for future studies of collaborative innovation because the concepts that 
can and should be studied become more and more refined and of broader applicability in organiza-
tions as firms become more acquainted with open source software development communities and 
community members appreciate corporate support on various levels (Stewart, Ammeter, and Marup-
ing, 2006). The inclusion and consideration of open source software in the design of information sys-
tems is one approach between firms and open source software communities, and the second essay in 
this section develops a set of questions for future research. The last section below picks up further is-
sues in collaborative innovation with a focus on technology development.  
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Code reuse is a form of knowledge reuse in software development that is fundamental to inno-
vation in many fields. However, to date there has been no systematic investigation of code re-
use in open source software projects. This study uses quantitative and qualitative data gathered 
from a sample of six open source software projects to explore two sets of research questions de-
rived from the literature on software reuse in firms and open source software development. We 
find that code reuse is extensive across the sample and that open source software developers, 
much like developers in firms, apply tools that lower their search costs for knowledge and code, 
assess the quality of software components, and have incentives to reuse code. Open source 
software developers reuse code because they want to integrate functionality quickly, because 
they want to write preferred code, because they operate under limited resources in terms of 
time and skills, and because they can mitigate development costs through code reuse. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The particular context of open source software 
development47, its organization in worldwide 
informal and virtual communities as it is Internet-
based, the mostly public and archived communi-
cation between developers, and the availability of 
the code base have contributed to the general 
interest of researchers from many fields. The 
extraordinary success of some of the resulting 
software products (such as GNU/Linux, Apache, 
Bind DNS server, OpenOffice, Mailman) has 
drawn attention from the public and both soft-
ware-creating and software-using organizations 
to this way of developing software. Yet, not all 
open source projects produce software targeted 
directly at the end-user. Some software is de-
signed to be reused and to provide functionality 
to other software projects. For example, Lame, a 
music encoder, cannot be used directly but has to 
be built into, and used by, another program to 
create mp3 files. This leads to the question: do 
open source software developers tend to build 
software from scratch or do they rather reuse 
readily available knowledge and software code 
from other projects? On the one hand, free and 
open source software licenses, such as the GNU 
General Public License (GPL), grant permission 
to reuse software components within the limits of 
the license and one should expect open source 
software developers to build on each other's 
work. On the other hand, the many barriers to 
code reuse discovered in firms (Lynex and 
Layzell, 1998) raise doubts about the actual reuse 
behavior of developers in the absence of corpo-
rate reuse programs. Motivated by these two 
contradictory premises, this paper derives two 
sets of research questions from the literature on 
code reuse in firms and on open source software 
development and explore them using qualitative 
and quantitative data from 6 projects that vary in 
project agenda, age, size, and other factors.  
Based on the premise that software development 
and code reuse in particular, hinges on technical 
as well as non-technical issues (Kim and Stohr, 
                                                
47  For better readability, the term open source will be used 
through- out this article, but the study also refers to Libre 
and Free soft- ware, which shares the same technical 
definition, but is driven by philosophical/moral 
considerations on freedom rather than techni- cal 
arguments: see http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/free-
sw.html. 
1998), our analytical starting point is the behavior 
of individual developers. The general interest of 
this paper is to explore the practices of knowl-
edge, and, in particular, code reuse in open 
source software development; what is being re-
used, when is it reused, by whom, and for what 
reasons. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
briefly discusses relevant theory and research on 
knowledge and code reuse in innovation and 
software development and identifies the research 
gap in the area of open source software develop-
ment. We formulate research questions from the 
literature that relate to code reuse in open source 
software development. Section 3 gives an over-
view of the research method and the sample of 
projects studied. Section 4 presents the findings in 
the form of an inventory of code reuse across the 
project sample, and we complement these with 
findings regarding other types of knowledge re-
use. This section also explores the research ques-
tions developed in Section 2. Finally, Section 5 
concludes the paper and discusses implications of 
the study for management practice and proposes 
future research topics founded on this work. 
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RESEARCH GAP: OPEN SOURCE SOFTWARE, 
KNOWLEDGE, AND CODE REUSE 
Open source software development is an example 
of "private-collective" innovation (von Hippel 
and von Krogh, 2003): software developers de-
rive private benefits from writing software and 
sharing their code and collectively contribute to 
the development of software. Such private bene-
fits include enjoyment, fun, learning, reputation, 
and community membership (Lakhani and Wolf, 
2005; Hertel, et al. 2003). An assertion in the 
private-collective view of open source software 
innovation is that benefits gained from contribut-
ing to the public good must outweigh the pri-
vately incurred cost of contributing to the soft-
ware development (von Krogh and von Hippel, 
2006). 
The literature on technological innovation argues 
that knowledge reuse is an important mitigating 
factor for the cost of innovation (Langlois, 1999). 
Returns on investment in the creation of new 
knowledge hinges on the extent to which this 
knowledge can be applied across the develop-
ment of new processes and products. Therefore, 
one of the central problems in the management 
of innovation is if and how firms reuse previously 
created knowledge across the various stages of an 
innovation process (see Argote, 1999; Majchrzak, 
Cooper, and Neece, 2004; Zander and Kogut, 
1995). 
The practice of knowledge reuse has been par-
ticularly relevant for innovation in the software 
industry and it is here that many of the most sig-
nificant advances in the research on knowledge 
reuse have been made (Cusumano, 1991; Mar-
kus, 2001). While software code is notably explicit 
knowledge that is both readable by humans and 
enables a computer to perform specific functions, 
knowledge reuse may cover more than code reuse 
(Knight and Dunn, 1998: p. 295). As Barnes and 
Bollinger (1991, p.14) suggest: "The defining 
characteristic of good reuse is not the reuse of 
software per se, but the reuse of human problem-
solving." Several types of knowledge can be re-
used across the different stages of software devel-
opment (Frakes and Isoda, 1994): problem de-
scription, artifacts, project proposals, feasibility 
reports, enterprise models, data dictionaries, pro-
totypes, decision tables, pseudo-code, source 
code, databases, the tacit knowledge of develop-
ers, networks of developers, and so on (for an 
overview, see Cybulski et al, 1998; Prieto-Diaz, 
1993; Ravichandran, 1999). The documentation 
of software design patterns facilitates the reuse of 
problem solving in software engineering, particu-
larly when using object-oriented languages 
(Gamma et al., 1995; Schmidt, et al 1996). The 
reuse of software is enabled through modular 
software architectures and the development of 
generic software components. However, the de-
sign of generic components requires substantial 
investment for a firm that can only pay off in the 
long run if and when the firm saves development 
costs through component reuse in software pro-
jects (Banker and Kauffman, 1991). In the soft-
ware industry, firms that reuse code on more 
than one project can amortize development costs 
faster and reduce development time in new pro-
jects (Barnes et al., 1987; Banker and Kaufmann, 
1991). Reusing code and components from soft-
ware libraries also enhances the quality of new 
software products by allowing for fully tested and 
debugged software (Knight and Dunn, 1998). 
In spite of the reported benefits, several studies 
on software development firms have found that 
code reuse in software development is problem-
atic and that the success of corporate reuse pro-
grams hinges on organizational factors more than 
on technical factors (Apte et al., 1990; Isoda, 
1995; Kim and Stohr, 1998; Rothenberger et al., 
2003). This literature also provides insights re-
garding the possibilities of code reuse in open 
source software: in software development firms, 
corporate reuse programs need to commit an 
initial investment to reuse (Isoda, 1995) in order 
to generate long-term savings including life-cycle 
benefits such as maintenance (Banker et al., 1993; 
Basili, 1990). Program success depends on stan-
dards and tools provided to developers (Lim, 
1994; Kim and Stohr, 1998), on the certification 
of software (Knight and Dunn, 1998), as well as 
on the incentives for developers to reuse (Poulin, 
1995).  
Systematic reuse in software development firms 
requires years of investment (Frakes and Isoda, 
1994) in order to create and maintain reusable 
code and other knowledge (Lim, 1994), populate 
repositories and libraries (Griss, 1993; Poulin, 
1995), and provide tools for developers to identify 
and reuse code (Isakowitz and Kauffman, 1996). 
The organization's funding structure usually 
needs adaptation to coordinate reuse investments 
across the organization (Lynex and Layzell, 
1998), because developers need to work in reposi-
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tories and components that are not directly linked 
to a product. Pilot programs, accompanied by 
code reuse performance metrics (Frakes and 
Terry, 1996), may instigate systematic reuse that 
can be monitored across the organization (Banker 
et al., 1993). Management needs to appoint 
champions as sponsors, reuse-librarians or -
coordinators (Isakowitz and Kauffman, 1996; 
Joos, 1994; Kim and Stohr, 1998).  
The success of a corporate reuse program de-
pends on whether the costs to the developer of 
search and integration are lower than the costs of 
writing the software from scratch (Banker et al., 
1993). According to the literature, this can be 
achieved by creating standards and tools that 
facilitate the search for and integration of soft-
ware components. Elaborate classification 
schemes (Isakowitz and Kauffman, 1996) facili-
tate the use of and access to libraries and lower 
search costs for developers. Domain analyses, 
documentation, and quality standards enhance 
the ability to reuse software components (Poulin, 
1995). Ideally, the information accompanying 
reusable code should incorporate a quality rating 
or certification in order to enhance the devel-
oper's trust in code and components written by 
someone else (Knight and Dunn, 1998; Poulin, 
1995). This emphasis on quality stems from the 
software developer "(feeling) that defects in a 
reused code could have a substantial negative 
impact on whatever system he or she is building" 
(Knight and Dunn, 1998: 293). 
Incentives play a crucial role in corporate reuse 
programs (Isoda, 1995; Lynex and Layzell, 1998; 
Poulin, 1995; Tracz, 1995). The monetary or 
reputation-based incentives offered by software 
development firms (Poulin, 1995) need to out-
weigh the dominant notion that code reuse is 
"boring" or "less satisfying" than writing code 
(McClure, 2001; Tracz, 1995), overcome the not-
invented-here syndrome, and the general resis-
tance to change in organizations (Lynex and 
Layzell, 1998).  
In contrast to software development firms, open 
source software development projects do not 
feature corporate reuse programs and usually 
have no financial resources to invest in tools, 
standards, and incentives. This could have ad-
verse effects on code reuse; for instance, the lack 
of incentives could prevent systematic code reuse 
by open source software developers who are 
known to code for the creative challenge and the 
fun of tackling "technically sweet" problems (see 
Raymond, 2000: 25; Lakhani and Wolf, 2005; 
Hertel et al., 2003). Thus, in the absence of cor-
porate reuse programs, it can be reasoned that 
open source software development projects would 
need “equivalent” mechanisms to substitute such 
programs. Based on the review of the literature 
on code reuse in software development firms, the 
following questions can be formulated regarding 
such mechanisms:  
Research question 1 a: Do equivalents to standards and 
tools (found in software development firms) support code 
reuse in open source software development? 
Research question 1 b: Do equivalents to quality ratings 
and certificates (found in software development firms) 
support code reuse in open source software development? 
Research question 1 c: Do equivalents to incentives (found 
in software developing firms) support code reuse in open 
source software development?  
Despite the absence of corporate reuse programs, 
research on open source software development 
provides reasons to expect systematic code reuse 
among developers. Three leading reasons are 
examined in this study. First, the demanding 
requirements for the functionality and architec-
ture of the code after the inception of an open 
source project might make it rational for devel-
opers to reuse already existing code. Second, the 
desire to work on preferred tasks should lead 
developers to reuse code that they prefer not to 
write on their own. Third, resource constraints in 
terms of time and skills should lead to reuse be-
havior in open source software development. 
The existence of a code base seems crucial in 
order to mobilize open source developers, as 
shown for example in a study of the Freenet pro-
ject (von Krogh et al., 2003). After a project's 
inception, its developers have to fulfill what we 
call a “credible promise,” best defined by using a 
quote from Lerner and Tirole (2002: 220): "a 
critical mass of code to which the programming 
community can react. Enough work must be 
done to show that the project is doable and has 
merit." The credible promise enables sufficient 
functionality of the software to catch the interest 
of potential users and developers. A side effect of 
reusing components is its impact on the software 
architecture which is also evaluated by prospec-
tive developers (Baldwin and Clark, 2006). The 
reuse of a software component takes advantage of 
a design option (Baldwin and Clark, 2006; 
Favaro et al., 1998, MacCormack et al., 2006) 
and adds to the modularity of the overall archi-
tecture. Given the advantages of modularity in 
software development across the time span of the 
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project (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Garud and 
Kumaraswamy, 1995), the reuse of components 
seems rational at any time, not only during the 
early phase of a project.  
Developers of open source software are known to 
self-assign to tasks based on their preferences and 
ability (Benkler, 2002; Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 
2003; Yamauchi, et al., 2000) and they seek a 
creative challenge and fun when writing software 
(Lakhani and Wolf, 2005; Hertel et al., 2003). 
Yet, some essential tasks in open source software 
development are considered to be mundane and 
boring (Shah, 2006; von Hippel and Lakhani, 
2003). A solution to achieving an operational 
software product could be code reuse. Developers 
who face several essential tasks may choose to 
solve the less preferred ones by reusing code 
rather than writing everything from scratch. 
Any open source software developer can consider 
the vast amount of available open source software 
when building their own code base. Open source 
licenses convey the basic rights to the developer 
to retrieve the code, inspect and modify it, and to 
freely redistribute modified or unmodified ver-
sions of the software to others. Such a license 
inherently encourages a developer to reuse code, 
although a license might require that derivative 
works are released under an open source license 
as well.48 The cost of contributing to open source 
software development can be substantial. For 
example, those who want to join a community of 
developers must demonstrate considerable skill at 
solving technical problems. Von Krogh, Spaeth, 
and Lakhani (2003) found that newcomers to a 
project reused software they had written for other 
projects in order to make their first contributions. 
Contributions to the public good incur private 
costs to developers (von Hippel and von Krogh, 
2003). Hence, one should expect that developers 
find it opportune to mitigate their development 
costs through code reuse from other projects. 
Empirical studies of Apache and Linux develop-
ers have demonstrated that a strong incentive for 
developing open source software is to solve a 
technical problem by writing software code and 
getting feedback from other users (von Hippel, 
2001; Hertel et al. 2003). If software that solves 
                                                
48 The exact definition of what poses a derivative work is 
disputed. There are, for example, many ways in which 
programs can interact. What kind of interaction implies a 
derivative work, versus a mere aggregation of individual 
programs, is a controversial issue among the various 
factions of producers and consumers of open source 
software. 
the problem is already available under an open 
source license, there is no reason why a developer 
should write their own code. This economic logic 
should apply beyond the initial release of the 
software. Hence, the following questions can be 
formulated: 
Research question 2 a: Does the open source software 
developers' aim to publish workable software as early as 
possible (credible promise) supports code reuse in open 
source software development? 
Research question 2 b: Does the open source software 
developers' self-assignment to tasks according to their pref-
erences and ability supports code reuse in open source soft-
ware development? 
Research question 2 c: Do Open source software develop-
ers' resource constraints (in terms of limited time and 
skills) supports code reuse in open source software develop-
ment? 
In sum, knowledge and code reuse are funda-
mental to the economics of innovation and cen-
tral to software development. The characteristics 
of open source software development could pro-
vide both favorable and inauspicious conditions 
for code reuse but, to date, there is no empirical 
research available on the topic. 
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RESEARCH METHOD AND SAMPLE 
This section describes the sample selection proc-
ess and the research method that guided this 
study. The literature review on code reuse and 
open source software led to the formulation of 
precise research questions for code reuse. The 
available literature indicated reasons why code 
reuse might occur in open source software devel-
opment without providing empirical evidence. 
Thus, we proceeded to explore the questions 
using a multiple case study design drawing upon 
several dif-
ferent data 
sources (Yin, 
1989). An 
open invita-
tion to a 
short, anony-
mous, web-
based survey 
was posted 
on a 
developer 
mailing list 
in order to 
decide 
whether the 
topic was of 
any interest 
and rele-
vance to the 
field. The 
resulting 30 
replies indi-
cated that 
knowledge 
and code 
reuse are 
important 
issues and an integral part of open source soft-
ware development practice. Next, interviews 
were conducted and emails, public documents, 
and code were gathered from an initial sample of 
15 projects. The sample included a wide variety 
of software products such as office software, 
games, a hardware driver, and an instant mes-
senger client. The projects needed to fulfill three 
conditions to be included in the sample: 1) the 
project was under active development, allowing 
us to track its development activity and interview 
key developers, 2) the source code modifications 
of the project needed to be available online, and 
3) the project had to have been in existence for at 
least a year which enabled us to track code reuse 
over time. 
For a more in-depth analysis, the initial sample 
was reduced to a “core sample” of 6 projects 
exhibiting variance on the sampling criteria: size 
(lines of code (LOC), number of developers), ob-
jective, date of inception, target audience for 
software product, license, and programming lan-
guage. By keeping the high variety of project 
characteristics, a sampling bias was avoided (e.g., 
Stake, 1995). Moreover, in order for projects to 
be included in the core sample, their core devel-
opers needed to be available for interviews. The 
resulting core sample is presented in Table 12.  
The data sources from the core sample included 
interviews, source code, code modification com-
ments, mailing lists, and various web pages re-
lated to the projects. Between December 2003 
and June 2004, interviews were conducted with 
21 core developers49 of sample projects, 12 of 
                                                
49 A “core developer” has CVS access, contributes the bulk 
of the code, and assumes administrative tasks. See also 
von Krogh et al. (2003) and Shah (2006). 
Table 11: Core sample overview 
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which belonged to the core sample.50 The inter-
views were semi-structured, conducted by tele-
phone, and lasted on average 50 minutes. The 
developers were contacted by email first. Two 
thirds of the interviews requested were carried 
out. The interviewees of the core sample con-
sisted of members of the inner circle of the cur-
rent development team. We were able to inter-
view the developers of 74% of all instances of 
initial software component code imports into the 
core sample projects (referred to as “architectural 
reuse,” see Section 4). In order to protect their 
privacy, the names of the respondents are re-
placed by capital letters throughout this text. 
Developer interviews were used to increase fa-
miliarity with the project, clarify open issues, and 
to examine the motivation for knowledge and 
code reuse. 
The developer mailing lists of all core sample 
projects were analyzed two weeks prior to and 
after the first reuse of a component. We coded all 
reuse-related comments and measured the length 
of discussions (by anyone on the lists) spurred by 
the reuse incidents.  
The source code of the core sample was initially 
available on project websites and managed using 
the Concurrent Versions System (CVS) source 
code management tool (for a description, see von 
Krogh et al. 2003). The CVS source code reposi-
tories of the core sample were retrieved and 
stored in a local database in order to enable the 
analysis of source code changes and the associ-
ated comments in the CVS.51 The source code 
was examined in four ways: accredited lines of 
code reuse, identification of reused components, 
identification of functions within the components 
and their reuse across the core sample, and an 
authorship analysis. 
First, a rough analysis was performed, including 
how many lines of software code were directly 
'copied and pasted' from other projects. In order 
to find these, the originating project and/or 
authors needed to be accredited in the CVS com-
ment and, therefore, they were referred to as 
                                                
50 For four of the six projects, two developers were 
interviewed. For GNUnet only the founder (who wrote 
the bulk of the project’s code) was interviewed, and for 
xfce4, three developers were interviewed. 
51 All projects were recorded from their inception until mid-
2004. An exception was Xfce4, which is a rewrite of 
Xfce3. Here, the inception date was adjusted to the time 
when development actually picked up, and the developers 
migrated to working on Xfce4. This meant relocating 268 
out of 62,000 CVS incidents to the new inception date. 
“accredited lines of code-” reuse. Developers 
commented and accredited these lines, such as 
the following comment made by developer G: 
"added configuration file parsing without 
OpenSSL using code from xawtv." Based on this 
analysis,52 38,245 accredited lines of code were 
identified across the core sample, - a relatively 
low value compared to more than 6 million lines 
of code in the core sample projects. The develop-
ers commented that copying lines of code only 
occurred infrequently and in small quantities, but 
that giving credit was mandatory. However, there 
might still be an unknown quantity of imported 
lines of code which was not explicitly accredited.  
The identification of reuse of software compo-
nents was done in an automated manner by fil-
tering the source code for programming state-
ments used to include components.53 In the next 
step, the functions within each reused component 
were identified and a more fine-grained analysis 
identified the reuse of functions offered by the 
components identified across the core sample. 
The tool “Doxygen54” was used to extract the 
software architecture, specifically the application 
programming interface (API) of the identified 
components. This XML file-based information 
was used to search all code modifications of the 
six sample projects for function calls added to 
each project's software, using functionality pro-
vided by the included components. This result 
                                                
52 To allow for the identification of accredited lines of code 
(ALOC), we applied a Bayesian filter. This is based on an 
algorithm that estimates the probability of a code 
modification to be a knowledge reuse incident, using 
conditional probabilities, by rating the occur- rence of 
specific words based on training data. In this study, the 
filter was trained by manually analyzing the source code 
modifi- cations of two projects. We were thus able to 
calculate the proba- bility that a source code modification 
comment related to imported lines of code from another 
project. Resulting hits and probable hits were examined 
manually in order to settle whether or not they 
represented ALOC reuse. As a reviewer correctly pointed 
out, this method provides the lower bounds for ALOC 
reuse as the filter might miss actual ALOCs. For the 
Bayesian filter reference, go to: 
http://www.paulgraham.com/spam.html. 
53  The search included source/header files through 
statements such 
as“#include”forC/C++,“package”/“import”forJava,and“
require”/ “require_once”/“include”/“include_once” for 
php-based projects. Sys- tem files, such as files belonging 
to the standard C library or the Linux kernel, were filtered 
out. 
54 Doxygen is described as “a documentation system for 
C++, C, Java, Objective-C, IDL (Corba and Microsoft 
flavors) and to some extent PHP, C#, and D.” It is 
publicly available at http:// doxygen.org. 
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covered high-level calls using the public API of 
the components. 
Using the first occurrence of each included file or 
reused function, the analysis identified 2,975 
unique reuse incidents. Of these incidents, 200 
imported a component (or part of a component) 
and 2,775 incidents made use of the functions 
offered by the reused components. A total of 55 
reused components were identified in this way, 
leading to a component reuse inventory (as 
shown in Table 13). The identified list of software 
components was sent back to the project lead 
developers (listed on the projects' web pages) in 
order to check its validity. Out of 6 projects, 4 
replies were received validating the results. One 
respondent confirmed in the interview that the 
project only reuses one optional component. In 
one case, the lead developer was too busy to vali-
date the findings. 
Finally, the timing of component reuse incidents 
and statistics on the developers who performed 
the reuse were collected for all component and 
function reuses in the component reuse inven-
tory. In the next section, we turn to the findings. 
 
Table 12: Component reuse inventory in the core sample 
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FINDINGS 
The aim of this section is to shed light on the 
research questions developed in Section 2. While 
we mainly report on code reuse, we also sustain 
the notion that knowledge reuse in software de-
velopment covers reuse of problem-solving as 
well as code (Barnes and Bollinger, 1991, Section 
2) and, thus, include other forms of knowledge 
reuse where appropriate. First, an inventory of 
the projects studied shows that developers pre-
dominantly reuse software components. Second, 
the research questions are explored and con-
trasted with the analysis of component reuse and 
the interview data in order to answer why reuse 
happens.  
4.1 Knowledge and code reuse 
There were three broad forms of knowledge and 
code reuse in the core sample: algorithms and 
methods, single lines of code, and components. 
First, an algorithm is a finite set of well-defined 
instructions for accomplishing some task or solv-
ing some problem which, given an initial state, 
will result in a corresponding recognizable end-
state (adapted from wikipedia.org, 2004). Meth-
ods contain several alternative algorithms and 
other scripts for solving a problem, rules for 
choosing between them, and they can be ex-
panded to cover a large problem area. The reuse 
of algorithms and methods includes the examina-
tion of source code or other information, but also 
the interpretation and adaptation of cues about 
technical problems and their solutions, abstrac-
tion, and implementation in a local context. 
Nearly all of the developers interviewed men-
tioned the reuse of algorithms and methods in 
their open source software development. The 
analysis across the core sample revealed that 
knowledge reuse in the form of methods and 
algorithms is frequent but rarely credited. Inter-
views revealed that developers spend non-
negligible amounts of time studying scientific 
publications (such as engineering journals) and 
standard specifications, or learning from the 
source code (and its documentation) of related 
projects. The reuse of algorithms and methods 
not accompanied by software code reuse is im-
possible to document completely, because it is 
part of the individual's learning and usually not 
made explicit. 
Second, copying specific lines of code from ex-
ternal projects is a systematic and direct form of 
code reuse in open source software development. 
The analysis of imported “accredited lines of 
code” amounted to 38,245 across the core sam-
ple. For reasons described in Section 3, this form 
of reuse was relatively rare, hard to quantify, and 
not further pursued in the current study. 
Third, all the core sample projects reused soft-
ware components. A software component is a 
software technology for encapsulating software 
functionality, often in the form of objects, adher-
ing to some interface description and providing 
an API, so that the component may exist 
autonomously from other components on a com-
puter. Technically, this autonomy allows the 
developer to treat the component as a "black 
box." The components were either integrated 
into the code of the project or linked to it. Link-
ing a component to the software could happen 
either at the time of compilation (static linking) or 
at run-time (dynamic linking). Reuse (or acquisi-
tion) of components can be "black-box" or 
"white-box" (Ravichandran and Rothenberger, 
2003), depending on whether changes were made 
to the reused code. With very few exceptions, the 
reuse in this sample amounted to black-box reuse 
since the components were reused without modi-
fications. Across the core sample, 55 components 
were reused, representing a total of 16.9 million 
component LOC, while the total LOC of the 
core sample was 6.0 million (not including the 
reused LOC). A complete list of reused compo-
nents can be found in Table 2. Each identified 
component reuse incident is listed together with a 
minimal description and its date of reuse. All the 
components reused in the core sample are main-
tained as external projects which means that they 
are available through a dedicated project website, 
provide code releases or open development, or all 
of the above. 
A closer analysis of the components revealed two 
distinct types of code reuse: architectural reuse 
and functional reuse. In order to make use of 
components that are not developed inside the 
project's community of developers, a developer 
has to first search for and integrate a suitable 
component. The decision to reuse a component 
introduces an architectural change to the soft-
ware because it changes its overall structure 
(Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Ulrich, 1995). Accord-
ing to the developers (B, H, M, L), the decision to 
reuse a component is based on the functions this 
component offers. In order to make the code 
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reuse decision, the developers studied not only 
the software code but also the documentation 
accompanying the code, web pages with fre-
quently asked questions (FAQs), overview docu-
ments and similar web-based resources before 
deciding to reuse a component. The first step of 
reuse is then the inclusion of the component in 
the software. The core sample contained 200 
instances of architectural reuse which import a 
component or part of a component. In Table 2, 
they are attributed to each of the 55 reused com-
ponents in the fourth column. 
The second type of component reuse was termed 
functional and based on previous architectural 
reuse. Each component offers a number of func-
tions that may or may not be used by the origi-
nating program. Through architectural reuse of a 
component, the developer makes functionality 
available to the program. The actual use of some 
of these functions executes the options inherent in 
the component. Functional reuse incidents be-
came visible through fine-grained analysis of the 
code base of the sample that revealed each avail-
able function. Only the first call of a new function 
was recorded in order to determine whether it 
was using functionality provided by components. 
The core sample contained 2,775 functional re-
use incidents. The functional reuse incidents cor-
respond to a reused component and are listed in 
the fifth column of Table 2. 
 
4.2 Substituting the corporate reuse program 
The component reuse inventory demonstrates 
that open source software developers routinely 
and widely reuse software components across the 
sample. The following analysis explores questions 
1a through 1c in order to explore how the con-
text of open source software provides equivalent 
mechanisms that corporate reuse programs fea-
ture, namely lower search costs, establishment of 
quality standards, and the provision of incentives. 
The perceived costs to a developer of searching 
and integrating a new component must stay be-
low the effort of writing software from scratch 
(Banker et al., 1993). Tools and standards facili-
tate the search and integration of existing com-
ponents (Ravichandran, 1999), and reuse in open 
source software development should only be ex-
pected if equivalents to corporate tools and stan-
dards exist. Internal search repositories, a solu-
tion proposed by Banker et al. (1993), could not 
be found in the core sample. However, a few 
large repositories of open source software projects 
(Sourceforge.net, Savanna, Berlios, etc.) as well as 
dedicated index and search tools (e.g., Freshmeat, 
koders.com) offer free infrastructure for projects 
of various domains and target both end-users as 
well as developers. Distributions, such as Debian 
GNU/Linux, publish extensive information that 
helps developers identify components and de-
pendencies of components which they contem-
plate using . We found that 85% of all reused 
components in the core sample were listed in the 
Debian package repository. 
However, even more important than repositories 
and search engines were means of local search in 
a known space (March, 1991). Several developers 
(D, K, F, H) underscored the importance of their 
respective software community for finding rele-
vant knowledge and code. One developer (F) 
suggested that of all sources, his project's devel-
opers and mailing list participants were the most 
direct and efficient source of information about 
reusable knowledge and code. Developer (H) 
suggested: 
“I'll post on the mailing list, - the developer list. I 
just ask everybody: does anyone know about this? 
Can anyone recommend a good library? Chances 
are somebody uses one. Might not even be writing 
code, but they might know something about it.” 
Next, standards provided a means of lowering 
search and integration costs. In the core sample, 
standards involved stable and documented inter-
faces to the component functionality, as well as its 
accessibility in the project programming lan-
guage, and influenced the developers' decision to 
reuse. By using a well defined and designed set of 
variables and commands (API), the developers 
could access the component's functionality, thus 
reducing the effort to understand the component 
(Developers A, G, H, D). With a good interface 
available, the developers did not have to fully 
understand the inner technical workings of the 
component in order to be able to use it and they 
could integrate the component into the software 
more easily. Accessibility of the component to the 
project's programming language also proved to 
be important. For example, the developers of 
iRATE radio considered replacing a component 
with another external library (libmadplayer) in 
order to take advantage of its advanced function-
ality. However, a lack of compatibility between 
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the two programming languages Java and C 
made this difficult:  
“But if we switch to libmad[player], we'll have 
to maintain the Java interface from libmad to 
iRATE. [...] They don't have a Java interface 
right now. Basically it's to use libmad, it's writ-
ten in C, and [it is] sort of difficult to interface C 
with Java code. Whereas [for] Madplay, - it's 
just a program [front end for libmadplayer] and 
Java doesn't really care what program it is as 
long as it can run from command line. But [with] 
libmad, we'll actually have to call internal rou-
tines, - it's much more difficult to keep it up to 
date.” (Developer I) 
The risk of unforeseen changes within reused 
components was mediated by what developers 
considered "a wide consensus" among open 
source software projects to guarantee API stabil-
ity within major releases. As developer D states, 
the effort of integrating a component increases 
when the interfaces change too often: 
”If [the component] changes constantly and it's 
incompatible with your project, it causes overhead. 
You don't want to have 50 million conditionals 
for every software that exists. In this case you 
might choose to copy over their code or email the 
software's maintainers and say; “listen, we're try-
ing to use your code but you keep changing it on 
us, is there any way you can keep this stable?” 
Frequently, they will be happy to comply because 
they'll have extra users of their code that help find 
bugs. There are several options, it's good to know 
the policy but it's not necessary for the initial use 
of their code.” 
The interviews revealed that open source soft-
ware development offers equivalents to search 
tools and standards which facilitate the develop-
ers' search for and integration of components, 
positively replying to question 1a.  
Knight and Dunn (1998) point out that develop-
ers in firms are unlikely to reuse a component 
unless they can trust its quality, since an external 
component can potentially harm the overall sys-
tem. Therefore, they propose certifying compo-
nents for reuse. In the core sample, the “popular-
ity” of a component served as a substitute to cer-
tification and generally signaled the quality of the 
software (developers H, G, F). The developers 
reasoned that bug fixes in the software are more 
frequent in widely used components leading to 
better quality: 
“There's a higher probability that more people 
have looked at the code, figured out if it works, 
how it works, and probably fixed more bugs if 
there are any. It's the whole peer review thing: the 
more people have looked at the code and still use 
it, the more it's trustable.” (Developer F) 
A straightforward indication of the popularity of 
a component is its inclusion in a major software 
distribution such as Debian which is peer re-
viewed, actively maintained, and reaches a wide 
user base. (As mentioned above, 85% of the re-
used components in the inventory were included 
in the Debian distribution). This answers ques-
tion 1b: by evaluating the popularity of compo-
nents, open source software developers indeed 
use a proxy to certification and quality standards 
in order to support code reuse. 
A software development firm needs to create 
incentives for developers to reuse code because 
they generally perceive reuse to be less rewarding 
than writing new code. Von Hippel and von 
Krogh (2003) argue that, in the private-collective 
model of innovation, developers expend re-
sources privately to contribute to a public good. If 
the developers perceive their resources as limited, 
reuse could help to mitigate development costs. 
In this case, the net savings in development costs 
through reuse should act as individual incentives. 
Support was found for this conjecture: developers 
in the core sample explicitly reused code in order 
to reduce their costs of creating the software. 
They spent available resources in consideration 
of both available time and skills (developers K, D, 
H, A): 
“The primary driver of that [reuse] decision is 
making the project the best it could be. The fact is 
that we're mortal and we don't have an infinite 
amount of time to rewrite everything. So even if 
the other project's code isn't perfect but good 
enough, you're simply going to use it because if 
you've got a thousand bugs to fix you don't want 
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to spend the next year rewriting all the software 
you could just use from someone else.” (Developer 
D) 
The interviews confirmed the existence of re-
source constraints in open source software devel-
opment. The economic rationale of saving devel-
opment costs, where possible, was consistent 
among developers' replies. The need to advance 
the code base and approach the objectives of the 
overall project was weighed against the time and 
skills available and influenced the decision to 
reuse code, as shown in this example: 
“There were cases where it was better to have a 
third-party program. OK, for example jgraphpad, 
which is a java applet, to have graphics. We 
wouldn't necessarily have the expertise on the team 
to do that, or the time or the interest, but that was 
a perfect match between what they were doing and 
what we were doing.” (Developer K) 
An additional incentive to reuse was the option to 
outsource the maintenance work through reuse. 
For 53 out of 55 reused components, at least one 
new release became available after the first date 
of reuse. Hence, the reusing projects could bene-
fit from "free" maintenance by other projects. 
Developers (B, K, H) considered external main-
tenance as an incentive to reuse components 
because it lowered the long-term costs of produc-
ing a component inside the community by the 
effort to maintain it, particularly regarding inter-
nal bugs and errors. The developers in our sam-
ple systematically reused components because, 
first, they saved effort by not having to write the 
component, and second, by not having to main-
tain it in the future. These findings relate to ques-
tion 1c; developers' limited time and skills create 
incentives to seek savings in development costs 
through code reuse. The pattern that an eco-
nomic logic influences reuse behavior also posi-
tively replies to question 2c. 
4.3 Fulfilling the credible promise 
The credible promise, or the release of workable 
software that is complete enough to work on, 
helps attract users and potential developers to a 
project (as described in von Krogh et al., 2003). 
Accordingly, this section explores questions 2a 
through 2c. One way to quickly establish a work-
ing code base is to integrate existing components 
and building on existing functionality. The find-
ings shed light on question 2a: developers reused 
components as early as of day one of the project's 
inception. Figure 7 shows that 666 of 2,975 reuse 
incidents (22%) already occurred during the first 
10% of the observation period for the core sam-
ple projects. The credible promise is fulfilled in 
the core sample: the first public software release 
happened on average already 44.5 days after a 
project's inception.55 
 
Figure 7: Reuse incidents over the total observation 
period 
The patterns of architectural reuse resemble 
those of functional reuse; new components (or 
parts of components) were added to the code base 
throughout the observation period. Hence, de-
velopers make use of the (modular) design options 
by adding components. This observation is con-
sistent with a claim made in the literature that 
developers exercise design options in software 
architecture (Baldwin and Clark, 2006). 
As mentioned above, developers chose areas they 
like to work on through self-assignment of tasks. 
But since an open source software project also 
requires the execution of mundane and difficult 
work for developers, question 2b asks if code 
reuse could help to evade the writing of “mun-
dane” code and focus on more rewarding pro-
gramming tasks specific to the project and that fit 
the developers’ skills. 
                                                
55 The day of inception is the first day on which code is 
added to the repository. It is possible that part of the 
source code existed earlier outside of the repository. 
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Figure 8: Reuse incidents during the developers' life 
span 
The developers' individual reuse behavior shows 
increased reuse early on in the developers' coding 
activity for the project (Figure 8). The total me-
dian in this sample (architectural and functional 
reuse combined) was 0.28 (avg: 0.37, sd: 0.32). 
Thus, on average, developers performed reuse 
after having contributed a third of their total 
number of lines of code.56 This implies that most 
developers remained active after a reuse incident 
and continued to write code for the project. The 
interviewees confirmed the developers' preference 
for reusing early during their active period on the 
project. They (J, H, K, A, E) perceived reuse as 
an opportunity to get rid of mundane, time-
consuming, or difficult coding tasks, that helped 
them to work on their preferred tasks. Developer 
E sums it up: 
“Code reuse is just helping us to get the job done, 
so I can work on something that is more interest-
ing.” 
                                                
56 The data also showed that long-term and more active 
developers performed more code reuse, not in relative, but 
in absolute terms. The reason may be that these 
developers have acquired a better familiarity with the 
code base. We are grateful to the associate editor for 
pointing this out. Dividing developers into two groups 
(contributing for more/less than 50% of the observation 
period pre- ceding the reuse incident), additional analysis 
showed no signifi- cant differences between the groups in 
code reuse frequency over a developer’s life span in a 
project. 
These findings answer question 2b: software re-
use helped developers to get mundane or difficult 
tasks done and allowed them to focus on “inter-
esting” (preferred) areas of work. 
Finally, as elaborated in subsection 4.2, resource 
constraints were explicitly and frequently men-
tioned as reasons for code reuse by developers. 
The developers benefited from “free” mainte-
nance and improvements made to project-
external components and chose the least costly 
path to ensure that workable code could be re-
leased and progress was being made. This behav-
ior relates to the finding that developers spend 
their scarce resources economically. Component 
reuse helped to advance the project, thus answer-
ing question 2c positively. 
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CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
In the “private-collective” innovation model, the 
benefits must outweigh the cost of contributing to 
the public good (von Hippel and von Krogh, 
2003). Knowledge reuse can be a strategy to 
mitigate the costs of innovation (Langlois, 1999) 
and commercial software engineering practices 
emphasize the reduction of developments 
through code reuse (e.g., Barnes, et al. 1987; 
Barnes and Bollinger, 1991; Banker and Kauf-
mann, 1991). This study departs from two con-
tradicting issues, namely that open source soft-
ware licenses are designed to enable and encour-
age sharing and building on others' work, yet 
reuse is hard to achieve in commercial settings. It 
shows that developers in open source software 
projects actively reuse available code and other 
knowledge that solve their technical problems, 
and it presents empirical evidence on the extent 
of code reuse, and the development practices of 
developers in open source software projects 
where resources are scarce, highlighting the im-
portance of reusable software components. In the 
sample of six open source projects, this research 
identified 55 reused components comprising 
2,975 reuse incidents. The findings are presented 
against the back drop of the literature on code 
reuse in software development firms, offering 
insights with regard to the context of open source 
software. The data from the core sample showed 
that developers used tools and relied on standards 
when reusing components. They used "popular-
ity" as a proxy for quality ratings and acted under 
resource constraints (time and skills) when select-
ing reusable components. While core developers 
participated in the reuse activities, they offered 
no explicit encouragement for code reuse across 
their project. As predicted by the existing litera-
ture on open source software development, build-
ing an initial credible promise required code re-
use early on during the project, with developers 
continuing to reuse code as resource constraints 
persisted and suitable open source components 
were available. The developers continued to re-
use and stay active after their initial, extensive 
reuse behavior. This finding is consistent with 
Shah (2006) who showed that the type of tasks 
tackled by long-term developers changes over 
time. In summary, the developers reused for 
three reasons: they wanted to integrate function-
ality quickly (first public release after 44.5 days on 
average), they preferred to write certain parts of 
the code over others, and they could mitigate 
their development costs through code reuse. 
Implications for research 
Most component reuse in open source software 
development crosses project boundaries, thereby 
enlarging the project resources by effectively 
outsourcing part of the development. In particu-
lar, these additional resources might help young 
projects to gain the necessary momentum to 
reach a critical mass. This represents an alterna-
tive strategy to community growth and resource 
mobilization (e.g., Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2003). 
Future research should examine this form of 
growth in more detail. 
The software reuse literature (Tracz, 1995) esti-
mates that the cost of building reusable compo-
nents adds up to 200% of additional development 
costs. Future research should uncover who carries 
these costs in open source software development 
and why. As this study has shown, repositories 
such as Sourceforge offer vast amounts of reus-
able software and most components were re-
leased by projects dedicated to that specific com-
ponent development. Casual evidence from the 
core sample suggests two possible explanations: 
the developers' mobility across software projects 
(proprietary and open source) benefits from reus-
ing parts of their own work in parallel or subse-
quent projects. Second, reputation rewards from 
peers for “clean”, that is modular and well struc-
tured, code justify the private, additional efforts 
to build reusable components. Both arguments 
deserve further in-depth examination. 
Certain projects reuse more code than others, but 
the antecedents of reuse in open source software 
development are largely unknown. Future re-
search should identify individual and organiza-
tional characteristics that impact on reuse. Open 
source licenses enable the “outsourcing” of func-
tionality to other projects. The resulting shared 
use of code across projects may be related to the 
total level of reuse and the cost of innovation. 
Future research needs to identify the factors that 
drive such outsourcing behavior.   
As table 2 shows, certain components are reused 
more frequently than others. Future research 
should analyze the characteristics of reused com-
ponents in order to predict the frequency of 
component reuse. This study should inform the 
design for reuse. The results from the present 
study pertaining to the search and maintenance 
costs, and the trust in components should inform 
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hypotheses about component characteristics that 
lead to high reuse frequencies. Future advance-
ment of the research on the above research issues 
should be built on a categorization of compo-
nents in terms of functionality and, possibly, qual-
ity in order to theorize about reuse success. 
Finally, we found that long-term and more active 
developers performed more code reuse in abso-
lute, but not in relative terms (see footnote 12). 
The controls showed that the relative pattern of 
reuse activity over the total time of coding activity 
remained unchanged across developers who had 
coded for the project for more or less than 50% 
of the observation period preceding the reuse 
incident. Future research needs to investigate if 
the cause of this is individual developer learning, 
familiarity with the code base, stronger specializa-
tion in the functionality of the software, or other 
reasons.  
At least two limitations apply to this research. 
First, the study focused on code reuse, specifically 
component reuse. Data on single accredited lines 
of code was based on interviews and on an auto-
matic analysis. By definition, the reuse of these 
lines of code requires developers to credit those 
who wrote these lines in the code modification 
comment made in their own projects. Consider-
ing the sheer amount of existing open source 
projects, non-credited lines of code reuse is close 
to impossible to identify. Therefore, the correct-
ness of the accredited lines of code-analysis can-
not be guaranteed. Yet, the developers stated that 
giving credit for reused code is a social norm 
when sharing code across projects (see also 
Fauchart and von Hippel, 2006). Future research 
into code reuse might need to capture accredited 
lines of code reuse through survey data in addi-
tion to components.  
Second, the initial sampling only included pro-
jects in active development. Since active devel-
opment enables the observation of code reuse 
practice in real time, the analysis could combine 
interview material with current examples and 
easy-to-verify component origins (e.g., whether 
the component was under active development in 
another project). Defunct projects were excluded. 
In order to understand the full performance im-
plications of code reuse, future research should 
compare code reuse in successful and failed pro-
jects. 
Implications for management practice 
Open source software projects offer a vast reposi-
tory of readily usable software for almost all pur-
poses. Within the limits of the licenses and the 
mechanisms that communities apply to protect 
their work (O'Mahony, 2003), this software can 
be used, reused, and built upon freely (see also 
Henkel, 2006). This corresponds to the advan-
tages of black-box reuse in component markets 
(Ravichendran and Rothenberger, 2003) with the 
difference that the open source components are 
available for free. Commercial software develop-
ers may observe and learn from open source 
software developers' work. The available reposi-
tory of knowledge and code could lower the 
probability of reinventing the wheel for firms and 
communities by offering methods and algorithms 
from open source solutions for reuse. Thus, man-
agers of software firms should encourage and 
support the learning process for developers who 
spend time looking at available open source soft-
ware.  
Managers who allocate developer resources to 
open source software projects will possibly see 
new practices of innovation develop in their 
firms. Developers exposed to open source soft-
ware development might bring practices into the 
firm that favor knowledge reuse over the reinven-
tion of the wheel and introduce elements of an 
open source software development culture that 
could change the firm's internal culture. 
An organization-wide, corporate reuse program 
is not a prerequisite for code reuse. This is an 
important lesson for management practice. In-
formation about the popularity of software may 
substitute a costly certification process and en-
hance the developer's trust in the code. This 
study also showed that strong incentives for code 
reuse exist if the software developers act as "soft-
ware entrepreneurs". Software developers who 
are compensated for task achievement, rather 
than time spent, have incentives to cut develop-
ment costs and to reuse existing functionality. 
This could imply that if a software firm creates an 
entrepreneurial organization for its software de-
velopers, it may complement the importance of 
other reward-based incentives. 
The equivalent to incentives in corporate reuse 
programs in the context of open source software 
development could help managers structure more 
effective non-monetary incentives. Recognition 
and extrinsic awards were found to promote code 
reuse in firms (Poulin, 1995; Isoda, 1995). In 
open source software, the continuous mainte-
nance of reused components by others created 
the perception of free maintenance for the reus-
ing developers. Avoiding to write a component 
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from scratch combined with the free (external) 
maintenance provides incentive for reuse. Possi-
bly, managers allowing developers to self-assign 
tasks may achieve the necessary level of compo-
nent maintenance to encourage reuse and can 
further facilitate reuse by separating the mainte-
nance and reuse of existing components. 
When inspecting the component reuse inventory, 
established and well-known low-level components 
can be identified, such as encryption software 
(OpenSSL), compression software (zlib), data-
bases (MySQL), or graphical toolkits (GTK). 
These have all proven useful to a large audience 
of users and developers. The reuse behavior of 
open source software developers also informs the 
potential commercial suppliers of software com-
ponents about the structure of this “emerging 
market”. Similarly, experience from corporate 
component reuse shows that domain-
independent reuse (often low-level components) is 
easier than domain-specific reuse due to lower 
adaptation costs (Poulin, 1995; Ravichandran 
and Rothenberger, 2003). 
Interviews revealed that open source software 
developers work under severe time and skill con-
straints. The self-inflicted pressure to release a 
working product leads to efficiency thinking and 
economic behavior with regards to the utilization 
of scarce resources. The insights from innovation 
process research in open source software con-
tinue more than ever to be useful to researchers 
studying innovation in firms (particularly software 
firms), since similar economics of innovation ap-
ply in both contexts. The limitations of research-
ing into the alleged "hobbyist culture" of open 
source software (Carbon et al., 2001; Moody, 
2001) does not apply when studying the social 
and technical processes of innovation in open 
source software development. As shown, there 
are important lessons for researchers and manag-
ers considering innovation in both contexts. 
Work on open source software development and 
its commercial counterpart will mutually benefit 
from an exchange of results and jointly they can 
contribute to an extended theory and insights 
into private-collective innovation. 
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The purpose of this paper is to advance design science by developing a framework for research 
on reuse and the relationship between external IT artifacts and their users. A design science 
approach to IS research needs to grapple with the fact that a number of relevant, economically 
attractive, external IT artifacts cannot be designed from scratch nor meaningfully evaluated 
based on the current state of development, and so design science research will struggle with in-
complete cycles of design, relevance, and rigor. We suggest a strategic research agenda that in-
tegrates the design of the relationship between an external IT artifact and the user by consider-
ing the impact artifacts exert on users. Three dimensions derived from adaptive structuration 
theory inform our framework on three levels of design granularity (middle management, top 
management, and entrepreneur): agenda considers the dynamic properties of technological ob-
jects, adaptability refers to the functional affordance of external artifacts in development, and 
auspice captures the symbolic expression and scope for interpretation. We derive implications 
for research design. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Information systems (IS) pervade everyday orga-
nizational life. Managers and IS professionals 
build and evaluate IT artifacts, such as vocabu-
lary, symbols, models, algorithms, procedures, 
and instantiations, tailored to organizational 
needs in order to solve problems that, until now, 
could not be addressed by information technol-
ogy. The design science approach in IS estab-
lished rigorous research guidelines that foster 
contributions to the problem-oriented, innova-
tive, and effective creation, deployment, and 
evaluation of IT artifacts in organizations (Hev-
ner et al., 2004; March and Storey, 2008; March 
and Smith, 1995). However, a growing number 
of IT artifacts are not only created outside the 
organization, they also extend beyond the orga-
nization in terms of both complexity and dynam-
ics (Elbanna, 2010). As a result, any one de-
signer’s ability to fully understand and influence 
overall development remains limited. Working 
with systems and environments such as GNU 
Linux, Apache, or Mozilla, to name just a few of 
the largest and most popular open source (OS) 
families of programs, managers and designers 
face the challenge of using external IT artifacts—
existing artifacts developed outside their organi-
zation. This design activity that encompasses 
relating to external IT artifacts is only partially 
understood: as reuse across organizations (Ravi-
chandran and Rothenberger, 2003; Haefliger et 
al., 2008) and as community relations entertained 
by firms (Shah, 2006; Dahlander, 2007).  
The emerging literature on reuse of external IT 
artifacts considers search and adaptation efforts 
(Bonaccorsi et al., 2006; Majchrzak et al., 2006; 
West, 2003), whereas the literature on commu-
nity relations emphasizes evaluation and sharing 
of IT artifacts (Henkel, 2006; Dahlander and 
Wallin, 2007; Dahlander, 2007; Stuermer et al., 
2009). These design activities, while effective in 
tackling the challenge of dealing with external 
artifacts, partially ignore the systematic context 
difference between the external developers and 
the designers and users within the adopting orga-
nization. We currently lack a comprehensive 
framework that could inform design science re-
search on the use of externally developed IT arti-
facts, in particular adaptation and evaluation. 
Crucially, use occurs in a different context from 
development and designers must be made aware 
of the effects external IT artifacts can have on use 
within the organization (Ciborra, 1998). Starting 
with the search for an IT artifact and problem 
formulation all the way through the adoption, 
development and internal evaluation, under-
standing the effects of use and context, that may 
limit “degrees of freedom” in design, has become 
a priority for IS researchers and practitioners. A 
strategic perspective reinforces the urgency be-
cause successful information systems (e.g. for 
knowledge management) rely on accessible and 
well integrated IT artifacts (Butler et al., 2008; 
Massey et al., 2002), and integration refers to the 
everyday context of use in an organization.  
The purpose of this paper is to advance design 
science by developing a framework for research 
on reuse and the relationship between external 
IT artifacts and their users. We seek to advance 
avenues for future research on IS through the 
design science approach by formulating and 
grounding a set of research questions. In the next 
section, we briefly introduce the literature on the 
design of IT artifacts, and show the importance 
of a research thrust on designing and relating to 
externally designed IT artifacts. Next, we develop 
a framework of research questions to guide future 
work in this particular area. Before concluding, 
we discuss the implications of our framework for 
research design and for the role and focus of the 
design science researcher.  
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DESIGN AND RELATE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE 
LITERATURE 
Design science was originally conceived within 
engineering and computer science and aimed at 
problem solving in these areas (Simon, 1996). 
Today, design science is pervasive in several aca-
demic disciplines that build artifacts, such as me-
chanical or medical engineering, biotechnology, 
construction engineering, and architecture. In IS, 
design science evolved into a coherent body of 
theory and research on design and action (Gre-
gor, 2006). It opened vast opportunities for pre-
dicting and observing the interaction between 
researchers, designers, users, organizations, and 
the evolving artifact (Cross, 2007; Markus, et al. 
2002; Hevner et al., 2004; Banker and Kauff-
man, 2004; Gregor, 2006). Hevner and col-
leagues (2004) developed a foundational design 
science approach to IS research consisting of two 
activities, the initial development of artifacts and 
their subsequent justification and evaluation. 
They based their study on business needs origi-
nating with people, organizations, and technol-
ogy, as well as theoretical foundations and re-
search methods. More specifically, Hevner (2007) 
posited three cycles in design science: the rele-
vance cycle that connects design science research 
and the problem environment through the speci-
fication of requirements and field testing; the 
design cycle that connects building and evaluat-
ing artifacts; and the rigor cycle that connects 
design science research and developing knowl-
edge bases. Hevner et al. (2004) distilled the prac-
tical aspects of design science into seven pivotal 
IS guidelines: 1) create an artifact that addresses 
an organizational problem; 2) ensure the problem 
is relevant to business; 3) evaluate the utility of 
the design in view of the needs or problems it is 
created to address; 4) contribute to academic and 
practical knowledge through the new artifact, 
methods, or foundations; 5) use rigorous methods 
when creating and evaluating the artifact; 6) 
search for an effective artifact using available 
means to reach a desired end, within the (legal) 
constrains set by the problem environment; 7) 
communicate design outcomes to managers and 
academics.  
As these guidelines show, one undisputed advan-
tage of the design science approach is the inter-
twined nature of artifact design and the process of 
researching it. The distinctions between “re-
search and design” or “observing and doing” 
become increasingly blurred, to the potential 
benefit of practice and academia alike. Design 
science helps researchers and managers engage in 
constructive dialogues: researchers to identify the 
most relevant and pressing research problems, 
and the academic IS discipline to contribute to 
practically useful knowledge, novel theories, and 
tested methodologies (Hevner, 2007). Fundamen-
tally, design science frees the IS field of excessive 
technological determinism, or the simplistic view 
that technology is determined by rules or laws 
beyond human control (Hickman, 1998). It also 
helps IS researchers to add “truth value” to arti-
facts and recommendations by specifying their 
effectiveness and efficiency in specific situations 
(Iivari, 2007: 46-47). An important assumption 
for design science to work, however, is that con-
text along the dimensions of people, organization, 
and technology is known, potentially understood 
or, to some limited extent, controllable by the 
researcher, much like an attempt to identify and 
unilaterally control a complex set of variables in 
quasi-experiments. Inside firms, the design sci-
ence approach to IS research still very much 
relies on a notion of a cyclical process that starts 
with problem formulation and ends with success-
ful implementation (Hevner, 2007; March and 
Storey, 2008). As Hevner suggested (2007: 89), 
“Good design science research often begins by 
identifying and representing opportunities and 
problems in an actual application environment.” 
Hevner then proceeds to clarify how the applica-
tion context not only provides requirements for 
research, but also specifies acceptance criteria for 
the final evaluation of the research outcome. 
Under such conditions, design science is rational, 
rigorous, and useful. Yet, with the advent of ex-
ternal IT artifacts—where collaborative devel-
opment across organizational boundaries engages 
widely distributed populations of designers and 
users and integrates a large variety of technolo-
gies—new forms and contingencies raise an im-
portant challenge to conventional design science 
in IS: the context defined along multiple dimen-
sions becomes increasingly dynamic and prob-
lematic to identify, understand, and control uni-
laterally. Garud, Jain, and Tuertscher (2008) 
alluded to this challenge when elaborating on the 
design approach taken by developers of collabo-
rative efforts such as Wikipedia and GNU Linux. 
What the authors call “designing for incomplete-
ness” is a cycle of evolving artifact designs that 
opens up questions and options for re-design.  
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Today, there is a growing environment populated 
with large and complex IT artifacts that have 
been in development over many years (the GNU 
Linux operating system, for example, began de-
velopment in 1991) involving communities of 
thousands of individuals and organizations 
worldwide (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003). 
The artifacts are often instantiations, (e.g. OS 
software licensed code), but may equally well 
include a vast repertoire of alternative algorithms, 
symbols, design methods, vocabulary, or proce-
dures. In the light of this phenomenon, we pro-
pose two important issues to be considered for 
design science: reuse and community relations. 
First, the global search space for OS-related arti-
facts is virtually unconstrained. Although soft-
ware repositories such as Freshmeat or Source-
Forge (which list more than 120,000 projects and 
1.2 million developers producing a host of IT 
artifacts) aid firms and users conduct searches for 
effective artifacts, the information problem is 
overwhelming: depending on the constraints set 
by the problem environment, one does not know 
if an even more effective artifact could be avail-
able “out there,” or if some individual or firm is 
working on solving the exact same problem at 
this very moment. Haefliger et al. (2008) found 
that OS software developers sometimes use soft-
ware repositories for searches, but that they rely 
more strongly on their contacts with other trusted 
developers when identifying effective and efficient 
artifacts. It should also be noted that the reuse 
literature in IS focuses on cost savings through 
internal reuse programs (Frakes and Isoda, 1994; 
Kim and Stohr, 1998; Cybulski et al., 1998; Ly-
nex and Layzell, 1998) without formulating 
methods to decide which external IT artifacts to 
reuse in order to design new or better informa-
tion systems. 
Second, current and future individuals and orga-
nizations involved in the design of the external IT 
artifact may be unknown to the firm, its design-
ers, and users, as will their problems and business 
needs. Yet, an increasing number of managers 
and designers in firms see great promise in OS-
related IT artifacts developed by global commu-
nities, and have started to adapt these to internal 
needs, contribute to their collective development, 
and build relationships with the communities 
(Bonaccorsi et al., 2006; Henkel, 2006; Dah-
lander and Wallin, 2006). Additionally, a design 
science approach to IS research needs to answer 
the question of how best to relate to the commu-
nity to jointly build new and effective IT artifacts. 
OS software and related artifacts often evolve 
without a clear “roadmap,” and the boundaries 
of their future functionality may be highly uncer-
tain. For example, in very large systems, such as 
the Debian GNU Linux Distribution, continu-
ously changing groups of committers with privi-
leged access to the software development add or 
remove software components at a high pace. 
Their decisions to remove or add components are 
often based on the intensity of certain compo-
nents’ use in the community (Maillart et al., 
2008). Any single organization is but one (possi-
bly important) contributor to the community’s 
project. Given the importance of the nature of 
each contribution to the collective design agenda, 
design science needs methods to determine what 
to contribute for joint development. 
One response to these and other challenges 
would be to limit the application of design science 
to the stable and well-defined organizational con-
text where it first originated, and then create new 
theories and research approaches for these novel 
and evolving phenomena. We believe this would 
be the wrong response, as it would fail to realize 
the strong potential that design science in IS 
holds for the phenomenon of OS software. 
Rather, we argue that designing the relationship 
between the artifact and the user is a vital, if not 
central, aspect of design when external IT arti-
facts are developed by global communities. This 
calls for a new research framework with a set of 
questions to be tackled by design science re-
searchers. We turn to this point next.  
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TOWARD A NEW RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
FOR DESIGN SCIENCE  
A design science approach to IS research needs 
to grapple with the fact that a number of relevant 
external IT artifacts cannot be designed from 
scratch nor meaningfully evaluated based on the 
current state of development, and so design sci-
ence research will struggle with incomplete cycles 
of design, relevance, and rigor. Three observa-
tions lead to a new research agenda that inte-
grates the design of the relationship between an 
external IT artifact and the user.  
1. Economically attractive, complex, and 
large IT artifacts are publicly avail-
able and can be used for free.  
2. Their complexity may prevent members 
of one organization from fully know-
ing or understanding the context of 
the artifact, including the dimensions 
of people, organization, and technol-
ogy involved in its design.  
3. The artifact is being developed by a 
global community, which may or 
may not be open to artifact modifica-
tions and suggestions for improve-
ment as part of the design process. 
The sustainable development and 
maintenance of the artifact remain 
outside the full control of any one or-
ganization. 
These observations do not imply that contribu-
tors to collective innovation processes are not 
open to influence, but that joining or even influ-
encing the development agenda can be difficult to 
achieve in a manner satisfactory to the user 
(O’Mahony and Ferraro, 2007; Spaeth et al., 
2008). The first observation justifies economic 
interest in external IT artifacts. The second 
points to the challenge of reuse because, with 
only a partial understanding of context, reuse 
decisions become complex design matters. The 
third observation draws attention to community 
organization (Sawhney and Prandelli, 2001; Lee 
and Cole, 2003) and, thus, the importance of 
community relations by anyone wishing to invest 
in, use, and control external IT artifacts.  
Reuse and community relations are positions on 
two dimensions that need to be taken into con-
sideration when designing the relationship be-
tween an external artifact and the user. Reuse 
can mean adopt-as-is or adapt-to-fit, a choice 
with respective trade-offs. A purely reactive ap-
proach to reuse (adopt-as-is) may lead to unsatis-
factory results in terms of fit with organizational 
needs. A focus on adaptation (adapt-to-fit), on the 
other hand, may miss the advantages of external 
maintenance and future improvements. The ap-
proach to community relations implies similar 
trade-offs: founding and nurturing a community 
is costly but rewarding in terms of influence over 
the artifact development agenda (Spaeth et al., 
2010), whereas remote participation may yield no 
influence at all. Community relations can mean 
foundation or sponsorship by a firm—such as 
IBM’s decision to release the Eclipse software 
development platform under an OS license and 
help build a foundation to manage it—or remote 
participation, evidenced in the roughly 170 
member organizations contributing to the Eclipse 
platform. A statement in a recent keynote address 
by Dan Frye, Vice President of OS software at 
IBM, shows how delicate this trade-off is for 
Eclipse:  
“For IBM, one of the hardest lessons it had to 
learn was one about control. Mainly, there is 
none. There is nothing that we can do to control 
individuals or communities, and if you try, you 
make things worse. What you need is influence. It 
goes back to the most important lesson, which is 
to give back to the community and develop exper-
tise. You’ll find that if your developers are work-
ing with a community, that over time they’ll de-
velop influence and that influence will allow you 
to get things done.” (Quoted in Kerner, 2010.) 
While the trade-off may prevent firms and other 
users from engaging in and developing commu-
nity relations, research by Joachim Henkel (2006) 
shows that reciprocity in community relations 
can offer benefits for the participant firm, such as 
external bug fixes and software improvements, 
and an enhanced technical reputation.  
The trade-offs apparent in reuse and community 
relations are contingent upon the way designers 
and users in organizations understand and relate 
to external contexts, technologies, and commu-
nity organization. Existing artifacts are known to 
impact users (Orlikowski, 1992; DeSanctis and 
Poole, 1994)—an insight that may be fruitfully 
combined with a design science approach that 
views artifacts as the creative outcome resulting 
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from a precise understanding of the gaps between 
the current and desired states of organizational 
information systems. We propose that a future 
design science approach should consider more 
closely the relationship between a given and 
adaptable artifact and the user. Adaptive structu-
ration theory (AST) is particularly useful to help 
devise a framework toward this end (DeSanctis 
and Poole, 1994; Markus and Silver, 2008)57.  
AST builds on the work by sociologist Anthony 
Giddens, and originates from an effort to com-
bine various institutional and decision making 
theories in prior IS research. AST examines 
technological and organizational change from the 
types of structure offered by advanced technolo-
gies, and the structures that emerge in human 
action as people interact with these technologies. 
The theory is relevant to our argument because it 
aims at improving the design and implementation 
of new technologies (DeSanctis and Poole, 1994). 
Correspondingly, we suggest the effects of IS on 
users should be considered along the three di-
mensions identified by Markus and Silver (2008) 
in their later critique and advancement of AST: 
technological object, functional affordances, and 
symbolic expression.  
Acknowledging that a global community may 
continuously develop artifacts, the dimensions of 
AST take on a dynamic aspect ranging from 
current to future activities and states, which needs 
to be considered by designers. The characteristics 
of the technological object can be subsumed un-
der “agenda,” consisting of realized, planned, or 
evolving technology. The functional affordances 
can be termed “adaptability,” since they result 
from an informed perception of functions by 
designers ready to invest considerable resources 
to adapt a given functionality. Third, “auspice” is 
the promise of symbolic expression that covers 
the interpretative scope of designers and users 
who choose to work with a “foreign” external IT 
artifact developed by a global community. In 
ancient Rome, an auspice referred to patterns as 
“signs from the gods,” such as a flock of bird or 
                                                
57 March and Smith (1995) suggested that adaptive 
structuration theory is a prominent example of an 
approach to theorizing about the “why” and “how” effects 
in IS design. For example, an issue that connects the two 
theories is why particular artifacts (constructs, models, 
methods, and instantiations) work. It should be noted, 
however, that Markus et al. (2002) elected to talk about 
“design theory” when describing knowledge management 
systems linking theory and instantiations, rather than 
design science, which focuses more on design as an 
activity. For more on this, see Gregor (2006). 
the appetite of chickens, interpreted by an augur. 
Analogously, designers read patterns in the de-
velopment of an evolving complex artifact as well 
as the many weak and strong signals emerging 
from the behavior of the community. Patterns in 
development might include software components 
removed from or added to the OS software re-
pository, implementations of algorithms, choice 
of programming language, API specifications, 
waiting times for bug fixing, release histories, or 
evolving documentation of code. The behavior of 
the community may include messages posted to 
mailing lists, thread lengths of discussions, the 
developers or users who choose to participate in 
certain discussions, the types of mailing list used 
(e.g. technical topics versus general lists), fre-
quently asked questions, helping behavior, etc. 
The community often cultivates and communi-
cates specific values that might contradict organi-
zational values and otherwise interfere with work-
ing routines, rhythms, and interaction patterns in 
the organization. Within this structuring process, 
the role of the designer can be considered at dif-
ferent levels of granularity: from middle man-
agement to top management, and from an indus-
try perspective, where designers are entrepre-
neurs (Steyaert, 2007) using given artifacts and 
combining them with their own perception of 
markets, user needs, and technological visions. 
Table 1 presents a number of critical design is-
sues that risk remaining invisible when ignoring 
the relationship between external IT artifacts and 
users. 
Agenda 
As designers, middle management need to antici-
pate the planned, realized, and evolving 
characteristics of the external IT artifact, to 
understand and evaluate its potential utility for 
their organizational problem, and ultimately for 
the business relevance of the artifact. In a global 
community the number of components that con-
stitute the artifact may grow exponentially, satis-
fying some user’s personal needs (von Hippel, 
2001). In the process, some components may 
become increasingly peripheral, whereas others 
may take on an important role in the overall de-
sign, channeling the efforts of a greater part of 
the community toward upgrading and ensuring 
compatibility with other components. Nokia’s 
development of the OS software platform 
Maemo is a case in point. While the platform 
includes OS software like GNU Linux, GTK, 
and Gnome, in addition to many other user de-
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to many other user developed instantiations (e.g. 
mapping software or star gazer), Nokia has cho-
sen to keep some software proprietary, including 
user experience-related software components. 
However, for Nokia, the design of an optimal 
user experience needs to be kept consistent with 
the functionality of these evolving artifacts. Thus, 
Nokia’s designers are required to interact care-
fully with, learn about, and monitor the realized, 
planned, and evolving technology development 
and other activities of the community.  
In a context where the dimensions of people, 
organization, and technology are in flux, the 
organization’s overall strategic direction is an 
important consideration for researchers who do 
IS design science. A changing context can alter 
organizational problems, undermine their busi-
ness relevance, and diminish the utility of a de-
sign. The development agenda also includes top 
management designing an overall reuse strategy 
aimed at externally developed IT artifacts, and 
asks how the realized, planned, and evolving 
artifact complements other internal strategic as-
sets (artifacts) and their sourcing. The reuse strat-
egy defines a scope for design and action 
throughout the organization, and provides direc-
tion for middle-level managers and other design-
ers and users to identify relevant communities 
and technologies. Moreover, the reuse strategy 
also defines how externally and internally devel-
oped artifacts relate, including make-or-buy deci-
sions at the level of artifacts, such as software 
components and other instantiations. Ravi-
chandran and Rothenberger (2003) discuss this 
for component markets, where the difference is 
that components are commercial and pro-
tected by copyright.  
At the industry level, the development agenda 
may inspire the design of new business models. A 
study of new entrants in the Italian software in-
dustry (Bonaccorsi et al., 2006) finds that entre-
preneurship emerges on the fringes of OS soft-
ware development, giving rise to new markets for 
products and services. Here, users design business 
models that involve community support, packag-
ing, combining, selling artifacts, or providing 
services to other OS software users (see, for ex-
ample, Fitzgerald 2006). Interestingly, the fact 
that artifacts rapidly evolve is in itself an entre-
preneurial opportunity. Examples of entrepre-
neurial firms that developed new business models 
based on OS software include Red Hat and Suse. 
In a world where Linux and related software may 
contain numerous releases, Red Hat adds value 
Table 13: Understanding the relationship between the external IT artifact and the user: a research framework for 
advancing design science in IS 
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to the user of OS software by securing coherent 
and updated versioning of the software (Red Hat 
Linux) in combination with other artifacts. To 
summarize the discussion this far, the overarch-
ing research question regarding the effect of the 
agenda is: how can the link between existing 
technology and organizational needs be designed 
so that the use of the artifact can sustain, evolve, 
and grow in conjunction with the external devel-
opment? 
Adaptability 
Adaptability requires an understanding of the 
potential match between the user’s requirements 
and the functional affordances, defined as “the 
possibilities for goal-oriented action afforded to 
specified user groups by technical objects” (Mar-
kus and Silver, 2008: 622). From a dynamic per-
spective, middle managers are challenged to find 
a match and design an adaptation strategy that 
takes into account the specific needs of the orga-
nization regarding scale, security, reliability, sta-
bility, and more. Here, make-or-buy decisions as 
part of the adaptation strategy become an impor-
tant object of research. What are the costs and 
benefits involved in adapting an external IT arti-
fact, and at what point do net benefits of adapta-
tion offset the cost of developing a targeted arti-
fact inside the firm?  
For top management, these dynamics imply the 
choice of a community of external developers or 
the foundation and nurturing of sub-communities 
to design sustainable collaboration with competi-
tors and volunteers (Spaeth et al., 2010). Top 
management involvement is essential here be-
cause engagement with the community to safe-
guard functional affordances represents potential 
risks including loss of reputation, loss of trade 
secrets, spillover of technically sensitive informa-
tion, the use of internal labor for external IT 
artifact development of no relevance to organiza-
tional problems, unintended or intended breach 
of commercial and OS software licenses, etc. 
While prior work has suggested investigating the 
roles and activities of top management by design 
science methods (Van Aken, 2004), little is known 
about their involvement in design science and 
how the reuse of external IT artifacts opens a 
new research space.  
An entrepreneur’s challenge is to identify and 
build the match between the functional affor-
dances of the existing artifact and a new segment 
of users willing to pay for a specific service or 
complementary product. The entrepreneur holds 
or creates knowledge about the evolving artifacts, 
their goal orientation, and the existing and poten-
tial needs of users. Through involvement in the 
design, the entrepreneur learns about the affor-
dances of the IT artifact and starts to relate it to 
new users (Steyaert, 2007). This process may 
result in new matches between functionality and 
existing demand, but it may also, through a suc-
cession of commitments, result in the creation of 
entirely new markets (Sarasvathy and Dew, 
2005). As Sarasvathy and Dew (2005: 559) put it: 
“Entrepreneurs do not ‘leave it’ to differences in 
tastes or behavior to build markets. They work 
very hard to make tastes cohere and to concur-
rently embody them into particular transforma-
tions in real artifacts.” The overarching research 
question regarding the adaptability is: how can 
the functional affordances of the artifact be iden-
tified and (or) created in order to meet the needs 
of users when both technology and requirements 
continually evolve? 
Auspice 
The symbolic expression of an IT artifact corre-
sponds to a dynamic scope for interpretation. 
Auspice is a promise in need of design. Manage-
ment is challenged to communicate the usefulness 
of a need and convey a sense of motivation 
among users that triggers their creativity. For 
example, Hevner (2007) highlights the impor-
tance of creativity and flow in problem solving for 
a successful design. Yet, the use of an evolving, 
external IT artifact is fraught with difficulties: it is 
“not invented here,” it may come with bugs, it 
may be poorly documented, it does not perfectly 
fit internal routines and practices, it may be 
abandoned by the original developers, and its 
inner workings may never be fully understood by 
users and designers in the organization. Appro-
priation by internal designers and users, their 
acceptance and enthusiasm for integrating the 
artifact with the information architecture of the 
organization, can be designed, and our frame-
work specifies the issues involved. Middle man-
agement designs for goodwill toward a specific 
external IT artifact. The successful use of IT arti-
facts depends on organizational changes in rou-
tines and business processes (Brynjolfsson and 
Hitt, 1996), which include complex relationships 
between management levels and organizational 
units (Mata et al., 1995). Auspice describes the 
relationship between the external artifact and the 
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user, the scope for interpretation and, hence, 
communication and flexibility in promoting the 
artifact’s advantages. At the middle-management 
level, auspice also involves transforming internal 
processes to accommodate for and actively use 
the external IT artifact. These middle manage-
ment tasks can be daunting, as any external IT 
artifact may be viewed with skepticism and mis-
trust, based on justified criticism.  
For top management, designing openness be-
comes a strategic issue: why should the firm 
adopt external IT artifacts at all? Previous re-
search has shown that IT assimilation crucially 
depends on top management (Armstrong and 
Sambamurthy, 1999) prioritizing and carrying 
out specific organizational initiatives. Top man-
agement may indeed have significant influence 
over whether external IT artifacts are generally 
positively received, and future research needs to 
substantiate the most effective strategies. In the 
case of Nokia’s Maemo platform, significant 
communication was needed by top management 
on the direction of the company’s collaboration 
with the community of volunteer developers con-
tributing a variety of artifacts. A good starting 
point for research could be some of the world’s 
largest technology companies, which frequently 
interact with and contribute to OS software 
communities. For example, companies such as 
Red Hat, IBM, Novell, Intel, and Oracle are top 
contributors to the Linux kernel: in 2009, there 
were 240 companies contributing overall58.  The 
fact that some of these companies have been 
working with OS communities for many years 
seems to indicate that they value community 
relations highly and that they have found ways to 
communicate the value of openness to internal 
users and designers.  
From an entrepreneurial perspective, under-
standing the symbolic expression of an artifact 
could translate into designing an environment for 
collaboration and overcoming the little under-
stood hurdle of motivating distributed individuals 
to share or contribute to a new business. While it 
is clear that many entrepreneurial firms have 
emerged on the fringes of the OS software phe-
nomenon as discussed above (we also see software 
vendors being formed around the Maemo plat-
form), a large research gap exists concerning the 
community’s engagement in the formation of 
these business. The emergence of entrepreneurs 
                                                
58 For recent statistics see lwn.net or for a comprehensive 
update for 2009 see Kroah-Hartman et al. (2009). 
may indeed create an imbalance in the incentive 
structure that safeguards OS development. Some 
voluntary users and designers who do not expect 
to benefit economically, at the same levels as 
entrepreneurs, may defect from the development 
effort, which could lead to an undersupply of the 
external IT artifact (see discussion by Young and 
Rohm, 1999, on establishing Red Hat and the 
sensitivity to voluntary Linux developers). The 
overarching question regarding the auspice is: 
how can the promise of using an external IT 
artifact be communicated and promoted in order 
to enable efficiency and foster creativity? 
Table 1 summarizes a host of design tasks that 
are relevant, but neither obvious nor easily tack-
led by existing approaches to design science in IS. 
A focus on the relationship between artifact and 
users can broaden the scope of the design science 
approach considerably and enrich research by 
incorporating theory from other fields, such as 
structuration theory, motivation theory (flow, 
cognitive dissonance, self-determination), private-
collective innovation theory, or behavioral eco-
nomics (reciprocity, fairness, altruism). If the 
technology is developed outside the influence of 
any one organization, and if both technical char-
acteristics and internal needs continue to evolve, 
the great promise of a design approach lies in the 
carefully structured, rigorous, and repeated ques-
tioning, understanding, and designing of the rela-
tionship between the artifact and the user.  
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IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH DESIGNS 
In the following, we discuss the implications of 
our framework for design science research and 
the researcher to indicate potential avenues for 
future work. The result of design science research 
is the production of an artifact such as a con-
struct, model, method, or instantiation. Thus, an 
important strength of the design science ap-
proach in IS is its close link to action and practice 
(March and Smith, 1995; Hevner et al., 2004; 
Hevner, 2007; Sein et al., 2010). Similarly, in the 
framework we propose, the result is the artifact 
that emerges from a collaboration where the 
design approach includes not only the artifact 
itself, but also the relationship between designers 
and users (spread out across several communities 
or firms). This broader focus implies extensions to 
the design science research process in IS.  
Recall that design science consists of cycles of 
activities to foster academic and practical knowl-
edge; the design cycle (build and evaluate), the 
relevance cycle (specify requirements, field tests), 
and the rigor cycle (grounding, additions to 
knowledge base). The framework developed in 
the last section raises the question of the location 
of these cycles and the role of the researcher 
within them. If the problem environment for one 
artifact consists of multiple and changing people, 
organizations, and technologies, the focus of de-
sign science and the position of the researcher 
become ambiguous. We cannot fix a general 
position but need to consider a space with multi-
ple dimensions and multiple perspectives from 
which an artifact is external. Design science, 
then, can be understood along a vector in a 
three-dimensional space where its direction cap-
tures the focus of research (the user as researcher, 
the community, and the firm) and its scope cap-
tures the extent to which research cycles include 
the relationship between external artifact and 
user. We use the term “vector” because individ-
ual researchers can choose to focus to a greater or 
lesser degree on one or more players and their 
relationships in the overall research context.  
First, let us consider direction. The orientation of 
design science research can be towards the re-
searcher as user. An important motivation for OS 
software is for users to solve their own problems, 
through the building and evaluation of an artifact 
(von Hippel, 2001). Here, the artifact can be built 
from scratch or reused from the wide offerings in 
an OS environment. A prerequisite, however, is 
for researchers to build and evaluate an artifact 
with future potential reuse in mind. In many 
engineering fields, researchers build IT artifacts 
to solve critical scientific problems, and release 
them with the publications of their research re-
sults. In geography, for example, researchers 
have built numerous OS software components for 
geospatial applications. The purpose of these 
systems ranges from helping researchers to do 
more accurate mapping and tracking of geo-
physical changes, to better analysis through geo-
metric algorithms (Steiniger and Bocher, 2009). 
So, too, in the field of economics, where authors 
have argued for the need for the discipline to 
build and evaluate new OS IT artifacts such as 
software packages for more effective statistic 
analysis (Yalta and Yalta, 2010). When research-
ers share these artifacts in the way the examples 
show, it may help advance a discipline more effi-
ciently and effectively.  
Design science research can be oriented toward a 
community that engages in collective building 
and evaluation of reusable artifacts. Researching 
OS software communities is nothing new, of 
course, but following the principal cycles of de-
sign science (Hevner, 2007) researchers are more 
than passive observers—they must join the com-
munity, build and evaluate through participating 
in discussion forums, testing software, reporting 
bugs, fixing bugs, documenting, writing code, 
coordinating projects, and so on. The focus of 
design science research would be on the extent to 
which reusable artifacts that fit with the emerging 
needs and problems of the community can be 
built. To our knowledge, this type of research 
design is currently almost non-existent (an excep-
tion is Bodker et al., 2007), but we think it will be 
instrumental for the development of our aca-
demic and practical understanding of OS com-
munities. For example, community oriented de-
sign science will allow us to examine in detail a 
number of context-sensitive issues linked to the 
building and evaluation of an artifact. For exam-
ple: if, why, and how do small changes to an arti-
fact initiate supportive or negative reactions from 
the community? When and how does the com-
munity perform search? What is the form or con-
tent of discussions closed to people outside the 
small circle of OS developers? What changes in 
an artifact relate to or emerge from the ongoing 
discussion on project developer lists? 
Finally, design science research can be oriented 
toward the firm as the user organization. Here 
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researchers place themselves within the organiza-
tion, jointly searching for and evaluating com-
munities and external IT artifacts for reuse. De-
sign science has contributed significantly to in-
formation systems research in this domain; their 
contributions have strategic implications for how 
to improve working environments in organiza-
tions and leverage information systems for busi-
ness purposes. Consequently, it is here where our 
framework most obviously builds on prior work 
and extends the design science approach to in-
clude the relationship to external IT artifacts. We 
are not aware of scholars using the three design 
science research cycles in conducting research 
that takes into account the impact of the dynamic 
properties of external IT artifacts under devel-
opment, of their functional affordance, and of 
their symbolic expression. However, Hevner 
(2007) sees parallels between action research (e.g. 
Susman and Evered, 1978) and design science 
research, and suggests that both could benefit 
from each other. Very recently, Sein and col-
leagues (2011) developed a methodology that 
combines action research and design science 
research by building on their own action research 
and on prior work in design science that explicitly 
takes into account the organizational context of 
the design process (Gregor and Jones, 2007; Or-
likowski and Iacono, 2001; Orlikowski and Scott, 
2008). There are several studies in IS that report 
having used an action research methodology 
concerning the implementation of OS software in 
public organizations, developing economies, and 
the educational system. For example, Braa and 
Hedberg (2002) report on an action research 
program to develop a health information system 
based on OS software for African countries, in-
cluding a number of challenges such as accep-
tance of the new systems by local users. However, 
many of these studies fall prey to a common criti-
cism that action research tends to favor strong 
relevance over academic rigor. An exception here 
is Fitzgerald and Kenny (2004) who provide a 
rigorous account of OS software implementation 
in a large Irish hospital. Their study identifies 
challenges such as the shift of mindset needed to 
work with OS software, as well as the resistance 
among staff who felt their expertise was threat-
ened as the hospital abandoned popular com-
mercial software. Yet, while the study pays sig-
nificant attention to the change resulting from the 
OS software implementation, reporting case-
based findings of high relevance to the IS disci-
pline, it is not a direct application of a design 
science research approach. In particular, it does 
not place the researcher in the focal position of 
external IT artifact design and reuse. This will 
need to be the orientation of future design science 
research.  
Second, the scope of the vector represents the 
building and evaluation of the artifact itself, deal-
ing with the extent to which researchers take into 
account relationships with external IT artifacts. It 
is here that our framework suggests specific ques-
tions for design science research, specifying 
methods to decide on the fundamental trade-offs 
in reuse as well as community relations. While 
the application of our framework is not limited to 
firms or communities, the questions are most 
fruitfully investigated in a context where more 
than one individual (the researcher) is affected by 
external IT artifacts and organizational IS chal-
lenges can be approached with the relationship 
explicitly considered.  
As an iterative process, the cycles imply that not 
only the external artifact underlies a build and 
evaluation process but also the nature of the rela-
tionship with the community and the design ef-
forts that can be controlled by the internal de-
signers. The search for a reuse target is a process 
that compares expected search costs with esti-
mated costs of designing in-house: only if the 
efforts to design an artifact by internal designers 
are considered to be higher than the potential 
identification of a reusable artifact will search be 
undertaken (Haefliger et al., 2008). All three di-
mensions of our framework should be considered 
when making decisions about reuse and commu-
nity relations. First, regarding agenda, should 
search focus on currently available artifacts or 
include, or even focus on, technological road-
maps and development agendas set by communi-
ties? Any candidate artifact needs to be consid-
ered in terms of its relationship with internal de-
signers and users. This means that the estimated 
adoption effort depends on current and likely 
future needs. The design of a search process is 
already known to be fraught with “uncontrollable 
forces in the environment” (Hevner et al., 2004: 
88), without taking into consideration the rela-
tionship between an externally available artifact 
and internal designers and users at a given time. 
The resulting complexity may well overtax pre-
defined search procedures and call for new search 
heuristics.  
An externally developed system comes with a 
history. Its architecture has evolved based on the 
needs of the community developing it and its 
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features may make it a promising candidate for 
reuse. The community’s agenda to develop the 
system further may be in line with internal needs 
and first tests might suggest adoption. Designing 
for adoption requires the design science re-
searcher to answer a number of specific questions 
such as: how does the system technology interact 
with the internal technical environment? Do in-
ternal designers sufficiently understand the sys-
tem to make use of it? Is compatibility ensured 
across key processes? What is the release history 
of the community and can we expect the com-
munity to continue to maintain and release up-
dated versions? Is the community responsive, 
offering documentation or a help forum?  
Second, regarding adaptability, searching for the 
right contribution to a community, given the 
functional affordance of the external artifact and 
the pre-defined and emerging needs of internal 
designers, may result in experimentation and 
improvisation with new approaches such as de-
sign for incompleteness (Garud et al., 2008). De-
signing the contribution means evaluating the 
gap between existing (and potential) functionality 
and internal needs in terms of adapting the sys-
tem. This may entail contributing to the commu-
nity in order to benefit from the community’s 
future improvements (Dahlander and Wallin, 
2006). Design evaluation, here, means gauging 
the potential community relations that allow 
quality improvements to flow both ways. Is there 
mutual understanding in terms of quality, usabil-
ity, and security standards? If not, can new re-
quirements be introduced into the community by 
contributing and relating to the community on 
productive and friendly terms?  
Third, the extended design cycles may benefit 
particularly from the auspice that external arti-
facts carry. Wide-spread use and popularity of an 
artifact designed by a global community may 
signal quality and the visibility of the artifact may 
reduce the search cost (e.g. components in the 
GNU Linux distribution Debian)—but such arti-
facts may also have an “image” that could deter 
internal users from embracing them. Consider 
the ease of identifying software distributed under 
the Apache umbrella of projects hosted by the 
Apache Software Foundation. The public fame of 
Apache and the outstanding reputation of the 
Apache web server enhances the visibility of af-
filiated programs, such as Lenya, an OS content 
management system. Opting for a highly visible 
artifact may increase internal acceptance and a 
perception of openness in the firm. However, it 
may also have a reverse effect and aggravate a 
“not invented here” response by internal design-
ers, or raise flags about potential legal issues 
when using free and OS software rather than a 
commercial alternative. Designing for goodwill 
has to do with internal acceptance and leverage 
of the community’s work despite uncertain com-
munity relations. How is the community per-
ceived by users and internal designers? Is close 
interaction with the community desirable and 
promising? Does the community’s work and 
practice (including visible signs, communication 
style, quality perception, etc.) inspire the creativ-
ity of internal designers and users?  
Establishing research cycles in design science that 
take into account the dimensions outlined in our 
framework shows the complexity of an iterative 
and often intractable process. The AST approach 
suggested in our framework emphasizes the mu-
tual influence between the reuse of artifacts and 
community relation decisions and the ability of 
internal designers to build and evaluate effective 
IT artifacts in collaboration with external com-
munities. Thus, the extensions to design science 
research contained in this framework directly 
inform reuse and community relation decisions, 
possibly to a finer level of detail and practicability 
than the innovation literature has so far achieved.  
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CONCLUSION 
Design science has evolved into a powerful set of 
theories and methods of design and action in IS. 
A conventional approach to design science in IS 
benefits from a stable context along the dimen-
sions of people, organization, and technology. 
We argue that the phenomenon of OS software 
introduces major changes in this context, calling 
for a new and important strategic research 
agenda for design science. A focus on the rela-
tionship between external artifacts and organiza-
tional users and designers can considerably 
broaden the scope of the design science approach 
and enrich research by incorporating theory from 
other fields, such as adaptive structuration theory 
(AST). Based on AST, we developed a new re-
search framework covering agenda, adaptability, 
and auspice at three levels of granularity—middle 
management, top management, and entrepre-
neur. The framework sorts design tasks and chal-
lenges pertaining to the different dimensions and 
shows how technological artifacts impact internal 
designers and users. Future work needs to de-
velop methods and processes that ultimately help 
designers make key decisions regarding reuse and 
community relations. We outline a design science 
research vector along which researchers can or-
ganize their research activities.  
A focus on the user-artifact relationship also 
opens up new research topics in other areas, such 
as motivation theory (flow, cognitive dissonance, 
self-determination), private-collective innovation 
theory, or behavioral economics (reciprocity, 
fairness, altruism). If the external IT artifact is 
developed outside the influence of any one orga-
nization, and if both technical characteristics and 
internal needs continue to evolve, the great 
promise of a design science approach lies in the 
carefully structured, rigorous, and repeated ques-
tioning, understanding, and construction of the 
relationship between artifact and user. Working 
on the research areas defined by the framework 
may even bring forth the contours of an “open 
design science.” 
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This study explores how software developers collaborate across several projects (and organiza-
tions) to innovate and to make their software compatible with other software. Technology de-
velopment is perceived as a social activity and developers manipulate the social fabric of soft-
ware development for economic reasons. The developers reuse and fork Free/Libre Open 
Source software (FLOSS) code developed in other projects in order to build an integrated sys-
tem. Referred to as sociomaterial transactions, these practices of distributed systems integration 
share three characteristics: transparency (openness) of technology, frequent communication, 
and long-term, multiple project affiliations by developers. This study contributes to the eco-
nomics of systems integration and technical design by showing how developers from different 
organizations integrate software systems without the use of a formal, central systems integrator, 
and how interfaces are built collaboratively across organizations. Sociomateriality as a perspec-
tive renders the surprising empirical results amenable to an economic analysis of the integra-
tion work of software developers because it allows technology (code) to play a social role and 
social organization to become technically salient. Methodological and theoretical implications 
are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Developers of Free/Libre Open Source software 
(FLOSS) organize their work in projects dedi-
cated to specific software products (von Hippel 
and von Krogh, 2003). The software each project 
develops must function with other software prod-
ucts. Integrating software products requires not 
only time and effort but also knowledge about the 
technologies underpinning the various compo-
nents (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006; Brusoni, 
2005). This study explores how FLOSS develop-
ers collaborate across several projects in order to 
integrate their software into a complex system 
and make it compatible with other software, 
without any one individual or organization taking 
the systems integrator role. The collaboration 
observed contributes evidence regarding the dis-
tributed location of systems integration activity in 
FLOSS projects.  
FLOSS development is frequently described as a 
social activity (Weber, 2004; Bergquist and 
Ljungberg, 2001) because of the central role that 
FLOSS code plays in the social exchange: the 
exchange of code and about code lends itself 
naturally to a perspective of entanglement where 
a separation of the code from developers’ inten-
tions, claims and interpretations of the code 
seems artificial (Orlikowski, 2010; Orlikowski and 
Scott, 2008). The costly work of systems integra-
tion brings to light the role that technology plays 
in economic terms when it comes to bear on the 
developers’ struggle to make code matter for their 
projects and get it to work in relation to a wider 
system of components. Projects are built on re-
used and forked software code and, hence, the 
technology is the social fabric that connects de-
velopers’ work (Faulkner et al., 2010). Sharing 
code is part of the social activity that leads to a 
working, integrated system. The work organized 
in projects centers around the development of 
software, which is the artifact that helps shaping 
the cross-project work (Chua and Yeow, 2010). 
Given these entanglements, I try to analytically 
untangle actors and artifact in order to speak to a 
baseline model and connect the emerging per-
spective of sociomateriality to long established 
scholarship on technical design and the econom-
ics of systems integration.  
Building and changing complex systems is be-
lieved to require a systems integrator who is able 
to understand and to some extent shape (a) the 
technological fields underpinning the variety of 
components, (b) the organizational and relational 
requirements for integrating the activities of mul-
tiple actors, and (c) the evolution of coordination 
(Brusoni, 2005; Miller et al., 1995; Prencipe, 
2000; 2003). Among students of systems integra-
tion, the notion seems to prevail that “the more 
dispersed is the production of knowledge and the 
more complex are the products, the higher also 
are the requirements of explicit integrative capa-
bilities embodied in systems integrators” (Dosi et 
al., 2003: 110).  
The management of technical interfaces and the 
corresponding organizational structure is a dy-
namic process (Sosa et al., 2003). The model 
most appropriate for this analysis is loose organi-
zational coupling (Orton and Weick, 1990; Bru-
soni et al., 2001) because it captures the middle 
ground between contractual arrangements that 
can create a market for technology (decoupled) 
on the one hand and hierarchical organization 
based on authority and control (tightly coupled) 
on the other hand. Organizational coupling thus 
served as a baseline model to formulate expecta-
tions for systems integration activity derived from 
the literature. 
In order to identify patterns of collaboration and 
integration activity, an environment of about 
thirty projects were studied, with a focus on three 
central projects. Key developers were inter-
viewed, and software code and communication 
archives (mailing lists, repositories, release notes, 
and documentation) analyzed. The types of col-
laborative activities in which developers engaged 
were categorized, and then analyzed in terms of 
authorship, affiliations, and technical impact.  
Two types of transactions and three enabling 
conditions led to integrated systems without cen-
tralized system integration and an efficient han-
dling of technical uncertainty and multiple func-
tional objectives. The transactions include (1) the 
sharing of code, in 50 instances, and (2) friendly 
forking, in 23 instances. The enabling conditions 
include (1) transparency provided by the regular 
publication of code (encouraged by Free and 
Open Source software licenses), (2) the frequent 
exchange of messages and comments among 
developers from different projects, and (3) long-
term interactions in two forms: developers who 
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are substantively engaged in several related pro-
jects (facilitating shared code), and authors of 
forks and branches who continued to be involved 
in the main project even as they pursue their 
separate trajectories. I refer to these findings as 
“sociomaterial transactions” across loosely cou-
pled organizations, which describe how a com-
plex product can be developed and integrated.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows: Section 2 explores the theoretical back-
ground, Section 3 introduces the Free Java envi-
ronment studied, which represents a network of 
projects that produces components of a system 
called a runtime environment, and describes the 
research design. Section 4 discusses the results, 
and Section 5 concludes and Sections 6 and 7 
highlight the implications for theory and meth-
ods, and limitations and future research.  
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THEORETICAL BACKGROUND—
SOCIOMATERIALITY, ORGANIZATIONAL 
COUPLING AND THE ROLE OF SYSTEMS 
INTEGRATION 
FLOSS projects develop software that works in 
conjunction with other software and hardware. 
Projects that develop FLOSS are usually under-
stood as virtual organizations of volunteers and 
company employees who contribute to a com-
mon goal of producing an envisioned software 
product using a small range of fairly common 
tools, such as mailing lists, Internet Relay Chat 
(IRC), central code repositories, and web-based 
content management systems (Lee and Cole, 
2003). For the purpose of this study, a project is 
defined as an organization that develops and 
evolves a clearly defined software product (code). 
It consists of all the members (or developers) who 
contribute to the development of the software by 
either writing code, participating in the discus-
sions, or by helping other members: this includes 
individuals who post comments but not those 
who only read and do not participate (so called 
lurkers). By core developers, I refer to individuals 
who received write access to the project’s soft-
ware repository. All developers in this study were 
also users in the sense that they utilized the code 
bases under development in their work or daily 
life.  
As virtual projects become commonplace in or-
ganization theory (Sproull et al., 2007), their in-
teractions and alliances have been overlooked. 
To the author’s knowledge, there are no studies 
that systematically explore alliances and resource 
exchanges among virtual projects. There are 
studies of communities of practice building in-
formal communities that bridge organizations in 
order to connect experts separated by organiza-
tion boundaries (von Hippel, 1987; Rosenkopf et 
al., 2001). But the engineers who traded know-
how in von Hippel’s 1987 study did not build an 
integrated system, and studies on communities of 
practice often ignored the exchange of actual 
technology in favor of analyzing communication 
flows.  
The literature on collective activity in user inno-
vation (e.g. von Hippel, 2005) lacks a precise 
understanding of how users collaborate across the 
basic organizational unit, which is a project that 
develops and advances innovations such as soft-
ware (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003; Sawney 
and Prandelli, 2000). A body of research on 
communities of practice (Brown and Duguid, 
1991) and technical communities (Rosenkopf et 
al., 2001) has identified the exchange of knowl-
edge across organizational boundaries (across 
firms and outside of firms) and the effects on mu-
tual learning and future alliance building. In con-
texts without face-to-face contact, news group 
members were found to exchange knowledge (in 
the form of messages) about their practice and 
build social relations (Faraj and Wasko, 2005). 
However, the knowledge exchanged in these 
studies rarely included the exchange of the tech-
nology itself, an omission that has been criticized 
by IT researchers (Orlikowski and Iacono, 2001).  
It is this omission that points to the heart of an 
open debate about the role of technology in 
management and economics (Leonardi and Bar-
ley, 2010; Faulkner et al., 2010; Dosi and Grazzi, 
2010). FLOSS code has been referred to as a 
public good due to its status as explicit knowledge 
that is non rivalrous in use and non-excludable 
by the design of the Open Source license (von 
Hippel and von Krogh, 2003). However, the 
question what technology is in FLOSS is more 
complex. Dosi and Grazzi (2010: 179) point out 
that technology can hardly be considered a pub-
lic good due to the tacit knowledge required 
when attempting to use technology and the costs 
involved in building capabilities and learning. 
Taking this argument a step further and ac-
knowledging that know-how, the capacity to act 
that knowledge confers, is a matter of action leads 
to a focus on practice (Nicolini, 2011; Suchman, 
2007; Schatzki et al. 2001) and, even further, on 
the entanglement of developers with technology 
with “temporarily emergent sociomaterial reali-
ties (Orlikowski, 2010: 137).” This controversy 
about the inseparability of human and non-
human entities in action is useful in the study of 
systems integration because organizational and 
technical boundaries are subject to negotiations 
and sources of significant costs to developers. 
Whether a sociomaterial perspective is helpful to 
understanding the economics of distributed sys-
tems integration is an empirical question. Thus, 
this study centers on the following research ques-
tion: 
Where and by whom are the tasks of systems 
integration performed in a collective of FLOSS 
projects, each dedicated to developing a certain 
software product?  
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The literature on technical designs and product 
development teaches organizational frameworks 
that can deal with dispersed learning processes, 
technical interdependencies, and uncertainty in 
both the rate of technological change as well as in 
the interdependencies of components that need 
to work together (Staudenmayer et al., 2005; 
Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Brusoni et al, 2001). 
Using the idea of organizational coupling (Bru-
soni et al., 2001; Weick, 1976; Orton and Weick, 
1990), I propose a conceptual analogy and a 
baseline model that can inform this exploratory 
study of integration and collaboration between 
FLOSS projects.  
Organizational coupling describes the choice of 
organizational arrangement used to manage the 
development, integration, and maintenance of 
technical systems that span across specialized 
organizations (Langlois and Robertson, 1992; 
Langlois, 2002). Three arrangements can be dis-
tinguished: decoupled, tightly coupled, and 
loosely coupled organizations.  
Decoupled organizations can coordinate via the 
market because the technology is stable enough 
to allow for specialized organizations to provide 
components that interoperate thanks to stan-
dards, or design rules, without the need for con-
tinuous integration efforts (Sanchez and Ma-
honey, 1996). According to Baldwin and Clark 
(2000), the establishment of design rules lowers 
the costs of coordination between technical mod-
ules because the teams involved in developing 
each module comply with the rules, thus there is 
mutual compliance between modules. This helps 
to separate tasks among teams and ensure 
interoperability between the technical compo-
nents. According to their analysis, information 
about the design rules leads to specialization 
across an industry because individual, component 
producing firms can rely on their industry part-
ners (suppliers and customers) to produce com-
patible components. An example of decoupled 
organizations can be found in the personal com-
puter industry (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Brusoni 
et al., 2001). For software, component markets 
can emerge when proprietary software compo-
nents match exact descriptions and standards that 
enable their trading between software develop-
ment organization (Ravichandran and Rothen-
berger, 2003). 
Tightly coupled organizations are thought to be 
good at handling component technologies with 
high levels of interdependency and changing 
customer needs (Teece, 1996; 2006). Technolo-
gies evolve and shift to completely new designs, 
uses, or platforms that may trigger large changes 
in the overall system, including the standards or 
design rules (Utterback, 1994; Clark, 1985). The 
consequences for the organization of an industry 
are contested. While specialized firms may ac-
commodate the changes by entering alliance 
contracts early on, Chesbrough (2003a) predicts 
integrated organizations in order to coordinate 
technology development during a state of flux 
where standards are not fixed and subject to 
competition. Examples of tightly coupled organi-
zations can be found in the hard disk drive indus-
try in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Ches-
brough, 2003a), in the telecommunications 
equipment industry (Brusoni et al., 2001), and 
Microsoft in software (Cusumano and Selby, 
1995). 
Loosely coupled organizations occupy a middle 
ground, with either lower uncertainty regarding 
component interdependencies or lower rates of 
change in the component technologies relative to 
tightly coupled organizations (Brusoni et al., 
2001). They employ a range of integration and 
collaboration mechanisms that include in-house 
as well as outsourced development, and the man-
agement of linkages to network partners that 
require explicit attention due to unexpected con-
tingencies (Brusoni et al., 2001; Staudenmayer et 
al., 2005; Kodama, 2006). “A key characteristic 
of loosely coupled network organizations is the 
presence of a systems integrator firm that out-
sources detailed design and manufacturing to 
specialized suppliers while maintaining in-house 
concept design and systems integration capabili-
ties to coordinate the work (R&D, design, and 
manufacturing) of suppliers” (Brusoni et al., 2001: 
617-618). Examples include the hard disk drive 
industry in the early and mid 1980s (Chesbrough, 
2003a), and the automotive industry (Brusoni et 
al., 2001). 
FLOSS projects are organizations that usually 
focus on developing a specific software product 
(von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003) and engage in 
protecting (O’Mahony, 2003) and regulating 
access to their work (von Krogh et al., 2003). If, 
as in the sample studied here, several projects 
produce the components of a larger system, that 
is the software components need to interoperate 
in order to be useful for the intended purpose, 
they can best be compared to loosely coupled 
organizations for three reasons. First, decoupled 
organizations require existing design rules and 
mature technologies, which are frequently not 
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given in FLOSS. Second, tightly coupled organi-
zations require hierarchies that confer authority, 
such as task assignments to members, a property 
alien to most FLOSS projects. And third, FLOSS 
projects exhibit specialization and shared knowl-
edge to various degrees, two aspects that deter-
mine the extent of loose coupling across projects 
(Orton and Weick, 1990).  
The first point is the least obvious because soft-
ware systems frequently start out with minimal 
standards that allow a new program to run on a 
specific operating system (such as GNU Linux), 
using a specific infrastructure (such as XML), or 
depending on pre-installed software. Since many 
new projects self-select their compatibility and 
requirements, the analogy to decoupled organiza-
tions frequently holds. Hence, if we study a con-
text where design rules are incomplete or about 
to be established, we are likely to observe loosely 
coupled organizations. 
Second, tightly coupled organizations are unlikely 
to emerge in FLOSS due to the partly voluntary 
character of contributions and the self-selection 
of tasks within projects (Lee and Cole, 2003; von 
Krogh et al., 2003). Hierarchies exist, however, 
and large FLOSS projects may use release dead-
lines, social norms, clearly defined roles, or char-
ismatic leadership to convey a sense of responsi-
bility and discipline (for the example of the Linux 
kernel, see Moon and Sproull, 2000). More fre-
quently, and this is the third argument, small 
FLOSS projects are observed (Krishnamurthy, 
2002) with varying degrees of specialization and 
scope that, given the need, will have to expend 
considerable effort to achieve integration with 
other programs. A recent study of code reuse in 
Open Source software documented the vast reuse 
activities by FLOSS developers and the accom-
panying work needed to make reuse successful 
(Haefliger et al., 2008). The study focused on the 
reuse of code from the perspective of the re-user 
only rather than on the production of shared 
code as carried out by potentially more than one 
party.  
Using the analogy of loosely coupled organiza-
tions as a baseline model, we can formulate three 
predictions for the tasks of systems integration 
across FLOSS projects:  
First, collaboration is a prerequisite for integra-
tion, and the building of design rules requires the 
exchange of knowledge and expertise. The inte-
gration of technical systems critically depends on 
the knowledge required to understand the various 
disciplines underlying the system components. In 
their thorough case study, Brusoni and Prencipe 
(2006) demonstrate that a modular technical 
system does not imply a modular organization 
(see also Hoetker, 2006) nor modularization in 
the knowledge domain. Innovation at the system 
level instead requires integration of knowledge 
across the organization (Brusoni and Prencipe, 
2006) and the, potentially costly, establishment of 
design rules. The authors showed that aligning 
production phases with the corresponding infor-
mation flows demanded and triggered communi-
cation between experts that had previously been 
separated, and previously tacit knowledge had to 
be made explicit. We should therefore expect that 
systems integration across FLOSS projects may 
require collaboration among previously uncon-
nected programmers, because the integration of 
work flows and processes only succeeds if appro-
priate design rules are built first, and if knowledge 
overlaps can be created.  
Second, systems integration is costly because it 
creates specific tasks that need management, 
central or distributed. The economics of systems 
integration creates possibly the biggest puzzle 
when formulating predictions for FLOSS devel-
opment. The role of the systems integrator is 
central to loosely coupled organizations and, it 
seems, indispensable for an environment of com-
plex technologies and dispersed knowledge pro-
duction (Dosi et al., 2003; Prencipe, 2003). 
FLOSS projects arguably match the description 
of loosely coupled organizations and, thus, should 
incur considerable costs for making a system of 
integrated software components work. However, 
we rarely observe FLOSS projects dedicated to 
systems integration. This contradiction warrants 
a special focus on the handling of the economic 
aspects of systems integration, in particular the 
location or distribution of integration efforts. 
Software developers set up or break component 
(module) boundaries as they see fit given the state 
of the technology and given the need to transfer 
information and code to other developers. 
Baldwin (2008) describes online communities, 
such as FLOSS projects, as enabling unencapsu-
lated, transaction-free zones. “Transaction-free 
zones in which agents freely access and transfer 
valuable materials and information are necessary 
for most forms of efficient production.” (Baldwin, 
2008: 182) In contrast to firms, however, FLOSS 
developers perceive advantages in free access to 
their code by all (von Hippel and von Krogh, 
2003) and do not encapsulate their productive 
system. Unencapsulated, transaction-free zones 
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may lower the transaction costs associated with 
systems integration tasks. 
Third, systems integrators apply mechanisms to 
deal with uncertainty, both in technical change 
and in the interdependencies. Systems integration 
requires explicit attention to uncertain develop-
ments in both technological components and 
dependencies among the components. The man-
agement of these contingencies may include crea-
tive solutions that run counter to established wis-
dom, such as adding organizational structure to 
handle external relationships and introducing 
new, shared responsibilities (Staudenmayer et al., 
2005), or establishing monitoring systems that 
also facilitate communication (Argyres, 1999). 
Hence, predicting creative solutions to manage 
uncertainty is difficult. We may expect FLOSS 
projects, similar to firms, to rely on a range of 
organizational mechanisms that lie between in-
house production and outsourcing.  
The baseline model leads to a research agenda 
that starts at the deep end of collaboration by 
analyzing the actual collaborative and integrative 
activities of developers spanning more than one 
FLOSS project.  
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 RESEARCH SAMPLE AND DESIGN 
The research design and data analysis is de-
scribed in the light of the research goals: sam-
pling, initial coding and working constructs, and 
final coding. Table 15 summarizes the research 
process and an overview lists and briefly describes 
the sources and data that informed this study. In 
the first step of the analysis, the project sampling 
was subjected to an exploratory data collection 
because the organizational and technological 
environment for this study had to offer prospects 
of filling the theoretical gap (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985). Thus, the coding, framing, and data 
analysis overlapped in time and evolved as the 
understanding of collaboration improved.  
A group of collaborating sets of projects was 
sampled to enable a study of technical collabora-
tion among developers across FLOSS projects. At 
the outset, three candidate environments were 
scanned: an integrated development environment 
(Eclipse), a Linux distribution (Debian 
GNU/Linux), and the Free Java runtime envi-
ronment. All of these technical environments 
consisted of dozens of FLOSS projects that were 
collaborating at some level.  
Three aspects led to the runtime environment 
being favored for the final coding. First, the copy-
right for much of the Free software written for 
the runtime environment projects was owned by 
the Free Software Foundation, which required 
written copyright transfer statements from the 
authors. In this hacking culture, people tended to 
use their real names when posting on mailing lists 
and communicating publicly. This characteristic 
helped to identify the authors across projects. 
Second, the Free Java runtime environment al-
lowed the observation of a current, large-scale 
integration effort between the GNU Classpath 
and Kaffe projects, which proved very accessible 
through a friendly developer community. Third, 
Eclipse built on governance structures that 
seemed unusually complex and explicit for open 
source projects. The structures helped to balance 
the interests of the open source project and the 
consortium of firms that contributed to the tech-
nology. 
 
 
Free Java 
Java is an object-oriented programming language 
developed by James Gosling and others at Sun 
Microsystems. It was first released in 1996 and 
the Java trademark is owned by Sun Microsys-
tems. Since its release, Java has gained popular-
ity, particularly for application development and 
web-related programming, and many software 
engineers use it. Over the years, developers have 
acquired skills in writing Java code, and proprie-
tary as well as open source software is being writ-
ten in Java. At the time of this writing, Source-
forge.net listed more than 40,000 FLOSS pro-
jects written at least partly in Java. The official 
Sun Microsystems Java components impeded the 
basic freedoms associated with FLOSS and 
trapped developers who wrote FLOSS using the 
Java language (Stallman, 2004). The so-called 
Java Trap motivated developers to write a ‘free 
stack’, i.e. the sum of underlying programs 
needed to run a Java program. One of the efforts 
by Free Java developers to integrate Free Java 
with the GNU Linux desktop and with software 
from the Apache group became known as 
Apache Harmony (Wielaard, 2006). The integra-
tion led to a wide acceptance of Free Java but 
also raised new questions about the compatibility 
of the different Free and Open Source software 
licenses. In November 2006, Sun Microsystems 
released their Java implementation under the 
GNU General Public Licence (GPL), thus mak-
ing it Free software. 
It is important to note that, since the invention 
and initial development of Java by Sun Microsys-
tems, an environment of software products, both 
proprietary and Free and Open Source, has de-
veloped that extends and continues to extend the 
Java platform in various ways. The projects in 
this study each provided Free components or 
versions of a platform or runtime environment to 
enable programs written in the Java language. At 
the same time, the Free components attempted to 
improve the proprietary system and expand its 
functionality, speed, usability, and compatibility 
to other Free and proprietary systems, such as 
Microsoft’s .NET framework. 
A program written in Java programming lan-
guage is first compiled into Java’s intermediate 
language, Java bytecode. The program is then 
executed on a Java virtual machine which inter-
prets the intermediate language on a target sys-
tem or computer. The Java platform, or runtime 
environment, as the system of components 
needed to successfully run a Java application is 
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known, consists of three core components: the 
Java virtual machine; the class libraries; and the 
compilers. Other components of the Java plat-
form include tools, toolkits, and interfaces. The 
virtual machine is the program that executes the 
same bytecode program on many different plat-
forms, devices, and hardware systems. The class 
libraries contain reusable code and functions that 
facilitate programming and enable the system 
independence of Java by providing basic func-
tionality without relying on the underlying oper-
ating system. The compilers transform human 
readable and writable Java source code into Java 
bytecode and into machine code.  
The example of the compiler shows how the 
functionality provided by Sun Microsystems is 
being altered and extended in important ways. 
One compiler turns the Java source code, as writ-
ten by a programmer, into Java’s intermediate 
language. Another compiler translates from the 
intermediate language into the so-called native 
language of the target system (machine code) 
usually at runtime, while the program is being 
used. The FLOSS compiler studied here, the 
GNU Compiler for Java (GCJ), can do either, 
plus compiling Java source code directly into 
machine code, thereby creating new options for 
users. Meanwhile, compilers have been created 
for other programming languages such as Python 
or Ruby to compile or interpret these languages 
into Java bytecode in order for programs written 
in these languages to take advantage of the Java 
platform. Thus the basic Java technology with its 
specifications and reference implementations 
functions as the baseline for innovations that 
enable an ecosystem of software projects. 
The core sample studied here contains three 
FLOSS projects aimed at producing one of the 
core components of a Java platform: Kaffe is the 
Free virtual machine, GNU Classpath the class 
library, and GCJ the compiler. None of those 
programs stands alone, they need to be integrated 
to function as a runtime environment. However, 
for each of the programs, there were Free alter-
natives. GCJ implemented its own class library 
(libgcj) before deciding to merge it with GNU 
Classpath. GNU Classpath, in turn, could and 
had been used with a number of other virtual 
machines, and Kaffe could select between exist-
ing class libraries. A number of other components 
of the Free Java platform could be associated 
with the core sample because they contributed or 
built on resources and code from the core pro-
jects studied. About thirty projects included soft-
ware for testing (the Mauve Project), other virtual 
machines (such as Jikes RVM or IKVM.NET), or 
academic research projects.  
 Research Process 
The nature of this study is exploratory and induc-
tive in order to construct a theory that is directly 
grounded in data. Many terms used in this study 
are defined explicitly because their meaning var-
ied between the literature and the informants’ use 
in the field. During work with the field data, it 
became clear that the explanations for observed 
behavior in particular emerged from a negotia-
tion of meaning between the observer, the 
author, and the data (Lincoln and Guba, 1985), a 
difficulty that was mediated partly by the wealth 
of data and the multiple sources employed (van 
Maanen, 1979). Daily immersion in the field 
during the months of February to April 2005 
followed the method of netnography (Kozinets, 
1999; 2002). Reading all the mailing lists run by 
and pertaining to the three focal projects (12 lists 
in total), and studying weblog entries, news post-
ings and code documentation, generated an ap-
proximate understanding not only of the technol-
ogy but also of the efforts incurred by the devel-
opers during that time. Certain development 
issues could be tracked in real time and the field 
notes taken during this period informed the tar-
gets for and content of the subsequent interviews. 
In addition to the conversational and communi-
cative data drawn from interviews and communi-
cation archives, the technology itself could be 
scrutinized by the author.  
The analytical process to validate the constructs 
and patterns in the data followed several cycles of 
verification to extract meaning and condense the 
observed patterns, and to exclude an observer 
bias as thoroughly as possible (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Systematic checks between interview statements 
and software change logs allowed for a certain 
level of triangulation, which was further im-
proved by applying modest quantitative tech-
niques of counting technology change incidents 
and interactions between individuals and groups 
of individuals (Jick, 1979). As part of a member 
check, all direct informants received the oppor-
tunity to comment on the full set of results from 
this study, and received a late working paper of 
this text as an email attachment.  
Six primary sources of data informed this study: 
interviews with developers; communication ar-
chives such as mailing lists; software code; change 
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logs and version history archives; web-based 
documentation material (hacker guides, code 
documentation, links); and weblogs (individual 
and group). The interviews were semi-structured 
and lasted between 35 and 90 minutes, the aver-
age was around 45 minutes. Fourteen conversa-
tions were carried out by telephone (nine of 
which were later transcribed verbatim), two were 
conducted face-to-face, and seven took the form 
of email conversations that spanned more than 
one week. The language was either English (14) 
or German (9), and 11 respondents were located 
in Europe, 1 in Japan, and 11 in the US and in 
Canada. The interviews took place between Feb-
ruary and June 2005. Mailing list archives were 
used to learn about the content matter, follow the 
authors involved over time and across projects, 
triangulate interview statements, and track tech-
nical decisions back in time. All three focal pro-
jects used mailing lists both to discuss the devel-
opment as well as to communicate code patches 
directly when they were added to the code reposi-
tory. The software source code of two projects 
was downloaded into a 
local database and 
coded for authorship 
analysis. The logged 
source code changes 
could be accessed 
through the research 
database or online, as 
all three projects 
allowed web-based 
access to the code 
repository. Anonymous 
viewers of the code 
could browse the file 
tree online and access 
or download all the 
files. Some of the log 
files were made 
available more conven-
iently through direct 
links on the projects’ 
internet pages. The 
change logs appeared in the file structure in full 
length, sometimes spanning several years and 
listing thousands of logged changes. Additionally, 
the project maintainers announced an edited, 
shorter change log which contained excerpts of 
the original change log. Release announcements 
contained what the maintainers considered to be 
the more important changes. These announce-
ments were used for the final coding of code shar-
ing incidents.  
The project web pages usually contained diverse 
resources for current and prospective developers, 
including software documentation and introduc-
tion, historical explanations and developments, 
links to related projects, ‘hacking guides’ and 
more. These resources helped to locate a project’s 
role within the technical environment and the 
developers’ goals regarding collaborations and 
affiliations with other projects. The hacking 
guides and project histories explained to new 
contributors the histories of collaborative efforts 
and the intricacies of contributing to shared code. 
More current issues and events could be found on 
weblogs59 where developers exchanged their 
views on the evolution of the field and shared 
technological novelties that might be of interest to 
developers of related projects. Internet search 
engines helped in locating messages in mailing list 
archives: Gmane, Google and specialized archiv-
ing sites facilitated the recovery of list messages 
that were up to seven years old. All these data 
sources were consulted regularly and frequently 
in order to learn about the Free Java environ-
ment and the roles of the different technologies 
within the environment. The coding activities 
involved the above data sources in alternating 
intensity as the picture of the various collabora-
                                                
59 A frequently cited weblog in the Free Java world is Planet 
Classpath: http://planet.classpath.org 
Table 14: Summary of the research process 
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tive efforts across the projects emerged. However, 
only the key intermediary constructs are men-
tioned below and only the final coding is de-
scribed in detail.  
Data Analysis 
Initial coding in step 2 allowed a first overview of 
collaborations carried out on different levels and 
with varying impacts. The interviews were tran-
scribed during the first few days after the conver-
sations and coded in the form of a simple list that 
sorted and counted the key themes across the 
interviews. This list was amended and extended 
by reading through the full set of interviews at the 
end. The focus on three central projects within 
the Free Java runtime environment (GNU 
Classpath, Kaffe, and GCJ) revealed collabora-
tions that spanned and went beyond these pro-
jects, and differed in their technological and or-
ganizational scope. 
An initial classification of activities, based on the 
coded interviews, led to two groups of emerging 
constructs: shared use, merger, reuse, fixes, and 
resynchronization on one hand, and fork, incuba-
tor, and platform technology on the other. En-
tanglement became tangible in step 2: developers 
identified so closely with the code they developed 
that they created, in words and action, organiza-
tional boundaries for their work: the social (orga-
nization) and the material (code) appeared as 
entangled (Orlikowski and Scott, 2008). An ex-
perimental branch organized discussions about its 
meaning and promise for the system and the 
classification had to pay careful attention to all 
cases in comparison. These constructs appeared 
as patterns in the data due to the frequency of use 
by the respondents. They reflected the wording of 
the respondents, who drew organizational 
boundaries when pointing to collaborative activi-
ties. The boundaries were not always obvious. An 
incubator project, for example, referred to a 
technological experiment with speculative out-
come. Organizationally, it could be either a fork 
or an experimental branch within the same pro-
ject. The terms and constructs are explained in 
detail in Section 4. 
The third step in data analysis focused on the 
organizational consequences of collaboration. 
The collaborative activities broadly varied on two 
dimensions, their organizational and their tech-
nological impacts. These dimensions were used to 
structure the final coding. First, the organiza-
tional dimension distinguished collaborative ac-
tivities that formed new organizations from those 
that connected two or more existing organiza-
tions. It became clear that forking and experi-
mental branching were an integral part of tech-
nology development in the Free Java runtime 
environment. Hence, research on collaboration 
across FLOSS projects would have to take into 
account the fact that the foundation of new orga-
nizations could establish a collaborative activity. 
Additionally, forming new organizations was 
clearly seen by the informants as playing an im-
portant role in the development of the technol-
ogy.  
The second dimension discriminated according 
to technological impact. The subset of collabora-
tive activities resulting in considerable techno-
logical impact was followed in time and coded 
with regard to authorship and cross-affiliation of 
the authors. The project maintainers announced 
new releases to the project. They communicated 
the major changes to the technology featured in 
the current release. Their choice of changes 
worth communicating explicitly skimmed for the 
more important changes among the hundreds of 
changes made to the technology during the time 
that had elapsed since the last release. The analy-
sis considered only the collaborative activities 
among the code changes communicated in the 
releases. The maintainers usually credited the 
contributors individually and thereby carried the 
responsibility for not forgetting contributions that 
individual developers may consider important. It 
could not be a spontaneous, arbitrary choice to 
leave out important contributions, except maybe 
the maintainer’s own. The complete change logs 
and the interviews suggested that the changes not 
reported in the announcements included minor 
improvements to the performance of the software 
or bug fixes. Hence, they were not analyzed in 
detail. 
The set of activities that underwent detailed cod-
ing was split in two according to the formation of 
new organizations: the complete, recent release 
announcements of all of the three focal projects 
were coded separately from the forks spinning off 
the three projects. The announcements over a 
period of six (GNU Classpath) and 18 months 
(Kaffe and GCJ) amounted to 158 technology 
changes in total. The three projects followed dif-
ferent release schedules, which meant varying the 
observation periods in order to have a balanced 
sample of recent changes. GNU Classpath re-
leased about every two months, whereas Kaffe 
only announced one development release in 
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2004. GCJ was part of the larger GNU Compiler 
Collection (GCC) project and aggregated its rela-
tively rare GCJ-specific release announcements 
over the branches depending on their progress 
and the need to communicate. Coded together, 
the observation period of GNU Classpath was cut 
to six months to contain a number of changes 
comparable to the Kaffe project (72 for GNU 
Classpath and 76 for Kaffe). GCJ only an-
nounced 10 changes during the 18-month period.  
Technical changes stemming from collaborative 
activities were separated from technical changes 
stemming from contributions. Fifty of the re-
ported 158 changes were directly related to a 
collaboration with another project. In these cases, 
code was imported from another project or 
jointly used with another project. Through mail-
ing list searches, the technical changes could be 
attributed to the authors or the group of authors 
that implemented the change. The 50 collabora-
tion incidents marked a lower bound since it was 
possible that more changes could be used jointly 
by other projects but were not reported as such. 
The analysis followed the collaboration incidents 
more closely and tracked the author’s affiliation 
with the project back in time. Additionally, the 
references to mailing list discussions were re-
corded and unclear issues marked and later dis-
cussed in interviews with the authors or core de-
velopers of the corresponding, importing project.  
The new organizations (23 forks) that were di-
rectly linked to by the three focal projects were 
coded according to founding date, their purpose 
with regard to eventual research output (publica-
tions), the author’s overlap and affiliations with 
the old organization, and possible back-merging 
activities. Again, the number of these organiza-
tions marked a lower bound as possibly more 
forks existed but did not report their use of the 
original project’s code.  
The analysis then sought to identify explanations 
for the observed behavior. The interviews were 
coded in terms of the rationale given for collabo-
rative activities. The interview guidelines in-
cluded questions about the nature of cross-project 
collaborations, examples of specific activities that 
the informant was personally involved in, as well 
as why-questions that did not aim at personal 
motivation but at the specific reasons for why an 
activity was called for in technical terms. As men-
tioned above, the interviews were used to discuss 
changes observed in the code and also to follow 
the histories of specific implementations, particu-
larly of interfaces. 
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RESULTS 
Early on during the interviews and the analysis of 
the code changes, it became clear that both the 
organization of the projects and the technology 
were open to new participants and receptive to 
changes originating from other projects. FLOSS 
projects formed around a specific agenda to build 
particular software, and a set of goal and mission 
statements about what that software should do, to 
whom it should be useful, how it may be used, 
and so on. Since the software is Free or Open 
Source, it may be viewed, downloaded, and 
changed by anyone. Developers and users sent 
back bug reports and suggested fixes, contributed 
to the discussions on the mailing lists, or altered 
the technology in significant ways. In the projects 
analyzed here, the users’ comments and contribu-
tions were usually solicited and welcomed explic-
itly. 
At every moment in time, a project could be de-
fined as a group of individuals working on an 
emerging code base that makes up a software 
product or designs a software product in the mak-
ing. Working meant developing and discussing 
development. Respondents understood project 
boundaries as technical rather than social al-
though they repeatedly voiced concerns about 
this separation as being artificial or historically 
determined. If a user and developer of a virtual 
machine contributed a security algorithm to, say, 
GNU Classpath, the contribution was credited to 
the user and labeled as shared code or as a 
merger because the algorithm was not exclusively 
developed for GNU Classpath, but reused from 
the virtual machine. If the user contributed regu-
larly, he could receive write access to the source 
code. Even then, with the committer and the 
author being the same person, a contribution 
could be considered shared code simply because 
it had been developed mostly outside of the pro-
ject.  
Figure 9 displays a few sample transactions in-
volving five projects, two of which belong to the 
core sample (Kaffe and GNU Classpath). In the 
environment studied, developers engaged in vari-
ous collaborative activities. The Jessie project 
reused security software developed in GNU 
Classpath and the code was later merged back 
and then reused in its updated form by GNU 
Classpath developers. Kaffe merged its network-
ing classes with those developed for GNU 
Classpath. This was a long-term process that 
involved many individuals and represented one of 
the core integration efforts between the two pro-
jects. Janos VM and JC spun off as friendly forks 
from Kaffe and GNU Classpath, respectively, 
Janos in 1999, JC in early 2004. Each built on 
the code base of the original project but main-
tained collaborations with developers from the 
other projects. In 2005, Kaffe merged back JIT3 
code from the Janos VM fork. 
Figure 1 cannot show the collaborative ground-
work within a technical system. The focus on 
important technical changes tends to forget that 
users and developers regularly and frequently 
discussed and fixed minor problems across the 
projects that made up the Free Java runtime en-
vironment being studied. Informants for this 
study reported applying fixes and improvements 
to other projects, that is to software of other de-
velopment organizations, as 
part of their regular devel-
opment work (developers P, 
K, A, and M).  
Integration through 
shared code: transaction 
type one 
The shared use of software 
code in the sample relates to 
long-term collaboration of 
developers across projects. 
While the data did not re-
veal integration perform-
ance, the software products 
studied, and the products of the core projects in 
particular, formed a functioning runtime envi-
Figure 9: Examples of integration activities across organization boundaries 
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ronment which required a certain level of inte-
gration. Each release communication coded for 
the analysis tracked integration performance by 
referring to successful tests and merged code. 
Collaboration activities were thus aimed at the 
long-term goal of successful technical integration 
and occurred in parallel to a social integration 
that started to unite members of the core projects 
in the sample.  
Analyzing the technical change announcements 
of the three focal projects revealed that 50 out of 
158 announced changes originated from outside 
the respective projects. Hence, almost one third 
of announced technical changes were related to 
incidents of code sharing. Table 15 summarizes 
these findings. According to the announcements, 
46 technical changes were fixes or improvements 
to existing code. If these important but incre-
mental changes are subtracted, 45% of the an-
nounced changes originated from outside the 
project. This classification of technical changes 
was informed primarily by the announcements, 
and further by authorship analysis and the discus-
sions and documentation that historically sur-
rounded the technical changes. Table 16 lists the 
50 changes originating from outside the respec-
tive projects with their source and the original 
classification. 
Where applicable, the committer and the author 
of the change were recorded and the correspond-
ing email conversation logged. Of the 50 changes 
originating from outside the project, 42 were 
authored by a developer who was active on the 
importing project for at least one year or, in cases 
of co-authorship, came from a project in which at 
least three developers were active on the import-
ing project for at least one year. The time period 
of the collaboration relative to the implementa-
tion and relative to the announcement of the 
changes varied broadly across the sample. In the 
eight remaining cases, the overlap could not be 
identified or was negligible, for instance amount-
ing to a handful of posts by the original author on 
the importing project’s mailing lists. Cases where 
a single author could not be identified concerned 
the sharing of classes from GNU Classpath (into 
Kaffe or GCJ). Twenty-six out of the 50 imports 
originated from one of the two other projects in 
the sample. Despite certain overlaps, it seemed 
reasonable to keep all the changes in the analysis. 
What was labeled as an important change in one 
project was not necessarily announced in the 
other project. Because the attribution of rele-
vance was determined by the importing project 
(see section 3.3), the analysis had to include each 
change instance according to this design. Cancel-
ing out the change instances would assume that 
the projects in the sample were somehow related 
ex ante.  
The explanation for sharing code with another 
project was to prevent duplication, or ‘reinvent-
ing the wheel’ (Developers K, A, D). The origin 
of the decision to share a component was difficult 
to track because, just as in other FLOSS projects, 
the implementation counted more than the inten-
tion (Mulgan et al., 2005; Raymond, 1998), and 
developers tended to act rather than discuss. Uni-
lateral sharing activities were rare: for six out of 
the eight changes without long-term collabora-
tion, no collaboration could be found at all.  
Shared code is usually clearly marked as such, 
either in docu-
mentation or in 
mailing lists. For 
the shared code 
between GCJ and 
GNU Classpath, 
developer P ex-
plains the coordi-
nation process:  
The two projects are overlapping, GCJ builds on 
Classpath at this point. The library part of GCJ 
is Classpath. Whether someone works on the li-
brary part of GCJ or Classpath is kind of imma-
terial, the code goes both places to the extent ap-
plicable. The current GUI [graphical user inter-
face] work, SWING, and AWT goes into both 
Classpath and libgcj and it’s the same source 
code. And there’s policies, if you make a change 
you’re supposed to check it in both places at the 
same time or at least into Classpath first. so it’ll 
eventually get merged into GCJ. (Developer P) 
Table 15: Origin of technical (source code) changes 
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There were shared task lists and agendas, but 
only a few developers regularly used them to 
communicate what tasks they were working on. 
Others mentioned 
their current activi-
ties on Internet 
Relay Chat (IRC) 
or in the mailing 
lists. The an-
nouncements then 
triggered discus-
sions among users 
about technical 
consequences for 
other projects and 
users. As IRC was 
not archived by the 
projects studied, 
the developers felt 
the need to docu-
ment certain deci-
sions for new 
participants. A wiki 
in GNU Classpath 
listed a series of 
recent coding deci-
sions relating to 
collaborative activi-
ties.  
Two core develop-
ers in the sample 
seemed to assume a 
particular responsi-
bility for bringing 
the technologies 
closer together: 
developer K be-
tween GNU 
Classpath and 
GCJ, and devel-
oper D between 
Kaffe and GNU 
Classpath60. Their 
efforts involved 
careful monitoring 
of changes to the 
respective code 
bases (source trees) 
                                                
60 Upon later request, developer D indicated that he did not 
get paid for programming in Java nor for the integration 
work at the time of this study (2004 and early 2005). 
Developer K did not provide information. 
and communication about the intended and on-
going sharing activities. This observation corre-
sponded to the finding of specialization in other 
open source projects (von Krogh et al., 2003). 
Monitoring merging activities consisted of com-
paring the shared software components, and 
working with others to eliminate any differences 
between the original and reintroduced implemen-
tations, since changes made in one project could 
make the code incompatible with the other pro-
Table 16: 50 changes originating from outside the target project with reuse classification 
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ject. Additionally, a few important pieces of the 
shared code (in the example of GCJ and GNU 
Classpath the java.lang.string class) needed to 
remain specific to each project for historical rea-
sons or due to optimization and performance 
issues. Developers K and D devoted considerable 
resources, possibly the majority of their contribu-
tions, to integration activities. They worked with-
out formal authority nor could they necessarily be 
considered central figures in their respective com-
munities. 
For important technical changes, developers 
shared components with other projects and con-
tinued to contribute to both projects. The ob-
served practice could have been transient and 
technology-based only. The ability to cheaply 
identify and access technology might be inde-
pendent of the organization of technology devel-
opment. However, the data from this sample 
revealed that not only did developers work with 
the software of other projects over long periods of 
time, they also interacted with the developers 
from other projects and built social ties that 
linked the projects. The Apache Harmony effort 
published in May 2005 represented an institu-
tional move that tied the projects closer together 
after years of social interactions on the level of 
code (Wielaard, 2006).  
Transparency, the frequency of communication, 
and long-term, multiple project affiliations by 
developers seemed to enable distributed integra-
tion through shared code. First, populated mail-
ing lists provided a resource for new joiners and 
users to receive technical help and to learn about 
the technology and its development (von Krogh 
et al., 2003; Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003). The 
continuous work of maintaining and adding 
compatibility and developing standards needed to 
involve users from various technical backgrounds. 
Developer M specifies the forms of interaction on 
the GNU Classpath mailing list as follows: 
There are two kinds of interactions, one is [the 
users] explicitly ask for new interfaces and fea-
tures: “We want to use it in this way. is this 
possible?” And most of the time it’s just splitting 
what you have now in an extra direction. That’s 
what you do with software. You make certain 
functionality depend on input from the user. The 
other thing is, they say, “we have to do it this way 
because you defined these interfaces and we don’t 
actually get them”. Mostly, it turns out that you 
made some design mistakes or, at least, you didn’t 
document them very well. [...] Users on our mail-
ing list mostly define our interfaces. And we’re 
there, of course, and act like we know a lot. And 
we do because we saw a lot of users. The good 
interfaces are when two of your users duel out 
what they need with you present. 
As this quote illustrates, the joint use of mailing 
lists served a number of purposes. The evolution 
of interfaces was a continuous, social process. 
Notably, the details of how the system compo-
nents actually interoperated were subject to con-
stant improvements and negotiation. These nego-
tiations focused on new and emerging features 
but extended to the improvement of existing 
functionality, such as new graphic support tools 
and components that allowed compatibility with 
other platforms or distributions. Note that the 
interfaces were built jointly by developers of sev-
eral projects and not only by one party that 
sought compatibility with another technology.  
Second, a constant flow of communication, both 
via mailing lists and IRC, allowed the developers 
in the sample to discuss what they were working 
on and sort out technical problems. A few devel-
opers reported being present on several IRC 
channels (of two or more of the projects in this 
sample) more or less all day long (K, G, D, M, A, 
F). These channels provided an important social 
meeting opportunity along with the privacy to 
voice opinions which were not appropriate for 
the public domain (developer K). They were also 
testimony to the social ties that developed be-
tween many of the project developers during the 
two years that preceded this study. Developers D 
(Kaffe) and M (GNU Classpath) reported having 
initiated regular face-to-face meetings in 2003 for 
developers of both projects. Also, the Planet 
Classpath weblog attracted contributions and 
comments about new technical breakthroughs as 
well as personal opinions and confessions. Ideas 
and achievements were part of this blog as well as 
accounts of personal events, such as the life-
threatening illness of one developer, which trig-
gered consolations and personal contributions by 
members of the wider community. 
Third, as observed in other FLOSS projects, 
most tasks were self-assigned by developers (Ya-
mauchi et al., 2000; Haefliger et al., 2008). One 
consequence of self-assigned tasks in convergence 
is a time lag between a change being introduced 
from one project and developers in the other 
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project intervening for compatibility. This effect 
applied to corrections as well. With code that 
served as a core system for other software solu-
tions and ran on dozens of platforms, such as 
both Kaffe and GNU Classpath, sorting out the 
side effects slowed development and created time 
lags: 
Often you have to adapt the patches [when shar-
ing code], which takes time. You have to count on 
lags of up to several months because nobody dares 
to rewrite the patch. (Developer K) 
In order to accommodate time lags, developers 
tended to stay active and oversee future devel-
opments of their code after it became shared 
code among the projects. The shared expertise 
led to mutual help and learning.  
Back-merging, the reuse of shared components 
that had been improved outside the original pro-
ject, was given great importance in the develop-
ers’ evaluation of collaborations. Back-mergers 
could be observed in at least three cases and were 
included as instances of code sharing. A number 
of specific candidate technologies for back-
merging, both back into Kaffe and back into 
GNU Classpath, could be tracked in mailing list 
discussions and task lists. The perceived impor-
tance of back-merging clearly motivated long-
term collaboration and created incentives for a 
general convergence between the projects. If code 
was being shared among two or more projects, 
improvements to the code were shared as well. 
Hence, whoever contributed to the code, both 
projects would benefit from the improvement. If 
this process worked properly, back-merging 
should remain incremental and few important 
technical changes should stem from back-
merging. This corresponded to the actual obser-
vations.  
In summary, integration through shared code 
was frequent, without intervention of a central 
system integrator, and enabled by transparency 
and frequency in communication and long-term 
affiliations with multiple projects. Collaboration 
exposed developers to new technology, which in 
turn impacted on their previous work. Collabora-
tion was often motivated by gaining access to a 
solution that would have had to be written from 
scratch otherwise. By collaborating with another 
project, developers (A, G, K, D) sought to avoid 
duplication. However, the shared code had to be 
adapted to new users and new environments over 
time, and it had to be maintained. A shared re-
sponsibility and common knowledge about the 
history of both the code and the collaboration 
created identification across the projects. This 
identification was explicitly promoted by at least 
two developers of Kaffe and GNU Classpath, 
who organized regular face-to-face meetings. 
Several developers referred to the group of pro-
jects, spanning beyond but including the sample 
studied here, as one family (developers P, K, M, 
D).  
Integration through branches and friendly 
forks: transaction type two 
An evolving project needs mechanisms for explo-
ration of new ideas and functions as well as ex-
ploitation in the sense of serving current user 
needs. Branching and forking allow such explora-
tion to take place. Thus, the branches and forks 
can be seen as a part of an extended family of 
integrated software products. Branching of the 
code base builds on the infrastructure of an exist-
ing project, forking establishes a new project 
based on code taken from an existing project. A 
branch is necessarily collaborative as the author 
of a branch makes use of the given project infra-
structure, while a fork does not have to be col-
laborative, but was observed in this study as only 
taking place under friendly auspices. The follow-
ing quote by a core developer of Kaffe introduces 
the issues: 
Usually, we think that forks are something bad. 
But what people tend to overlook is that [forks] 
have great advantages, because projects may de-
velop in multiple directions. Some can or want to 
do only their thing without paying attention to 
others. And most of Kaffe’s forks are in research: 
Janos, Jessica, Hydra, Latte. They prove, invent, 
and implement new and exciting things without 
arguing: „Why should exactly this patch...?”, 
and so on. A project with the ambition to be port-
able [such as Kaffe] spends a lot of time identify-
ing and fixing small problems. Developing for 
radical problems becomes difficult in the main 
branch. [...] And research needs a solid basis, 
which we’re offering. That’s why I think forks 
make sense. They avoid social tension from the 
outset. (Developer D) 
   121 
The Kaffe and GNU Classpath projects linked to 
a total of 23 forks on their websites between 1998 
and 2004. These projects were based on, or relied 
on, a derivative version, or parts of the original 
code at the time of the fork, and formed their 
own development projects. The term fork often 
carries a negative connotation (Raymond, 1998) 
as a schism that tears a project apart and creates 
social distress. In this environment, however, no 
hostile project separations were observed. How-
ever, this is only a casual observation and could 
not be tested, as hostile forks might not have been 
reported or were intentionally not mentioned.  
Uncertainty and lower development costs related 
to negotiation and communication appeared as 
reasons to branch or fork code. Negotiation and 
communication costs occurred whenever a large 
group of users behaved as a constituency to the 
software. The costs accrued independently of the 
actual problem solving, fixing, and development 
work before and after intervention by a user. 
Avoiding interaction with the large group of users 
in favor of an emerging, smaller group of users 
created incentives to fork. Friendly forks cater to 
the heterogeneous needs of users (Franke and von 
Hippel, 2003) while the forked project, the solid 
basis, benefits from network effects (Economides, 
1996) due to increased portability and the larger 
user base of its code. Thanks to the friendly fork 
more users and developers will be acquainted 
with the technology and refer back to the forked 
project. The work in the project was viewed as 
costly because it triggered tensions and led to 
negotiation costs about technical decisions. 
Branches and forks offered an efficient way for 
mediating these costs while working with the 
same technology.  
Both GCJ and GNU Classpath entertained de-
velopment branches.  
GCC has two types of branches, release branches, 
and development branches, where you make work 
that’s larger or more speculative. It’s just a way to 
let you do major, possibly disruptive changes 
without disturbing anybody who’s not interested 
in them. So GCJX falls into that category. It’s 
not complete, doesn’t fully work yet and because 
it’s a replacement for GCJ, making it all work 
entailed on the branch deleting the old GCJ. I 
couldn’t do that in an environment where other 
people are using it. I couldn’t do it until it’s done, 
and that’s still months away.(Developer T) 
Developer T, who was the principal author of the 
GCJX branch, used similar arguments as did 
authors of forks. Branches offered the same ad-
vantages as forks, but inside existing projects, 
which meant that the communication and source 
code management infrastructure did not need to 
be replicated. Additionally, a branch was re-
garded as the seed of future major changes to the 
existing project, even a replacement. In the case 
of GCJX, the replacement was deemed necessary 
due to significant changes in the specifications of 
version 5.0 of the Java language. A development 
branch of GNU Classpath followed the same 
objective of adapting the project to implement 
Java 5.0 specifications in parallel.  
Similar to the integration through shared code, 
the enablers of integration through branches and 
friendly forks included transparency (openness), 
frequent communication, and long-term, multiple 
project affiliations by developers. 
First, research projects played an important role 
as authors of forks because researchers appreci-
ated the openness provided by the FLOSS li-
censes. Publications documented 16 out of the 23 
forks. The relevant working papers, theses, or 
conference proceedings were available on the 
projects’ websites or on a university site that was 
linked to from the projects’ sites. Some of the 
forks were initiated by research teams, which 
published several works over the years. The 16 
publicized forks did not correspond to the 16 
cases of long-term collaboration (see below). Only 
in one instance could neither a publication nor 
long-term collaboration be logged. The impor-
tance of researchers as authors of FLOSS forks 
did not seem to be an exception in this sample. 
The Jikes RVM, an open source virtual machine 
that was initially sponsored by IBM, documents 
over 100 publications related to the project (see 
Alpern et al., 2005)61. In the case of Kaffe, devel-
oper C and a team at university built their project 
on the basis of Kaffe, which included changing 
some of the basic internals of Kaffe in order to 
demonstrate a new approach to object-oriented 
programming.  
I’m using Kaffe because it’s concise, because it’s a 
simple implementation with which we could 
quickly demonstrate an idea. For research pur-
                                                
61 For more information on the Jikes RVM turn to: 
http://jikesrvm.sourceforge.net/ 
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poses, the most important thing is that we can 
build a prototype that proves that the idea works. 
We don’t need commercial quality that works un-
der all circumstances but it has to function. And 
at that time, I found the option very attractive that 
someone may later reuse our work. (Developer C) 
The licenses provided by Sun Microsystems for 
Java products tended to offer source code access 
to researchers more easily than to other industry 
partners. But since Java products were not open 
source at the time of this study, the researchers 
could not distribute their adapted versions pub-
licly.  
Second, on the mailing lists and on weblogs, de-
velopers within the Free Java environment dis-
cussed not only current features and project de-
tails but also the larger picture of the technologi-
cal environment. Discussions conducted with 
particular verve involved technological visions 
and breakthroughs to other language environ-
ments, and the general evolution of the Java lan-
guage. Excellent examples were the enthusiasm 
for the IKVM.NET project62, or the broad inter-
est in the Apache Harmony63 effort to unify or 
integrate the various efforts to create a compati-
ble, open source implementation of the Java 2 
Standard Edition (J2SE) runtime environment. 
The awareness of the wider evolution of technol-
ogy implied an appreciation of technical changes 
in the environment. This appreciation included 
not only an interest in new features of closed pro-
jects (closed in the technical sense), but also a 
sense of the uncertainty involved in new ventures. 
Developers who had been implementing Free 
Java components for up to ten years shared a 
close understanding of technical boundaries to 
other languages and environments. Uncertainty 
was mentioned repeatedly (Developers T, P, K, 
D) as the reason why a project forked the original 
project’s code. To the developers, it often seemed 
obviously impossible to incorporate the vision 
                                                
62 The project's site can be found at: http://www.ikvm.net/ 
63 The announcement on May 6, 2005 triggered wide 
discussions across the larger project of projects who 
implement runtime components such as the projects in 
this sample. The announcement, and the involvement of a 
number of developers of the sample projects in the 
original announcement, reverberated on the mailing lists 
and on the Planet Classpath weblog (referenced above). 
The announcement may be found here: http://mail-
archives.apache.org/mod_mbox/incubator-
general/200505.mbox/%3CCA4BEB82-3D84-457D-
9531-1477DD749919@apache.org%3E 
See also: Wielaard, 2006 
and goals of the forking project into the original 
software, thus founding a new project was the 
logical consequence. In a separated environment, 
where radical changes to the code did not affect 
the original code and its users, the developers 
could follow more experimental approaches and 
speculative ideas.  
Third, developers from 19 out of the 23 forks 
maintained a long-term collaboration with the 
originating project. Developers of 16 forks fre-
quently contributed for at least one year. For two 
additional forks, the analysis revealed a close 
involvement with the originating project for at 
least nine months, and the author of one fork 
continued to contribute infrequently to GNU 
Classpath for more than 18 months. The four 
remaining forks did not generate long-term col-
laborations. For two of them, contributions by 
their developers amounted to a mere handful of 
posts on the originating projects’ mailing lists, 
and for the other two, no traces of interaction 
could be identified. Similar to integration 
through shared code, no central authority could 
be found to be involved in decisions about 
branches or forks.  
Changes in interfaces were usually up for nego-
tiation between the external project involved and 
existing users (Developers M and T), and a large 
volume of communication in the mailing lists 
related to relative details compared to the impor-
tant changes as highlighted by the release an-
nouncements (see also the quote by Developer D 
at the beginning of this sub-section). The devel-
opers discussed interdependencies between com-
ponents and the consequences for their use of the 
software. If a change to the code affected some-
one’s ability to use the software, the consequences 
were mentioned via the mailing list. The devel-
oper complained about any misfits between his or 
her use of the code and other software, and the 
problem got the attention of the project. This 
normal process of advancing the software created 
development costs, which included reading high 
volumes of communication traffic inside a single 
project. The average monthly load of messages 
on the main mailing list of the GNU Classpath 
project in the first 6 months of 2005 was 141. 
Considering that many developers read the lists 
of several projects, the reading alone consumed 
considerable amounts of time. Negotiations with 
the heterogeneous demands of users added to the 
costs of developing a solution. Thus, long-term, 
multiple project affiliations by developers enabled 
integration through branching and forking be-
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cause developers could explore new ideas and 
features for the entire system at lower costs while 
staying in touch with the original code base. 
Enablers of distributed systems integration 
As observed here, project boundaries allowed for 
partially integrated organizations that saved de-
velopment costs through reuse and facilitated 
convergence among, both, the groups that devel-
oped the projects and the code. Roughly a third 
of important technical changes entered the code 
base through collaborations with other projects 
via code sharing (see Table 2), and forks ap-
peared as an accepted and useful way to create 
new module boundaries and enable one module 
to work without the forked other but with the rest 
of the runtime environment (the system). Three 
enablers of distributed systems integration stand 
out: transparency (openness), frequent communi-
cation, and long-term, multiple project affiliations 
by developers. 
First, the source code was downloaded directly 
from the project that developed and maintained 
the software, and, in addition, the developers 
could be reached through public mailing lists. 
The openness of project boundaries with respect 
to newcomers and their knowledge shaped the 
collective of projects. The projects kept their 
technical strongholds and responsibilities and at 
the same time converged towards integrated, 
technical systems by exchanging code and devel-
opment resources in the form of individuals who 
contributed to more than one project. Hence, 
innovative activities that are usually considered to 
take place inside firms (Dosi, 1988) and even 
require the existence of firms (Ghoshal and 
Moran, 1996: 33) could be observed as taking 
place between and across FLOSS projects.  
Second, the context observed here is akin to work 
in development alliances such as the ‘stealth’ 
bomber example described by Argyres (1999), 
where continued interaction and shared informa-
tion systems mitigated coordination costs across 
organizational boundaries. Developers in the 
sample referred to the complex tasks of develop-
ing shared code. The complexity, in their percep-
tion, was rooted in the multiple stakes of users 
depending on their platform and system envi-
ronments. Multiple reviews in both projects that 
shared code enabled a careful improvement that 
cycled through long discussions and technical 
references in order to reach a consensus among 
the users. Thus, the frequency of communication 
enabled the distributed integration of complex 
technology. The establishment of trust was men-
tioned in the same vein. Trust could ease the flow 
of communication as it enabled the participants 
to criticize more easily and express opinions that 
might have remained concealed otherwise. The 
use of IRC channels for private communication 
that should not be logged and published pointed 
to the need for “unstructured technical dialog” 
(Monteverde, 1995): the exchange of experience 
and tacit knowledge.  
Third, with certain important exceptions (Dah-
lander, 2007; Henkel, 2006; Harhoff et al., 2003, 
von Hippel, 1987), firms tend to keep knowledge 
protected and proprietary, which leaves binary 
choices for collaborating partners with respect to 
coordination costs, and consequently access to 
the knowledge resources entails contracting. 
Since FLOSS project boundaries are less rigid, 
the costs of negotiating and communicating can 
be split among the members of various projects 
without formal alliances. Long-term collabora-
tion among projects enabled the exchange of 
knowledge despite a separate technical domain 
(and organization). Again, complexity and trust 
were used to justify long-term interactions with 
users of other projects. 
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SOCIOMATERIAL TRANSACTIONS: SYSTEMS 
INTEGRATION ACROSS FLOSS PROJECTS 
Developers in this sample were able to collabo-
rate across more than one project to integrate 
complex software components into a larger sys-
tem. The developers’ behavior and rationale can 
be summarized in terms of two types of organiza-
tional practices and three enablers for distributed 
systems integration: integration through shared 
code and integration through branches and forks 
enabled by transparency, frequent communica-
tion, and long-term, multiple project affiliations.  
With sociomaterial transaction I refer to the two 
types of organizational development practices 
that forge a technical system by socially and 
technically linking the work of many individuals. 
The term sociomateriality points to the insepara-
bility of individuals and their working relation-
ships from the artifacts, which lie at the core of 
the working relationships. More generally, “hu-
mans/organizations and technology are assumed 
to exist only through their temporally emergent 
constitutive entanglement (Orlikowski and Scott, 
2008: 457).” The observed transactions involve 
developers reusing code and engaging in con-
tinuously demonstrating why it makes sense to do 
so, by explanation, by assuming authorship, and 
by extending development. In other words, the 
transactions describe activities that technically 
integrate the work of two or more groups of indi-
viduals by making their work interdependent 
and, thus, one group’s work immediately relevant 
to the other. A sociomaterial transaction manipu-
lates the social fabric of technology development 
by developing the technology so as to make new 
connections between individuals necessary and 
intelligible.  
The analytical separation of the two activities of 
technology development for integration and so-
cial interaction is an artificial separation by the 
observer because the code that was to integrate 
components into systems only came to perform 
what it was meant to through interpretations, 
negotiations, and mutual agreement. Neverthe-
less, the separation makes analytical sense as it 
allows for a comparison against the baseline 
model informed by theory. As the analysis 
showed, the developers were fully aware of the 
economic relevance of their activities and en-
gaged in the transactions described for economic 
reasons. Comparing the implications for systems 
integration in loosely coupled organizations with 
the findings of this study reveals parallels and 
differences as follows. The literature on organiza-
tional coupling and systems integration led to 
three predictions for this exploratory study of 
FLOSS development which can now be ap-
praised in light of the findings.  
First, and unsurprisingly, FLOSS projects rely on 
collaboration and knowledge overlaps in order to 
integrate a large technical system. Previously 
unconnected programmers interacted over long 
periods of time, as predicted by the baseline 
model (Brusoni and Prencipe, 2006). In addition 
to the prediction from the literature, the role of 
the users appeared as critical in defining and 
evolving the software interfaces within the sys-
tem.  
Second, and rather surprisingly, the system stud-
ied did not feature a central project dedicated to 
systems integration. This finding deviates from 
the literature of systems integration (Dosi et al., 
2003), which predicts a central, indispensable role 
for systems integration in such an environment. 
Rather, a number of developers and users from 
different projects spent time on integrative tasks 
and setting up minimal coordination routines to 
be followed by the developers. However, the 
users and developers of system components 
seemed responsible for setting up interfaces to 
other components in order for ‘their’ component 
to work with the system.  
Third, the baseline model led us to expect a 
range of organizational mechanisms to deal with 
uncertain developments in the components and 
the dependencies among the components 
(Staudenmayer et al., 2005). Users and develop-
ers of the Free Java runtime environment re-
verted to a host of activities aimed at raising or 
lowering boundaries between projects and be-
tween modules. All forms of code sharing ob-
served aimed at facilitating collective use and 
development of code and, thus, lowered bounda-
ries between projects. Branches and forks raised 
boundaries within projects or across projects 
where there had been no boundaries previously. 
The accompanying communication and collabo-
ration demonstrated that integration continued 
on the system level and the boundaries set up 
new transaction-free zones for developers to ex-
periment with new technologies (Baldwin, 2008).  
The sociomaterial transactions describe how 
distributed developers (and users) define and set 
up component interfaces as part of a long-term 
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process of interaction with other developers. The 
visibility and accessibility of the technology af-
fords a range of design options for sharing re-
sources and creating interfaces between technical 
components. Developers engage with these op-
tions as they see fit and they carry the costs asso-
ciated with the integration tasks, relying on sup-
port from and co-engagement with experienced 
developers. The performance of the sociomaterial 
transactions is most visible when users “duel out 
what they need” (Developer M) in front of other, 
more experienced, developers who help and assist 
if necessary. This finding resonates and adds pre-
cision to the concept of bazaar governance by 
Demil and Lecocq (2006) who found that coordi-
nation depends on the affordances of code re-
leased under a FLOSS license. 
The question whether the sociomaterial transac-
tions described can also be found in contexts 
beyond FLOSS development cannot be settled 
here, yet the results contain pointers. All three 
enabling factors seemed indispensible for distrib-
uted systems integration and withdrawing one 
may either bring development to a halt or jeop-
ardize the maintenance of the software on the 
long run. Hence, the sociomaterial transactions of 
sharing and forking may be bound to environ-
ments that feature transparency of knowledge 
assets and allow for frequent communication 
between developers and their ability to stay active 
on multiple projects. The combination of factors 
might imply a process of social integration that 
supports and accompanies technology develop-
ment. Ultimately, distributed systems integration 
as observed here may prove to be more efficient 
than central systems integration due to the dis-
tributed, self-selected task allocation. Developers 
work on features they perceive as useful, direct 
their integration efforts to where they think it is 
needed most, and attend to the improvements 
and maintenance of integrated modules out of 
self-interest.  
Free revealing solicits development support 
(Henkel, 2006) and may, crucially, trigger the 
building of interfaces to other software. In col-
laboration with users, firms could accomplish the 
work of technical alliances between firms but at a 
lower cost since, under distributed systems inte-
gration, all parties contribute to building the in-
terfaces (for a discussion of open standards, see 
Hyvättinen, 2006). Testing the impact of the two 
sociotechnical transactions on the costs of innova-
tion would mean comparing the results of techni-
cal alliances between firms with and without user 
involvement at the technical level.  
Ghosh and colleagues (2002) found that almost 
30% of FLOSS developers in their survey con-
tributed to more than five projects, which could 
indicate that distributed systems integration per-
mits synergies between individuals and projects. 
Future research on user projects should investi-
gate the role of individual mobility between pro-
jects. Contractual exclusivity or loyalty tends to 
tie a worker to one firm and mobility becomes a 
critical issue for knowledge management. Allow-
ing developers to enact the two sociomaterial 
transactions, however, the threat of mobility may 
become a promise: if developers work for several 
organizations at a time, reusing knowledge across 
the organizations, the total amount of knowledge 
available to any one organization can increase. 
The surrounding legal policies and revealing 
strategies (Henkel, 2006), the accessibility and 
integration of the mobile individuals (Dahlander 
and Wallin, 2006), and the mobile workers’ ac-
tual behavior, all deserve closer scrutiny.  
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND METHOD 
Four implications for theory can be derived. First, 
system integration tasks in complex, technical 
systems can be handled in a distributed manner, 
at least in FLOSS development. This finding 
represents a challenge to the literature on systems 
integration (Dosi et al., 2003; Prencipe, 2003). 
However, the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
systems integration observed was untested and 
should be subject to future research.  
Second, if developers from several projects con-
tribute to the building of component interfaces, 
the costs are effectively shared across organiza-
tion boundaries. This finding adds a subtle twist 
to the innovation literature by demonstrating that 
free revealing (a condition for distributed systems 
integration) may not only solicit product devel-
opment support (Henkel, 2006) but also systems 
integration support. While users are known to 
develop and share features and fixes to a given 
product (von Krogh et al., 2003; Franke and 
Shah, 2003), they are less known to build com-
patibility, that is interfaces that allow a new 
product to work within given technical systems or 
vice versa. 
Third, this research contributes to a more de-
tailed understanding of the economics of user 
innovation where users organize in projects to 
develop technologies that rely on interoperability 
with other technologies. Firms can learn from 
lead users who adapt a product according to their 
needs and thereby inform the manufacturing of 
new versions of the product (Morrison et al., 
2000). In addition, this study explores how users 
adapt software to work with a larger system and 
thus create new options for product development 
under open innovation that point beyond im-
proved product versions to improved systems. 
Fourth, the findings may inform the economics of 
innovation for knowledge goods such as software. 
The open access to transaction-free zones such as 
FLOSS projects (Baldwin, 2008) may lead to cost 
advantages along the innovation process in terms 
of integration tasks because developers can ac-
cess, reuse, and contribute to other projects' code 
base without the need for contracting, measuring, 
and billing. In addition, this study demonstrates 
how developers can save negotiation and com-
munication costs by consolidating or setting up 
new (unencapsulated) transaction-free zones, 
within or outside existing project boundaries. 
This study is one of the first to apply a perspec-
tive of sociomateriality to an empirical study (see 
Wagner et al., 2010). The difficulties encountered 
may be useful for future empirical studies to con-
sider and improve upon. First, it proved difficult 
to adequately capture in words the observation of 
entanglement. Stumbling over formulations 
rooted in a logic of separatedness poses a chal-
lenge for research applying a sociomaterial per-
spective, both during the process of data gather-
ing as well as during analysis and writing. This 
difficulty does not only apply to a researcher 
trained in rather modern views of science but also 
to the respondents in the field struggling to put 
into words their interdependent, co-emergent 
practices on multiple levels: friendships that hap-
pen to co-evolve with code, documentation writ-
ten to help newcomers that in turn helps struc-
ture own work, saved development costs due to 
less negotiations while, nevertheless, constantly 
communicating, and many more. 
Applying analytical separations to data that ap-
pear as entangled might be considered as incom-
patible with a sociomaterial perspective. The 
objection is valid and methodological approaches 
need to evolve in parallel with more refined em-
pirical studies that employ a sociomaterial per-
spective. An economic analysis of organizational 
decisions builds on the evaluation of costs and 
benefits perceived by individuals and weighed 
against opportunity costs. It requires that indi-
viduals form expectations and make (boundedly) 
rational choices, in the case studied, for example, 
about organizational boundaries. Studying the 
economic rationale of organizational actors en-
tangled in co-emergent and constitutive practices 
raises fascinating ontological and epistemological 
puzzles for research. Two small cautions can be 
derived from this study that might be worthwhile 
to pursue when refining empirical research 
strategies for a sociomaterial perspective: socio-
materiality emphasizes the constitutive nature of 
entanglement that involves humans and non-
humans, such as software code. A consequence is 
that entities cannot be taken for granted inde-
pendent of the performance of a practice (for a 
critical discussion see Faulkner and Runde, 
2010). Particular attention to time may be war-
ranted due to the changes in organizational con-
texts. Interviews with and observations of the 
same individuals and their actions at multiple 
points in time may inform researchers about 
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evolving practices and actors’ evaluation of ob-
servable, economic activity in retrospect.  
Second, a multi-level and multi-context approach 
to data gathering may prove valuable for study-
ing the economic rationale of organizational ac-
tors. Sociomaterialty implies that technology is 
constitutive of the work in organizations includ-
ing the meaning of specific actions as attributed 
by a collective of individuals and the identity of 
an individual engaged in a practice. These proc-
esses are highly relevant for economic decisions 
such as how to develop which kind of interface 
between technical components or who to ap-
proach for help. Orlikowski and Scott (2008: 465) 
suggest that: “if we can find a way to reveal the 
taken-for-granted, invisible dynamics of socioma-
teriality, it will enable us to generate deep insights 
into the contemporary world.” Revealing such 
dynamics may require paying attention to the 
decision context at the cognitive, the collective, 
the technical, as well as the organizational (and 
here: inter-organizational) level because each 
level generates a context that will likely influence 
individual expectations and experiences that un-
derlie economic decisions. 
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LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study suffers from a few limitations. The 
choice of the Free Java environment as a sample 
was not a choice for the study of a particularly 
high or low rate of technological change, but for 
an environment that contained aspects of both 
(Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1995). The specifica-
tions for the Java language published by Sun 
Microsystems provided guidelines for the imple-
mentation of the technology. Beyond and within 
these specifications, FLOSS developers perceived 
ample freedoms for innovation and solutions that 
reached beyond the intended functionality.  
A study of collaboration across a large sample of 
FLOSS projects could help to build a more gen-
eral theory of cross-project collaboration. The 
study of a context where a given technology ex-
isted, at least in the form of specifications, was 
carried out in the full knowledge that it occupied 
a medium position, between radical and incre-
mental, within the evolution of the technology 
(Utterback, 1994). Given the current context, 
collaboration and the observed social conver-
gence were by no means inevitable. Historically, 
the projects were torn by license disagreements 
and personal feuds.  
With respect to the social convergence in the 
sample, it is difficult to argue that this research 
represents a multiple case study. The observed 
convergence was a single process and possibly 
idiosyncratic for this sample (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985). However, the notion of sociomaterial 
transaction rests on over 180 observations of 
technical collaboration across more than 30 pro-
jects. The non-obvious social convergence be-
tween the projects linked by individual networks 
that engage in technical collaboration invites 
further studies from a sociomaterial perspective. 
Environments with technologies that may work 
as integrated systems appear as particularly 
promising to study interwoven social and techni-
cal (inter-) organizational work practices.  
The results reported challenge the established 
economics of systems integration and call for 
research on the organization of complex devel-
opment projects. In contrast to prior work, which 
points to the necessity of a central systems inte-
grator (person, team or firm), this study indicates 
that it is possible to distribute the tasks and 
authority for systems integration and negotiate 
user interfaces and the modes of interaction be-
tween different parts of the system. Furthermore, 
the problem of novelty – how to explore new 
ideas without compromising existing functionality 
– can be addressed by branching and/or friendly 
forking.  
A number of questions remain unanswered. First. 
How common is distributed systems integration? 
Second, can these practices be observed in non-
software contexts, for example, urban planning, 
education, or industrial products (Müller-Seitz 
and Reger, 2010)? Third, can distributed systems 
integration be applied within a firm, and what 
are the barriers to doing so? Fourth, can such 
practices be used across firms, for example to 
structure technical alliances or joint development 
projects? These questions alone make up a full 
agenda for future research. 
More importantly, this paper has shown that 
distributed systems integration constitutes a vi-
able method of coordinating relatively large 
FLOSS projects. Conceptually, this method of 
coordination is an alternative to “silo develop-
ment” and centralized systems integration, which 
are regarded as “essential” features of proprietary 
development projects. When and why one 
method of coordination should be preferred to 
the other is a crucial question for future research 
in economics of innovation. 
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4. SOCIAL PRACTICE 
The development of complex innovations usually requires collective action because no single individ-
ual may likely embody the combined skills required. For the case of firms producing an output of ap-
propriable, private goods coordinating collective action is well understood (Coase, 1937). Outside of 
firms, however, collective action is associated with struggles over the sharing of costs and benefits. The 
problem associated with collective action appears when considering the economics of public goods, 
which tend to be undersupplied or over-used, as in the tragedy of the commons (Olson, 1965; Hardin, 
1968; Ostrom, 1999) due to the characteristics of public goods: non-rivalry and non-exclusiveness.  
Studies of collective action, when the output is a public good, have focused on either non-routine 
events such as riots or revolutions or routine collective action such as rallies, protests, or a soccer game 
(Piven & Cloward 1992; Useem 1998). Knowledge is usually seen as a byproduct of collective action 
(Flora and Flora, 1993; Indyk and Rier, 1993; Myers, 1994) but rarely as its core product (von Hippel 
and von Krogh, 2003). With the collaborative development of technology, knowledge is the central 
output of (routine) collective action, open source software being its prime example (von Hippel and 
von Krogh, 2003).  
Two literature streams in collective action are important in order to motivate a social practice perspec-
tive to gain theoretical weight going forward. Resource mobilization theory (see McCarthy and Zald, 
1977 for a synthesis) contributed to an understanding of social movements as resting on organization 
to succeed. Rather than highlighting grievances and social unrest as crucial for collective action, re-
source mobilization holds that organization makes the difference between failure and success in mobi-
lizing contributions and participation (Tilly, 1978). Second, process-based approaches to collective 
action focus on the dynamics in the work of collective action and the rewards available to contributors 
through participation (Elster, 1986). Elster writes: 
“... cooperation reflects a transformation of individual psychology so as to include the feeling of solidarity, altruism, 
fairness and the like. Collective action ceases to become a prisoner's dilemma because members cease to regard partici-
pation as costly: It becomes a benefit in itself, over and above the public good it is intended to produce.” (1986: 132) 
Collaborative innovation can be understood as a form of collective action where the central output is 
knowledge. Resource mobilization theory alerts us to the critical role that organization and coordina-
tion play for collaborative innovation. And process-based approaches remind us that identity and 
meaning change during the involvement in collective action (Melucci, 1996). This has economic con-
sequences because it changes the individual perception of costs and benefits and can, thus, solve the 
free rider problem. It is this insight that the notion of private-collective innovation brings to organiza-
tion science that dramatically improves our understanding of collective action when development 
processes are long-term, participatory, and knowledge-based (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003; 
Spaeth et al., 2008).  
However insightful the basic understanding of the terms of contributions is in economic terms, it si-
multaneously opens a wide set of questions about how collaborative innovation can be organized. 
Knowing that the free rider problem can be overcome when individual benefits outweigh the individ-
ual costs of contributing leads to the understanding that collaborative innovation can be sustainable 
(Roberts, Hann, and Slaughter, 2006; Hertel, Hermann, and Niedner, 2003). How this can be 
achieved is less clear, it is not obvious how organizations can implement processes and structures to 
support this form of collective action. The starting point is the process of collaboration because it is 
from the process that benefits emerge that have been missed in economic analysis that focused on the 
outcome only (exceptions are findings in behavioral economics that take into account, for example, 
warm-glow or reciprocity: Andreoni, 1990; Fehr and Schmitt, 1999). 
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This section speaks of social practice and it is all but a straightforward shift from the notion of studying 
a process to adopting a practice lens. In fact, this shift introduces an epistemological departure and an 
opening. The shift marks a break with methodological individualism and rational choice theory, two 
sets of assumptions underlying much of the work just cited in the last paragraphs. Attention to practice 
theory may yield valuable and complementary insights into processes of collaborative innovation de-
spite non-compatible assumptions. When drawing on practice theory, I refer to accounts of relevance 
to social sciences more generally (Schatzki, Knorr Cetina, and von Savigny, 2001, Boltanski and 
Thévenot, 2006/1991) and to the study of technology in organizations more particularly (Leonardi, 
2011; Feldman and Orlikowski, 2011).  
Three reasons for attending to a practice lens stand out. They are, in a nutshell: experience, ethics, 
and material agency. First, the idea that a process yields benefits to individuals represents a corner-
stone of private-collective innovation (von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003). Benefits that somehow ac-
crue during and as part of a production process change and challenge the calculus of public good eco-
nomics. Contributions no longer rest exclusively on the valuation of benefits connected to the availabil-
ity of the final product, say, street lights. In public goods economics the willingness to pay depends on 
the benefits street lights provide. In aggregate, street lights are underprovided due to some individuals 
waiting for others with higher expected benefits to pay for the lights. Now, building the lights is no 
longer a black box and being part of the production process is beneficial, so far the analogy. And the 
example used is open source software development. Contributing to the development process of the 
public good that is open source software becomes worthwhile beyond the usefulness of the final prod-
uct. Staying with the terminology of rational choice, we may account for the learning benefits involved 
when developing software jointly with peers (Spaeth et al., 2008), developers may experience fun and 
joy during work (Torvalds and Diamond, 2001), and they may see an opportunity to help others and 
interact in generative ways in the community (Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003). However, doing what 
developers do is rooted in causes that go beyond the rational and the three examples just cited stand in 
for wider developmental and personal motives best captured by the practice lens. Learning is also the 
path of becoming a skilled software developer, fun can represent an experience and mental state of 
flow, and helping is a form of empathy towards others. Simply rewording these three “intrinsic motiva-
tions” reveals the inadequacy of rational choice in capturing individual experience. The scare quotes 
refer to the first essay in this section where we complement self-determination theory with a social 
practice lens based on the work by Alasdair MacIntyre (1985). Beyond motivation, attention to indi-
vidual experience may allow theorizing the acquisition and sharing of tacit knowledge and its applica-
tion in skillful work, which plays a fundamental role in knowledge creation theory (see Niccolini, 2011). 
The concluding section five discusses aspects of individual experience for an agenda based on a prac-
tice lens. 
Second, collaborative innovation is a collective activity spread over time. With a focus on technological 
innovation we know that the technology can enter as a significant way of life for the engineer (the de-
veloper) and shape her way of thinking and acting and experiencing the world (Martin 2002; Flyvb-
jerg, 2001, Raymond, 1999). In the case of open source software development, Raymond (1999) and 
Stallman (1999) were the first to point to the defining role that the way software was developed played 
in the life of the developer. The sharing of code and the responsibilities for technological progress and 
social, and communal development was seen as a defining aspect of being part of the Free and open 
source software movement (see also Himanen, 2001). Hence, the moral choice of being part of the 
movement or the community and contributing to its functioning and growth can be understood by 
considering the process of development rather than the outcome or final product. Reading Stallman 
and Raymond may even suggest that ethical consideration drive collaborative innovation in open 
source software. The first essay in this section takes a close look at the moral component of individual 
motivation to contribute and argues that self-determination theory may in fact be fruitfully comple-
mented by a more long-term, developmental perspective on why individuals keep engaging in collabo-
rative innovation. The key theoretical term is social practice. The contemporary moral philosopher 
Alasdair MacIntyre helps in drawing a wider circle around the moral consideration that software de-
velopment practitioners such as Richard Stallmand advocate. A social practice, that can be collabora-
tive innovation as practiced in a specific community of developers, works as a school of virtue (MacIn-
tyre, 1981). This means that, by becoming a member of the social practice, the individual is socialized 
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into a way of doing things according to standards of excellence that both shape the individual sense of 
the right thing to do as well as evolve the community. The standards of excellence are worked out in 
daily activity during the process that is collaborative innovation. They are shared and refined in the 
community of practitioners. Hence, the practice over time, the process rather than the final product 
follows ethical considerations by developers who exercise judgment and responsibility as part of their 
engagement with a community and their (evolving) sense of belonging to that community.  
Third, theorizing the emerging properties of technology in development is critical for understanding 
work contexts and strategic choice in a myriad of practical domains (Haefliger et al., 2011, see section 
one on strategy). A practice lens may help capturing the role technology plays in structuring and shap-
ing organizational processes because it takes seriously the embodied and material context of collabora-
tive innovation. A framework of rational choice may risk glossing over the material context by assum-
ing a social component somewhere in the process and focusing on the outcome. Feldman and Or-
likowski (2011) point out that organizational outcomes depend not on the specific technology or how 
they are generally used but on the enactment of technologies in practice as the technology is recur-
rently used and constituted in everyday action. While the authors refer to organizational outcomes of 
any type, collaborative innovation as the organizational process in focus here is affected directly. The 
decision what to develop next and how to expand and improve the technology under development 
depends on prior choices and practical contingencies (such as, for example, modularity, see Baldwin 
and Clark, 2006). These contingencies can be theorized as material agency which overlaps in construc-
tive ways with human agency (Leonardi, 2011; 150). This thesis does not build further on this argu-
ment and I leave this angle on practice theory as simply a promising reason why to consider the prac-
tice lens in the study of collaborative innovation, pointing the reader to the last section of this thesis.  
The papers in this section combine the study of communities of practice with theorizing on social prac-
tice as well as an observation of user behavior in a large online community.  
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Open source software (OSS) is a social and economic phenomenon that raises fundamental 
questions about the motivations of contributors to information systems development. Some de-
velopers are unpaid volunteers who seek to solve their own technical problems, while others 
create OSS as part of their employment contract. For the past ten years, a substantial amount 
of academic work has theorized about and empirically examined developer motivations. We 
review this work and suggest considering motivation in terms of the values of the social practice 
in which developers participate. Based on the social philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre, we con-
struct a theoretical framework that expands our assumptions about individual motivation to in-
clude the idea of a long-term, value-informed quest beyond short-term rewards. This "motiva-
tion-practice" framework depicts how the social practice and its supporting institutions mediate 
between individual motivation and outcome. The framework contains three theoretical conjec-
tures that seek to explain how collectively elaborated standards of excellence prompt develop-
ers to produce high-quality software, change institutions, and sustain OSS development. From 
the framework we derive six concrete propositions and suggest a new research agenda on mo-
tivation in OSS. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the last 20 years, open source software 
(OSS) products have made successful inroads into 
many information systems (IS) segments, attract-
ing millions of users. OSS, broadly defined, is 
software where users can inspect the source code, 
modify it, and redistribute modified or unmodi-
fied versions for others to use. Today, firms are 
both heavy users of OSS products and contribu-
tors to their development. As a result, IS manag-
ers are increasingly dependent on development 
resources outside their direct control, giving them 
reason to be concerned about what motivates 
developers outside the firm, many as volunteers, 
to participate in the creation of OSS. For exam-
ple, if a firm decides to invest millions of dollars 
to migrate its servers to a Linux system, managers 
will want to know to what extent Linux will con-
tinue to receive contributions from individuals 
and companies, how the software will evolve, and 
if the OSS projects involved will manage to re-
lease new and improved versions of the software 
regularly. Thus, IS managers should be interested 
in the question formulated by Lerner and Tirole 
(2002) which points to the very existence of the 
OSS phenomenon: “Why would thousands of 
top-notch software developers contribute for free 
to the creation of a public good?” A public good, 
here, is defined by its non-excludability and non-
rivalry in consumption, which applies to software 
published and licensed under an open source 
license. Lerner and Tirole’s question poses huge 
challenges for scholars studying IS development 
within firms that systematically rely on pay and 
career incentives. Answering this question ex-
plains a phenomenon of high academic and prac-
tical interest and much research on motivation in 
OSS has already shed considerable light on criti-
cal issues regarding contributions to OSS projects 
and the emergence and growth of OSS projects 
and their organization (e.g., Hertel et al. 2003, 
Markus, 2007; Ulhøi, 2004; West and 
O’Mahony, 2005). 
In this paper we review the literature on motiva-
tion to contribute to the development of OSS. 
The review shows that the existing literature does 
not provide satisfactory answers to three more 
differentiated questions as to why this phenome-
non exists (cf. Lerner and Tirole, 2002): First, 
why do OSS developers produce high-quality 
software when they do? This question is war-
ranted because software quality is critical for 
attracting interest in OSS, as high-quality OSS 
systems make headlines due to their developers’ 
achievements in terms of reliability, speed, acces-
sibility, and more. For example, the world’s larg-
est stock exchanges run Linux systems while rac-
ing for trading speed records (Vaughn-Nichols, 
2009; King, 2010) and 75% of the world’s web-
sites are served by OSS web servers. However, as 
our review will show, while the existing literature 
informs us well how developers are intrinsically 
and extrinsically motivated to contribute by 
means of time, effort, and code contributions, 
little is known about why they develop high-
quality OSS when they do. 
Second, why do OSS developers change institu-
tions? A significant impact of the phenomenon on 
business and public administration stems from 
the nature of the free and OSS licenses that de-
fine and govern their potential use.  Public ad-
ministrators perceive value in the free accessibil-
ity of OSS (Comino et al., 2010; Maldonado, 
2010) and firms have long used and contributed 
to OSS (Bonaccorsi et al., 2006; Dahlander and 
Wallin, 2006; Henkel, 2006; Stam, 2009; 
Rolandsson, 2011) as part of a model of innova-
tion that has become known as private-collective 
(von Hippel and von Krogh, 2003). Thus, it is 
critical to explain why OSS developers set up OS 
licenses, organizations, and foundations and thus 
create new institutions that house what they do 
and make. However, while existing academic 
work explains how institutions constrain develop-
ers’ motivation, it does not address more broadly 
how developers are motivated to change institu-
tions.  
Third, why do developers sustain OSS develop-
ment? This question is critical because the answer 
indicates whether firms and individual users can 
expect future development of the software prod-
ucts in use today.64  In this regard, volunteering 
OSS developers may constitute an unstable de-
velopment resource as they can stop development 
or leave the project anytime. Developers may 
also suddenly and opportunistically alter their 
                                                
64 See The Economist, May 16, 2006 – “Open, but not as 
usual.” 
http://www.economist.com/node/5624944?story_id=56
24944 
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sharing behavior (Osterloh and Rota, 2007). 
However, so far, theory and research have not 
investigated in much detail why OSS developers 
engage in activities that guarantee the survival 
and sustainment of the OSS development prac-
tice. 
In order to explore the three questions, we first 
review existing literature on motivation to con-
tribute to OSS development and subsequently 
advance a new theoretical framework that deep-
ens, enriches, and reinvigorates research on mo-
tivation in OSS. We show that the concepts of 
individual motivation and social practice are 
mutually constitutive, and argue that theory and 
research should incorporate a social practice 
perspective that focuses on action to explain how 
shared beliefs are created through shared work 
(Orlikowski, 2005, 2010; Rouse, 2007; MacIn-
tyre, 1981), rather than reducing motivation stud-
ies to a conventional model that relies on short-
term intrinsic and extrinsic motivation (e.g., Hars 
and Ou, 2002). A simple analogy illustrates our 
argument: Humans often act to satisfy their im-
mediate needs and might fall for the dangling 
carrot. Occasionally, humans also make elabo-
rate detours, strive for bigger things in life and 
undertake long voyages to find the gold at the 
end of the rainbow (even though they know it is 
not there). They value the journey, perceive unity 
in the sum of their efforts, and manage their life 
so that they can reflect upon it as well lived in a 
social practice. The new theoretical framework 
we put forward is based on the social philosophy 
of Alasdair MacIntyre. MacIntyre’s perspective of 
social practice and motivation rests on a belief 
that human behavior cannot be decoupled from 
ethical considerations about what people strive 
for and the narratives they construct about their 
life. His work provides three important concep-
tual building blocks—goods, institutions, and 
social practice—that assist in the analysis of moti-
vation to act. While much is known about the 
direct link between individual motivation and 
output in the form of, for example, submitting 
new or modified code to OSS projects, much less 
is known about how motivation is intertwined 
with forms of cooperative human activity (which 
we analyze through MacIntyre’s concepts of “so-
cial practice” and “institution”) and a broader set 
of related outputs, including high-quality tech-
nology for public use (which we analyze through 
his concept of “good”).  
With regard to motivation, OSS differs from 
traditional software development in firms along 
three dimensions: incentives, control, and coor-
dination mechanisms. First, to motivate software 
development, firms rely on pay and career incen-
tives, and other benefits stipulated as part of em-
ployment contracts (e.g., Peters, 2003). The pres-
ence of a significant number of volunteers in OSS 
development (Hars and Ou, 2002; Lakhani and 
Wolf, 2005) limits the effectiveness of incentives 
to firm employees; volunteers find motivation 
elsewhere. Second, and related to the use of in-
centives, software development firms implement 
control mechanisms, including behavior-, or out-
put-based control (see Ouchi, 1978). The lack of 
formal governance and mandatory or formal 
membership by volunteers excludes managers 
from exerting control in a OSS project following 
these traditional ways (Markus, 2007). OSS is 
predominantly characterized by clan control, 
which is based on common values and beliefs 
(Ouchi, 1980), or self-control, based on self-
monitoring (Kirsch, 1996; Ouchi, 1979). Third, 
firms tend to coordinate software development 
projects through organizational hierarchy and 
centralized planning (Cusumano and Selby, 
1995). In contrast, coordinating the work of dis-
tributed OSS developers hinges on their ability to 
exchange information over the Internet at low 
cost (Bonaccorsi and Rossi, 2003). A set of rather 
simple tools, such as concurrent versioning sys-
tems and mailing lists, are used for coordination 
at the level of information exchange (Lee and 
Cole, 2003).  
These three dimensions illustrate differences that 
can be expected between the social practice of 
OSS development and those normally associated 
with software development in firms and software 
engineering (Scacci, 2002). Moreover, the social 
practice of OSS development is saturated with 
ethical aspects. Historically, open source software 
grew out of the Free Software movement founded 
by Richard M. Stallman, which was primarily 
driven by ethical considerations; running soft-
ware that a user cannot inspect, modify, and 
share is considered immoral. Developers who 
identify themselves with the Free, or Libre, Soft-
ware movement are often motivated by the desire 
to allow users to control the software they require 
(Stewart and Gosain, 2006). Thus, motivation of 
OSS developers should also be studied from the 
perspective of the social practice in which the 
development work collectively unfolds, evolves, 
and heeds ethical considerations (Rouse, 2007). 
In the following, we will argue that MacIntyre’s 
theory accomplishes precisely this task.  
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Next, we describe the method used for the review 
and examine existing theory and research, which 
predominately covers the link between motiva-
tion and contribution and, to a far lesser extent, 
the link between motivation, quality, institutions, 
and sustainable practice. Subsequently, we intro-
duce and critique MacIntyre’s theory, which is 
suited to further exploration of our three ques-
tions pertaining to motivation. In a fourth sec-
tion, we develop a new motivation-practice 
framework that allows us to answer these three 
questions. The framework contains a set of theo-
retical conjectures from which we derive concrete 
propositions and suggest new research opportuni-
ties. The last section concludes the paper. 
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RESEARCH AND ON OPEN SOURCE AND MO-
TIVATION 
Review Method 
We performed a literature review of publications 
pertaining to motivation in OSS. The review 
aimed to (1) reveal in what way and to what de-
gree literature has addressed the three questions 
we posed in the Introduction; (2) organize and 
classify received literature according to topics 
covered and their theoretical underpinnings, 
focusing on motivational aspects; and (3) identify 
gaps in the current literature that justify the crea-
tion of a new framework.  
The review stages conducted correspond to those 
recommended by Cooper (1998: Problem formu-
lation, data collection, data evaluation, analysis, 
and presentation. In doing so, we were able to 
take advantage of the suggestions and potential 
pitfalls associated with each stage of the review. 
The reviewed papers originated in different disci-
plines, including organization and management 
theory, anthropology, economics, law, psychol-
ogy, and sociology, and applied a variety of quali-
tative and quantitative research designs. We 
therefore report the data and methods used for 
each paper reviewed (Table A1 in the Appendix). 
We adopted a broad hierarchical search strategy 
to capture high-quality and relevant articles start-
ing with the most reliable sources and adding 
not-previously-identified articles in subsequent 
searches. The search strategy followed four main 
steps (the first three were carried out on June 22, 
2009, while the papers in the fourth category 
were added on a continuous basis). First, we iden-
tified all articles listed in the ISI Web of Knowl-
edge database published by Thomson Reuters 
containing the terms “open source,” “motiva-
tion,” or “incentive(s)” in the title, abstract, or 
keywords. This index is the most critical source of 
published material since it contains published and 
peer-reviewed articles. The initial search yielded 
214 articles; we excluded those that did not spe-
cifically deal with the relationship between moti-
vation and OSS. Search results that described 
software that happened to be open source were 
also excluded, as were articles that focused exclu-
sively on technical issues.  
Our review focused on motivation in the practice 
of software development under open source li-
censes and excluded other activities carried out in 
electronic networks of practice (Wasko and Faraj, 
2005), online communities (Wiertz and de 
Ruyter, 2007), and social networks sites more 
generally (Boyd and Ellison, 2007). While motiva-
tion patterns might be similar across various ac-
tivities we have no indication to combine in one 
review motivation studies in different practices 
simply because they might occur online or share 
volunteer contributions. In total, we included 26 
articles from the ISI Web of Knowledge data-
base. Second, we browsed the paper repository at 
www.opensource.mit.edu to identify articles that 
matched the ISI search criteria. This online pa-
per repository is a major source of unpublished 
papers and work in progress dealing with OSS. 
We included eight articles from this source. 
Third, in order to be more comprehensive, we 
searched Google Scholar with the combined 
search terms “open source” and “motivation.” 
Google Scholar searches the scholarly literature 
and identifies articles from multiple disciplines 
and sources: Peer-reviewed papers, theses, books, 
abstracts, and articles, from academic publishers, 
professional societies, preprint repositories, uni-
versities, and other scholarly organizations. The 
initial search yielded 38,900 (often duplicated) 
articles. Because of the vast number of articles 
identified we opted to retain only the top 200 
articles. Google Scholar ranks articles “the way 
researchers do, weighing the full text of each 
article, the author, the publication in which the 
article appears, and how often the piece has been 
cited in other scholarly literature. The most rele-
vant results will always appear on the first 
page.”65  In line with the two previous searches 
we excluded articles not specifically dealing with 
the relationship between motivation and OSS. 
We included one additional article that appeared 
only in Google Scholar. In addition, we searched 
Google Scholar using slightly different search 
phrases, such as “incentive” and “open source 
software.” However, this search failed to yield 
any relevant articles to add to the full sample. 
Fourth, we included topical conference papers 
and book chapters that were known to us and 
colleagues in the field (and which had escaped the 
previous identification). This yielded six addi-
tional articles. 
Finally, we only included English-language 
documents, which led to the exclusion of one ISI 
paper. The search strategy led to 40 articles in 
                                                
65 http://scholar.google.com/intl/en/scholar/about.html, 
retrieved June 22, 2009 
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our review sample, with a comprehensive inclu-
sion of empirical contributions but a selective 
inclusion of purely theoretical contributions. The 
sample included all articles that empirically inves-
tigate the relationship between motivation and 
OSS development but excluded non-empirical, 
non-ISI articles that do not develop new theoreti-
cal categories or explanations. Conceptual papers 
were examined for motivational factors that were 
used to create theory. Motivational factors that 
proved relevant in empirical papers were also 
included in the review.  
We coded all papers according to motivational 
aspects covered, as well as to how they regarded 
institutional context. For example, surveys pro-
posing “I am contributing software because I 
learn from receiving feedback on my work” led to 
the creation of a “learning” dimension of indi-
viduals’ motivations to contribute. If a study used 
a different terminology, but the specific motiva-
tion seemed sufficiently close to an existing one in 
the taxonomy, it was merged into the existing 
category. After a first round, we convened and 
performed a triage of all studies and motivational 
dimensions, merging them when they seemed to 
express the same type of motivation. This led to a 
final typology of ten clusters related to individual 
motivation. As a final step, we decided whether 
each cluster covered intrinsic motivation, inter-
nalized extrinsic motivation, or extrinsic motiva-
tion. 
While reviewing the articles, we also categorized 
topics relating to institutions (which are outside of 
the direct control of a single individual), leading 
to a list of five dimensions, as discussed later. A 
complete list of papers included, with a brief de-
scription of methods and data used, is included in 
Table A1 in the Appendix. 
The Motivation to Contribute 
Studies of individual motivation to contribute to 
OSS development were grouped into ten motiva-
tional categories. We also examined the frame-
works used to justify and categorize motivations. 
While a wide variety has been used, the most 
frequent framework by far has been the distinc-
tion between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in 
self-determination theory (SDT) (see e.g., Deci 
and Ryan, 1985; Gagné and Deci, 2005). This 
distinction is based on different reasons that bring 
about human action. An action is extrinsically 
motivated when it is performed to obtain some 
separable outcome, whereas an action is intrinsi-
cally motivated when it is done for the inherent 
interest or joy of performing it (Deci and Ryan, 
1985). A number of empirical studies have shown 
that OSS developers have both intrinsic and ex-
trinsic motivations for contributing to its devel-
opment (Hars and Ou, 2002; Lakhani and Wolf, 
2005; Roberts, Hann, and Slaughter, 2006; Wu, 
Gerlach, and Young, 2007), and we summarize 
how some of the works make use of SDT. Follow-
ing Lindenberg (2001) and Lakhani and Wolf 
(2005), Osterloh and Rota (2007) distinguished 
between enjoyment-based intrinsic motivation 
and obligation-based or community-based intrin-
sic motivation. Their paper provided a theoreti-
cal overview, whereas Lakhani and Wolf (2005) 
presented survey data showing that both types of 
intrinsic motivation, as well as extrinsic motiva-
tion, impacted on work effort. Wu et al. (2007) 
also used the SDT framework to explain the con-
tinued intention to contribute to OSS projects.  
Most of the studies using SDT focused on intrin-
sic motivations. For instance, Hars and Ou (2002) 
suggested that intrinsically motivated developers 
spend more time and effort in open source pro-
jects than extrinsically motivated developers, but 
did not examine this empirically. Other empirical 
studies concentrated on intrinsic motivation 
rather than extrinsic motivation. For example, 
Lakhani and von Hippel (2003) linked feelings of 
competence and fun to willingness to help other 
developers. Authors have also viewed motivation 
in relation to reciprocity, for example: Giving 
software patches as “gifts” to the community 
(Bergquist and Ljungberg, 2001; Wu et al., 2007); 
reciprocal helping behavior (i.e. helping because 
of having been helped or expecting to be helped) 
(Lakhani and von Hippel, 2003); or status moti-
vation (Roberts et al., 2006). This work stands in 
contrast to Lerner and Tirole’s early explanation 
of contribution, purely based on extrinsic motiva-
tion (2002). Few of the works on intrinsic motiva-
tion looked at how institutional context shapes 
motivations (and incentivizes to create or change 
institutions). 
While alternative frameworks have been pro-
posed, they are often closely related to Deci and 
Ryan’s original framework of extrinsic and intrin-
sic motivation. For example, Bonaccorsi et al. 
(2006) distinguished between economic, social, 
and technological motivation, building on a tax-
onomy proposed by Feller and Fitzgerald (2002). 
Economic motivation is similar to extrinsic moti-
vation, while social motivation roughly corre-
sponds to intrinsic motivation. The authors also 
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suggested a third type—“technological motiva-
tion”—that includes benefits from learning and 
working with a “bleeding-edge” technology. 
Attempts toward a broader and integrative 
framework can be found in Hemetsberger (2004) 
and Hertel et al. (2003). Hemetsberger viewed 
motivation as “self-interest” and “others-
orientation.” Self-interest was further divided into 
task- and product-related motivation (corre-
sponding to intrinsic motivation); others-
orientation, including long-term utilitarian goals 
and social significance (corresponding to extrinsic 
motivation), was divided into internalized group 
goals and values, and socio-emotional relation-
ships. Hertel et al. (2003) extended a model of 
voluntary action in social movements proposed 
by Klandermans (1997). The authors included 
collective, norm-oriented, reward, and identifica-
tion motives, and combined these with the 
“VIST-model” (Hertel, 2002) that explains indi-
vidual motivation in virtual teams.66 These 
frameworks go beyond self-determination theory 
in specific aspects but do not answer any of the 
three questions we developed in the previous 
section. 
Most of the work on motivation based on the 
intrinsic/extrinsic framework can be grouped 
into intrinsic motivation, internalized extrinsic 
motivation, or extrinsic motivation (see Table 14 
for an overview of the resulting dimensions). 
Some motivations are by definition extrinsic but 
developers could internalize them, so that they 
are perceived as self-regulating behavior rather 
than external impositions (Deci and Ryan, 1987; 
Roberts et al., 2006). These internalized extrinsic 
motivations include reputation, reciprocity, learn-
ing, and own-use value. Pure extrinsic motiva-
tions include careers and pay. The specific di-
mensions with key empirical findings of the pa-
pers in our sample are summarized in Tables 
A2–A4 in the Appendix. 
Interaction among motivation factors has been 
given less attention, with the notable exception of 
crowding theory (Frey and Jegen, 2001), which 
predicts mutual adjustments between intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivation; introducing pecuniary 
incentives may not always increase the supply of 
a public good (Frey and Jegen, 2001). Osterloh 
                                                
66 VIST stands for valence (the subjective evaluation of 
goals), instrumentality (the perceived importance of one’s 
own contribution), self-efficacy (team members’ perceived 
ability to perform the required activities for the team task), 
and trust (the expectation of reciprocity rather than 
exploitation). 
and Rota (2007) argued that extrinsic motivation 
might crowd out voluntary sharing of software 
and other knowledge. Several surveys have 
shown that around 40 percent of the contribu-
tions to OSS emanate from paid working time 
(Hars and Ou, 2002; Hertel et al., 2003; Lakhani 
and Wolf, 2005; Luthiger and Jungwirth, 2007). 
However, crowding out of intrinsic motivations 
cannot be detected in empirical studies so far. 
Lakhani and Wolf (2005) found that intrinsic and 
extrinsic motivations co-exist, and Roberts et al. 
(2006) detected no crowding out of intrinsic mo-
tivation by extrinsic motivation. Osterloh and 
Rota (2007) argued that this might be due to a 
balance between intrinsic and extrinsic motiva-
tions and the “pro-social intrinsic motivation of a 
sufficient number of participants to contribute 
[...enforcing the rules of cooperation]” (Osterloh 
and Rota, 2007, p. 196). Increased reputation 
and career concerns (“status motivation”) even 
enhance developers’ intrinsic motivations (Rob-
erts et al., 2006), although extrinsic motivation 
does crowd out “own-use value” motivation (a 
form of internalized extrinsic motivation) (Rob-
erts et al., 2006). 
To conclude, while research on motivation in 
OSS generated a clear link between extrinsic and 
intrinsic motives and contributions, it did not 
relate individual motivation to the quality of the 
contributions made. This leaves our first question 
(“How and why do OSS developers produce 
high-quality software when they do?”) unan-
swered.  
Motivation, institutions, and social practice 
OSS development is a form of collective action 
that shapes institutions, and in turn enables indi-
viduals to contribute (von Hippel and von Krogh, 
2003). Decades of research into other forms of 
collective action, ranging from lobbying and 
preservation of natural resources, to money col-
lection for a good cause, have shown that institu-
tions and individual motivations are interrelated 
(e.g., Morris and Mueller, 1992). As a result, we 
believe that it is important to investigate both the 
individual level and the social context of devel-
opment in order to understand individual behav-
ior in a social practice. This section reports on 
our findings on the relations between motivation, 
institutions, and social practice in the literature 
reviewed. 
The research reviewed here mostly investigates 
why developers are moved to contribute to OSS 
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development. However, it has disregarded poten-
tial external influences and interferences, and 
focuses instead on the underlying needs, wishes, 
and goal orientations of individuals. Early on, 
though, Deci and Ryan (1985) pointed to the link 
between a context (the external environment) and 
individual motivation. In self-determination the-
ory, extrinsic and intrinsic motivations are both 
predictors and outcomes of institutional ar-
rangements such as governance or norms, de-
pending on “the nature of the study and the way 
and time in which self-determined motivation is 
measured” (Sheldon and Krieger, 2007, p. 885). 
Accordingly, some OSS scholars have recently 
moved beyond the direct link between motivation 
and contribution, and investigated factors that 
enable and constrain motivation and contribution 
to OSS. These factors are external to individuals 
and often beyond their direct control, impacting 
indirectly on OSS contributions. They do so ei-
ther by influencing individual motivation or 
moderating its effect. While some authors discuss 
the interrelationship between the motivation of 
OSS developers and contextual factors that im-
pact on development, most of this work is recent 
and difficult to categorize (e.g., von Hippel and 
von Krogh, 2003; Shah, 2006). Yet, our review 
was able to identify five kinds of contextual fac-
tors of relevance to our second question (“Why 
do OSS developers change institutions?”) and the 
third (“Why do developers sustain OSS develop-
ment?”). 
First, a few studies related motivation to institu-
tions in terms of governance, community spon-
sorship, the provision of rewards, and license 
restriction. Markus (2007, p. 152) defined OSS 
governance as “the means of achieving the direc-
tion, control, and coordination of wholly or par-
tially autonomous individuals and organizations 
on behalf of an OSS development project to 
which they jointly contribute.” While governance 
in OSS has been described in terms of structure, 
practices, rules, and norms, it leaves unanswered 
an important question relating directly to motiva-
tion: What is the source of control in OSS devel-
opment communities (Markus, 2007, p. 153)? As 
well as exerting control, the creation of routines 
and rules impacts on developers’ voluntary en-
gagement and motivation. Markus’s question also 
points to the organizational sponsorship of OSS 
development. Shah (2006) distinguished between 
“open” and “gated” source communities, where 
“gated” refers to developers’ limited access to the 
development process, due to firm sponsorship 
and control. She found that, in the long run, de-
velopers who are mainly motivated by use value 
tend to contribute to gated source communities, 
whereas developers mainly motivated by enjoy-
ment contribute to open source communities. 
Stewart, Ammeter, and Maruping (2006) investi-
gated the role of community sponsorship and 
distinguished between market (e.g., firm) and 
non-market (e.g., university) sponsors and con-
cluded that developers pick up cues as to the 
project’s future from the type of sponsor, impact-
ing incentives to contribute. For example, they 
found that projects with a non-market sponsor 
attracted greater development activity than pro-
jects without a sponsor. How contributions are 
rewarded also seems to matter. Alexy and Leitner 
(2011), in a working paper, criticized existing 
OSS literature for assuming that intrinsic motiva-
tion and extrinsic financial rewards have a one-
dimensionally positive effect on the motivation of 
individual developers; they claimed that payment 
norms moderate the effect on intrinsic and total 
motivation. It has also been found that license 
restriction impacts on developers’ motivations, in 
the sense that less restrictive licenses tend to at-
tract more development activity to a project 
(Fershtman and Gandal, 2007; Stewart et al., 
2006). The literature reviewed thus far considers 
institutions as constraints to motivation and has 
studied the interaction and interference that gov-
ernance, community sponsorship, provision of 
rewards, and license restrictions inflict upon indi-
vidual motivation. That is, causality has been 
established between the way institutions impact 
on motivation and human behavior. However, 
the opposite causal direction has not been inves-
tigated although it is known that OSS developers 
set up governance structure (O’Mahony and 
Ferraro, 2007). This means that question 2 
(“Why do OSS developers change institutions?”) 
remains unanswered.  
Second, a number of studies related motivation 
to norms and exposure to a specific community. 
The literature reviewed identifies social and tech-
nical exposure to a community that over time 
creates opportunities, in terms of advancement 
within the community’s social structure (von 
Krogh et al., 2003; Rullani, 2007) and of insights 
that can lead to more challenging tasks (Shah, 
2006). To get their work accepted by established 
developers and to be able to exert influence on 
the technical design in the project, newcomers 
have to adhere to behavioral scripts for joining 
the community. Learning about and following 
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“joining scripts” takes time for developers, but 
this time is essential if they are to advance to 
community leadership or other central positions 
(von Krogh et al., 2003). Although this literature 
approaches the idea of a social practice, question 
3 (“Why do OSS developers sustain the social 
practice of OSS development?”) remains unan-
swered.  
Reviewing state-of-the-art literature, we identified 
five dimensions (governance, community spon-
sorship, provision of rewards, license restrictions, 
and social and technical exposure to the commu-
nity) associated with institution and social prac-
tice that impact on motivation to contribute 
source code (see Table 15). However, little is yet 
known about what moves OSS developers to 1) 
produce high-quality work when they do, 2) en-
gage in institutional change, or 3) sustain OSS 
development. In order to address these issues, we 
suggest research to take a social practice perspec-
tive on OSS development.  
To summarize, individual motivation rooted in 
people’s search for immediate outcomes is impor-
tant but does not suffice to explain critical facets 
of the OSS phenomenon. The OSS phenomenon 
initially triggered research on contributors’ moti-
vation from a self-determination perspective, but 
to get more differentiated explanations we may 
need to look beyond this dominating perspective. 
Some of the work reviewed represents a first step 
toward taking into account institutions and prac-
tice; yet it seems that the emergence of institu-
tions through social practice, and their interac-
tions in OSS development, are currently not well 
understood. A perspective that explicitly engages 
with these interactions can be found in the social 
philosophy of Alastair MacIntyre, which we in-
troduce in the following section. Subsequently, 
we develop a framework that contains theoretical 
conjectures from which we derive concrete 
propositions. The framework fills the identified 
research gap and thus answers the three ques-
tions posed in the Introduction.  
 
 
 
  Intrinsic Internalized Extrinsic Extrinsic 
  Ideo-logy 
Altru-
ism 
Kin-
ship Fun 
Repu-
tation 
Reci-
procity 
Learn-
ing 
Own-
use Career Pay 
Alexy and Leitner, 2007           
Baldwin and Clark, 2006           
Benkler 2002           
Berquist and Ljungberg 2001           
Bitzer et al. 2007           
David and Shapiro, 2008           
David et al. 2003           
Fershtman and Gandal, 2004           
Ghosh 2005           
Hars and Ou 2002           
Haruvy et al. 2003           
Hemetsberger 2004           
Hertel et al. 2003           
Ke and Zhang 2008           
Lakhani and von Hippel 2003           
Lakhani and Wolf 2005           
Lattemann and Stieglitz 2005           
Lee and Cole, 2003           
Lerner and Tirole 2002           
Luthiger and Jungwirth 2007           
Markus, 2007           
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O’Mahony and Ferraro, 2007           
Okoli and Oh 2007           
Oreg and Nov 2008           
Osterloh and Rota 2007           
Riehle 2007           
Roberts et al. 2006           
Rullani, 2007           
Schofield and Cooper 2006           
Shah 2006           
Spaeth et al. 2008           
Stewart et al., 2006           
Stewart and Gosain 2006           
von Hippel and von Krogh 2003           
von Krogh et al., 2003           
Wu et al. 2007           
Xu et al. 2009           
Ye and Kishida 2003           
Yu et al. 2007           
Zeitlyn 2003           
Table 17: Intrinsic and extrinsic motivations 
 
Governance Governance refers to “the means of achieving the direction, control, and coordination 
of wholly or partially autonomous individuals and organizations on behalf of an OSS 
development project to which they jointly contribute” (Markus, 2007: 152). 
 
Key empirical findings: 
• Benkler (2002) argued that peer production has a relative advantage over firm- 
or market-based production because of the highly variable nature of human capital 
and lower costs of coordination and communication. 
• Lattemann and Stieglitz (2005) argued that the adequacy of governance tools is 
related to the motivational preferences of participants and that behavioral and 
output control should be regarded as secondary to social control in the form of 
morals and cultural rules. 
• Lerner and Tirole (2002) argued that the success of an OSS project is 
dependent on its ability to break it into distinct components as well as the presence 
of a credible leader or leadership. They suggest that code modularity enables the 
former and exemplifies the latter with projects characterized by authority or 
consensus.  
• Markus (2007) suggested three purposes of OSS governance: Solving collective 
action problems, solving coordination problems, and creating a better climate for 
contributors. Her review also suggested a framework for future comparative and 
case study research on OSS governance.  
• O’Mahony and Ferraro (2007) concluded that, contrary to common belief, the 
contributions the community valued the most were not purely technical. The study 
showed that over time a governance structure emerged that valued the informal 
work of coordinating individual efforts and linking them to community goals. In 
doing so, the members developed a shared basis of formal authority but limited it 
with democratic mechanisms. 
• Shah (2006) distinguished between open and gated software communities, 
performing a qualitative study of both, and found that the difference in governance 
structure affects the participation choices of volunteer OSS developers. In addition, 
she found that in the long run, developers who were mainly motivated by use-value 
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tended to contribute to gated source communities, whereas developers mainly 
motivated by enjoyment contributed to open source communities. Considerations 
of fairness and reciprocity explain this behavior. The developers were aware of the 
property rights situation in the gated source communities and suspected firms of 
acting “strategically,” that is, neglecting the needs of the community and pursuing 
their economic interests. Thus, developers in gated source communities 
contributed only if they derived direct use-value from their work. 
Community 
sponsorship 
Sponsorship refers to control by an organization, such as a firm, over the development 
process, source code accessibility, or code ownership. 
 
Key empirical findings: 
• Shah (2006) studied open and gated software communities and argued that 
firms may encounter difficulties if they seek to construct hybrid arrangements that 
balance community-based value creation with private value appropriation. 
• Stewart et al. (2006) found that community sponsorship and licensing address 
complementary developer motivations, so that the influence of licensing on 
development activity depends on what kind of organizational sponsor a project has. 
In addition, OSS projects with sponsors—non-market sponsors in particular—
attract more attention. 
Provision of 
rewards 
The provision of rewards refers to incentive structure, i.e., how someone other than 
the developer is rewarded for participation in OSS development. 
 
Key empirical findings: 
• Alexy and Leitner (2011) found that payment norms moderate the effect on 
motivation. In particular they studied the impact of rewards and payment norms 
within a community on developers’ intentions to contribute to an OSS project. 
They found that payment exhibited a positive effect on developers’ total motivation 
when they were offered a monetary reward on completion as long as payment was 
not strongly expected. At the same time intrinsic motivation only decreased for that 
share of the sample that received payment, which also perceived the existence of 
social norms refuting payment. 
• Benkler (2002) distinguished between, and related, monetary rewards, intrinsic 
hedonic rewards, and social-psychological rewards (such as social associations and 
status perception). He formalized the possible effects of increased monetary 
rewards. In particular, he discussed the situation when one agent is jealous of 
another’s rewards (which he called jalt), such as when some people are paid and 
others not. 
• Lerner and Tirole (2002) drew on labor economics when they analyzed the 
economics of OSS and concluded that OSS contributors could be directly 
rewarded though employment or rewarded by signaling and subsequently gaining 
employment. 
• Roberts et al. (2006) found that paid participation lead to above-average 
contribution levels. In addition, they found that being paid to contribute was 
positively related to developers’ status motivations but negatively related to their 
use-value motivations. No evidence of diminished intrinsic motivation in the 
presence of extrinsic motivations was found. 
License 
restriction 
License restriction is usually thought to limit the commercial exploitation of the source 
code, i.e., the option to combine OSS with proprietary software for sale.  
 
Key empirical findings: 
• Fershtman and Gandal (2007) found that output per contributor is much 
higher when licenses are less restrictive and that the number of contributors is 
higher when licenses are restrictive. 
• Lerner and Tirole (2002) described changes toward less restrictive OSS licenses 
that opened up for bundling OSS with proprietary software. They discussed the 
firm advantages of releasing existing proprietary code. 
• Osterloh and Rota (2007) claimed that OSS can flourish even after the advent 
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of a dominant design, when knowledge sharing is no longer supported by great 
learning potential, low opportunity costs, and selective benefits. They argued that 
this is because OSS is better at solving first- and second-order social dilemmas 
where OSS licenses hinder the exploitation of voluntary donors. 
• Stewart et al. (2006) found that community sponsorship and licensing address 
complementary developer motivations, so that the influence of licensing on 
development activity depends on the kind of organizational sponsor a project has. 
For example, “the presence of a non-market sponsor may alleviate concerns as to 
the project’s future in the same way as a restrictive license would, in the sense that 
the restrictive license is not perceived as necessary to protect the developers’ 
interests” (2006: 141). In addition, OSS projects that use a nonrestrictive license 
will attract greater user interest over time than those that use a restrictive license. 
Social and 
technical 
exposure  
to the 
community 
Refers to effects from exposure that, over time, create opportunities for advancement 
and work on more challenging tasks that require deep insights into the community’s 
workings. 
 
Key empirical findings: 
• Rullani (2007) concluded that exposure to a community increases developers’ 
contributions independently of their pre-determined preferences.  
• Shah (2006) maintained that the developers’ long-term accumulation of 
knowledge provided opportunities to engage in more challenging tasks, or tasks 
that require broader knowledge of the code base (multiple modules and 
components).  
• Spaeth et al. (2008) found that contributions impacted on developers’ 
positioning in the community, which in turn provided some developers with private 
benefits, such as reputation gain, influence of the technical agenda, and learning 
opportunities. 
• von Krogh et al. (2003) found that newcomers who wanted to get their work 
accepted by established developers and to be able to exert influence on the 
technical design in the project, have to adhere to behavioral scripts for joining the 
community. 
Table 18: Institutions and social practice 
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OSS DEVELOPMENT: CONCEPTUAL BUILDING 
BLOCKS 
In recent years, scholars have increasingly shown 
interest in the influence of social practices on the 
evolution of economy and society, often referred 
to as the “practice turn” in the social sciences 
(Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, and Savigny, 2001). 
The practice turn has also influenced theorizing 
in IS development and use (e.g., Kellogg, Or-
likowski, and Yates, 2006; Orlikowski, 2000; 
Suchman, Blomberg, Orr, and Trigg, 1999) and 
stimulated theory development on human moti-
vation that takes into account the relationship of 
passionate individuals engaging in their social 
practices and the role individuals play in the insti-
tutionalizing power of social practices (Brown 
and Duguid, 1991). The practice turn describes 
the work of social scientists who attempt to ar-
ticulate relationships between individual activi-
ties, structures, and matter (for example, rules or 
physical bodies) that have been separated by 
various dualisms (such as structuralism or meth-
odological individualism). Alasdair MacIntyre’s 
seminal work After Virtue (1981) presents a the-
ory that extends and links aspects from the social 
practice perspective. The theory includes an ethi-
cal dimension to the discussion of quality in the 
goods produced by motivated individuals in a 
social practice that is either enabled or con-
strained by institutions (Knight, 1998).  
MacIntyre’s work has had wide-ranging implica-
tions for several fields, including sociology, politi-
cal science, education, religious studies, and busi-
ness ethics (for a discussion and introduction, see 
Knight, 1998). His perspective on human motiva-
tion is rooted in moral philosophy, in particular 
virtue ethics, which concerns the knowledge of 
how to live a good life (MacIntyre, 1981). As we 
showed in the last section, motivation is often 
considered a physiological feature aroused in 
human beings that make us act in the direction of 
a specific goal. However, according to MacIn-
tyre, understanding what people do (or do not do) 
and why they do it cannot be decoupled from an 
analysis of ethical considerations, such as what 
they strive for in life, the narratives they construct 
about their life, and why these are worthwhile to 
them and others. The theory builds on, and criti-
cizes, Aristotelean value ethics by arguing from a 
more relativistic and process-based point of view. 
Furthermore, he takes a dynamic and historical 
perspective that is rare in mainstream motivation 
studies and explores the role of institutions and 
social practices in shaping virtues. 
More specifically for our purpose, MacIntyre’s 
(1981) theory is useful for analyzing motivation in 
the context of OSS development because it raises 
questions of ethics that guide the activities of 
people, institutions, and social practices. As 
shown by Stewart and Gosain (2006), OSS de-
velopers often report that their work is guided by 
strong ideologies (which may be expressions of 
ethics), such as writing software that should be 
free for all to download and use. A review and 
framework of motivations in the context of the 
OSS development phenomenon therefore needs 
a theoretical foundation that allows such ethical 
and ideological issues to be addressed.  
Further, MacIntyre (1981) is concerned with the 
implications of so-called “incommensurable 
moral premises” rather than approaches to reach 
a consensus on values, norms, and decisions often 
found in conventional (analytical) moral philoso-
phy (e.g., Habermas, 1988, on rational dialogue 
and communicative action; see Mingers and Wal-
sham, 2010, for an application to IS). The theory 
is based on the assumption that people from dif-
ferent cultures, practices, and institutions may 
“subscribe” to various ethics and thus may also 
argue from different moral premises that would 
be impractical or impossible to reconcile. 
Incommensurable moral premises are relevant 
for understanding motivation in OSS develop-
ment, too. While commercial firms provide pe-
cuniary and career incentives to motivate devel-
opers, many (but not all) OSS developers work 
for free (Lakhani and Wolf, 2005). According to 
field accounts, some developers even find it “im-
moral” to work for a commercial software com-
pany (Stallman, 1999).  
Trying to change developers’ moral premises 
may be difficult and impractical. Firm participa-
tion in OSS development and gated communities 
(Shah, 2006; Roberts et al., 2006) raises the ques-
tion of implications for developers’ motivation, 
given the co-existence and interaction of institu-
tions and social practices that build on different 
moral premises. People who join a social practice 
gradually adopt shared values and strive toward 
standards of excellence defined within it (MacIn-
tyre, 1981). Thus, the analysis of moral premises 
in a social practice is essential in order to under-
stand what motivates people to perform and im-
prove a craft. As Feller and Fitzgerald (2002) 
argue, software development is a craft that has 
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evolved its own professional standards, which 
constitute the context in which software devel-
opment is done. It is reasonable to assume that in 
contemporary software development people are 
differently motivated and conduct their work 
based on vastly different (perhaps incommen-
surable) moral premises. An analysis of motiva-
tion in this context thus needs a framework that 
can capture these moral premises. 
There are three concepts from MacIntyre’s the-
ory that are central to our analysis: Social prac-
tice, goods, and institutions. Human activity is a 
holistic expression of the narrative of a human 
life embedded in some social traditions that give 
rise to social practices and the pursuit of quality. 
MacIntyre defines a (social) practice as “any co-
herent and complex form of socially established 
cooperative human activity through which goods 
internal to that form of activity are realized in the 
course of trying to achieve those standards of 
excellence which are appropriate to, and partly 
definitive of, that form of activity, with the result 
that human powers to achieve excellence, and 
human conceptions of the ends and goods in-
volved, are systematically extended” (MacIntyre, 
1981, p. 187). This definition can be applied to a 
range of professions and crafts, such as architec-
ture, medicine, journalism, science, and the arts, 
with the precondition that a social practice 
should have wide and positive effects for human-
kind.67   
Because of its ubiquitous presence and the wide-
ranging impact of IS in all aspects of contempo-
rary human life, software development, like many 
other areas of engineering and technology (van 
der Burg and van Gorp, 2005; Latour, 1996), 
should be considered a social practice in MacIn-
tyre’s sense of the concept. Scacchi (2002), 
                                                
67 A social practice is the basis for making decisions about 
which virtues are called for in particular circumstances 
and the best way of enacting them (Noel, 1999; Fowers, 
2003; Rämö, 2004). Dunne (1992) refers to “ethical 
knowledge” that directs “ethical action.” Aristotle’s 
discussion of the “good” refers to man’s practice “of his 
soul’s faculties in conformity with excellence or virtue” 
(Aristotle, 2001: 33). The good becomes a metaphysical 
goal, like truth, justice, and beauty, toward which people 
strive by adjusting their life and actions. However, in a 
modern world “good” may be contested by people who 
pursue different goals. The very standards that define 
what is good may be subject to different interests and, 
therefore, judgment itself will be judged as more or less 
virtuous (whether something is judged good or bad, right 
or wrong). MacIntyre argues we should rather understand 
the common good as internal to a social practice, as a goal 
to be achieved by its practitioners (Knight, 1998). 
though, has written about the differences between 
traditional software engineering and OSS devel-
opment practices (see also Rolandsson et al., 
2011). He notes that “[OSS developers] enact 
teamwork structures and relatively flat, peer-
oriented, decentralized community forms that 
reduce/supplant functional organizational forms 
inherent in traditional [software engineering] 
techniques that increased bureaucratic tenden-
cies. [OSS] avoids reliance on formal project 
management techniques and administrative 
structures that pervade industrial [software engi-
neering] projects” (Scacchi, 2002, p. 3). Moreo-
ver, the social practice is intertwined with the 
technical object (see also discussions in Or-
likowski and Scott, 2008). MacKenzie (2005) 
suggests that the OSS code itself, with modular, 
functional, and transparent objects, gives rise to a 
social practice with its own ethics. The technical 
object of the software code requires developers to 
behave in a specific way when creating and main-
taining it, for example, modularizing, reusing, 
keeping to the API specification, or taking great 
care to document (Baldwin and Clark, 2006). 
Thus, “to be an OSS developer” means to en-
gage in a social practice and to adhere to its spe-
cific rules of conduct, because these are believed 
to enable the creation of a high-quality product 
for its users (von Hippel, 2001; von Krogh and 
von Hippel, 2006). At the same time, according 
to Scacchi, it also means abandoning other rules 
related to institutions of software engineering 
prevalent in industry  
When individuals act, MacIntyre’s theory pro-
poses that social practices together with institu-
tions create two types of good, external and in-
ternal. External goods (external to the social prac-
tice) include capital, status, or power, which are 
the property of individuals and/or institutions. 
Internal goods are defined by the social practice 
and are public goods that benefit all participants 
in the social practice and the wider community. 
This is why, as noted above, MacIntyre (1981) 
chooses to speak of a social practice in relation to 
collective activity that produces wide-ranging 
positive effects for humankind. The difference 
between external and internal goods can be ex-
emplified in the case of science. Scientific knowl-
edge can be considered an internal good of sci-
ence, of benefit to the scientific community and 
humanity at large. The creation of scientific 
knowledge adheres to the highest methodological 
standards set by the scientific community. The 
status and salary bestowed on individual scien-
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tists, and the power that follows from their exper-
tise, are the external goods of science. However, 
there is no short cut to obtain these external re-
wards, which illustrates the importance of prac-
tice-based virtues of practitioners extending be-
yond their personal preferences. One first needs 
to work hard on developing the skills necessary 
for being a good scientist (as an unpaid student, 
for example) in the view of the scientific commu-
nity, before personal economic benefits can be 
realized. Analogously, internal and external 
goods exist in OSS development. Internal goods 
are, for instance, the resulting software code, 
which—under an appropriate license—has pub-
lic good characteristics. Additional internal goods 
to the practice are the joy of collaborating with 
similar-minded peers and the spreading of quality 
software, empowering software users. Given the 
wide range of developers’ skills, the code quality 
nevertheless varies across projects. Individual 
reputation, the opportunity for developers to 
signal their value to potential employers through 
their code, and the solution to one’s private tech-
nical problems are external goods that are acces-
sible by one individual. 
MacIntyre’s theory emanates from a criticism of 
Aristotle’s work on ethics and virtues in political 
leadership. He notes that practitioners achieve 
excellence of character or virtue in pursuing in-
ternal goods. To act in a virtuous manner is to 
emulate the rules of morality rather than simply 
abiding by them because one is in one way or 
another commanded to do so. A social practice, 
therefore, is a “school of virtue,” where practitio-
ners learn aspects of the internal good, such as 
ethical reasoning, argumentation, criteria for 
excellence and product quality, rules of commu-
nication, and so forth. Justice, courage, truthful-
ness, and above all love for the social practice, are 
cultivated through practitioners’ participation. 
Practitioners discover and commit to goals that 
lie beyond their own selfish, short-term needs and 
desires. They realize that they can only achieve 
the internal goods that are of value to themselves, 
their social practice, and wider society when they 
emulate the standards of excellence already es-
tablished within the practice. Pursuing internal 
goods (excellence) is synonymous with cultivating 
virtues by subordinating oneself and one’s rela-
tions with others to the reasoning that is internal 
to the social practice.68   
                                                
68 For there to be an identifiable common and internal good, 
MacIntyre (1994, p. 35) suggests: “…there must be 
As Feldman and Orlikowski (2011, p. 11) argue, 
“in focusing on practice theory, we understand 
the mutually constitutive ways in which agency is 
shaped by but also produces, reinforces, and 
changes its structural conditions.” We refer to 
these structural conditions, which include organi-
zations (e.g. hierarchy, community), rules (e.g. 
coordination), and routines, as institutions. More 
specifically, in MacIntyre’s theory institutions are 
“characteristically and necessarily concerned with 
[the provision of] external goods” (1981, p. 194), 
and can be understood as sustainable forms of 
human cooperation, governed by these organiza-
tions, rules, routines, which exist beyond the 
presence and efforts of each individual. Thus, 
medicine, chess, and software development are 
examples of social practices, whereas a hospital, 
chess club, or software firm are institutions. 
Institutions such as governments, NGOs, and 
firms are a prerequisite for the organization and 
sustenance of social practices. In the words of 
Beadle and Moore (2006), “institutions house the 
social practice.” A social practice cannot exist 
and be sustained without the supporting struc-
tures that provide rules for human cooperation. 
The relationship between institutions and social 
practices is so intimate that they “form a single 
causal order in which the ideals and the creativity 
of the practice are always vulnerable to the ac-
quisitiveness of the institution, in which the coop-
erative care for common goods of the practice is 
always vulnerable to the competitiveness of the 
institution” (MacIntyre, 1981, p. 194). At the 
same time as institutions enable social practices to 
produce internal goods, they distribute external 
goods in the form of power, status, and financial 
rewards. Thus, internal goods and external goods 
are always produced concurrently, giving rise to 
unavoidable tensions between social practices 
                                                
identifiable structures of community, so that one can 
understand how the parts which different individuals 
contribute are contributing to a common goal.” However, 
as Blackledge (2009, p. 870) argues in his analysis of 
MacIntyre and social practices: “It is … only in small-
scale communities that politics can escape from the 
compartmentalization that is endemic in the modern 
world.” MacIntyre believes that it is this 
compartmentalization that hinders the “flourishing of 
local communities” (MacIntyre, 1998a, p. 248) and that it 
is only in local communities that “cooperation as a 
common good” (MacIntyre, 1999, p. 114) can emerge 
spontaneously. However, the Internet allows even large 
global communities with hundreds of developers and users 
to follow each other’s work, making Blackledge’s 
insistence on “local” less relevant for analyzing OSS 
development. 
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and institutions to be discussed below. To sum-
marize, the conceptual building blocks discussed 
here form a dynamic and mutually dependent 
complex that helps us to understand aspects of 
human behavior in general and cooperative be-
havior, such as OSS development, in particular.  
MacIntyre’s Critique of Firms and Managers 
MacIntyre’s theory has been used in organization 
studies (e.g., Beadle and Moore, 2006) but, as 
Dawson and Bartholomew (2003) note, applying 
it is not unproblematic since MacIntyre criticizes 
heavily contemporary notions of management 
and firms as institutions. While this concern must 
be taken seriously, we will show that the strength 
of the conceptual building blocks is precisely that 
they derive explanatory power from highlighting 
distinct differences between social practices and 
institutions. 
Whereas institutions provide practitioners with 
external goods that satisfy their need for compen-
sation, they may also corrupt or fail to support 
social practices by overshadowing or conflicting 
with motives to develop a craft to adhere to the 
social practice’s ethics. Inevitably, much of Mac-
Intyre’s critique of institutions is directed at man-
agement (MacIntyre, 1981). However, Moore 
(2008) points out that this critique is part of a 
general critique of modernity; we live in an emo-
tivist culture in which moral choices and actions 
are expressions of people’s preferences and emo-
tional states. In MacIntyre’s highly controversial 
view, managers’ preferences are to seek external 
goods as ends, using other individuals as means. 
They justify their power and monetary compen-
sation by implementing techniques and systems 
for social change. However, because of the com-
plexity of organizations, techniques and systems 
seldom lead to predictable outcomes in terms of 
enhancing effectiveness or efficiency, and so he 
claims the basis for justification must be false. 
Furthermore, the implementation of planned 
social change can do more harm than good to a 
social practice’s capacity for producing internal 
goods. This critique echoes Robey and Markus’s 
(1984) much-cited analysis of the unpredictable 
outcomes of the design of management informa-
tion systems (MIS). Moreover, because managers 
are often influenced by monetary rewards and 
seek to create and appropriate excessive external 
goods, their actions may undermine practitioners’ 
motivations to improve their social practice, and 
ultimately destroy its social fabric, including rela-
tionships between practitioners.69  
 Analyzing the “morality of management,” 
Moore (2008) attempts to find a solution to this 
conundrum. In his view, the business organiza-
tion is a social practice-institution combination 
where the presence of virtuous agents at both 
levels may result in a “virtuous business organiza-
tion.” The manager partakes in both the “core” 
of social practice of , for example, software devel-
opment and the social practice geared at building 
and changing institutions (e.g., running a soft-
ware firm). MacIntyre repeatedly warns that 
because institutional goals may conflict with the 
internal goods of a social practice, institutions 
may constrain or corrupt social practices and de-
motivate or demoralize practitioners. This is the 
case when institutions pursue limited goals aimed 
at external goods (e.g., excessive profits and com-
petition) at the expense of internal goods that 
motivate practitioners toward the goals of im-
proving the social practice, such as achieving 
excellence in a craft (making money on watches is 
not always the same as perfecting the skills of 
watchmaking). One strength of MacIntyre’s work 
is to highlight such distinct differences between 
social practices and institutions. The role of virtue 
ethics also becomes clear: Without virtues such as 
justice, care, courage, and truthfulness, social 
practices could not resist what he calls the “cor-
rupting power” of institutions (MacIntyre, 1981, 
p. 194).  
Critique and Exegesis 
We believe there are great merits to MacIntyre’s 
theory when analyzing human motivation in 
relation to social practices and institutions. Yet, 
                                                
69 MacIntyre (1998b) also raises doubts that management 
can be considered a social practice because this presumes 
attention to the creation of internal goods and the well-
being of humanity. Managers’ concerns are with 
techniques and systems for transforming raw materials 
into products, unskilled labor into skilled labor, and 
investment into profit (p. 30). Managers decide and act to 
achieve a desired end state through social change, but are 
blind to other concerns, such as the wider effect of their 
actions on humanity. Thus, MacIntyre concludes they are 
not able to engage in moral debates about their own 
actions. MacIntyre’s harsh critique is unwarranted. It 
neglects the very fact that managers are mostly concerned 
with the consequences of their actions and repeatedly 
engage in a wider discourse with society about the nature 
of their activities and the purpose of the institutions they 
run. A similar point is made by Dawson and Bartholomew 
(2003). 
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his writings have received fundamental criticism, 
which we will discuss briefly here. The following 
section thus completes our review of MacIntyre’s 
theory with a critique and exegesis. This critical 
interpretation aims to uncover the significance of 
the theory for OSS development, and in particu-
lar how it informs the three questions we posed in 
the Introduction.  
First, MacIntyre has been criticized for his claim 
that habitual patterns of behavior associated with 
ethical values can no longer be found in contem-
porary society in the way that Aristotle conceived 
of them in his idea of “polis” (Bender, 1998). 
MacIntyre gives too much credit to an historical 
account of virtues, and how they can be achieved 
by individuals seeking to obtain “unity of life.” In 
so doing, he takes an overly optimistic view of 
what social practices, and the people within 
them, can achieve in terms of striving for excel-
lence. Yet writers on OSS remind us that there 
are strong ethical values at work in the commu-
nity of developers (Stallman, 1999; Zeitlyn, 
2003). For example, people who are suspected of 
unlawfully commercializing the software, or of 
introducing code from a commercial environ-
ment, are likely to be “flamed” through verbal 
attacks and have their privileges (such as access to 
the formal version of the source code) revoked, 
because this behavior is not considered consistent 
with being an OSS developer (Shah, 2006). Mac-
Intyre’s theory links human behavior and stan-
dards of excellence within the social practice to 
outputs in the form of internal goods. One main 
concern for the software industry in general, and 
OSS in particular, is the output of high-quality 
software (see e.g., Aberdour, 2007; Gillies, 1992; 
Kan, 2002), which is captured by question 1: 
“Why do OSS developers produce high-quality 
software when they do?”  
Second, Macintyre speaks broadly and confi-
dently about managers and firms without seem-
ing to care much about the details of what they 
do and how they work. While he takes a negative 
view of institutions (e.g., firms), at the same time 
he acknowledges “no practices could survive for 
any length of time unsustained by institutions” 
(MacIntyre, 1981, p. 194). MacIntyre’s critique of 
institutions, in particular firms, is rooted in an 
overly critical view of modern society. Claiming 
that firms universally demoralize practitioners, 
who otherwise seek to do good for their craft and 
social practice, is naïve and does not take into 
account the variety of motivations and institu-
tions in existence (see also Brewer, 1997). Instead, 
it is more fruitful to point to the risk that institu-
tions may destroy social practices. For MacIn-
tyre, managers act on behalf of institutions and 
are primarily concerned with increasing external 
goods. Yet, the pursuit of external goods clearly 
does not preclude some kind of balance between 
internal and external goods (Halliday and Johns-
son, 2010). In our reading, MacIntyre is overly 
pessimistic about management’s ability to achieve 
this balance. As we mentioned above, one solu-
tion to the problem is to understand managers as 
belonging to a type of social practice geared at 
founding and changing institutions (Moore, 
2008). However, accepting this perspective risks 
omitting a potentially important inquiry into why 
OSS developers (rather than managers) contrib-
ute to institutional change. What is clear from 
MacIntyre’s analysis is that institutions and social 
practices are mutually dependent for the produc-
tion of goods, and it follows that changes in insti-
tutions may trigger changes in social practices 
and vice versa. The mechanisms by which this 
change functions, and the role of OSS develop-
ers, remain unknown but the link between institu-
tions and social practice provides a theoretical 
basis for approaching question 2: “Why do OSS 
developers change institutions?”  
Third, MacIntyre’s view of virtue ethics as re-
lated to social practices and, more broadly, cul-
ture can be criticized from a utilitarian view of 
moral philosophy. Proponents of the latter view 
would seek to find universal rules that can guide 
moral behavior (Adams, 1976; Cornman, Lehrer, 
and Pappas, 1982; Mill, Bentham, and Ryan, 
1987). For example, one person will help another 
in distress because helping is a universal rule that 
provides utility to the person being helped and 
brings the helper a deep sense of satisfaction. 
MacInytre’s relativistic position neglects the 
search for such universal rules. In addition, from 
a utilitarian perspective, the theory defines an 
ideal unity of life bound to the social practice and 
the virtues it develops, but lacks objective stan-
dards. However, it would also be problematic to 
ignore entirely that moral premise and actions in 
everyday life may be shaped by the social con-
text. Indeed, OSS development is a collective 
undertaking, whether in terms of reuse of soft-
ware code or adhering to collectively established 
rules of conduct. Thus, researchers may acknowl-
edge the social practice as the relevant context for 
OSS development and study rules that might 
depart from universal rules (say, of the Free Soft-
ware movement or commercial software devel-
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opment). In studying OSS development as a het-
erogeneous phenomenon70 that contrasts with 
commercial software development institutions 
(such as software firms and intellectual property 
rules), MacIntyre’s theory offers a way to think 
about motivation with a complementary set of 
assumptions about how and why people act in a 
particular context (see Section 4). This is particu-
larly relevant because of the long-term perspec-
tive on the end result of making a contribution to 
OSS and the unclear rewards associated with 
engaging in other practice-enhancing activities 
(see Shah, 2006). The shift in the conception of 
motivation as primarily reward-oriented (as e.g., 
in self-determination theory) to practice-oriented 
may guide research into answering question 3: 
“Why do developers sustain OSS development?” 
                                                
70 There can be major differences, factions, and guilds 
among OSS developers. As one reviewer helpfully pointed 
out, there is an “XML guild,” for example. Developers 
often campaign for the “right and best” text editor, 
programming language, or software license may be. 
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TOWARD A NEW RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 
AND AGENDA 
The research framework and agenda that we 
present in this section grows out of the incom-
plete match between the nature of OSS devel-
opment and the theoretical underpinnings of 
reviewed literature on motivation to contribute to 
OSS development. OSS development is charac-
terized by significant voluntary contributions, 
self-selection of tasks among developers, clan- 
and self-control, community-type organization, 
and strong ethical considerations. Our review 
identified the dominant role played by self-
determination theory in explaining developers’ 
contributions. However, as we discovered, self-
determination theory cannot account for several 
of the intricacies that characterize the OSS de-
velopment phenomenon. As a result, the domina-
tion of the self-determination perspective that 
runs through the existing motivation literature 
may compromise our field’s ability to adequately 
address the three research questions posed ini-
tially. There is no doubt that self-determination 
theory does provide very valuable guidance and 
answers to many important research questions. 
However, a fundamentally different and com-
plementary approach is required to account for 
gaps we identified; research on motivation in 
OSS development neglected important aspects of 
the social practice as a context for motivation, 
including the ethics and virtues that guide the 
work of engineers and software developers 
(Friedman and Kahn, 1994; Latour, 1999; Mar-
tin, 2000, 2002). In short, people are moved to do 
many things, but whether or not this is consti-
tuted by and for the social practice of OSS devel-
opment, is an entirely different matter. 
In this section, we develop a theoretical frame-
work to explain how virtues and ethics—integral 
elements of a social practice—influence develop-
ers’ motivations to contribute to OSS. Grounded 
in the conceptual building blocks discussed in the 
previous section, we suggest an alternative and 
complementary set of assumptions about the 
individual OSS developer, as outlined in Table 
16. In particular we emphasize a logic of unity of 
life. Following this logic, individuals do not neces-
sarily act to achieve some immediate reward, 
because they want to maximize use-value or gain 
favors (compare this with the self-determination 
view). Instead, they act to achieve unity of life; 
they want to reach or maintain consistency of 
action throughout their life—an ambition that 
values personal development and contextual 
events and points beyond the attainment of spe-
cific and immediate rewards. We use the meta-
phor of the journey to the end of the rainbow to 
describe the idea of unity of life because a quest 
harbors value in itself and can be questioned, 
interpreted, and reconstructed self-referentially. 
The journey might be considered worthwhile, 
exhausting, beautiful, pointless, fulfilling, and 
many other things—but as a journey it follows a 
sequence of events limited by the individual life 
experience and subject to reflection, memory, 
and expectation. In MacIntyre’s terms, human 
lives possess narrative structures because they are 
embedded in social practices (MacIntyre, 1981). 
It is from this link that we draw our framework: 
Individuals are motivated because through par-
ticipatory exposure to social practices, they learn 
what it makes sense to do; and, vice versa, by 
reflecting on the unity of life they shape social 
practices. This interdependence lies at the core of 
MacIntyre’s virtue ethics (MacIntyre, 1998b) as it 
allows for a characterization of the virtues in the 
interplay of individual life and social practice. 
Table 19: Assumptions about the individual OSS developer 
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Following this logic, OSS developers are moti-
vated by a consistent stream of actions that we 
call unity of life. Here, it is not the immediate and 
isolated outcome that matters (the carrot), but 
how the individual subjectively holds outcomes 
and actions to be consistent over time (the jour-
ney toward the end of the rainbow). We contrast 
the alternative set of assumptions with the as-
sumptions observed in the reviewed literature. 
The dominant role of self-determination theory 
informs the logic of what we call the self-
determination view.  
The reviewed literature on OSS development 
motivation has not accounted broadly for the 
insight that social practices strongly relate to peo-
ple’s motivation (Morgeson and Humphrey, 
2006). As a response we suggest a social practice 
view of OSS development, where individuals take 
a long-term, frequently developmental rather 
than situational perspective on social interaction, 
and pay attention to the importance an activity 
assumes for unity of life. Living well, in the Aris-
totelian sense, aims at the right timing of actions, 
attention to particulars, and aesthetic values 
(MacIntyre, 1981; Nussbaum, 1985). The indi-
vidual views actions, outcomes and interactions 
through a “temporal lens” in order to achieve a 
sequence of events that supports a life well lived. 
A good life refers to a moral position that results 
from the accumulation of individual perception 
and more general principles (Nussbaum, 1985, p. 
524). The general principles (standards of excel-
lence are of particular interest here) are shared by 
members of the social practice, and, following 
MacIntyre, the individual gradually adapts stan-
dards of excellence developed in the social prac-
tice, changing the institution to become suppor-
tive rather than constraining, and producing a 
“good” in terms of these standards, rather than a 
product measured in, for example, features or 
hours spent working. To be clear, a good can 
only result from work, effort, and activities car-
ried out in a social practice. Goods are collective 
in production even when only one person carries 
out coding activities, because coding follows 
standards of excellence that are defined by the 
collective, i.e. the social practice. In a social prac-
tice view, the individual’s ideas of quality extend 
beyond use-value—the value for users in resolv-
ing their own technical problem—to account for 
what the social practice values and defines as the 
current state of the art.  
To become an OSS developer means to acquire 
an identity related to a social practice. This 
means, contrary to the self-determination view, 
that an individual does not become an OSS de-
veloper simply by submitting code to a software 
repository. Martin (2002, p. 556) suggests: “These 
(social) practices enter centrally into defining a 
way of life, with technological development enter-
ing even more centrally into the ways of life of 
engineers. (The technologies are parts of or as-
pects of ways of life.)” Identification instills a 
sense of moral obligation in individuals to sup-
port and further develop the social practice. For 
example, a “moral obligation” in OSS is the early 
release of software patches to the public, an inte-
gral part of the social practice of OSS develop-
ment (Raymond, 1999).  
Personal commitment goes beyond commitment 
to the software product or external goods like 
profit but extends to the social practice and its 
broader social effects. From this perspective, OSS 
development embedded in a social practice be-
comes meaningful and a way of life with its own 
pleasure, challenges, and other benefits. Several 
authors have suggested that self-reflection helps 
shape practitioners’ character (Flyvbjerg, 2001; 
Habermas, 1988; MacIntyre, 1981). Once devel-
opers contribute to the social practice, are moti-
vated by it, and reflect on their actions (Calhoun, 
1983), they also gain insights about their values in 
relation to that social practice, for example, 
whether or not the virtues it values fit their own 
personal virtues.  
An orientation toward a sequence of tasks mirrors 
MacIntyre’s idea about the individual’s search for 
a narrative structure in life, which means that the 
sum and choice of our activities form a consistent 
story of our life or the role we see ourselves fulfill-
ing. This can mean that a developer follows a 
quest that extends beyond the next step in a 
workflow or the solution to a specific task and 
accepts high goal ambiguity. Individuals are im-
portant actors who participate in building institu-
tions that structure and govern the social practice 
(Geiger, 2009; Whittington, 2006) and whose 
motivations range widely from seeking auton-
omy, freedom from conventions, creativity, to the 
wish to change their world (Ketchen, Ireland, 
and Snow, 2007; Rindova, Barry, and Ketchen, 
2009).71  
In the social practice view, motivation can be 
directed at the good—which includes, e.g., soft-
                                                
71 Many authors on entrepreneurship therefore understand 
motivation and social practice as inseparable (Steyaert, 
2007, p. 467; see also Schatzki, 2005). 
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ware code produced following standards of excel-
lence defined by the social practice—or at institu-
tional change aimed at supporting the social 
practice. In either case it is not directly (short-
term) reward-oriented but induced through the 
social practice. Hence, motivation in the social 
practice view differs from motivation in the self-
determination view. According to the social prac-
tice view, motivation is intimately linked with a 
developer’s experience of being a member of the 
social practice of OSS. One important result of 
this is that if people sense that the social practices 
they value have become corrupted in some way, 
for example by institutional goals, they often seek 
to change institutions.  
These two views of motivation are complemen-
tary in the study of OSS development. Starting 
with the premise that the social practice view 
accounts for at least some individuals’ behavior, 
the framework’s theoretical conjectures can be 
used to formulate concrete propositions about 
OSS development and contribute to an agenda 
for future work. We begin the next section by 
illustrating this with an account of the emergence 
of the Free Software Foundation.  
On the Emergence of an Institution 
In the 1960s and 1970s much software develop-
ment was carried out by scientists and engineers 
in academic and corporate research laboratories. 
It was a normal part of developers’ social practice 
to give and exchange software they had written, 
in order to modify and build upon each other’s 
software, both individually and collectively, and 
in turn to make their modifications freely avail-
able. Virtues such as the openness to sharing 
knowledge actively and intensely were considered 
important for learning, efficient code develop-
ment, better bug-free products, and, overall, the 
development of the software engineering profes-
sion.  
The emphasis on the virtues of sharing work in 
software development was very strong among a 
group of developers at MIT’s Artificial Intelli-
gence Laboratory during this period (Levy, 1984). 
The first conflicts between the institutional goals 
and the virtues of individuals valued by the social 
practice can be traced back to the 1980s. At this 
time, MIT decided to license some of the code 
created by this group to a commercial firm. In 
accordance with its commercial interests (external 
goods), the firm restricted access to the source 
code for that software to exclude the original 
MIT developers, creating a great deal of frustra-
tion and irritation among them. This incident is a 
good illustration of the kind of conflicts to which 
MacIntyre draws our attention. Whereas soft-
ware developers at the time considered virtues 
such as openness, learning, and knowledge-
sharing a prerequisite for the social practice’s 
creation of internal goods (including product 
excellence, professional development, and bene-
fits for others), they felt institutional concerns for 
the constraint of external goods, which they 
feared would eventually harm the practice. Rich-
ard Stallman, at the time a programmer at MIT’s 
Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, was distressed 
by the institutional pressure to restrict access to 
source code and sell software through licensing. 
He believed it would harm the software engineer-
ing profession and hinder “humanity’s rapidly 
growing need for better and better technologies.” 
Stallman viewed these practices as “morally 
wrong” impingements upon the rights of software 
users to learn and create freely. In his own words, 
faced with the collapse of his community’s social 
practice, he was had to make “a stark moral 
choice”(Stallman, 1999, p. 19):  
With my community gone, to continue as before was im-
possible. … The easy choice was to join the proprietary 
software world, signing non-disclosure agreements and 
promising not to help my fellow hackers. Most likely I 
would also be developing software that was released under 
a non-disclosure agreement, thus adding to the pressure on 
other people to betray their fellows too. I could have made 
money this way, and perhaps amused myself writing code. 
But I knew at the end of my career, I would look back on 
years of building walls to divide people, and I feel I had 
spent my life making the world a worse place ... So I 
looked for a way a programmer could do something for the 
good. I asked myself, was there a program or programs I 
could write so as to make the community possible again? 
Stallman’s response to this challenge was to cre-
ate an institution as an alternative to the firm, 
called the Free Software Foundation. The pur-
pose of the foundation was to preserve free access 
to software developed by people who shared the 
virtues valued by the social practice. The legal 
mechanism he developed to support this idea was 
the GNU General Public License, which can be 
affixed to a piece of software by a developer, and 
which guarantees a number of basic rights to all 
future developers and users. These include the 
right to download for free, study, and modify the 
source code, and the right to redistribute to oth-
ers modified or unmodified versions of the soft-
ware for free. Stallman firmly believed that this 
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license and the new institution of the Free Soft-
ware Foundation would support the social prac-
tice of software development and eventually help 
create excellent products of benefit to society. His 
institutional alternative was created to preserve 
the social practice’s capacity to create internal 
goods alongside external goods pursued by the 
software industry. Later observers refer to Stall-
man’s institutional alternative as a “free software” 
ideology that motivates developers to join and 
contribute to OSS (Stewart and Gosain, 2006). 
However, the origin of this collective action was 
the social practice of software development that 
motivated Stallman to create an institution. To 
paraphrase an insight from MacIntyre’s theory, 
anything that does not promote the public good, 
such as the appropriation of collectively devel-
oped software code, may not be properly re-
garded as social practice.  
An internal good can be a practitioner’s pursuit 
of excellence in software development—it is 
against this backdrop we should understand 
Stallman’s moves. Thus, the new institution of 
free software sprang out of practitioners’ moral 
considerations, and these motives are shaped by 
the social practice of software development. 
Rather than ascribing to the view that the new 
institution originates in an overarching ideology 
that motivates people to act, we conclude that the 
concern for 
product quality, 
work, and the 
wider implica-
tions of Free 
and Open 
Source software 
gives rise to new 
institutions. This 
conclusion dif-
fers from other 
accounts of 
OSS, like 
Moody’s Rebel 
Code (2001), or 
social move-
ments that con-
front the establishment of the software industry 
on ideological grounds (see the discussion of ide-
ology and collective action in von Hippel and von 
Krogh, 2003; Stewart and Gosain, 2006). Finally, 
consistent with the theory we develop, if the insti-
tutions of free and open source software fail to 
support social practices that create internal and 
external goods and enable developers’ pursuit of 
excellence or unity of life, institutional alterna-
tives will emerge that do the job better.  
A social practice view on motivation in OSS 
development and issues for IS research 
In the previous two sections we discussed, first, an 
alternative set of assumptions about individual 
OSS developers and, second, how the emergence 
of new institutions are linked to values central to 
the social practice of OSS development. Based on 
this we now develop a framework that links Mac-
Intyre’s conceptual building blocks with motiva-
tion. In this motivation-practice framework we 
consider OSS development the social practice 
under investigation. Thus, the motivation to con-
tribute to OSS development can be rephrased as 
the motivation to contribute to the social practice 
of OSS development. However, in the MacInty-
rian perspective adopted here, it is not meaning-
ful to think of a social practice absent from insti-
tutions and goods. Strictly, a social practice can-
not exist without producing internal goods; and it 
cannot exist without supporting institutions that 
protect its standards of excellence and enable the 
creation of external goods. Such is the nature of 
the social practice. Rather, a separation of the 
social practice from institutions and goods can 
only be made for purely analytical reasons, a fact 
we shall profit from when theorizing from our 
conceptual building blocks.  
We postulate that individual-level motivation to 
act is directly related to either active participation 
in the social practice or through attempts to 
change the supporting institutions of the social 
practice. Thus, goods (as outcomes and rewards) 
are not directly impacted by motivation. Rather, 
Figure 10: Relationships between motivation and social practice, institution, and goods. 
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the individual is moved by and through the social 
practice to contribute to the good or to change 
the institutions that support the social practice. 
Figure 1 depicts these relationships and shows 
three theoretical conjectures discussed in detail 
below. In its most basic form, the framework 
illustrates that researchers should not implicitly 
assume a single unidirectional link between moti-
vation, action and reward. Thus, using the 
framework researchers can ask questions previ-
ously not considered to belong to the domain of 
motivation. 
The integration of motivation with MacIntyre’s 
conceptual building blocks creates relationships 
that suggest answers to the three questions stated 
at the outset of the paper, in the form of theoreti-
cal conjectures and concrete propositions. Each 
of the three questions corresponds to one of the 
relationships in the framework (numbered in 
Figure 1). Next, we discuss corresponding conjec-
tures and propositions as well as issues for future 
research. 
Theoretical Conjecture One 
Question 1: How and why do OSS developers produce 
high-quality software (goods) when they do? 
Theoretical conjecture 1: OSS developers contribute to the 
production of internal goods (e.g. high-quality software) 
when their actions follow the standards of excellence of the 
social practice. At the same time, the internal good pro-
duced by the social practice impacts on standards of excel-
lence pursued in the social practice.      
Proposition 1: Developers in a social practice create a sense 
of timing and developmental interactions with peers that 
improves the social practice.  
Proposition 2: The software product impacts on the stan-
dards of excellence in OSS development.  
First, quality is an essential element in under-
standing social practices because its members 
learn, internalize, and eventually improve the 
standards of excellence. Developers need to ac-
quire an understanding and appreciation of qual-
ity by participating (for some time) in the social 
practice. In the framework, quality is not globally 
assessed or measured but is understood as inter-
nal to the social practice: it is defined as a charac-
teristic of internal goods that adhere to the stan-
dards of excellence in the social practice. Revisit-
ing the assumptions about the individual devel-
oper, Proposition 1 fits with the observation that 
participation in a social practice requires en-
gagement with the practice’s goals, a develop-
mental understanding of social relations within 
the practice that leads to a broader set of activi-
ties (e.g., including helping behavior, see Lakhani 
and von Hippel, 2003), and an appreciation of 
incentives (their timing and moral and aesthetic 
value) beyond the immediate rewards of an activ-
ity. This is why OSS developers devote consider-
able effort to making code “beautiful,” helping 
other developers to understand and appreciate 
the nature of “beautiful code,” or releasing a new 
version of software at symbolic points in time. 
One OSS project, for example, chooses release 
version numbers that asymptotically approximate 
the number π. 
In addition, Proposition 2 fits with the observa-
tion that OSS developers often receive immediate 
user feedback on installing, systems compatibility, 
bugs, license restrictions, etc. (Lee and Cole, 
2003; Francalanci and Merlo, 2008). When de-
velopers see how the software product performs 
on their own and other users’ computers, or 
compare in efficiency with competing products, 
they may choose to maintain or adjust the stan-
dards of excellence in the social practice, as part 
of learning to practice better. In OSS develop-
ment, software users often communicate directly 
with software developers, exemplifying their in-
tent with code patches. The issue tracker of the 
Firefox web browser, for example, is filled with 
feature requests that are often accompanied with 
source code patches implementing these. 
The theoretical conjecture also entails a research 
agenda: What activities are considered good (e.g., 
code production, training of other developers, 
improving governance structures, or communica-
tion tools)? Collective work also involves mun-
dane tasks that, nevertheless, are taken up volun-
tarily if need be (Shah, 2006). In our perspective, 
what needs to be done to achieve quality is de-
termined collectively by individuals who “hold 
one another accountable to what is at issue and at 
stake in ongoing practices” (Rouse, 2007, p. 54). 
Yet, by which other mechanisms are quality 
standards collectively determined? Furthermore, 
what does the perception of quality, informed by 
standards of excellence, mean for firm-
community collaboration? What are the sources 
of heterogeneity in standards of excellence across 
OSS communities? These two questions are re-
lated because individual contributors (such as the 
representative of a software firm) help define 
standards of excellence in their respective com-
munities. In turn, the quality standards in an 
OSS community might have repercussions within 
firms that participate in collective development. 
The extent to which these repercussions lead to 
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conflict or to fruitful interaction between firms 
and communities is largely unexplored.  
Theoretical Conjecture Two 
Question 2: Why do OSS developers change institutions? 
Theoretical conjecture 2: OSS developers change institu-
tions when and where these institutions no longer protect 
sufficiently the standards of excellence of the social practice. 
In addition, institutions are changed in order to provide 
external goods that support the social practice. 
Proposition 3: Institutions that offer external goods to OSS 
developers (such as firms participating in OSS and hiring 
developers) are judged as supportive or constraining by the 
developers according to the institutions’ adherence to the 
standards of excellence defined in the social practice.  
Proposition 4: Under certain conditions, developers of OSS 
are prepared to sacrifice potential rewards (external goods 
offered by a current institution) in order to make an institu-
tion compatible with the standards of excellence defined by 
the social practice of OSS. 
Second, motivation may trigger institutional 
change. The earlier example of Richard Stall-
man, founding the Free Software Foundation, 
illustrated a form of motivation geared not at 
immediate rewards but at the protection of a 
social practice that achieves internal good. This 
can be labeled “ethical” or “ideological” and 
makes perfect sense when viewed from the per-
spective of the social practice. Institutional 
change was necessary to protect the social prac-
tice from extinction, given that newly formed 
software companies hired away Stallman’s com-
munity of peers and threatened to change radi-
cally the way software was developed. The 
changes Stallman and his peers implemented in 
the way software could be licensed represented 
an institutional change. The license regime regu-
lates the exchange of software among developers. 
The exchange is part of the social practice and 
free exchange is considered good practice in OSS 
development. MacInytre focuses on virtues that 
extend beyond the short-term interests of indi-
viduals giving social practices an enduring char-
acter worthy of analysis in their own rights (see 
also Halliday and Johnsson, 2010). In brief, we 
propose that these enduring characteristics of the 
social practice give rise to institutional change via 
the motivation of developers. 
When institutions, such as firms, cannot sustain 
social practices sought by virtuous software de-
velopers, the latter will seek to change or develop 
new institutions that serve better the internal 
goods of the social practice. Proposition 3 builds 
on the argument that practitioners will judge 
institutions by their adherence to the standards of 
excellence of the social practice because a firm, 
for example, that contributes to OSS develop-
ment engages in the social practice and offers 
external goods (such as salaries and career oppor-
tunities). As an output of institutions, external 
goods need to enable standards of excellence of 
the social practice that the institution supports. 
This could mean that salaries or promotions 
within the firm need to be perceived as fair ac-
cording to the standards of excellence in OSS 
development.  
In the motivation-practice framework, institu-
tions serve the social practice and not the other 
way around. The priority of the social practice 
over institutions implies that individuals will sac-
rifice potential rewards offered by an institution 
(such as a firm hiring OSS developers and offer-
ing a salary) in favor of adhering to standards of 
excellence, as Proposition 4 states. Thus, the 
“good and right thing to do,” according to the 
social practice’s standards of excellence, may be 
to change the institution and risk losing external 
goods in favor of internal goods if standards of 
excellence are threatened, as the example of 
Stallman illustrates. This could mean for a devel-
oper to lobby for policy changes, implement cor-
porate restructuring, or leave a well-paid job in a 
software firm. 
Scholars currently cannot explain when institu-
tional change is called for in more general and 
systematic terms, which opens a number of re-
lated research questions. For example: How are 
conflicts between extrinsic motivation and moral 
obligations resolved when current institutions 
impose a choice between the two (as in Stallman’s 
case)? Under what conditions do the assumptions 
about motivation from the social practice view 
hold and account for institutional change? How 
can organizations accommodate individuals pre-
pared to engage in institutional change in order 
to pursue standards of excellence? And related to 
this, how can organizations drive institutional 
change with the motivation of developers?  
Theoretical Conjecture Three 
Question 3: Why do developers sustain the social practice 
of OSS development?  
Theoretical conjecture 3: OSS developers sustain the social 
practice of OSS development because social practice instills 
the motivation to uphold its standards of excellence over 
time. 
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Proposition 5: The motivation to contribute becomes 
stronger during developers’ tenure in an OSS community 
and by their contribution to the social practice.  
Proposition 6: Through sustained contributions to the 
social practice, developers become motivated to contribute 
beyond code patches to educate and help others, and take on 
tasks that support the internal good of the social practice. 
Third, how does a social practice influence moti-
vation and vice versa? Perhaps surprisingly, this 
question does not appear to be prominent in 
MacIntyre’s work. Virtues are transmitted to 
individuals through socialization and collective 
work and exercised within social practices by 
individuals who choose activities that appear 
right in their life. They choose to sustain practices 
that cultivate internal goods that match their 
individual sense of the common good and the life 
they wish to live. Entry and exit represent the 
dynamics of these individual choices. Organiza-
tions continuously face the entry and exit of indi-
viduals who choose freely how and where to en-
act their profession. It follows from our argument 
that motivations change with the context of the 
social practice. A first entry into a community by 
making a contribution to OSS is motivated dif-
ferently from a sustained contribution to the same 
practice: Shah (2006) observes that mundane 
tasks tend to be accomplished by long-term 
members of communities. This can be inter-
preted, in line with our Propositions 5 and 6, as a 
growing understanding of the internal goods of 
the social practice and a stronger motivation to 
sustain contributions. Developers gradually de-
velop an understanding and appreciation of the 
larger needs of the practice and are motivated to 
contribute to necessary tasks that might appear 
mundane to the outside observer. Tasks such as 
bug fixing, maintenance of software, or helping 
new users are, however, essential for the social 
practice to function and produce high-quality 
software, perhaps understood even better by sea-
soned developers than newcomers. A flourishing 
OSS community succeeds in creating this under-
standing with its members and in motivating 
them to see these activities as core to the produc-
tion of internal goods.  
Future research should uncover more detail 
about mutual influence. The motivation to con-
tribute to a social practice may change in quality 
as well as in direction and open questions relate 
to both possibilities. For example: Could a loss of 
interest in the internal good and subsequent exit 
be triggered by conflicts over incommensurable 
moral premises? The emergence of a proprietary 
software industry, as witnessed by Stallman, 
made him the architect of a new software license 
that regulates the free exchange of software. 
When do competing views of what constitutes a 
good practice jeopardize developers’ long-term 
motivation? Under what conditions does an ini-
tial interest grow or wane over time, given expo-
sure to the social practice, learning, social inter-
action, moral premises, help received, or a sense 
of reciprocity in contributions to OSS?  
One individual’s mark on the social practice may 
turn its course of action or significantly extend its 
standards of excellence. According to the defini-
tion we discussed above, a social practice is co-
herent and complex, two characteristics that 
might be explained by the content of the work 
and the history of the internal discussions of de-
velopers about the good it achieves. However, the 
social practice depends on individuals who carry 
it forward, understand its complex history and 
possibly incoherent tendencies, and correct and 
sustain the social practice going forward. This is 
easier said than done. So far, research on OSS 
has not contributed much to the understanding of 
individual motivation beyond the contribution of 
code itself, which raises a number of future re-
search questions. For example: Why do individu-
als found new or fork (split up) existing OSS 
communities? Why do we observe a wide hetero-
geneity of communities and philosophies within 
OSS (Himanen, 2001; Moody, 2001)? There are, 
for example, distinct differences in ideology and 
values between pragmatic OSS enthusiasts and 
the Free Software Foundation (Stewart and Go-
sain, 2006). The wealth of licenses and ap-
proaches to similar problems calls for more re-
search on why individuals choose different paths 
and subtle changes over the established wisdom 
found in some social practice (developers are 
motivated to build institutions, not only code). 
Given the chance, OSS developers may diverge, 
follow their own ideas, and realize similar if not 
identical solutions in different ways. Thus, what 
are the proper time intervals to study motivation 
if one is to consider motivation in which develop-
ers seek unity of life? Another interesting topic 
worth exploring is the differences between paid 
and unpaid developers. In the motivation-
practice framework, paid developers partly re-
ceive monetary compensation provided by insti-
tutions, whereas unpaid developers need to seek 
other means of compensation. Future research 
could, for example, explore relationships between 
monetary compensation and behavior within the 
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social practice in order to identify potential 
threats to the sustenance of the social practice, 
beyond the contributions of individual develop-
ers. Finally, our review of motivation to contrib-
ute to OSS reveals a bias toward assumptions 
originating in self-determination theory, and 
prompts the development of a complimentary set 
of assumptions that we associate with a social 
practice view, building on the theory of MacIn-
tyre. The assumptions underlying the social prac-
tice view raise the empirical question of the actual 
distribution of motivation types in a population. 
Future research may study the distribution of the 
two “ideal types” of individual in a distribution of 
OSS developers.72  
                                                
72 Methodologically, this could be done analogously to the 
study of social preferences in behavioral economics—for 
example, as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) have done in their 
experimental studies to determine the distribution of 
inequity-averse individuals in a population of students. 
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CONCLUSION 
The objective of this paper is to provide a state-
of-the-art review of the study of motivation to 
contribute to OSS development, and reinvigorate 
the research field by providing a new theoretical 
framework with propositions. We identify a large 
body of work examining types of motivation that 
lead developers to contribute their time and effort 
to the development of OSS. However, we argue 
that both the antecedents and consequences of 
motivation are more extensive and complex than 
the present level of theorizing and empirical re-
search has suggested.  
OSS development differs from conventional 
software development along three dimensions, 
incentives, control and coordination mechanisms, 
which in turn are reflective of a distinct social 
practice in which ethics plays a central role. Be-
cause of these differences, we argued that indi-
vidual motivation should not be looked at in iso-
lation. Instead, scholars should expand theory 
building and research to cover the interplay with 
institutions, goods, and the social practice. Fol-
lowing a trend to explore the role of social prac-
tices in the IS field (Kellogg et al., 2006; Or-
likowski, 2000), and the social sciences more gen-
erally (Schatzki, 2005), we develop a theoretical 
framework around the conceptual building blocks 
of social practice, institutions, and goods. This 
new motivation-practice framework is based on 
the theory of Alisdair MacIntyre (MacIntyre, 
1998b, 1981) and includes ethical considerations 
of social practice. The framework’s set of theo-
retical conjectures and accompanying proposi-
tions provide answers to the three questions iden-
tified in the beginning of the paper and point to 
future research opportunities.  
 While the main contribution of the paper is the 
new motivation-practice framework, we also (a) 
formulate implications for IS management, (b) 
discuss the relationship between institutional 
change and social practice, and (c) tie implica-
tions from the framework back to the self-
determination perspective in motivation studies.  
Several implications for IS management can be 
extracted. First, standards of excellence emerging 
in global communities of software developers can 
gain broad endorsement and impact quality 
standards expected by users and customers. For 
example, peer review and quick feedback loops in 
OSS are said to lead to better quality. Installing a 
culture of “doing things properly,” rather than 
quickly hacking around bugs may ultimately re-
sult in better code quality. Finally, established 
tools developed for and within OSS can be em-
ployed by any software development project. 
Hence, close observation of the standards of ex-
cellence that characterize OSS development may 
pay off also for software firms that do not actively 
participate in OSS development.  
Second, software developers collectively account 
for and evolve the virtues in social practice. Mac-
Intyre (1981) refers to the social practice as a 
“school of virtue,” because individual learning is 
shaped by and informs the collective appropriate 
conduct regarding ways of developing software. 
Participating in OSS development could thus 
provide a valuable training ground for software 
engineers, in so far as the firm sees fit and is pre-
pared to comply with the ethical considerations 
in the social practice. In this regard, the new 
framework informs managers about the relation-
ship between OSS and proprietary software de-
velopment. OSS does not necessarily exist in 
competition to proprietary software, but rather 
complements it; it secures the social practices 
through which certain standards of excellence in 
software development can be further nurtured. 
Software firms are actively looking for developers 
who have “cut their teeth” in OSS communities; 
firms such as Intel or Red Hat recruit developers 
whose skills and standards of excellence stand 
out. 
Third, as shown in the framework, incommen-
surable moral premises may collide within a firm 
when developers adhere to different traditions yet 
collaborate on the same projects. In a social prac-
tice perspective, one may identify and preemp-
tively solve looming conflicts over technology, 
standards, rules, and routines in software firms. 
However, the activity of software development 
often builds on and refers to earlier work and 
developers and the firms they represent may be 
held accountable by other OSS developers for 
the work they submit to OSS projects. Questions 
of compatibility and compliance with OSS devel-
opment play an increasingly important role for 
those firms that develop both proprietary and 
open source software.  
Fourth, a related issue is that the use of incentives 
and control in software firms may need careful 
tailoring to fit with developers’ motivations to 
contribute to OSS development. Monetary in-
centives are of course compatible with OSS de-
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velopment (Roberts et al., 2006), but social prac-
tices can instill loyalty and lead to motivation for 
institutional changes that perhaps question the 
efficiency of such incentives (Figure 1).  
Fifth, developers can be motivated to change 
institutions in order to support their practices. 
This may apply to firms, too. For example, IBM 
founded the non-profit Eclipse foundation as a 
neutral steward for technology that IBM had 
initially developed, and created formal member-
ship roles in which IBM was only one among 
equals, in order to facilitate external contribu-
tions of other firms and individuals. Intel and 
Oracle have founded institutions such as the 
Open Innovation Network, which grants mutual 
licenses and a non-litigation agreement for cer-
tain OSS technologies to all of its members. 
The theoretical framework developed here also 
opens up a new view on the relationship between 
institutional change and social practices. Other 
perspectives on the emergence of institutions (see 
Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2006, for a review) 
argue convincingly that the struggle between 
factions and social movements brings about 
change and institutional innovation. However, 
framing and political struggles may capture nei-
ther the full diversity of people’s motivations to 
contribute nor the role technology might play in 
this process. As the case of the Free Software 
Foundation demonstrates, notions of quality that 
drive social practice to generate and maintain its 
standards of excellence can be powerful forces for 
change. These views are compatible, in that a 
social practice of OSS development can become 
a social movement (Hertel et al., 2003; von Hip-
pel and von Krogh, 2003). They are also com-
plementary, in that collective action emphasizes 
the “struggle over meanings of new issues and 
technologies” (Hargrave and Van de Ven, 2006, 
p. 884) across social movements, whereas social 
practice focuses on the quest for higher quality 
products, more profound knowledge, and im-
proved collaboration in creating internal goods.  
Collectively, we have merely begun to scratch the 
surface of a full exploration of developers’ moti-
vations for contributing to OSS development. 
There are vast research opportunities in all areas 
covered in this theory and review piece. The 
motivations across OSS projects could, for exam-
ple, be investigated productively using self-
determination theory. Three topics in particular 
could stimulate interesting research from a self-
determination perspective. First, future research 
can incorporate ethical considerations in self-
determination models, since ethics is integral to 
the OSS phenomenon per se. Self-determination 
theory would suggest the existence of both intrin-
sic and extrinsic ethical motives. Disentangling 
these ethical motives and linking them to types 
and levels of involvement would be an important 
contribution. The motivation-practice frame-
work, in turn, suggests that ethical considerations 
are geared toward the virtues and standards of 
excellences of the social practice. For example, 
self-determination research could fruitfully ex-
plore how developers are intrinsically motivated 
toward maintaining standards of excellence. 
Again, the motivation-practice framework is 
complementary since it explains how standards of 
excellence are formed collectively through active 
participation in the social practice over time.  
Second, our argument that social practice moves 
individuals to act may inform future applications 
of self-determination theory in two ways. Ethical 
considerations may not only directly motivate 
individuals to act, but also condition what is self-
determined. Cultural analysis in social sciences 
recently shifted to treating culture “as constitutive 
of a wide range of social processes rather than a 
regulative that works against other forces, such as 
interests or rationality” (Weber and Dacin, 2011: 
287; see also Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006). 
Motivation studies using self-determination the-
ory should explore if and to what extent a contex-
tual and cultural substrate impacts the confines of 
what individuals experience as self-determined 
action. Further, the social practice perspective 
suggests a carefully paced integration of temporal 
aspects to context when designing studies using 
self-determination theory. In other words, the 
perspective points to potential changes in motiva-
tion over time triggered by exposure to and inte-
gration in a specific context. Self-determination 
models in the reviewed literature treated context 
as exogenous and static and thus not accountable 
for motivational dynamics. For example, self-
determination research could investigate motiva-
tional differences between groups of developers 
with different lengths and types of contextual 
exposure to OSS projects.  
Third, the understanding of how OSS institutions 
(e.g., standards, licenses, governance, copyright 
and IP assignments) and supporting umbrella 
organizations relate to developers’ self-
determined motivations is only beginning to 
emerge and many questions remain unanswered. 
With the growth of social networking sites and 
online communities (Wiertz and de Ruyter, 2007; 
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Wasko and Faraj, 2005) countless other practi-
tioners apart from software developers rely on 
volunteer contributions and institutions such as 
open content licenses. Obviously, motivation 
research on the OSS phenomenon may inform 
research designs in other domains, and vice 
versa. 
To conclude, while there is ample room to inves-
tigate motivation in OSS from a multitude of 
perspectives and methodological approaches, we 
believe the greatest research opportunities lie in 
those questions found at the intersection between 
social practices and institutions, against which 
individual motivations can and should be under-
stood. Figuring out what moves people, we 
should start with the assertion that people’s pur-
suit of visible carrots is at times interrupted by the 
larger quest for the invisible gold at the end of the 
rainbow. 
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INTRODUCTION
In a recent MIT Sloan Management Review 
article, Bernoff and Li (2008) suggested “People 
are connecting with one another in increasing 
numbers, thanks to blogs, social networking sites 
like MySpace and countless communities across 
the Web. Some companies are learning to turn 
this growing groundswell to their advantage.” 
With close to one billion73 people connected to 
the Internet, firms not only face unprecedented 
opportunities but also considerable threats in 
such a digital economy. Numerous firms have set 
up “virtual communities,” a term coined by 
Rheingold (1993). These communities are, mostly 
but not exclusively, online spaces in which cus-
tomers and non-customers can interact with the 
firm and each other. Porter (2004) defines virtual 
communities as an “aggregation of individuals or 
business partners who interact around a shared 
interest, where the interaction is at least partially 
supported and/or mediated by technology and 
guided by some protocols or norms.” (see also 
Porter and Donthu, 2008). 
Virtual communities can have a positive impact 
on firm performance. According to one study, 
revenues have increased more than 50% for some 
firms (Algesheimer and Dholakia, 2006) that have 
managed these communities well. In addition 
members of virtual communities remain twice as 
loyal to and buy almost twice as often from the 
sponsoring firm. Armstrong and Hagel (1996) 
found that “companies that create strong online 
communities will command customer loyalty to a 
degree hitherto undreamed of and, consequently, 
will generate strong economic returns”. In addi-
tion, virtual communities can shift bargaining 
power from suppliers to customers (Kozinets, 
1999); spread positive word-of-mouth (Dholakia, 
Bagozzi and Pearo, 2004); help firms learn from 
customers (Kardaras, et al., 2003); increase web-
site traffic (Hagel and Armstrong, 1997); raise 
entry barriers for competitors (Hagel and Arm-
strong, 1997); facilitate product development 
efforts (Nambisan, 2002); and increase customer 
satisfaction and loyalty (Shankar, et al., 2003). 
Recently, social network sites caught the atten-
tion of users, firms, and researchers (Boyd and 
Ellison, 2007). Sometimes labeled “Web 2.0” 
                                                
73 Source: 
http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=2698 
coined by Tim O'Reilly74, social network sites 
(SNS) emphasize member profiles and direct 
interaction and links between members, provide 
content ratings, and enable rating behavior (de 
Valck et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2008; Pascu et al., 
2007). “Modding” (derived from “moderation”) 
refers to a type of trust rating that “allows mem-
bers […] to evaluate other users’ reviews with 
numerical ratings” (Kim et al., 2008: 532). Mod-
ding is a direct feedback mechanism between 
community members.  
Both streams of research on virtual communities 
and social network sites belong to the field of 
computer-mediated communication. The combi-
nation of features within one online environment 
triggered new forms of behavior that warrant 
analysis. If virtual communities make use of SNS 
features the combination results in a new type of 
virtual community that cannot easily be under-
stood by the frameworks used to classify virtual 
communities (Porter, 2004).  
A virtual community that makes use of social 
software features may be organization sponsored, 
yet dominated by direct interaction among com-
munity members, hence, social and at the same 
time commercial. SNS features offer communica-
tion structures that make member-to-member 
communication easier and more frequent. Mod-
erated communication makes members become 
more socially embedded in the virtual community 
(de Valck et al., 2007; Algesheimer et al., 2005). 
The availability of new communication structures 
that allow direct feedback on contributions calls 
for research exploring rating behavior. Specifi-
cally, modding of member comments by other 
members extends the communication options 
usually associated with virtual communities and 
call for more research on mass communication in 
virtual communities (Schoberth et al., 2006). 
Schoberth and colleagues (2006) found, among 
other things, heterogeneity in community partici-
pants' activities. Scholars have also called for 
more quantitative research using behavioral data 
from virtual communities (de Valck et al., 2007; 
Casalo et al., 2008). Thus, we ask: how do mem-
bers of a virtual community make use of mod-
ding? 
                                                
74 For more details: 
http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/oreilly/tim/news/200
5/09/30/what-is-web-20.html 
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METHODOLOGY
We conducted a large quantitative study on the 
virtual community of Rooster Teeth Productions, 
a Machinima Production company creating and 
publishing animated videos made in computer 
games. We present the sample case as well as 
data gathering and analysis in this section. 
2.1 Sample Case 
Producing animated videos was previously re-
stricted to media professionals because of the 
high cost of software packages. These restrictions 
led innovative users to produce animated shorts 
with computer games by using the underlying 3D 
render technology thus creating Machinima. 
Game engines were relatively cheap compared to 
traditional production tools. In addition, most of 
the in-game assets like characters and landscapes 
were already at hand, which reduced the overall 
production time for an animated movie signifi-
cantly. 
Rooster Teeth Productions is one of the most 
successful Machinima companies (von Krogh et 
al., 2009). They sell sponsorship subscriptions, 
merchandising, and DVDs and reach a large user 
community. The latter, in fact, was triggered 
early on when Rooster Teeth introduced an 
elaborate community platform offering SNS fea-
tures: 
“… well, I think a lot of it has to do with the 
fact that the community site that we have made 
… or at least at the time we made it … had fea-
tures that weren’t that present in other places, we 
were a little ahead of the curve at that time, and 
so there were a lot of cool features that people were 
interested in. This is like before MySpace really 
had taken off … So we’ve always tried to give it 
a little functionality, things they do in a commu-
nity website they’re interested in making … you 
know, interested in being a part of it. We tried to 
make the website almost like a game.” Geoff 
Ramsey, Rooster Teeth Productions 
Rooster Teeth Productions was founded in 2003 
by Burnie Burns, Matt Hullum, Geoff Ramsey, 
Jason Saldaña, and Gus Sorola in Austin, Texas. 
Their first and most widely known Machinima 
production was Red vs. Blue (RvB), a show fea-
turing two teams of soldiers in the game Halo 
who are stationed in an isolated canyon where 
their sole purpose is to fight each other. The 
popularity of the show that first aired April 1st, 
2003 profited from the humorous dialogues be-
tween the different characters. While the comedy 
was first aimed at other gamers, a broad audience 
swiftly appreciated RvB. To date, Rooster Teeth 
has released five seasons of RvB ‘The Blood 
Gulch Chronicles,’ and one season of RvB ‘Re-
construction’ comprising 20 to 25 episodes each 
as well as several spin-off mini-series. Over the 
years, shooting the movies has advanced from the 
game Halo 1 on the xBox to the latest release 
Halo 3 running on xBox 360 with overwhelming 
new possibilities in graphics and artistic composi-
tion. In addition, most of their merchandising 
articles were related to RvB, which remained the 
flagship show. Apart from RvB, Rooster Teeth 
produced several other shows including ‘The 
Strangerhood’, ‘P.A.N.I.C.S.’, or ‘1-800-Magic’, 
using different game engines to shoot the films.  
Each series had its own website on which the 
videos were shown, important announcements 
from Rooster Teeth staff members published, 
and where fans discussed topics around the show. 
The discussion took place where the videos were 
viewed – especially while viewers waited for the 
download to finish or directly after watching vid-
eos online. Users did not have to actively go to a 
website to express their thoughts about the prod-
uct as is the case with most websites of communi-
ties of consumption.  
Due to a steadily growing fan base, over the last 
four years the segment of the RvB community 
actively contributing to discussions grew to 
42,000 members who posted more than 400,000 
comments on 165 episodes. Members could 
choose their level of engagement. They could be 
mere “consumers” who just watched the videos 
and/or bought merchandising products without 
interacting, or they could interact with other 
community members. The Rooster Teeth com-
munity cannot be neatly classified as either VC or 
SNS since different users engaged differently. 
With 16% of all members, the 18 year olds repre-
sented the largest group (see figure 10). The aver-
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age age of members was 21 years with a standard 
deviation of eight years. The age distribution was 
biased and positively skewed by the fact that 
members who didn’t enter any age were listed as 
zero, and that few members who apparently en-
tered the maximum age of 88 years. 93% of the 
members were under 30 and the bulk was either 
in high school or college-age.  
Tracing the amount of members over four years, 
we found that the community had been growing 
at different speeds, but steadily in volume in a 
nearly linear fashion (r square= 0.95). There 
were four visible gaps in signups, which were 
located in the first two years of its existence with 
the longest gap lasting for two weeks (see figure 
2). 
The amount of comments per episode varied 
from a minimum of 58 to a maximum of more 
than 28,000 with an average of 2,400 comments 
per video (Figure 12). Five 
different sections could be 
identified with a strong cyclic-
ity given that the amount of 
comments increased notably 
during seasons: Section 1 
represents the comments to 
Season 1 and 2 that were 
aired on a former version of 
the Rooster Teeth community 
website. Those comments 
were not migrated to the new 
and more elaborate software 
infrastructure and therefore 
the amount of comments was 
low in section 1. Section 2 
followed the launch of the 
new website before Season 3 
leading to a steep increase 
in comments eventually 
coming to a slowdown 
after the end of the season. 
Section 3 was the most 
commented section ever 
covering Season 4. Half of 
the total comments-
population was found in 
this section. This finding 
does not imply that all 
comments were made dur-
ing Season 4 since it was 
possible to comment 4 and 
5 covering Season 5 and 
the start of RvB ‘Recon-
struction’ respectively con-
tain again relatively little commented products. 
The basic units of analysis were the RvB-related 
comments made by members and the mod-points 
associated with the comments. These were dis-
played chronologically below the corresponding 
video similar to YouTube with the difference that 
the comments in our case were ordered by as-
cending post date (i.e. the oldest post was dis-
played first). All comments and the associated 
mod-points were publicly accessible. In order to 
leave a comment one had to be signed in as 
community member. Member accounts were free 
of charge and did not have to be activated by a 
moderator or an administrator. Hence, members 
were able to sign up at any time and start posting.  
Comment modding is the act of rating another 
member’s comment(s). Synonyms are ‘rating’, 
‘giving mod-points’ or simply ‘modding’. In the 
Rooster Teeth community each modding of a 
Figure 11: Age distribution of members commenting on Red vs. Blue 
Figure 12: Accumulated daily sign-ups of members over the last four years. 
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comment consists of a combination of two values: 
a numerical value and a qualitative rating. The 
numerical value is either ‘+1’ or ‘-1’. Each nu-
merical value has to be combined with one of 
four qualitative ratings from which users can 
choose in a drop down menu. The four qualita-
tive ratings corresponding to ‘+1’ are ‘Cool, 
Ditto, Funny and Zing!75’. The four qualitative 
ratings corresponding to ‘-1’ are ‘WTF76, Lame, 
Flamebait77 and Noob78’. Mod points could only 
be given once per user and per comment. A user 
who has one account can mod each comment by 
another user only once. The mod is then publicly 
displayed next to the comment. 
                                                
75 Three possible definitions for our purpose: 1) New term 
for “owned”, said after saying something witty to someone 
in an insulting manner. 2) If someone makes an absolutely 
awful joke, or says something completely random or 
pointless. One member of the group may "zing" them. 3) 
A noise made when a person, place, or thing is 
discriminated against in a humorous manner. Source: 
www.urbandictionary.com 
76 Internet slang acronym for “What the fuck?” 
77 A message posted to a public Internet discussion group, 
such as a forum, newsgroup or mailing list, with the intent 
of provoking an angry response (a "flame") or argument 
over a topic the troll often has no real interest in. Source: 
www.wikipedia.org 
78 Short for “Newbie”. A slang term for a newcomer to 
online gaming or an Internet activity. Source: 
www.wikipedia.org 
2.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
For the purpose of the quantitative data analysis, 
we built up a database dedicated to the case un-
der study. All available data from the Rooster 
Teeth RvB website concerning the episodes, the 
members, and the comments was automatically 
fetched during a three-day period from Septem-
ber 20th to September 22nd, 2008 and transferred 
to a local MySQL database for further analysis. 
To be granted full access to all the data, we ob-
tained a sponsorship account. After screening and 
evaluating the data, we discovered some missing 
data sets that had been left out due to server 
maintenance by Rooster Teeth. For this, we ob-
tained the missing data sets on October 2nd. All 
data entries in the local database indicate their 
fetch time stamp to check for possible inconsis-
tency. We rebuilt the relational database struc-
ture of the original website using a separate table 
for episodes, members, and comments which 
were linked by their dataset identification num-
ber ‘id’ that remained the same as the online 
PHP web queries. 
We fetched a total of 42,771 member accounts 
and 483,272 comments with their corresponding 
information. Out of all 737,000 registered 
Rooster Teeth community members79, only those 
                                                
79 http://rvb.roosterteeth.com/members/stats/ 
Figure 13: Comments per video. Episodes ordered chronologically. 
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who at least commented once on a video of RvB 
were considered. Cleaning the fetched data sets 
from invalid information (either comments which 
link to a NULL member id or comments which 
link to empty member profiles) left us with 
406,173 comments and 41,016 user profiles (see 
Table 17).  
SPSS, Excel and the phpMyAdmin interface of 
the local server were used for the quantitative 
data analysis. 
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RESULTS
Almost half of all members posted at least one 
comment, which has been modded, but only 
15% of all comments were modded (see Table 
17). One possible explanation could be informa-
tion overload (de Valck et al., 2007). Members 
cannot browse the overwhelming amounts of 
comments that are posted. Observing modding 
behavior in more detail, we find that 60% of the 
modded comments obtained positive values (cu-
mulated mod rating > 0), 36% obtained negative 
values (cumulated mod rating < 0), and for 4% of 
the comments the mods evened out (cumulated 
mod rating = 0). The fact that 60% of all com-
ments carried a positive rating, with “Cool” being 
the predominant rating class, showed that mem-
bers generally tended to give friendly mods. 
Next, casual observation suggested that modding 
behavior centered around early comments. We 
analyzed the attention different comments re-
ceived based on their position in the comments 
thread (see Figure 13). This position corre-
sponded to the time the comment had been 
posted in ascending order i.e. the comment that 
was posted first is at position 1, second at position 
2, and so forth. Post numbers are displayed on 
the x-coordinate. For the y-coordinate we defined 
and calculated a ranking variable. We summed 
[0 to 36,921] the absolute values [0 to 2,920] of 
all mod points given to comments which share 
the same position (post number) [1 to 32,780]1 
and divided this value by the amount of modded 
comments [1 to 165]80 per position. We thus 
calculated the average mod points per comment 
position. In effect, we used the absolute mod 
value for a better representation of the attention a 
comment received, than the net value.  
We then ordered this quotient by descending 
value, i.e. starting with the highest value in order 
to receive a non-scaled ranking. For example, the 
data point at y=1 is calculated as follows: We 
considered all comments with post number 1. 
Since all 165 videos were commented at least 
once, 165 comments resulted. Some of these 
comments appeared to have invalid data base 
entries on the website. After pruning those, we 
were left with 147 valid comments. Out of these 
147 comments we only examined those that were 
modded. In post number 1, all 147 were modded. 
We then summarized 147 absolute mod values, 
and divided the sum by 147, resulting in 
36,921/147= 251. Repeating this procedure for 
all comments that were posted second (position 2) 
we get 107 respectively. Next, we ordered the 
quotients by descending value and displayed 
them as ranking. Thus, the y-axis represents the 
‘attention’ or the valuation (negative or positive) 
members accorded a comment where 1 is the top 
rank with the highest attention. 
                                                
80 The maximum amount of 165 videos that could be 
commented on limited this number. 
Table 20: General statistics for modding behavior in the Rooster Teeth online community. 
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The results show that the first comments on each 
video received on average more (absolute) mod 
points than the respective subsequent comments. 
This holds true to a certain comment position 
from which on the data points be-
come scattered. A threshold seems to 
appear around post number 50. The 
relationship between the post number 
of a comment, that is its position, and 
the mod value it received on average 
was positive and statistically signifi-
cant (beta(14665) = 0.578 ; p ≤ 0.01).  
 
 
 
Figure 14: Relationship between the order 
in which comments were posted 
(ascending) and the rank based on the 
average (absolute) mod value the 
respective comment received (ascending: 
average to rank inversely proportional): 
both scales were logged. 
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DISCUSSION
This exploratory study of modding behavior in a 
virtual community revealed three findings that 
open up for future research. First, just under half 
of the community members received mods on 
their contributions, while the other half did not 
received mods. Looking at the entire volume of 
comments, only 15% were modded. Second, the 
community studied leaned towards ‘positive 
modding’, with 60% of all mods being positive. 
Third, the time and location of a comment mat-
tered strongly for the likelihood that it would be 
modded. Comments that appeared early after the 
release of a new product and appeared on the 
first two pages of comments, received dispropor-
tionately high amounts of mod-points. After ap-
proximately 50 contributions, the direct link be-
tween the position and the rank of mod-points 
weakened.  
These findings warrant further research on vir-
tual communities with SNS features in three ar-
eas: individual behavior, collective behavior, and 
community structures. First, roughly half of the 
community members never receive mods on their 
comments. The behavior does not seem to catch 
on throughout the member base. The extension 
to mass communication in virtual communities 
provided by modding seems to be used unevenly. 
Hence our results extend the findings of 
Schoberth and colleagues (2006) on heterogene-
ous communication behavior in online communi-
ties. Future research should analyze the factors 
that explain this behavior. Is modding considered 
to be costly, either in giving or in receiving? Is 
modding contested? Do member demographics 
explain modding behavior? Further, how does 
modding impact on contributions? Do members 
who received negative mods learn or change their 
behavior? Do positive mods (or mods at all) in-
duce participation? 
Second, we observed a friendly community who 
distributed more positive than negative mods. 
This result may impact on community growth, 
the willingness of members to contribute, and 
ultimately, consumer behavior. The result could 
support the idea that mods express trust rather 
than distrust or disapproval (Kim et al., 2008). 
What explains this bias? How does this finding 
compare to other communities’ behavior? Can 
communities that lean towards offensive behavior 
be sustained? Also, researchers should conduct 
longitudinal studies of posting and modding be-
havior in order to identify changes in community 
behavior over time. 
Third, comments that appeared early and high 
up in the (chronological) list of comments re-
ceived disproportionately more mods than subse-
quent, less visible comments. A first interpreta-
tion suggests that community members may suf-
fer from information overload and pay far less 
attention to later comments than to early com-
ments. This finding raise doubts regarding the 
high expectations by some authors attached to 
modding and rating systems as quality signaling 
or filtering tools (Deng et al., 2008; Yang et al., 
2009). Should the timing and position of a com-
ment matter more than its quality in predicting 
the number of mods received, the modding sys-
tem may be of little use to managers, marketing 
experts, and users of virtual communities. How-
ever, this issue needs much more investigation in 
future studies. We observed that after a certain 
threshold the post number did not predict the 
number of aggregate mods received. This calls 
for a refined analysis across multiple contexts and 
communication structures. Is it important that 
the first page contains 30 comments? Does the 
chronological order matter or could it be re-
versed and produce the same pattern? 
Managers of virtual communities and social net-
work sites may take away three insights from our 
study. First, virtual communities gain significantly 
new characteristics by adopting features associ-
ated with social network sites. Managers may 
think of more effective ways of distinguishing 
communities, possibly based on posting or mod-
ding behavior by members. The case of Rooster 
Teeth Production provides evidence as to the 
successful combination of product feedback and 
social network site features. Community mem-
bers comment on a firm’s products when they are 
released. They evaluate each other’s comments 
and make use of the social infrastructure pro-
vided. Second, the modding behavior confirmed 
the impression of a friendly community. While 
this is only a first, preliminary finding it shows 
that the option of modding other community 
members’ contributions was being used in a ‘pro-
ductive and supportive manner’. In general social 
network site features could be meaningful exten-
sions to existing virtual communities. Third, fil-
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tering valuable comments with the use of mem-
ber-based modding tools may not be a simple 
matter. Our results show that only after about 50 
comments the mods received started to deviate 
from the comment number as received chrono-
logically. This may mean that after the first rush 
by people to make their comments visible, per-
haps later mods may signal high-quality com-
ments. 
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Purpose – Communities of practice (CoPs) have been found to support knowledge creation by 
enabling knowledge sharing among experts in firms. However, some perform better than oth-
ers. This paper seeks to explore what incentivizes employees to share knowledge in intra-firm 
CoPs. Design/methodology/approach – The paper presents a longitudinal case study in a 
large automotive company that introduced 82 cross-functional CoPs into its engineering de-
partment. Using extensive qualitative data, two sets of communities: best and worst performing 
were analyzed. 
Findings – It was found that perceived benefits and the employees’ willingness to invest indi-
vidual efforts into community work are stronger in better performing communities. Members 
of the better performing CoPs drew most benefits from participating in organizational decision 
processes, as they were able to influence the agenda and create relevant standards. The pat-
terns observed relate to the efforts, benefits, and barriers of community work. 
Research limitations/implications – The single case study design limits the generalizability of 
the results beyond the company studied. Furthermore, some of the data employed were per-
ceptional and relied partly on self-reporting of the community members. 
Practical implications – The paper argues that management support for CoPs should aim at in-
fluencing the individual cost-benefit calculus of community members. Respecting and imple-
menting results from the communities’ work is likely to provide the very basis for innovations 
to emerge at all. Originality/value – Other than extant studies on CoP performance that focus 
on company benefits from deploying CoPs, this paper offers a new perspective by exploring the 
benefits and incentives available to community members. 
Keywords Knowledge management, Performance management  
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INTRODUCTION
Motivating employees to participate in intra-firm 
knowledge sharing activities is notoriously diffi-
cult because it depends on their willingness to 
voluntarily share their experiences and insights 
(von Krogh et al., 2000; Wenger, 2000; Kogut 
and Zander, 1996; von Hippel, 1998; Hildreth 
and Kimble, 2000). Top management faces the 
challenge that it can allocate employees to 
knowledge sharing activities, it can assign them to 
dedicated projects and communities of practice 
and order them to contribute their knowledge to 
the organization, but valuable contributions can 
not be forced (Borzillo, 2009). Remedies sug-
gested in the literature include bonuses tied to 
knowledge contributions (Huber, 1991), care (von 
Krogh, 1998), a sequential process detailing every 
step of knowledge transfer (Szulanski, 2000), in-
formal socializing opportunities (Nonaka, 1994), 
team building activities (Huber, 1991), or, nota-
bly, the establishment of communities of practice 
(Brown and Duguid, 2001; Lesser and Storck, 
2001). 
Communities of practice have been found to 
support knowledge creation by enabling knowl-
edge sharing among experts in firms (Kodama, 
2007; Brown and Duguid, 2001; Wenger, 2000; 
von Krogh, 2003; for a critical review see Amin 
and Roberts, 2008). They are ‘‘groups of people 
informally bound together by shared experience 
and passion for a joint enterprise’’ (Wenger and 
Snyder, 2000, p. 139). Communities of practice 
exhibit three fundamental charcteristics which 
Wenger (2004) describes as domain, community 
and practice. The domain is the area of knowl-
edge which community members which to ex-
plore. The community is formed by the people to 
whom this knowledge domain is relevant and 
who interact and develop relationships enabling 
them to address issues and share knowledge. The 
practice is defined as ‘‘the body of knowledge, 
methods, tools, stories, cases, documents which 
the members share and develop together.’’ (Wen-
ger, 2004, p. 3).Communities of practice substan-
tially differ from formal teams concerning pur-
pose, membership, commitment and lifespan: 
they develop around a common topic domain 
that is self defined instead of preset by manage-
ment, membership in communities is self-selected 
instead of assigned, commitment arises from a 
common passion for a topic instead of formal job 
requirements or project objectives and the 
lifespan of communities depends from the interest 
of the members in the topic rather than form 
reorganizations or project completion (Wenger 
and Snyder, 2000, p. 142). Communities of prac-
tice provide the organization with an enabling 
context that allows for individual and group 
learning in knowledge sharing processes (Lave, 
1988; Wenger, 1999; Wenger and Snyder, 2000; 
Lave and Wenger, 1991). They enable the im-
provement and transformation of the practices 
they are centred on (Berends et al., 2007) because 
they constitute the perfect context for informal 
knowledge sharing among experts: Anderson et 
al. (2001) demonstrate in their case study that 
when seeking for information, aerospace engi-
neers prefer informal communication with spe-
cialists who have closely related interests. 
However, the question remains what incentivizes 
employees to share their experiences in intra-firm 
communities of practice. To answer this question, 
the authors conducted a longitudinal case study 
in a large automotive company that introduced 
cross-functional communities of practice into its 
engineering department. A total of 82 communi-
ties of practice were examined over a period of 
two years. It was found that, the organizational 
context being equal, some communities per-
formed significantly better than others. The lit-
erature on communities of practice and organiza-
tional learning did not help us distinguish be-
tween performance differences across communi-
ties as it highlights the voluntary aspirations of 
community members to learn together for solving 
problems related to own work as the driving force 
for engagement in the community (Wenger and 
Snyder, 2000; Thompson, 2005; Brown and 
Duguid, 1991). However, all communities in this 
sample seemed to share this aspect as all mem-
bers joined voluntarily and yet their performance 
varied. The literature on communities of practice 
performance tends to skim over intra-
organizational differences, such as the benefits 
and incentives available to community members, 
in favor of a perspective on company benefits 
from deploying communities of practice (Cross et 
al., 2006; Wenger et al., 2002; Lesser and Storck, 
2001; Wenger and Snyder, 2000; Brown and 
Duguid, 1991). Performance evaluation forms 
from the best performing 20 percent and the 
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worst performing 20 percent of all 82 communi-
ties were coded. It appeared that community 
members’ willingness to invest individual efforts 
relates to the perceived benefits and to commu-
nity performance. 
This article proceeds as follows: first, the extant 
literature which takes up the issues of community 
performance and participation incentives is in-
troduced and discussed. Next, the empirical set-
ting and research design is described. Subse-
quently, the findings are presented and, lastly, the 
findings in light of the theory and future research 
and draw implications for management practice 
are discussed.
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COMMUNITIES OF PRACTICE PERFORMANCE AND PARTICIPATION INCENTIVES
Knowledge created in intra-firm communities of 
practice will only take effect at the organizational 
level if it is ‘‘brought to bear on the business prac-
tices‘‘ (Spender, 2006, p. 238). Engineers invest 
with their activities into the performance and 
future of the organization. What are the incen-
tives to contribute to the organizational knowl-
edge pool? 
This question is not trivial; it becomes especially 
relevant when examining the barriers to knowl-
edge sharing in organizations. Barriers identified 
in the literature include the fear of criticism, re-
jection or retribution from colleagues in upper 
echelons of the hierarchy or a culture of suspicion 
and distrust (Michailova and Husted, 2003; Ardi-
chivili et al., 2003). Knowledge sharing has been 
found to depend on the relative power and status 
of the sharing parties (Huber, 1982), the work-
loads (Huber, 1982) and the rewards and penal-
ties connected to sharing (Huber, 1991), both 
individual and collective (Cabrera and Cabrera, 
2002). In laboratory settings, the mutual sharing 
of knowledge proved a highly fragile outcome 
when subjects were faced with conflicts of interest 
(Gächter et al., 2010). 
Managers are said to need to supervise and facili-
tate best practice development and sharing within 
CoPs (Borzillo, 2009) and to cultivate a context of 
trust and care that induces colleagues to share 
their knowledge and feel at ease when voicing 
their opinions (von Krogh et al., 2000). Often 
highlighted in the literature is the fear of exploita-
tion (Wolf and Wunram, 2003): externalized and 
shared knowledge creates a ‘‘public good’’ within 
the organization and reduces one’s individual 
power base. Research on knowledge sharing also 
uncovered potential cognitive barriers connected 
to reciprocity and other cultural norms (Bara-
chini, 2009), organizational subgroup affiliations 
(Rangachari, 2009), as well as shared language 
and vision (Chiu et al., 2006). 
Communities of practice seem to alleviate many 
of the above-mentioned barriers to knowledge 
sharing. However, not all communities of prac-
tice perform equally well. All other things equal, 
some perform better than others and members of 
one community contribute more than members 
of other communities. Existing research is up to 
date not able to explain this phenomenon totally. 
So far, the aim in research was to monitor bene-
fits and to justify organizational investments in 
communities (Wenger et al., 2002). Conse-
quently, studies investigating community per-
formance focus on revealing what benefits orga-
nizations gain from community work (Lesser and 
Storck, 2001; Wenger and Snyder, 2000; Brown 
and Duguid, 1991; Berends et al., 2007; Wenger 
et al., 2002). Scholars did not investigate yet what 
incentivizes employees to contribute to knowl-
edge sharing in some communities more than in 
others. With the study reported in this article, the 
authors aim at filling this research GAP. Below, 
the case study setting and then the research de-
sign and the methods applied are described in 
more detail.
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RESEARCH SETTING
The division ‘‘Passenger car development’’ of a 
large automotive company decided in early 2000 
to set up communities of practice in eleven tech-
nology fields in order to foster horizontal collabo-
ration on passenger car elements and processes 
across model ranges. At the same time, a search-
able know-how database should be created, 
aimed at supporting documentation of key expe-
riences and lessons learned. 
The process started with the set up of a project 
team which was assigned the task to develop and 
implement this database and to set up the cross-
functional communities of practice for the entire 
organization within two years. These CoPs were 
conceptualized as intraorganizational expert 
groups. The division ‘‘Passenger car develop-
ment’’ was located at two sites which were lo-
cated 30 
kilome-
ters 
away 
from 
each 
other. 
How-
ever, 
model 
range 
depart-
ments 
working 
on simi-
lar car 
ele-
ments 
were using the same technical infrastructure and 
therefore located at the same location. 
One of the authors of this article was member of 
this project team and responsible for monitoring 
the project’s success, i.e. the implementation of 
the CoPs into the department. The management 
board expected the communities of practice to 
meet up once a month for four hours and discuss 
cross-functional issues as well as to document 
commonly developed solutions. Apart from work-
ing for the company, this author was using the 
case study as empirical basis for her PhD thesis 
(Wolf, 2004) where she investigated changes of 
perceptions as well as patterns of sense making on 
the deployment process by different process 
stakeholders over time. She therefore kept track 
of the major developments during the community 
of practice deployment process in a work-
focussed observation diary (Webb, 2009). The 
authors are thus able to provide below a short but 
comprehensive overview on this process based on 
participant observation (Guba and Lincoln, 1981; 
Patton, 2002). 
The course of the community of practice de-
ployment project can be divided into four distinc-
tive phases: 
1. the conception; 
2. implementation; 
3. improvement; and 
4. reflection. 
Table 18 provides an overview on duration, main 
actors and major activities of these phases. 
Below, the different phases are described more 
into detail as it seems important to provide the 
reader with an overview on what happened in the 
CoP deployment process.  
The conception phase 
During the conception phase (first four months of 
the project), the project team developed the basic 
concept for the future communities of practice 
structure. Project team members reviewed orga-
nizational structure diagrams and interviewed 
Table 21: Phases of the project 
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experts in order to identify topics and needs for 
collaboration across model ranges. From this, 
they came up with a map of critical knowledge 
domains indicating relevant community of prac-
tice topic areas. Furthermore, a first prototype of 
the know-how database and an implementation 
action plan were developed. At the end of this 
phase, the management board approved the im-
plementation action plan but assigned the project 
team at the same time the task to develop a sys-
tematic performance measurement approach 
ensuring management information during the 
project. 
The implementation phase 
The implementation phase lasted from months 5 
to 12 of the project. During this phase, 82 com-
munities of practice and the know-how database 
were launched. Community building happened 
as follows: Project team members asked topic 
matter experts whether they would like to take 
over the facilitator role for a community in a 
certain topic domain. Future community facilita-
tors then contacted further topic matter experts 
across the car platforms and invited them to join 
the community. For both roles, the decision to 
join the community was totally voluntarily; there 
were no sanctions in case of a negative answer. 
Becoming a CoP member was even not sup-
ported by line management as there was no time 
budget dedicated to the community work so that 
engagement would capitalize resources of line 
managers. However, at the end of this phase 
approximately 1,000 employees out of 5,000 
committed themselves to the community work. 
After the communities of practice have been 
kicked off, the project team conducted kick-off 
events, trainings for the community of practice 
members as well as developed a communication 
and a performance measurement concept. Dur-
ing trainings, CoP coordinators were introduced 
into and coached in their role and CoP members 
were teached how to use the knowledge base and 
how to write up contributions for it. The per-
formance measurement concept reflected the 
claim of the management board for the collection 
of statistical data such as the frequency of meet-
ings, the attendance rate of the community of 
practice members, the number of published and 
planned contributions for the database as well as 
the accesses rate of documents at the know-how 
database. The community facilitators were very 
indignant with the performance measurement 
concept. They argued that the indicators used 
allowed no conclusions on the quality of the work 
achieved. Furthermore, the form of inherent 
control in the performance measurement activi-
ties was perceived as counter-productive. The 
management board ignored objections by com-
munity members and asked the project team to 
collect the statistical data. Not surprisingly, the 
analysis showed that all CoPs complied with the 
expectations formulated by the management 
board beforehand: All reported three CoP meet-
ings with an average attendance rate of 80 per-
cent and three contributions published in the 
database. If necessary, one large chapter was 
divided into three smaller ones in order to meet 
the requirements. 
In month 12, the deployment of communities of 
practice was deemed complete. A big event cele-
brated the success adequately. The community 
facilitators’ spirit during the reflection workshops, 
held every six months, was ambivalent. On the 
one hand they acknowledged that the communi-
ties of practice created platforms for openly and 
constructively discussing crucial questions that 
across functional boundaries. On the other hand 
they asked the project team to clarify with the 
management board whether the CoPs were 
authorized to make decisions for topics that reach 
across functional boundaries. Without decision-
making competence, cross-functional work did 
not make much sense for them as the solutions 
developed were not considered as mandatory for 
all model ranges. 
The improvement phase 
The improvement phase (months 13 to 24 of the 
project) focused on the optimization of the CoP 
work. In order to gain insights into the current 
state of the community of practice work, its prob-
lems, opportunities and risks, the project team 
planed and conducted a complex audit: On the 
basis of a structured questionnaire that focused 
on nine core areas of the CoP work, expert inter-
views were conducted in the 82 communities of 
practice. Prior to the audit at least one commu-
nity meeting was attended by the project team 
members for gaining an impression of the activi-
ties of the respective community of practice. 
The methods section reports in detail on the 
measures applied in the audit. Here, it is impor-
tant to mention that the assessment mark as-
signed to the CoPs was the product of a negotia-
tion process between the CoP and the project 
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members. The benefits CoP members perceived 
from their work in the CoPs was additionally 
documented a form for capturing success stories. 
The use of this form in the audits helped the 
community of practice members to reflect on the 
value of their work and created enthusiasm and, 
at the same time, the stories collected were used 
as marketing instrument towards the manage-
ment board. The review changed the relationship 
between the project team and the community of 
practice members dramatically. The latter per-
ceived the audit as a sensible and supporting 
counsel. The project team advanced from a bog-
eyman held responsible for unpopular orders of 
the management board to a counseling unit rep-
resenting the CoP members’ interests towards the 
management board. 
At the end of the improvement phase, the results 
of the audit were presented to the management 
board as part of the final project report. The CoP 
members made very clear that they would need 
further continuous support. Subsequently, the 
management board recognized the success of the 
project and changed its organizational status 
from a transient project team into a permanent 
group within the knowledge management de-
partment. 
The reflection phase 
The active marketing of the achievements of the 
community of practice work in the frame of the 
review convinced the management board of their 
value. At the beginning of the reflection phase, 
they obtained the official authorization to issue 
guidelines that reached across model ranges. 
Suddenly a horizontal, cross-functional structure 
was in a position to make decisions which con-
cerned all model ranges and to assert them 
against the vertical hierarchy, i.e. functional 
management. The management board reserved 
the right to veto any decision. Yet, the change 
was radical: everyone who was not a member of 
the respective Community of practice was not 
able to influence future guidelines. This change 
did not solve the problem of the missing budget-
ing for the communities’ work but it lead to re-
newed motivation of the community members. 
With the end of the project, a new phase of 
community of practice evaluation started. As the 
management board did not ask the new knowl-
edge management department for further regular 
justifications and the department saw its task 
mainly in supporting the CoP work, it developed 
a new instrument aimed at assisting the CoPs in 
systematic reflection of their work. The new form 
will be described in more detail in the method 
section of this article. The Knowledge Manage-
ment department triggered this reflection process 
every six months and collected the reflection 
forms. From this, the department received a fast 
overview on the actual situation in the commu-
nity of practice and was able to offer customized 
support. 
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RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS 
The aim of the research reported in this article 
was to explore what incentivises engineers to 
share their experiences in intra-firm communities 
of practice. As this topic has so far not received a 
lot of research attention, the pursued research 
strategy was exploratory. A predominantly induc-
tive and qualitative, hybrid approach was applied 
that suited the research situation in terms of its 
participants in the researched department, the 
researchers and the topic in question. The inter-
pretive paradigm guided the actions undertaken 
within the context of this research (Maxwell, 
2005; Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
The authors’ interest to study this topic emerged 
from the results of the CoP audit in the im-
provement phase in which communities and re-
searchers evaluated the performance of their 
CoP. Audit results (details below) suggested that 
all other things being equal, some CoPs in this 
sample performed better than others: Audits 
rated each community with a maximal score of 
100 percent. The 20 percent best performing 
communities of practice (14 CoPs) ranged be-
tween 86.67 percent and 96.19 percent; the 20 
percent worst performing communities of prac-
tice (14 CoPs) exhibited scores between 50.91 
percent and 67.05 percent. The average assess-
ment score differed clearly: the average of the 
‘‘best’’ group was 90.45 percent, those of the 
‘‘worst’’ group 63.93 percent. 
To exclude other variables that might have an 
influence on community performance, the 
authors performed an analysis on community 
member characteristics. The organizational con-
text was similar across all communities: the 
community composition was quite homogenous, 
all participants were of the same profession (engi-
neers with a specialisation in passenger car devel-
opment), had been working for a minimum of 
three years in the same company, and were about 
the same age (average age was 42, members age 
ranked from 35 to 48 years). In addition, the 
authors were able to exclude structural character-
istics as influential on community performance. 
As described above, all communities have been 
set up at the same time, they all received the 
same structural support in terms of training, 
counselling by the project team, and rooms and 
facilities for community meetings. It was there-
fore decided to analyse the qualitative data avail-
able with a specific focus on the research question 
at hand. 
Data sources used 
For each of the two community groups (i.e. the 
best and worst performing), the authors created a 
set of qualitative data that had been gathered 
with the different evaluation instruments (see 
below) applied by the project team from the be-
ginning of the implementation phase (month 5) 
up to month 12 after the end of the project. The 
data included perspectives of both the project 
team members and self-evaluations of CoP mem-
bers during the different phases of the research. 
This provided an inside and outside view on the 
communities from their initiation until the end of 
the first year after the end of the implementation 
project. Table 19 gives an overview of the data 
sources used.  
The data sources are described in more detail 
below. 
Audit assessment. The CoP audit rated commu-
nity performance in six core areas identified by 
the project team as important for the quality of 
community of practice work: 
1. Efficient organization of community work (in-
vitations on meetings, agendas, topic lists, dura-
tion of meetings, roles)? 
2. Motivation and team composition (participa-
tion, collaboration, fluctuation of community of 
practice members, topics, guests)? 
3. Focus of the community work on the right 
content in terms of strategic relevance for the 
organization? 
4. Interconnectedness (with other communities 
of practice, with the steering committee, with 
working groups, with community of practice ex-
ternal experts)? 
5. Quality of chapters contributed to the know-
how database? 
6. Quality of meeting results in terms of achieve-
ment of community objectives? 
The audit guideline consisted of these six ques-
tions that served to score the community per-
formance. For each of them, the actual commu-
nity work was rated on a LIKERT scale between 
1 (very bad) and 5 (excellent). CoPs could reach a 
maximum of 30 points corresponding to a score 
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of 100 percent. The audit guideline furthermore 
asked for the documentation of answers to the 
questions ‘‘What goes well in the CoP work?’’, 
‘‘Where would you like to improve or need sup-
port by the project team or the management 
board?’’ and ‘‘What are tips and tricks you would 
like to suggest to other CoPs?’’ for each of the six 
core areas. 
Prior to the audit, project team members at-
tended at least one community meeting for gain-
ing an impression of the actual status of the re-
spective community of practice. The community 
members prepared for the audit in discussing the 
six topic areas among them and documenting 
their self-perception. The audits itself were at-
tended by the author-researcher, two members of 
the project team who had supported this CoP 
from the very beginning and from a group of 
three CoP members including the community 
facilitator. Audit assessments lasted two hours in 
average. 
The audit assessment can be classified as a mix 
between expert interviews and group discussions. 
In a first step, the project team members asked 
the CoP members to tell their self-perception on 
what was good concerning their work and where 
they would like to improve or would need some 
support by the project team or the management 
board. During this (expert interview) part of the 
assessment, the present CoP members were 
treated as experts in their own field of activity, i.e. 
their CoP work. They represented a group of 
specific experts, namely the members of their 
CoP; and the semi-structured interview guideline 
was used to restrict the interviewees to their area 
of expertise (Flick, 2009). 
After having documented the answers of the CoP 
members, the members of the project team gave 
their own impressions and negotiated with the 
CoP members an assessment mark for each of the 
six core areas. They documented the negotiated 
assessment mark as well as the result of the dis-
cussion on what was perceived as good and what 
should be improved. The value of the community 
work perceived by the community of practice 
members was additionally asked for and docu-
mented in the form for capturing success stories. 
This part of the assessment resembled much 
more a group discussion where participants nego-
tiate consensus on a certain issue (Kru ̈ger, 1983) 
and develop strategies for solving problems 
through the discussion of alternatives (Flick, 
2009). The author-researcher took additional 
Table 22: Evaluation instruments used as data sources 
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notes on the negotiation process in the group 
which she later transferred into her research di-
ary and used exclusively for her PhD. 
Form sheet for success stories. CoP members 
have been free to fill in the form sheet for success 
stories at any time. The form sheet included three 
questions: 
1. What is the concrete incident from your CoP 
work you would like to report on? 
2. What is the qualitative benefit you would like 
to report? 
3. If applicable: What is the quantitative benefit 
(cost or time savings) you would like to report? 
Success stories reported with this instrument rep-
resented solely the perspective of the CoP mem-
bers. Therefore, CoP members have been asked 
in trainings to support the reported benefits by 
further documents if possible. 
Reflexion form sheet. The reflexion form sheet 
was the successor of the audit documentation 
form and the form sheet for success. It addition-
ally asked for statistical data in terms of an indica-
tion of the frequency of meetings and the atten-
dance rate of these meetings. Data gathered with 
this form sheet were self-reported and the result 
of a discussion among the CoP members. 
For understanding how perspective biased the 
data reported in the form sheet for success stories 
and the reflection form sheet were, the authors 
compared them to what has been documented 
during the audit assessment. It was found that 
although data indicated a specific CoP perspec-
tive and the development of the CoP over time, 
none of the CoPs reported issues which were very 
surprising or did totally not fit the picture that 
was created during the audit. However, it is obvi-
ous that the authors are not able to totally ex-
clude relational biases produced by the situation 
of reporting to a support team in any of the data 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
Observation diary. The author (and member of 
the project team) who aimed to use the empirical 
case study for her PhD documented the major 
developments during the community of practice 
deployment process in a work-focussed observa-
tion diary (Webb, 2009). She documented on a 
daily basis what happened to her, to whom she 
had been speaking and what she talked about to 
these people for keeping track on who or what 
influenced her perceptions during different times 
of the process. Documented items took the form 
of descriptions of situations and events or quotes 
of utterances of other people and subjective in-
terpretations. The data collected with the diary 
are valuable in the sense that they provide in-
sights into the subjective perceptions of the 
author-researcher, but limited as they involve a 
selection bias (Alaszewski, 2006). 
Data analysis 
The qualitative data in the two data sets (i.e. the 
best and worst performing CoPs) which served as 
our units of analysis took the form of statements 
by project team members and community mem-
bers on both good and bad aspects that influ-
enced the performance of the community work. 
For data coding, the authors applied Miles and 
Huberman’s (1994) thematic coding approach for 
generating meaning out of a large amount of 
qualitative data. This coding approach involved 
three steps: At first, ‘‘first-level’’ codes (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994, p. 69) taking the form of cate-
gories or metaphors were assigned to the data for 
labelling units of meaning. Thereafter, ‘‘first-
level’’ codes were grouped together to ‘‘pattern 
codes’’ which represent emergent topics (Miles 
and Huberman (1994, p. 69). Finally, codes were 
mapped and relations between them were noted 
and displayed as components in a network of 
themes (Miles and Huberman, 1994, pp. 70-71). 
The software Atlas.ti was used for coding. The 
coding strategy was not exhaustive, i.e. not all 
data fit into a ‘‘first-level’’ code. 
The authors applied an iterative coding procedure 
involving multiple interpreters for ensuring credibil-
ity of the data analysis (Patton, 2002): In a first step, 
the data was coded by the author who was a mem-
ber of the project team. This author knew the em-
pirical context from personal experience and was 
able to interpret and contextualize statements by 
both the community of practice members and the 
project team members adequately. In a next step, 
the other two authors checked the validity of the 
coding. As they did not know the context in which 
the statements had been made, they came up with 
additional codes, interpreted certain statements 
differently and sought clarification. The discussions 
of possible interpretations lead to a subsequent 
change and refinement of the codes. Thereby, the 
findings were iteratively improved until all authors 
agreed on the codes and the thematic maps devel-
oped. Interpretation of qualitative data in groups is 
an important step to reduce the influence of the 
frame of reference of one researcher and to increase 
the validity of the interpretation (Steinke, 2004). 
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RESULTS 
During the coding process, the authors linked 
1096 text passages (662 in the ‘‘best’’ sample, and 
434 in the ‘‘worst’’ sample) to a total of 48 codes. 
From the coding, three thematic clusters evolved: 
CoP members talked about: 
1. the efforts they invested or did not invest into 
the community work; 
2. the benefits they perceived from participating 
in to the community; 
3. the barriers they perceived in their community 
work. 
The quantities of the text passages for each code 
from the two data samples are displayed in Ta-
bles 20-22 respectively. 
This section reports results of the three thematic 
clusters, namely first the effort investments 
community members made into the community 
work and which indicate the extend to which 
CoP members were motivated to participate and 
contribute; second benefits they perceived from 
the community work and which display reasons 
community work and which display reasons why 
they participated and contributed; and third bar-
riers that accompanied the collaborative work in 
the communities. It seeks to identify if and how 
they differed across the two data sets of commu-
nities of practice. 
Efforts invested 
Table 20 represents the codes related to the ef-
forts that community members were ready to 
invest into the CoP work. 
A main trend that emerged was that members 
were willing to invest more efforts in terms of 
time and contributions in best performing com-
munities (130 mentions) than in the least per-
forming (51 mentions). One CoP coordinator for 
example explained: 
I have included the time which is necessary for 
Knowledge Management work in my annual plan 
during my appraisal. 
The efforts community members were not ready 
to invest present an inverted picture. The authors 
found only 90 in-
stances where mem-
bers of best performing 
communities of prac-
tice stated that they 
were not willing to 
invest a certain effort, 
while 164 examples in 
worst performing 
communities where 
members said that they 
would not take on spe-
cific issues could be 
identified. The follow-
ing statement of a CoP 
coordinator from the 
worst CoP sample ex-
emplifies how these 
statements looked like: 
To our members, the 
operative tasks of the 
day-to day business have a higher priority than 
the work on contributions to the knowledge data 
base; Knowledge Management does not have such 
a high priority. 
Table 23: Efforts invested and not invested 
COLLABORATIVE INNOVATION STEFAN HAEFLIGER• 2012 
 182 
In the best performing communities in this sam-
ple, members were willing to invest substantially 
more efforts. Statements from members of the 
latter communities of practice indicate that at-
tendance rates were high, one CoP coordinator 
for example highlights the ‘‘more than 86% at-
tendance rate!’’. Furthermore, these CoPs held 
additional ‘‘regular knowledge exchange with the 
communities X and Y’’ to facilitate exchange. 
Members in the worst performing communities 
were not willing to invest efforts in many activi-
ties, including the participation in meetings and 
the planning of activities within the community. 
For example, one CoP coordinator of the worst 
performing CoPs states: ‘‘We still did not estab-
lish long term planning of community meetings’’. 
Coordination with other communities was not 
systematically managed, as this statement of a 
CoP coordinator exemplifies: ‘‘We should inten-
sify networking and ensure continuous participa-
tion in meetings of other communities’’. Simi-
larly, critical self-reflection of activities did not 
happen regularly according to the CoP coordina-
tors: ‘‘The reflection on benefits from community 
participation of the members did not take place 
due to time limitations.’’. Once, for example, a 
community even declined to meet a member of 
the observing project team for a review session. 
Statements of members in worst performing 
communities also indicated that attendance rates 
in meetings were often below 50 percent and 
important people were missing as this CoP coor-
dinator explains: ‘‘Directly affected members do 
often not participate 
– participation rate 
of only 46%’’. In 
summary, it can be 
observed that the 
contributions dif-
fered widely across 
the two sets of com-
munities. Members 
did contribute more 
to better performing 
communities. 
Benefits perceived 
Did members who 
contributed more 
also receive more 
back in return? Ta-
ble 21 presents the 
resulting codes re-
lated to benefits that 
community members 
perceived from con-
tributing to the 
community and re-
ports on the fre-
quency of the code 
occurrences in both data sets. 
The 15 codes that emerged during the analysis 
have been subsumed under three main topics: 
1. participation in decision processes; 
2. building up of relationships/networks; and 
3. learning effects/knowledge exchange in social 
learning processes. 
In general, community of practice members from 
the ‘‘best’’ communities mentioned beneficial 
aspects of their work three times more often than 
community of practice members from the 
‘‘worst’’ communities (318 text passages versus 
104 text passages), indicating that these members 
perceived more benefit from the community 
work. 
The most significant differences can be seen in 
the first category: members of best performing 
Table 24: Perceived benefits of community of practice work. 
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communities of practice participated much more 
into and impacted organisational decision proc-
esses (109 versus 16 instances mentioned). One 
CoP member summarizes for example the bene-
fits he experienced in the following statement: 
‘‘The community is integrated into decision 
processes and contributes standards.’’ 
Being able to influence strategy development, 
contributing to the selection process of ideas for 
future innovation management projects as well 
participating in the creation of organization-wide 
best-practices and standards was perceived as 
beneficial by contributing members. Members of 
best performing communities of practice were 
able to decide on a set of standards within their 
area: ‘‘We develop and define best practices and 
specifications.’’. Contributing members thus 
brought up topics and set the agenda of upcom-
ing standards and best-practices. Members of one 
community experienced for instance an ‘‘im-
provement of the product maturity stage through 
agreed standards.’’ Members who did not par-
ticipate or contributed less had less control over 
what would become organization-wide practices. 
Also, in both other code categories the differences 
were obvious. Analysing the text passages from 
the ‘‘worst’’ communities of practice sample, it 
can be seen that members did profit from net-
working, however, much less so than in successful 
communities (32 versus 68). Being able to get 
access to and benefit from relationships mainly 
across functional domains and to top manage-
ment proved to be a benefit accessible to contrib-
uting members. Statements from members of 
communities of practice stated that especially 
being able to work with experts from other car 
platforms was beneficial: ‘‘In community meet-
ings, experts from different domains meet and 
develop solutions of concrete tasks.’’ On contrary, 
in the data from the worst CoPs we find state-
ments like this one: ‘‘Due to the heterogeneous 
composition of the CoP, the work on relevant 
questions is difficult.’’ 
Personal learning from the exchange between 
experts appeared to be the third benefit category 
that has been identified. Members of the best 
performing communities of practice mentioned it 
more than two times more than members of the 
worst performing ones (122 versus 54 mentions). 
Contributors were able to develop and learn a 
common language and terminology across geo-
graphical and divisional boundaries: ‘‘A first 
benefit has been reached through the standardi-
zation of the terms used.’’ They were informed 
about current ‘‘hot’’ topics in those discussions, 
and learned from openly shared experiences of 
experts in other fields: ‘‘The community is a very 
good information platform concerning all rele-
vant topics in the topic area.’’ Those who shared 
also received feedback and advice from others 
resulting in direct benefits for their day-to-day 
work. Members of the worst performing commu-
nities, on the other hand, did not think highly of 
the discussed topics: ‘‘Actual topics are discussed 
only to a very small degree.’’ Only 13 times, top-
ics were classified as attractive or interesting, 
compared to 43 times in the best performing 
communities. 
When looking at the set of ‘‘worst’’ communities 
of practice only, another pattern emerges. The 
two most frequently cited benefits were open 
sharing and the networks and relationships to 
other competent individuals. While these benefits 
were mentioned far less frequently than in the set 
of ‘‘best’’ communities, they allow the conclusion 
that community members benefited from net-
working even in the context of low performance 
communities of practice. 
The benefits available through engagement in the 
community led to increased commitment (which 
was not perceived as costly) and increased per-
ceived benefits and, ultimately, better community 
performance. (see Table 20) 
Barriers to CoP work perceived 
The third thematic cluster reported on barriers 
CoP members perceived to their community of 
practice work. Here, the authors examined 
whether performance differences arose because 
the best performing communities faced fewer 
barriers. No attempt was made to classify the task 
complexity of the specific communities and all 
statements were coded according to the perceived 
difficulties and hurdles. Table 22 summarises the 
statements related barriers in the communities’ 
work. 
 
Although community of practice members from 
the ‘‘best’’ and the ‘‘worst’’ sample mentioned 
almost the same amount of hurdles, they empha-
sized different issues. The emerging codes were 
subsumed under three categories: 
1. structural barriers; 
2. unclear goals, power and responsibilities; and 
3. community work/topic related issues. 
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While the lack of a time budget for community 
work was perceived as equally limiting, members 
of the best performing communities of practice 
were much more concerned about the lack of 
unrestricted access to the resulting documents: 
‘‘Access authorization for community members 
from plant X is dissatisfactory’’. A further prob-
lem mentioned by members of the worst CoPs 
was documentation restrictions due to the confi-
dential state of some information: ‘‘Documenta-
tion is limited due to the confidentiality of the 
topic.’’. These issues did not seem to be a prob-
lem or were at least not perceived as one in the 
lower performing communities. 
Second, best performing communities were more 
sceptical about being controlled and monitored. 
They demanded more authority and less moni-
toring of their activities like this CoP coordinator: 
‘‘The status form is not purposeful, the people 
feel imposed!’’ Filling in status forms has been 
perceived as ‘‘stolen’’ precious time in which they 
could have been productive. Third, almost exclu-
sively the communities of practice in the ‘‘worst’’ 
set perceived significant work-related barriers. 
The topics discussed were deemed unattractive 
and led to no relevant decisions, like this state-
ment exemplifies: ‘‘The presentation and com-
mon discussion of technologies relevant for our 
area has not happened yet.’’ Altogether, there 
was a lack of benefits for community members. 
The best performing communities of practice 
seem to suffer – or perceive to suffer – more from 
external barriers 
while the worst 
performing com-
munities of prac-
tice have a much 
more inside fo-
cused perception. 
For instance, only 
members of the 
worst performing 
communities la-
mented about the 
‘‘lack of coffee and 
cake at meetings’’. 
In summary, none 
of both sets of 
communities en-
joyed a better posi-
tion from the be-
ginning or gained 
more financial 
support than oth-
ers. The communities of practice from the ‘‘best’’ 
set claimed more frequently that they faced ex-
ternal barriers, whereas the communities of prac-
tice from the ‘‘worst’’ set would complain more 
about internal work-related issues and found 
discussions fruitless. In addition, members’ per-
ceptions of the costs and benefits displayed clear 
differences between the two sets of communities 
studied.
Table 25: Perceived barriers to community of practice work. 
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DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATION 
This study of 82 communities of practice in the 
engineering department of a large automotive 
firm revealed that the communities differ greatly 
in performance. The employees’ willingness to 
invest individual efforts into community work was 
shown to relate to the perceived benefits and to 
community performance. A community that 
created personal networks, fostered discussions of 
relevant topics and created standards of practice 
was perceived by its members as worth partici-
pating. Vice versa, a community without engaged 
participants led to less perceived benefits. Mem-
bers of the lower performing communities were 
not willing to invest in coordination and reflec-
tion activities and perceived the efforts to exceed 
the benefits. The nature of this ‘‘chicken and 
egg’’ relationship is precisely the point the 
authors intent to make. Perceived benefits grow 
from collaboration and simultaneously increases 
collaboration as the perceived benefits become 
stronger. 
While the initial emergence of perception of 
benefits from community work cannot be traced 
nor explained in this study, the authors observed 
clear differences in the availability of benefits 
across communities. The differences gave rise to 
observable patterns that allowed us to cluster and 
characterize them. Three types of perceived 
benefits could be indentified: 
1. learning effects/knowledge exchange in social 
learning processes;  
2. participation in decision processes; and 
3. building up of relationships/networks. 
As Wenger (1999) and others observed, commu-
nities of practice foster relationships and social 
learning first of all. This study confirms this result 
but find that benefits pertaining to relationships 
and networks, while useful, only represent one 
type of benefit. Second, members of the best per-
forming communities of practice drew most 
benefits from participating in organizational deci-
sion processes, as they were able to influence the 
agenda and create relevant standards. Third, the 
establishment of new networks and personal rela-
tionships to other competent individuals inside 
the firm characterized best performing communi-
ties of practice vis-a`-vis less performing commu-
nities. 
A few limitations apply to this research: The sin-
gle case study design limits the generalizability of 
the results beyond the company studied. Other 
industries, the company size, and the communi-
ties’ location within (or across) the organization 
could impact on the members’ willingness and 
cost-benefit calculus to contribute to the activities 
of a community of practice. The approach cho-
sen to capture members’ perceived costs and 
benefits might have missed important cognitive 
barriers or facilitators of knowledge sharing (Ba-
rachini, 2009). However, some of these potential 
barriers are limited by the homogeneity of this 
sample of communities that by and large oper-
ated within one cultural environment. 
Furthermore, some of the data employed was 
perceptional and relied partly on the self-
reporting of the community members. The per-
ceptions of benefits and efforts are inherently 
subjective (and inter-subjective) and may change 
over time. One author accompanied the com-
munities and their evaluation sessions over the 
time period studied to ensure the consistency of 
the reports that underlie the analysis. This limita-
tion holds implications for the potential use of 
information support systems that could be used to 
circumvent the role of the mediator when assess-
ing community of practice performance. More 
applied research is needed here. 
Three implications for future research stand out. 
First, it remains unclear how the creation and the 
benefits of community contributions are linked in 
time and how the benefits become visible to new 
joiners. If the emergence of perceived benefits is 
tied to collaboration, what determines if a virtu-
ous cycle creates perceived benefits or if a vicious 
cycle deters engagement and increases perceived 
costs? The understanding of these dynamics ap-
pears central to the management of communities 
of practice and other forms of collaboration and 
research only started to shed light on this issue 
(Spaeth et al., 2008). 
Second, the characteristics of perceived benefits 
identified in this research could inform organiza-
tion theory and practitioners about the nature of 
incentives relevant for knowledge sharing. If indi-
viduals perceive networking opportunities and 
agenda setting (and others) as key benefits that 
induce them to share knowledge, this insight 
could translate to employment contracts, office 
layouts, fringe benefits, as well as work routines 
and structures that better accommodate for 
knowledge workers’ needs. While the effect of 
learning and relationship building are well under-
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stood, the participation in decision processes may 
have been overlooked as a motivating factor in 
community of practice work. 
In particular, the translation from innovations 
generated in communities (standards, best prac-
tices) to the organizational level is well under-
stood by community members and anticipated in 
their willingness to share their experiences. Ap-
plied research in communities of practice may 
test whether transparent decision and translation 
processes will in fact boost perceived benefits of 
community work. 
Third, the level of formality of communities of 
practice may play a less important role than the 
literature suggests (Wenger and Snyder, 2000). 
This study examines variance in performance 
across a large sample of communities of practice 
that have been established formally yet with the 
usual characteristics of voluntarism and hierar-
chical independence. It remains unclear whether 
the formal establishment of communities of prac-
tice has any impact on their performance and 
future research should compare formal with in-
formal communities to control for this potential 
effect. Special attention should be given to inter-
nal communication and how voluntarism is un-
derstood in each case: communication and fram-
ing might impact perceived costs of contribution. 
The results hold implications for management 
practice. Recognizing that communities of prac-
tice may help to solve the collective action prob-
lem of knowledge sharing in firms may lead to 
action in two areas. Support for innovation can 
start at the individual or at the community level. 
While the literature has adequately described the 
support for communities of practice, the individ-
ual cost-benefit calculus can also be favorably 
influenced. Lower perceived costs of contribution 
by very engaged members led to increased com-
mitment. 
The established insight that communities of prac-
tice contribute to knowledge creation by encour-
aging knowledge sharing in an organization de-
serves refinement. While top management should 
foster communities of practice (Brown and 
Duguid, 1991; Wenger and Snyder, 2000; 
Borzillo, 2009), the way in which communities of 
practice are tied into the organization is likely to 
exert direct impact on benefits perceived by 
community members. The latter derive benefit 
from knowing that their contributions translate 
into new knowledge and most probably innova-
tions at the organizational level. 
Members of high-performing communities of 
practice in the sample reported personal benefits 
deriving from the contributions to organizational 
standard setting and best practice development. 
Respecting and implementing results from the 
communities’ work is likely to not only contribute 
to innovation in the organization but to provide 
the very basis for the innovations to emerge at all. 
It seems that only if the innovative ideas and 
approaches of CoP members translate to organi-
zational practice, that is only if the knowledge 
from the community is transformed into organi-
zational knowledge (Spender, 2006; Luhmann, 
2000), community members will perceive benefit 
from their contributions to the collective work in 
communities.  
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5. CONCLUSION AND ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
This thesis defined collaborative innovation as a collective development process of new and useful 
products and services across and outside firm boundaries. From a strategy perspective, the essays gath-
ered in this thesis established key activities when entering new markets with products based on collabo-
rative innovation and, even earlier, our findings call for a cautious setup of initial conditions of sharing 
that appears as highly fragile in the laboratory. In a nascent area of the entertainment industry, we 
identified a group of companies commercializing innovations related to the new genre in film called 
Machinima: the shooting of film inside video games. These companies innovated with technology they 
co-developed with peers outside their firms. They developed production technology and evolved skills 
pertaining to Machinima production that allowed for their entertainment products to sustain an audi-
ence. At the same time these firms recognized that the user innovations they developed was not 
enough to succeed in the motion picture industry. They hired experts in cinematography to bring in 
and teach them how to produce better films. An implication from this finding is that strategic collabo-
rations between firms and individuals or between firms and user communities can be instrumental to 
succeed.  
In order to learn more about the very initial conditions of collaboration as needed for collaborative 
innovation, as defined here, we took a simplified setting to the laboratory. Remember that our defini-
tion involves collaboration across firm boundaries. This implies that hierarchies and contractual obli-
gations may not (yet) bind collaborators and the initial conditions may be subject to strong conflicts of 
interest between the collaborators. A question of strategic interest was whether and how the initial 
collaboration can sustain. Our laboratory study revealed that the conflicts of interest of the follower, 
the collaborator who picks up a suggested collaboration or the “second” of two collaborators in the 
simple model, impact collaboration more adversely than the conflicts of interest of the first collabora-
tor. This implies that business and government policies to protect initially shared content from poten-
tial appropriation (and limit the opportunity costs for the follower) can have significant impact on sus-
taining collaborative innovation.  
A third topic in strategy concerned the use and potential benefit of social software. Social software, by 
definition, allows groups of individuals to interact. The groups may span organizational departments 
and teams or entire organizations. The interactions may enable collaborative innovation and even 
entrepreneurship (Hienerth, Keinz, and Lettl, 2011) or lead to stifling political processes and demoti-
vation within organizations (Denyer, Parry, and Flowers, 2011). When deploying social software de-
signed to facilitate collaborative innovation it is strategically important to accompany its use and pre-
pare for ambiguous reception and changing behavior among potential collaborators. While this thesis 
points to the myriad of promises of collaborative innovation we also consider the possibility of flawed 
incentives and the uncertainty inherent in introducing tools all too frequently heralded as automating 
collaborative innovation. 
From the perspective of technology, collaborative innovation appears as straightforward at first. Open 
systems allow for reuse, thus developers will reuse extensively if reuse is easy and free. However, even 
within organizations developing software, code reuse is notoriously difficult to implement on a large 
scale (Kim and Stohr, 1998). Between firms and communities, relationships can be fraught with lack of 
trust or the suspicion that the other may not adhere to own standards of quality or reciprocation 
(Faraj, et al., 2011; Shah, 2006; Dahlander, 2007). Our work documents reuse on the level of code 
across open source software development communities and suggests policies and strategies on the level 
of system development taking into account the possibilitiy of reuse and joint development. It becomes 
clear that reuse decisions as the very basis of collaborative innovation processes touch upon the behav-
ior of various actors beyond “the user developer” and “the firm develper”: In fact, management on 
several levels of hierarchy in the firm are implicated when it comes to initiating and sustaining tech-
nology reuse and joint development strategies with parties outside the firm. Critical research questions 
going forward include the work on frameworks for establishing an open design methodology that takes 
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into account repeated, reliable, and measurable processes of joint development that tie firms and 
communities together in their quest for building better technologies. Developing code or entire systems 
with user communities may imply contributions to a public good and clear managerial goals and poli-
cies about how the sharing of internally developed knowledge with a public proceeds and how (Jarven-
paa and Mazchrjak, 2010). Table 23 gathers nine select issues for future research that stand out from 
the topics covered in this thesis in addition to each of the essays in this collection drawing conclusions 
and outlining issues for future research with respect to the specific contribution made in the essay. 
 
 
Table 26: Issues for future research on collaborative innovation. 
The secion on soclial practice starts with our review and theory article on motivation of open source 
software developers. While it offers a complementary perspective on individual motivation adding to 
the established lens of self-determination theory, its main contribution lies in framing institutional 
change and a drive for quality in technology development as issuing from the social practice that de-
velopers come to share and evolve. In that essay, the notion of social practice derives from the work of 
Alasdair MacIntyre and resonates a deep concern for ethical aspects in practice. It is based on social-
ized and internalized understandings of good and right ways of doing things, developing software in 
our case, that individuals come to appreciate, embody, and demand of others an adherence to stan-
dards of excellence that become definitive of the social practice they share. The importance and im-
pact of these shared values should not be underestimated and we theorize that institutional change 
may follow changes in values in the social practice where institutions are no longer thought fit for sup-
porting the social practice. In other words, an institution, such as a firm or a regulataion, may support 
collaborative innovation and the social practice that carries out the process of collaborative innovation. 
If that institution, however, no longer complies with the values that define the social practice, it may be 
rejected or reformed to better fit shared values. We suggest that these mechanisms are not yet well 
understood but may prove critical for collaborations between firms and user communities.  
Rather than delving deeper into the specific issues for future research outlined by the essays above, I 
wish to open up a few lines of thought that broaden the scope for an agenda on collaborative innova-
tion beyond what’s been done so far by our group of co-authors. Social practice theory offers an at-
tractive lens with which to approach the dualities of individual and collective, subject and object, 
knowing and doing, which permeate the literature on knowledge creation theory and seem all too fre-
quently to assume entities rather than the process of creation at the origin of new knowledge. With a 
focus on action we may be better positioned to theorize knowledge creation at the point where human 
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and material agency overlap and embodied ideas can emerge into consciousness and be retained (Va-
rela, Thompson and Rosch, 1993; Barad, 2003).  
Future research on collaborative innovation should probe deeper into the origins of organizational 
knowledge creation, the starting point of the spiral, or the nature and conditions for an enabling con-
text or Ba (Nonaka, Toyama, and Hirata, 2008; von Krogh et al., 2000), which is the place and time 
where socialization between individuals becomes productive and knowledge takes form and can be 
retained. The origin is not a singular point in time but an organizational routine in need of enactment, 
maintenance, and structuring (Feldman, 2000 etc.). Hence, we start with the presumption that action 
lies at the heart of knowledge creation because in the theory not only is knowledge “the capacity to 
act” (Nonaka and von Krogh, 2009) but also action the capacity to know (Nicolini, 2011).  
The interplay of human and material agency in changing technologies and routines has been captured 
by the metaphor of imbrication (Ciborra, 2006; Leonardi, 2011), which is an architectural metaphor 
that describes the interdependence of two types of roof tiles to suggest that human and material agen-
cies are closely linked to produce a working routine or technology. In Leonardi’s words, “human and 
material agencies are the shared building blocks of routines and technologies” (2011: 149). Practically, 
this means that people change office layouts or software code or take shortcuts in order to reach their 
goals. The physical environment and technologies afford certain freedoms to act or interact and they 
constrain at the same time. That material and human agencies act jointly is obvious but how they 
combine is less understood, less even how the entanglement of the social and material environment 
(Orlikowski, 2010) impacts collaborative innovation. 
Insights from architecture may help social scientists better understand how material agency through 
the physical layout of cities and spaces for work, including digital materiality (Gramazio and Kohler, 
2008), influences how people interact. The three questions developed below emerge from a confronta-
tion of material and human agency at the very front end of the innovation process that is organiza-
tional knowledge creation: First, how are standards of excellence brought into knowledge creation 
processes and how are they changed and retained? (consequentiality) Second, how does individual 
experience appear and change the dynamics of knowledge creation in groups? (intercorporeity) Third, 
how do sociomaterial practices give rise to routines for organizational knowledge creation processes? 
(purification). 
The spiral in Nonaka’s (1994) article on knowledge creation is a brilliant metaphor because it not only 
teaches to study knowledge creation on the continuum from tacit to explicit knowledge but also in an 
oscillation between the individual and the collective. A sociomaterial practice perspective helps in ap-
proaching both dimensions because both, that is the presumption, reflect a duality that should be stud-
ied as one (connectivity or sequentiality) rather than as a separation of poles from the start. The em-
phasis on the start of the spiral is crucial here because it brings to the fore the inevitable theoretical 
conundrum of the prior, the boundary object and material, embodied context in which ideation takes 
place. Retained technology and routines become artifacts in collective use and thus entangled in every 
further oscillation. Conceptually, the starting point is an intention, a perception, and an experience: in 
other words, how does individual experience appear and change the dynamics of collaborative innova-
tion? 
Individuals intuit and experience new ideas and insights (Hodgkinson et al., 2009) that they value as 
something worth exploring further (Spinosa et al., 1997). While ideas may appear as strokes of genius, 
organizational knowledge creation theory is concerned with group work and socialization as the prac-
tice of ideation and development (Nonaka and von Krogh, 2009). The experience of the collective 
expresses in action towards and with others: it is here that future research may aim at contributing by 
exploring the relationship between individual experience and collaborative innovation processes. The 
work by Monteiro (2010) uses visualization to show how groups interact with digital objects to create 
scientific insights. 
More practically, future work on collaborative innovation may ask how individual experience appears 
and changes the knowledge creation process when it occurs in the context of collective work. Re-
searchers may study the patterns of how individuals experience knowledge creation processes and how 
process dynamics relate to individual perception and relations to each other in a state of spontaneity 
and flow. A contribution could lie in a more precise concept of what Ba means to the individual and 
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collective in terms of experience and creativity when relating to the group and drawing from the group 
as an emergent, interactive context of being and staying in touch, physically or virtually. 
 “Is our body a thing or is it an idea? It is neither, being the measurement of the things. We will therefore have to 
recognize an ideality that is not alien to the flesh, that gives it its axes, its depth, its dimensions”.  
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1968: 152) 
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